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Yes, But … One More Thing: Karlsruhe's Ruling on the European Stability Mechanism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Karsten Schneider

Extract

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As in its first leading Euro-Case (“Greece Bailout”) one year ago, the Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) once again decided on the fate of Europe's bailout. The Court's ESM ruling on September 12, 2012, clears the path for the next steps in a fast-moving “rescue” situation. This time for the ratification of three international agreements: The insertion of Article 136(3) TFEU, the new Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM Treaty), and the new Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (Fiscal Compact).

Type
Special Section: The ESM Before the Courts
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 14 , Issue 1: Special section - The ESM Before the Courts , 01 January 2013 , pp. 53 - 74
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], 1 BvR 987/10, Sept. 7, 2011, 129 BVerfGE 124 (Ger.) [hereinafter Greece Bailout case]. See also Martin Nettesheim, “Euro-Rettung“ und Grundgesetz, 46 Europarecht 765, 765 (2011); Hanno Kube, Rechtsfragen der völkervertraglichen Eurorettung, 66 Wertpapiermitteilungen 245, 245 (2012); Matthias Ruffert, Die europäische Schuldenkrise vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht—Anmerkungen zum Urteil vom 7. September 2011, 46 Europarecht 842, 842 (2011).Google Scholar

2 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 1390/12, Sept. 12, 2012 ___ BVerfGE ___(Ger.), citations refer to the paragraphs of the English translation [hereinafter ESM case], published by the Court, available at: http://www.bverfg.de/en/decisions/rs20120912_2bvr139012en.html; they do not correspond with the different (!) number of paragraphs of the judgment [hereinafter ESM case (Ger.)]. See also Frank Schorkopf, “Startet die Maschinen“—Das ESM-Urteil des BVerfG vom 12. 9. 2012, 31 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 1273, 1273 (2012); Christian Tomuschat, Anmerkung zum Urteil des BVerfG vom 12.09.2012— BvR 1390/122—u.a.—Verhinderung der Ratifikation von ESM-Vertrag und Fiskalpakt überwiegend erfolglos, 127 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 1431, 1431 (2012).Google Scholar

3 European Council Conclusions of 24 and 25 March 2011, Annex II, 21 [hereinafter European Council Conclusions of March 2011]Google Scholar

4 Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen und Protokolle [BT] 17/9045, pg. 6 [hereinafter BT 17/9045].Google Scholar

5 Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen und Protokolle [BT] 17/9046, pg. 6 [hereinafter BT 17/9046].Google Scholar

6 See ESM case, supra note 2, at para. 222.Google Scholar

7 See Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), art. 32 (5), 34, and 35 (1), Feb. 2, 2012 [hereinafter ESM treaty].Google Scholar

8 See ESM case, supra note 2, at para. 228.Google Scholar

9 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 2134/92, Oct. 12, 1993, 89 BVerfGE 155 (Ger.) [hereinafter Maastricht case].Google Scholar

10 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 987/10, May 7, 2010, 125 BVerfGE 385 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 1099/10, June 6, 2010, 126 BVerfGE 158 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 1485/10, Sept. 7, 2011, 129 BVerfGE 124 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvE 8/11, Feb. 28, 2012, 31 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 495, 495 (2012) (Ger.), Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG -Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvE 4/11, June 19, 2012, 31 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 954, 954 (2012) (Ger.).Google Scholar

11 See infra Part B.Google Scholar

12 See infra Part C.Google Scholar

13 See ESM case (Ger.), supra note 2, at para. 190–94.Google Scholar

14 This extent of review is, however, already known from other constellations. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvQ 5/77, Oct. 16, 1977, 46 BVerfGE 160, 194 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 617/84, May 30, 1984, 67 BVerfGE 149, 151 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], 1 BvQ 19/04, June 23, 2004, 111 BVerfGE 147, 153 (Ger.).Google Scholar

15 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG], art. 38 (1) (“Members of the German Bundestag shall be elected in general, direct, free, equal, and secret elections. They shall be representatives of the whole people, not bound by orders or instructions, and responsible only to their conscience.”).Google Scholar

16 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG], art. 20 (1) (“The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state. (2) All state authority is derived from the people. It shall be exercised by the people through elections and other votes and through specific legislative, executive, and judicial bodies.”).Google Scholar

17 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG], art. 79 (3) (“Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.”).Google Scholar

18 The ESM standard of review can be found at ESM case (Ger.), supra note 2, at paras. 209–28. Identical wordings can be found at Greece Bailout case, supra note 1, at paras. 120–32: see paras. 210/121–22, 211/124, 212/125, 213/127, 214/128, 216/131, 216/135, 217/132, 219/137, 219/129, 220/129, and 224/104.Google Scholar

19 Four (out of five) headnotes of the judgment address the “budgetary responsibility” (No. 1, 2, 3 and 5). See Greece Bailout case, supra note 1, at paras. 96–102 and 121–32.Google Scholar

20 Within the meaning of Article 20 (1) and 20 (2) of the Basic Law.Google Scholar

21 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvE 2/08, Oct. 30, 2009, 123 BVerfGE 267, 340 (Ger.) [hereinafter Lisbon case].Google Scholar

22 Greece Bailout case, supra note 1, at para. 125.Google Scholar

23 See id. at para. 99.Google Scholar

24 See id. at para. 100.Google Scholar

25 See Greece Bailout case, supra note 1, at para. 97.Google Scholar

26 See ESM case (Ger.), supra note 2, at para. 202.Google Scholar

27 See Greece Bailout case, supra note 1, at para. 113.Google Scholar

28 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 2661/06, July 6, 2010, 126 BVerfGE 286 (Ger.) [hereinafter Honeywell case].Google Scholar

29 See id. at para. 60 and Headnote 1. b).Google Scholar

30 See Maastricht case, supra note 9.Google Scholar

31 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 1877/97, Mar. 31, 1998, 97 BVerfGE 350 (Ger.) [hereinafter Euro case].Google Scholar

32 See Lisbon case supra note 21.Google Scholar

33 See, however, ESM case, supra note 2, at para. 203, but this does not describe a standard of review.Google Scholar

34 See ESM case (Ger.), supra note 2, at paras. 231–38.Google Scholar

35 See ESM case (Ger.), supra note 2, at para. 233.Google Scholar

36 See infra Part C.Google Scholar

37 See ESM case, supra note 2, at paras. 208–48.Google Scholar

38 See ESM case (Ger.), supra note 2, at paras. 300–19.Google Scholar

39 The most interesting omission in the history of the Court's dissenting opinions would still be represented by dissenting Justice Zeidler's opinion “I do not agree.”, see 77 BVerfGE 167 (Ger.)Google Scholar

40 See Greece Bailout case, supra note 1, at paras. 125–28 headnotes 3a (“The German Bundestag may not transfer its budgetary responsibility to other actors by means of imprecise budgetary authorisations. In particular it may not, even by statute, deliver itself up to any mechanisms with financial effect which—whether by reason of their overall conception or by reason of an overall evaluation of the individual measures—may result in incalculable burdens with budget relevance without prior mandatory consent.”) and 3b (“No permanent mechanisms may be created under international treaties which are tantamount to accepting liability for decisions by free will of other states, above all if they entail consequences which are hard to calculate. Every large-scale measure of aid of the Federal Government taken in a spirit of solidarity and involving public expenditure on the international or European Union level must be specifically approved by the Bundestag.”).Google Scholar

41 See Greece Bailout case, supra note 1, at para. 125; ESM case, supra note 2, at para. 196.Google Scholar

42 See Greece Bailout case, supra note 1, at para. 125; ESM case, supra note 2, at para. 196.Google Scholar

43 See Greece Bailout case, supra note 1, at para. 121.Google Scholar

44 See Maastricht case, supra note 9, at para. 172; Euro case, supra note 31, at paras. 368–69.Google Scholar

45 See Greece Bailout case, supra note 1, at para. 133.Google Scholar

46 The Greece Bailout judgment also calls these mechanisms “irreversible processes” or “automatic effects”, see Greece Bailout case, supra note 1, at paras. 127, 136–37.Google Scholar

47 See Greece Bailout case, supra note 1, at para. 135.Google Scholar

48 See id. at para. 136.Google Scholar

49 See European Council Decision of 25 Mar. 2011, amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ 2011, L 91/1; ESM Treaty, supra note 7; Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, Mar. 2, 2012; see also Press Release, Federal Constitutional Court, Applications for the Issue of Temporary Injunctions to Prevent the Ratification of the ESM Treaty and the Fiscal Compact Unsuccessful for the Most Part (Sept. 12, 2012) (which does not mention article 136 (3) TFEU).Google Scholar

50 See Tomuschat, Christian, Anmerkung zum Urteil des BVerfG vom 12.09.2012—BvR 1390/122—u.a.— Verhinderung der Ratifikation von ESM-Vertrag und Fiskalpakt überwiegend erfolglos, 127 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 1431, 1433 (2012) (which does not notice this omission).Google Scholar

51 European Council Conclusions of March 2011, supra note 3.Google Scholar

52 See Amos Tversky & Kahneman, Daniel, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 Science 453, 453 (1981).Google Scholar

53 See ESM case (Ger.), supra note 2, at para. 236.Google Scholar

54 See ESM case (Ger.), supra note 2, at para. 236.Google Scholar

55 Game theorists might prefer the label “sequential move game” instead. See Ulrich Rolf, Fiskalpolitik in der Europäischen Währungsunion. Marktdisziplinierung, Transfers und Verschuldungsanreize 74 (1996); Stefan Magen, Spieltheorie, in Ökonomische Methoden im Recht 71 (Emanuel V. Towfigh & Niels Petersen eds., 2010); James M. Buchanan, The Samaritan's Dilemma, in Altruism, Morality, and Economic Theory 71 (Phelps ed., 1975).Google Scholar

56 See Kenneth Dyson & Lucia Quaglia, 2 European Economic Governance and Policies 371 (2010).Google Scholar

57 For example the fact that the interconnection of the capital markets has greatly increased or the effects of economic contagion, which the payment default of one state in the monetary union has on the other Member States.Google Scholar

58 Such as “When I choose A, second actor will choose Y, when I choose B, second actor will choose Z.”Google Scholar

59 A combined with Y, A combined with Z, B combined with Y or B combined with Z.Google Scholar

60 Another kind of commitment is based on “collaterals”; see infra section 4.Google Scholar

61 See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 123–26, 136.Google Scholar

62 That is to say that the mere legal possibility of implementing such a scheme in the future suffices to change the present framework.Google Scholar

63 Whether it is a historic truth or not, the story, however, tells about the military commander Cortés during the Spanish conquest of the Aztec Empire, that he actually burned his ships—that is, he willingly reduced his options (commitment strategy)—in order to “strengthen” his soldiers’ incentives for fighting under his command instead of running away. The story is especially instructive given the fact, that Cortés was much less susceptible to his men's interests than democratic governments are to their voters’ interests.Google Scholar

64 In fact, the problem of the Greece Bailout case has exactly been this kind of collateral.Google Scholar

65 See Greece Bailout case, supra note 1, at paras. 16–31; ESM Case, supra note 2, at paras. 4–6.Google Scholar

66 See ESM case, supra note 1, at paras. 11–75.Google Scholar

67 These risks are in particular connected with the ECB's so called “Target2-System,” discovered and made public by Hans-Werner Sinn, who already mentioned this problem during the oral hearing on 5 July 2011 in the Greece Bailout case.Google Scholar

68 ESM case, supra note 2, at para. 240.Google Scholar

69 See supra Part C(III)(4).Google Scholar

70 See supra Part C(III)(3).Google Scholar

71 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat products, WT DS26/AB/R, para. 187. (Jan 16, 1998).Google Scholar

72 See generally Hentschelmann, Kai, Der Stabilitäts und Wachstumspakt 1495 (2009).Google Scholar

73 See Maastricht case, supra note 9, at page 199; Euro case, supra note 31, at page 373; Greece Bailout case, supra note 1, at para. 129; ESM case, supra note 2, at para. 203.Google Scholar

74 See Greece Bailout case, supra note 1, at para. 129; ESM Case, supra note 2, at para. 203.Google Scholar

75 See Eur. Union Council Report, Doc. No. 15302/10 (Oct. 21, 2010).Google Scholar

76 See Greece Bailout case, supra note 1, at para. 89.Google Scholar

77 See id. at para. 137.Google Scholar

78 Following the ECB's decision on Outright Monetary Transactions, the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) was terminated. See Press Release, European Central Bank, Technical Features of Outright Monetary Transactions (Sept. 6, 2012).Google Scholar