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“Volenti non fit inuria” - How to make a principle work

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Gregor Bachmann

Extract

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The ancient Latin saying volenti non fit iniuria (loosely translated: if you consent you cannot complain) denotes a legal principle on a par with principles such as pacta sunt servanda or non concedit venire contra factum proprium. As a defence to tort claims well established in both the civil and the common law tradition, the phrase articulates an universal value that has never been seriously contested. Why, then, does a young German scholar devote a complete habilitation (professoral thesis) to the study of such an expression? The answer is clear: as with any general principle of law, the problems start once you try to apply them to a specific case. Unlike rules, principles do not lend themselves to easy execution but require thorough reasoning, taking into account the fact that principles may work both ways. For example, if a seller does not deliver the promised good in time, he may invoke the principle of pacta sunt servanda in order to convince a judge that despite his breach the contract should be upheld. Likewise, the buyer may claim that, since the seller did not keep his promise (i.e., violated the said principle), she does not have to keep hers either.

Type
Private Law
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 4 , Issue 10 , 01 October 2003 , pp. 1033 - 1042
Copyright
Copyright © 2003 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

** Reflections on Ansgar Ohly, “Volenti non fit iniuria” – Die Einwilligung im Privatrecht, Mohr Siebeck, ius privatum vol. 73, Tübingen 2002, 503 p., € 99.Google Scholar

1 Cf. Prosser and Keaton on Torts, 5th ed. 1984, p. 112: “It is a fundamental principle of the common law that volenti non fit iniuria“; see also C.D. Baker, Tort, 5th ed. 1991, pp. 72, 193 seq. (distinguishing between consent and volenti); Zimmerman, The Law of Obligations - Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition 450, 1013 n. 92, 1990.Google Scholar

2 The usual reference here is to Dworkin, Taking Rights seriously, 1978. The fundamental difference between principles and rules had been highlighted earlier in a comparative methodological analysis by German jurist Josef Esser, Grundsatz und Norm in der richterlichen Fortbildung des Privatrechts, 1956 (Principle and Rule in Judicial Advancement of Private Law). For a modern account see Robert Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, 1985 ([Theory of Basic Rights).Google Scholar

3 A similar case has formed the factual background for the famous Herrenreiter-decision by the German Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice), see BGHZ 26, 349 (1958) (recognizing monetary damages for unconsented commercial use of a private picture).Google Scholar

4 See CENTRAL - Center for Transnational Law (ed.), List of Lex Mercatoria Principles, chapter I., principle No. 8: “A party suffering damage or another prejudice may not raise claims arising out of this if it has consented to the act leading to the damage or prejudice ('volenti non fit iniuria')”.Google Scholar

5 Oliver Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance 6, 1996 Google Scholar

6 For a critical account of that legislative concept see Zimmermann (note 1), 31; Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit, 2nd ed. 1967 (History of Private Law in the Modern Age), 486 seq. (pleading for an abolishment of the General Part).Google Scholar

7 The “Willenstheorie” (will-doctrine) claimed that a promisor is bound to his promise solely because he wants to be bound. The concurring “Erklärungstheorie“ (reliance-doctrine) held that the promisor is bound because the promissee relies on the promise. See Zimmermann (note 1), 584 seq. A thorough account of the disputing positions and their main proponents in the 19th century is given by Sibylle Hofer, Freiheit ohne Grenzen? Privatrechtstheoretische Diskussionen im 19. Jahrhundert, 2002 (Freedom without limits? Discussions on Private Law Theory in the 19th century), 157 seq.Google Scholar

8 See Ohly, Volenti non fit iniuria, 42 seq.Google Scholar

9 Id., 5.Google Scholar

10 Cf. Esser (note 3).Google Scholar

11 Ohly (note. 8), 70. John Stuart Mill, ancestor of the liberal-utilitarian tradition, explicitly referred to the “excellent work” by German jurist and Prussian reformer Wilhelm von Humboldt.Google Scholar

12 Ohly (note 8), 77.Google Scholar

13 Cf. Prosser and Keaton on Torts, 112: “.none of the most complex and difficult [subjects] in the entire area of the law”.Google Scholar

14 Landmark decision: BVerfGE 7, 198 – “Lüth” (1958): Private call for boycott justified by freedom of speech.Google Scholar

15 BVerfGE 89, 214 – “Bürgschaft” (1994).Google Scholar

16 See Manfred Wolf, Rechtsgeschäftliche Entscheidungsfreiheit und vertraglicher Interessenausgleich, 1970 (Freedom of choice and contractual balance of interests), drawing on the seminal article by Walter Schmidt-Rimpler, Grundfragen einer Erneuerung des Vertragsrechts (Fundamental Questions of a Rebuilding of Contract Law), Archiv für die civilistische Praxis (AcP) 147 (1941), 130–197. Although published in 1941 and prompted by the attempt to replace the BGB by a “Volksgesetzbuch“, Schmidt-Rimplers article does not reflect Nazi-ideology but rather presents an early example of economic analysis of contract law, cf. Schäfer/Ott, Lehrbuch der ökonomischen Analyse des Zivilrechts (Economic Analysis of Private Law), 3rd ed. 2000, 391.Google Scholar

17 See, e.g., Deutsch, Review of Ohly, Volenti non fit iniuria, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2003, 1854.Google Scholar

18 Ohly (note 8), 132.Google Scholar

19 Id., 136.Google Scholar

20 Id., 140.Google Scholar

21 Id., 134 seq.Google Scholar

22 Cf. C.D. Baker (note 1) (labeling the first category “volenti non fit iniuria”, the second “consent”); Ohly (note 8), 147 (labeling the the second category “volenti non fit iniuria”, the first “Handeln auf eigene Gefahr“ [~ voluntarily assumed risk]).Google Scholar

23 Ohly (note 8), 141-177.Google Scholar

24 Id., 237-289.Google Scholar

25 Id., 206.Google Scholar

26 Id.Google Scholar

27 See - from a comparative point of view - Zweigert, “Rechtsgeschäft” und “Vertrag” heute (“Rechtsgeschäft” and “Contract” today), in: Festschrift Rheinstein, 1969, 493, 498.Google Scholar

28 Ohly (note 8), 214; contra Deutsch (note 17).Google Scholar

29 Id., 248 (concerning the problem of “Patientenverfügung“ - “living will”). The subject of Patientenverfügung will now be tackled by an expert commission headed by former Federal Judge Klaus Kutzer (see Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Tuesday Sept. 9, 2003). Its task will be to develop a legal framework for determining the validity of a “living will”. Until now, no special statutory law with regard to that issue exits in Germany.Google Scholar

30 For a detailed analysis of case-law in Germany, England and the US see Ohly (note 8), 295 seq.Google Scholar

31 Ohly (note 8), 318.Google Scholar

32 Id., 323 seq.Google Scholar

33 Id.Google Scholar

34 Id., 349.Google Scholar

35 Id., 354.Google Scholar

36 See, supra, note 26.Google Scholar

37 See, e.g., Ohly (note 8), 320 seq.Google Scholar

38 See especially Heck, Philipp, Grundriss des Schuldrechts (Compendium on the Law of Obligations), 1929, 471-482; see also Fritz von Hippel, Zur Gesetzmäβigkeit juristischer Systembildung, 1930 (On the rules of legal systemizing), reprinted in v. Hippel, Rechtstheorie und Rechtsdogmatik (Legal Theory and Legal Dogmatics), 1964, 13–46. For a general account see Wilfried Kallfass, Die Tübinger Schule der Interessenjurisprudenz, 1972 (The Tübingen-School of Interest-Jurisprudence).Google Scholar

39 Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Legal Reasoning, 23 Yale L. J. 28-78 (1913).Google Scholar

40 See Esser (note 2); see also Josef Esser, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen des dogmatischen Denkens im Zivilrecht (The potential for and the limits of dogmatic reasoning in private law), AcP 172 (1972), 97-130.Google Scholar