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Religious Tolerance, Pluralist Society and the Neutrality of the State: The Federal Constitutional Court's Decision in the Headscarf Case
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
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Some of the most magnificent achievements of human culture, from the Parthenon to Paradise Lost, have been inspired by religion and some of the worst atrocities of human history have been committed to worship its commands. In consequence, whenever questions of religion become part of the political and legal agenda of a society one might be very insecure about the solution of the problem but can be absolutely confident that the stakes are high and the discussions intense. This general observation about religious issues has gained a special dimension due to the events of September 11, 2001, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since then the role of religions in general and of Islam in particular is at the very core of central debates of global civil society and of the deliberations and actions of policy makers.
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References
1 BVerfG, 2 BvR 1436/02, 24.9.03; available at: http://www.bverfg.de. There is another decision of the German Constitutional Court dealing with head scarves. The Federal Labour Court had ruled that it is impermissible to dismiss an employee in a department store because this employee wears a head scarf. The defendant had argued that he would incur financial losses because costumers were not accustomed to such a sight. The Federal Labour Court did not engage in a principled discussion of the role of fundamental rights like the freedom of religion in this case but argued simply that there was no evidence for the economic losses given. Compare BAG, 2 AZR 472/01, DB 2003, 830. The Federal Constitutional Court followed this argumentation, compare BVerfG, 1 BvR 792/03, 30.7.2003, available at: http://www.bverfg.de.Google Scholar
On the background of the head scarf issue and the divided opinion in German constitutional doctrine compare Stefan Huster, Die ethische Neutralität des Staates 143 – 144 (2002).Google Scholar
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3 VG Stuttgart NVwZ 2000, 959; VGH Mannheim NJW 2001, 2899.Google Scholar
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8 More precisely from Art. 4.1, 3.3. Sentence 1, Art. 33.3 and 140 of the GG, the latter incorporating Art. 136.1, 136.4, Art. 137.1 of the Constitution of Weimar into German constitutional law.Google Scholar
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11 Id. at 255.Google Scholar
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13 VG Lüneburg NJW 2001, 767. Overruled by OVG Lüneburg, NVwZ-RR 2002, 658.Google Scholar
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67 BVerfGE 93, 1 (20) rightly pointed out that such an understanding would be a profanation of its meaning.Google Scholar
68 Mill, J. S. in On Liberty rightly defended with this argument the necessity of civil rights even in democracies against Rousseauians’ ideas of the absolute reign of the democratic volunté générale.Google Scholar
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