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The Pragmatic and Functional Indeterminacy of Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Klaus Günther

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Durkheim considered the existence of indeterminate norms to be a characteristic of modern societies organized according to the division of labor. Contrary to what one might readily assume, he did not see the increasing complexity of the matter regulated as the sole reason for this. Rather, he regarded the indeterminacy of norms to be a phenomenon, which complemented the individual autonomy of that society's members - however unusual this may sound. The determinacy of the rules diminishes to the same extent that the networks of societalization become increasingly dense: rule application becomes “free.” It is assumed that the addressees of indeterminate norms can make use of their autonomy instead of merely exhibiting mechanical obedience. It is hardly compatible with the ideal of individual autonomy that a society only deploys such rules as prescribe every single action in every situation down to the last detail, until they could be applied just as unconsciously as the highway code.

Type
Articles
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 12 , Issue 1: Critical Legal Thought: An American-German Debate—Republication [with a new Introduction] Twenty-Five Years Later — , 01 January 2011 , pp. 407 - 429
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 by German Law Journal GbR 

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