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On the constitutional question in global governance: Global administrative law and the conflicts-law approach in comparison

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 September 2013

MING-SUNG KUO
MING-SUNG KUO*
Affiliation:
School of Law, University of Warwick, Gibbet Hill Road, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
*
*Email: M-S.Kuo@warwick.ac.uk
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Abstract

The question of constitutionalization cuts through the heart of theoretical debate on the fragmentation of global governance. This paper aims to contribute to this debate through a comparison of global administrative law (GAL) and the conflicts-law approach. While the conflicts-law approach espouses the move towards global constitutionalism, GAL disavows constitutional ambition. I make a twofold argument. First, the differing diagnoses these two approaches make of global governance lead to their distinct proposed solutions. GAL identifies the lack of accountability as the underlying concern of global governance and responds to fragmented global governance through balancing-centred legal management. The conflicts-law approach instead attributes the challenges facing global governance to the ill-designed democratic institutions in nation states and turns to ‘democratic juridification’ as the solution. Second, GAL and the conflicts-law approach reflect two distinct images of constitutionalism. GAL’s ‘constitutional deficit’ suggests its implicit embrace of a version of constitutionalism rooted in the tradition of populist democracy. The conflicts-law approach situates transnational democracy in the conflicts-law process in which inter-regime conflicts are resolved, suggesting a prototype of constitutionalized global governance underpinned by an epistemic understanding of democracy.

Keywords

global administrative lawglobal constitutionalismglobal governancepopulist and epistemic constitutionalismthe conflicts-law approach
Type
Research Article
Information
Global Constitutionalism , Volume 2 , Issue 3 , November 2013 , pp. 437 - 468
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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References

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17 Although originating in New York, GAL has attracted scholarly attention from around the globe. See e.g. Krisch, N and Kingsbury, B, ‘Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 1Google Scholar; Anthony, Get al. (eds), Values in Global Administrative Law (Hart, Oxford, 2011).Google Scholar

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20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

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25 Ibid 17.

26 Ibid 20–7.

27 The underlying values of the notion of publicness include the principles of ‘legality’ in its power-limiting sense, rationality, proportionality, rule of law, and human rights. See Kingsbury, B, ‘The Concept of “Law” in Global Administrative Law’ (2009) 20 European Journal of International Law 23, 31–3.Google Scholar

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29 See Kuo (n 5) 71–80.

30 See N Krisch, ‘Global Administrative Law and the Constitutional Ambition’ in Dobner and Loughlin (eds) (n 5) 245.

31 See Krisch (n 13).

32 See Kingsbury (n 27) 56.

33 See e.g. Koskenniemi (n 3); Fisher-Lescano, A and Teubner, G, ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 999Google Scholar. See also Teubner (n 3).

34 See also Kuo (n 13) 1000–1.

35 See Kingsbury (n 13) 197; Kingsbury (n 27) 56.

36 Cf Krisch (n 8) 277–8.

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40 It should be noted that there are two strains under the rubric of the conflicts-law (Kollisionenrecht) approach. In addition to the Joerges School discussed here, another strain of the conflicts-law approach is attributed to Gunther Teubner, whose theoretical underpinning is systems theory. While both strains of the conflicts-law approach concern the issue of conflict in global governance, the Teubner School is focused on the functional differentiation of (sub)social systems in what he terms ‘world society’ and the resulting decoupling of the legal system from other social systems. Under Teubner’s view, how to restore the status of the legal system, especially in terms of its mediating role among (sub)social systems, constitutes the main theme. My discussion here centres on Joerges’s variety of the conflicts-law approach as his theory puts the choice over conflicting regulatory regimes front and centre in the discussion on global constitutionalism. See Joerges (n 39) 370. Outside the Bremen nucleus, the Joerges School also attracts Joost Paweleyn (Geneva) and Ralf Michaels (Duke) among others. See Michaels, R and Pauwelyn, J, ‘Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws? Different Techniques in the Fragmentation of International Law’ in Broude, T and Shany, Y (eds), Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms in International Law (Hart, Oxford, 2011) 19Google Scholar. For a representative publication centring on the Joerges School, see generally Nickel, R (ed), Conflict of Laws and Laws of Conflict in Europe and Beyond: Patterns of Supranational and Transnational Juridification (Intersentia, Antwerp, 2011)Google Scholar. For further discussion on the Teubner School of the conflicts-law approach, see Teubner (n 3) 150–73; Fisher-Lescano and Teubner (n 33).

41 See Joerges (n 39) 370–2.

42 See Joerges (n 12) 467–9. See also Joerges, Kjaer and Ralli (n 12) 154. Cf Howse, R and Nicolaïdis, K, ‘Democracy without Sovereignty: The Global Vocation of Political Ethics’ in Broude, T and Shany, Y (eds), The Shifting Allocation of Authority in International Law: Considering Sovereignty, Supremacy and Subsidiarity: Essays in Honour of Professor Ruth Lapidoth (Hart, Oxford, 2008) 163, 167.Google Scholar

43 See text at notes 21–24 above.

44 See Joerges, Kjaer and Ralli (n 12) 154; Joerges, C and Neyer, J, ‘From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology’ (1998) 3 European Law Journal 273, 293–5.Google Scholar

45 Joerges imputes the gap between ‘political decision-making powers’ and ‘affectedness by political decisions’ to the ‘“democracy failure” of constitutional nation states’. See Joerges (n 12) 468.

46 See ibid 481.

47 See Slaughter Burley, A-M, ‘International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda’ (1993) 87 American Journal of International Law 205, 230–1Google Scholar. Despite the analytical distinction between private international law and conflicts of law, I use them interchangeably.

48 See ibid 214–15.

49 See ibid 230–2.

50 Cf Joerges (n 12) 455–6.

51 See ibid. See also Joerges, Kjaer and Ralli (n 12) 154–5.

52 See Joerges and Neyer (n 44).

53 See Joerges (n 38) 318.

54 Joerges, Kjaer and Ralli (n 12) 155 (quoting R Mayntz, ‘The Architecture of Multi-Level Governance of Economic Sectors’, MPIfG Discussion Paper 13/2007, 23–4).

55 See Joerges (n 38) 315–16.

56 See Teubner (n 3).

57 See Joerges (n 38) 312–15. See also Joerges (n 12).

58 See Joerges (n 39) 347–8.

59 See Joerges (n 12); Joerges, Kjaer and Ralli (n 12); Joerges (n 13). See also J Pauwelyn, ‘Public International Law and the Conflicts-Law Approach’ (13 October, 2011), available at <SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2017542> accessed 27 January, 2013.

60 Notably, the correspondence between the three types of conflicts and the three-dimensional conflicts law is not clear. Cf Joerges (n 12); Joerges, Kjaer and Ralli (n 12).

61 See Joerges (n 12) 477–80, 488–95; Joerges, Kjaer and Ralli (n 12) 158–9. Joost Pauwelyn, another important contributor to the Joerges School of the three-dimensional conflicts-law approach, recently labels this first dimension of conflicts law as ‘law as system’, which concerns ‘how to open up a specific treaty regime to other legal orders’. See Pauwelyn (n 59). Even so, when a treaty regime is opened to an international organization, which must be treaty-based, the core issue is how to tackle the conflicts between two treaty regimes.

62 See Joerges and Neyer (n 44) 293–4.

63 See Joerges, Kjaer and Ralli (n 12) 158–9; Joerges (n 38) 316–18. Understood in this way, Pauwelyn’s first dimension of conflicts law, law as system, is not so much about opening up a treaty regime to the legal orders of its member states as about tackling the conflicts of laws between its member states.

64 Joerges (n 38).

65 See Joerges, Kjaer and Ralli (n 12) 159.

66 See Joerges (n 12) 480–2, 495–8; Joerges, Kjaer and Ralli (n 12) 159–60. Pauwelyn terms this second dimension of conflicts law ‘law as regulation’, which concerns ‘how to open up law to non-legal expertise’. See Pauwelyn (n 59).

67 Joerges, Kjaer and Ralli (n 12) 159.

68 Ibid 160. See also Joerges (n 12) 483–5, 498–500.

69 This is what Pauwelyn calls ‘law as governance’. See Pauwelyn (n 59).

70 See Joerges (n 12) 483–4.

71 Joerges suggests that GAL falls within the second dimension of conflicts law. See ibid 495–8. Yet, taking account of the types of global administration identified in GAL, i.e., ‘international administration’, ‘distributed administration’, ‘transnational networks and coordination arrangements’, ‘hybrid intergovernmental-private administration’ and ‘private bodies’, GAL’s concern extends to all the three dimensions of conflicts law. See Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (n 13) 19–23. See also Cassese, S, ‘Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure’ (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 109, 113–15.Google Scholar

72 Compare Stewart, RB, ‘The Reformation of American Administrative Law’ (1988) 88 Harvard Law Review 1667CrossRefGoogle Scholar, with Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (n 13).

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75 Joerges, Kjaer and Ralli (n 12) 158.

76 For the epistemic function of democratic institutions, see Michelman (n 15) 54–60. For a philosophical justification of the epistemic value of democracy, see Estlund, DM, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2009).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

77 See D Chalmers, ‘A Comment on Joerges’ in Kohler-Koch and Rittberger (eds) (n 38) 329.

78 Joerges, Kjaer and Ralli (n 12) 158.

79 See Joerges (n 38) 318–22.

80 Krisch and Kingsbury (n 12) 10. See also Shapiro, M, ‘Administrative Law Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Governance’ (2001) 8 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 369, 377.Google Scholar

81 See Krisch (n 30).

82 See Kuo (n 5) 71–7.

83 See Cohen, JL, ‘Whose Sovereignty? Empire versus International Law’ (2004) 18 Ethics and International Affairs 1, 2.Google Scholar

84 See Kuo (n 5) 72.

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86 See Kuo (n 5) 72–3.

87 See ibid 73. See also Kuo, M-S, ‘The End of Constitutionalism as We Know It? Boundaries and the State of Global Constitutional (Dis)Ordering’ (2010) 1 Transnational Legal Theory 329, 358–64.Google Scholar

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89 See ‘Introduction’ in MacDonald, RStJ and Johnston, DM (eds), Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2005)Google Scholar xiii, xv. Cf Walter, Christian, ‘Constitutionalizing (Inter)national Governance: Possibilities for and Limits to the Development of an International Constitutional Law’ (2001) 44 German Yearbook of International Law 170Google Scholar. This ‘conceptual shift’ is related to the globalist epistemological shift to an external sociological perspective of the law. See Cohen (n 83) 7.

90 See Kuo (n 5) 74.

91 See ibid 71–7.

92 See Krisch and Kingsbury (n 12) 10.

93 See Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (n 13) 28.

94 See e.g. Cass (n 5); S Gardbaum, ‘Human Rights and International Constitutionalism’ in Dunoff and Trachtman (eds) (n 4) 233; Everson, M and Eisner, J, The Making of the European Constitution: Judges and Lawyers beyond Constitutive Power (Routledge-Cavendish, Abingdon, 2007).Google Scholar

95 See Kuo (n 5) 74–5.

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101 See Kuo (n 98) 393–4.

102 See Kuo (n 5) 75–7.

103 See ibid 77–80.

104 See Krisch (n 30).

105 See ibid 256–8.

106 See generally M Shapiro, ‘APA: Past, Present, Future’ (1986) 72 Virginia Law Review 447. See also Stewart (n 73) 73.

107 See Krisch (n 8) 55–7.

108 See ibid 41–4. See also Krisch (n 30) 252.

109 See Krisch (n 8) 41–2.

110 It is empirically questionable that most national constitutions can be attributed to a historical process of revolutionary constitution-making. Nevertheless, the conceptual dualism of constitution-making and normal law-making underlies constitutional theories. See Krisch (n 30) 252. See also Kuo (n 87) 345.

111 See e.g. Joerges (n 12); Fisher-Lescano and Teubner (n 33).

112 See Joerges (n 38) 312–13; Joerges (n 39) 346.

113 See Joerges (n 39) 346.

114 See ibid 346–7.

115 See ibid 347–8.

116 See Joerges (n 38) 312–15.

117 See Joerges (n 13) 474–6.

118 See Joerges (n 38) 314, 322.

119 See ibid 318–22; Joerges, Kjaer and Ralli (n 12) 158.

120 See Joerges (n 38) 314, 322.

121 See Joerges (n 12) 467–76.

122 See Joerges, Kjaer and Ralli (n 12) 158.

123 See Joerges (n 12) 482.

124 See Joerges (n 39) 374.

125 See Joerges (n 38) 320–1.

126 See Joerges (n 12) 467–76; Joerges (n 39) 373.

127 See Joerges (n 12) 481–2; Joerges (n 39) 372–3.

128 See Joerges (n 12) 481–2.

129 See ibid 486–8; Joerges, Kjaer and Ralli (n 12).

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132 Joerges implicitly acknowledges the roles of weighing and balancing in the conflicts-law approach. See Joerges (n 39) 370.

133 See Joerges (n 12) 481, 496.

134 See Koskenniemi, M, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001) 12–67.Google Scholar

135 Ibid 43.

136 See ibid 43–5

137 Ibid 43.

138 Ibid.

139 Ibid 44.

140 Ibid.

141 Ibid.

142 Ibid 45.

143 See ibid 77, 183.

144 Cf Joerges (n 12) 496.

145 This position seems to echo the legalistic conception of constitutionalism that regards a constitution as serving ‘towards the legalization or juridification of the already existing [political order]’ as the cases of England and Germany suggest. See Möllers, C, ‘Pouvoir Constituant—Constitution—Constitutionalisation’ in von Bogdandy, A and Bast, J (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd rev. edn, Hart, Oxford, 2010) 169, 173.Google Scholar

146 See Joerges, Kjaer and Ralli (n 12) 158.

147 Cf C Möllers, ‘Transnational Governance without a Public Law’ in Joerges, Sand and Teubner (eds) (n 39) 329.

148 In the nation state context, statutory law-making can also be regarded as the legislative interpretation of the constitution. See also Eskridge, WN Jr and Ferejohn, J, ‘Super-Statutes’ (2001) 50 Duke Law Journal 1215Google Scholar. Cf Fisher, L, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1988).Google Scholar

149 See Krisch (n 8) 58–61.

150 See ibid 57–66.

151 Cf Amstutz, M, ‘In-Between Worlds: Marleasing and the Emergence of Interlegality in Legal Reasoning’ (2005) 11 European Law Journal 766.Google Scholar

152 Cf Teubner, G, ‘A Constitutional Moment? The Logics of “Hitting the Bottom”’ in Kjaer, PF, Teubner, G and Febbrajo, Al (eds), The Financial Crisis in Constitutional Perspective: The Dark Side of Functional Differentiation (Hart, Oxford, 2011) 3.Google Scholar

153 Cf Picciotto, S, ‘Constitutionalizing Multilevel Governance?’ (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 457, 461.Google Scholar