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Rebel Without a Good Cause: Karlsruhe's Misguided Attempt to Draw the CJEU into a Game of “Chicken” and What the CJEU Might do About It

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Mattias Kumm

Extract

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When the Federal Constitutional Court (hereinafter FCC) decided to refer the question of whether the European Central Bank's (ECB) decision on the purchase of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) is compatible with EU primary law, it effectively forced the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) into a game of “chicken.”

Type
Research Article
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 15 , Issue 2: Special issue - The OMT Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court , 01 March 2014 , pp. 203 - 215
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 Rebel Without a Cause (Warner Bros. 1955). In fact the game that Buzz challenges Jim to in that movie is called “chicken run” and is structured slightly differently: Both cars race towards an abyss and the “chicken” is the person who jumps out first.Google Scholar

2 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2661/06, 126 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 286 (July 6, 2010) [hereinafter Honeywell Decision].Google Scholar

3 And one would have to be generous beyond the interpretatively defensible not to associate the FCC with “Buzz,” rather than “Jim,” although trying to see the CJEU as the cool but troubled James Dean clearly leaves one confronted with the limits of this analogy.Google Scholar

4 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 1 BvL 3/08, 129 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 186 (Oct. 4, 2011), at paras. 56–59, for the most recent decision.Google Scholar

5 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2236/04, 113 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 273 (July 18, 2005).Google Scholar

6 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2134/92, 89 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 155 (Oct. 12, 1993), at para. 106.Google Scholar

7 Honeywell Decision at headnote 1(a).Google Scholar

8 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13 (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/index.html [hereinafter Jan. 14, 2014 Decision], at para. 55 et seq.Google Scholar

9 Lindseth, Peter, Barking vs. Biting: Understanding the German Constitutional Court's OMT reference … and its implications for EU Reform, EUtopia law (Feb. 10, 2014), http://eutopialaw.com/2014/02/10/barking-vs-biting-understanding-the-german-constitutional-courts-omt-reference-and-its-implications-for-eu-reform/.Google Scholar

10 Pringle v. Ireland, CJEU Case C-370/12 (Nov. 27 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/recherche.jsf?language=en.Google Scholar

11 Jan. 14, 2014 Decision at para. 99 et seq.Google Scholar

12 Id. at para. 100.Google Scholar

13 Pernice, Ingolf, Karlsruhe wagt den Schritt nach Luxemburg, Verfassungsblog (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.verfassungsblog.de/de/karlsruhe-wagt-den-schritt-nach-luxemburg/#.UxoWaoU9OzI.Google Scholar

14 Armin von Bogdandy and his team in Heidelberg have brought into the discussion the idea of a European “reverse Solange” doctrine. It might be worthwhile to also consider the introduction of a “reverse ultra vires” doctrine. It would function as a check to allow the CJEU to interpret and check whether national actors, including national courts, have provided a plausible interpretation of their constitutional identity under Art. 4 TEU, or whether their interpretation constitutes an act ultra vires incompatible with the shared principles of constitutionalism under Art. 2 TEU. Mirroring Honeywell such an act might be ultra vires, if it is clearly and evidently not compatible with a plausible interpretation of Art. 2 values or it places unreasonable burdens on the attainment of common European objectives.Google Scholar

15 Jan. 14, 2014 Decision, at para. 102 et seq.Google Scholar

16 For a discussion of these issues see Kumm, Mattias, The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Supremacy Before and After the Constitutional Treaty, 11 EUR. L. J. 262, 302–03 (2005).Google Scholar

17 The dominant view is that an act of constituent power can validly bring about changes of even the basic guarantees of Art. 79 III of the Basic Law.Google Scholar

18 Denninger, Erhard, Vom Ende nationalstaatlicher Souveränität in Europa, 55 Juristenzeitung 1121, 1122 (2000).Google Scholar

19 See Kumm, Mattias, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An Integrated Conception of Public Law, 20 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 2013, 605.Google Scholar

20 Id. Google Scholar

21 Id. Google Scholar

22 See the so-called “Solange” or “As-long-as” decision: Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvL 52/71, 37 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 271 (May 29, 1974).Google Scholar

23 See Kumm, Mattias, Constitutionalizing Subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: Case of Tobacco Regulation, 12 Eur. L. J. 503–533 (2006), for a discussion of these issues.Google Scholar

24 See, e.g., Pernice, Ingolf, Das Verhältnis europäischer Gerichte zu nationalen Gerichten im europäischen Verfassungsverbund 22 (2006).Google Scholar

25 E.g., Comm'n v. Council, CJEU Case C-137/12 (Oct. 22, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/recherche.jsf?language=en.; Parliament v. Comm'n, CJEU Cases C-317/04, C-318/04, 2006 E.C.R. I-4721; Germany v. Parliament, CJEU Case C-376/98, 2000 E.C.R. I-08419.Google Scholar

26 See Jan. 14, 2014 Decision (Gerhardt, J., dissenting).Google Scholar

27 See the reasoning of the FCC in the Jan. 14, 2014 Decision at para. 89.Google Scholar