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Towards a theory of neoliberal constitutionalism: Addressing Chile’s first constitution-making laboratory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2021

Benjamin Alemparte Open the ORCID record for Benjamin Alemparte [Opens in a new window]
Benjamin Alemparte*
Affiliation:
Duke University School of Law, United States
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Email: benjamin.alemparte@duke.edu
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Abstract

Before neoliberalism became global, it was an intellectual project that had a particular view of the power of constitutions to limit sovereign states, anchor economic freedoms and protect markets from democratic pressures for greater equality. In Latin America and the developing world, neoliberalism has long been identified with the political economy of the Washington Consensus. However, the comprehensive study of its legal foundations and institutional arrangements is still an area of limited scholarly attention. This article attempts to advance in that direction. By examining the work of Friedrich A. Hayek, Milton Friedman and James M. Buchanan, it explores a theory of neoliberal constitutionalism within Chile, the so-called first neoliberal laboratory. These authors visited the country during the Pinochet dictatorship (1973–90), and were connected with top Chilean authorities as part of their global ambitions to implement their theoretical agendas in real-world scenarios. The article argues that Chile’s constitution-making process between 1973 and 1980 offered an on-site experiment in introducing neoliberal’s radical economic transformation. It addresses how the dictatorship’s natural law-based rule of law principles were compatible with the neoliberal constitutional ideology by supporting a distinctive view of the state’s role and designing the innovative institutional arrangements necessary to guarantee the market’s priority in the structural and rights dimension of the 1980 Constitution. In the wake of Chile’s recent constitutional change agenda, this article not only contributes to the existing debate by reflecting on the ideological origins of the still-persistent constitutional neoliberal features, but also works as a case study for evaluating new global turns towards authoritarian neoliberal politics.

Keywords

authoritarianismconstitutionalismneoliberalismrule of lawChile
Type
Research Article
Information
Global Constitutionalism , Volume 11 , Issue 1 , March 2022 , pp. 83 - 109
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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125 Article 3, Law Decree No. 1, 18 September 1973 and Law Decree No. 128, 16 November 1973. See also Barros (n 104) 84.

126 Supreme Decree No. 1.064, 12 November 1973.

127 See CENC Session No. 388 (06/27/78).

128 Ibid 174–75. This draft was sent to the Council of State for review, and in July 1980 the junta introduced the final changes.

129 CENC Session (hereinafter, Session) No. 243 (08/11/76).

130 See Session No. 37 (05/02/74). See also Session No. 361 (04/27/78).

131 Declaración de Principios de la Junta de Gobierno de Chile, 11 March 1974. Underlying the common good is a rejection of the Marxist idea of class struggle. Thomas Aquinas defines law as ‘an ordinance of reason made for the common good’. See T Aquinas, Philosophical Texts, (Oxford University Press, New York, 1960) 354–55.

132 See Declaración de Principios de la Junta de Gobierno de Chile (n 131), Sección II.

133 Ibid.

134 See ‘Discurso de S.E. el Presidente de la República General de Ejército D. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte’ (1977) Nueva Institucionalidad en Chile.

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148 Art. 67, 1980 CP.

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150 Art. 64, 1980 CP.

151 Ibid.

152 Ibid.

153 Session No. 394 (07/04/78).

154 Ibid.

155 Session No. 384 (06/14/78). See Art. 97, 98, 1980 C.P.

156 Session No. 3 (09/26/73).

157 See Art. 63 and 82, 1980 C.P. See session No 344 (04/04/78).

158 Session No. 1 (09/24/73). See generally Art. 116–119, 1980 C.P. See also session No. 374 (05/23/78).

159 Art. 1, 1980 C.P.

160 Session No. 388 (06/27/78).

161 Session No. 400 (07/12/78) and 405 (08/08/78).

162 Art. 19 No. 21, 1980 CP.

163 Ibid.

164 Session No. 388 (06/27/78).

165 Art. 19 No. 22, 1980 CP. See also Art. 19 No. 23, 1980 CP.

166 Art. 20, 1980 CP.

167 Session No. 398 (07/11/78) and Session No. 384 (06/14/78).

168 Session No. 399 (07/12/78).

169 Art. 60 No. 7, 1980 CP.

170 Ibid. See Session No. 398 (07/11/78).

171 Art. 60 No. 8 and 9, 1980 C.P. Articles 60 No. 7 and 8 would not apply to the Central Bank.

172 See Session No. 161 (10/28/75).

173 See (n 167). See also art. 19 No. 24, 1980 CP.

174 Ibid.

175 See Session No. 1 (09/24/73); Session No. 3 (09/26/73) item number 3, and Session No. 10 (10/25/73).

176 See Session No. 1 (09/24/73). Also, see Session No. 10 (10/25/73).

177 See Session No. 1. (09/24/73), Session No. 18 (11/22/73).

178 The previous 1925 Constitution, after its 1971 reform known as Estatuto de Garantías Constitucionales, declared in Art. 10 No. 16 that the state would ‘adopt all measures to facilitate the fulfillment of social, economic, and cultural rights necessary for the free development of the personality and human dignity, for the community’s integral protection, and to promote an equitable redistribution of the national income’.

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181 See Session No. 11 (10/30/73) and Session No. 407 (08/09/78).

182 Art. 19 Nos. 9;10;11;18, 1980 C.P. See also Session No. 403 (07/18/78).

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184 Hayek (n 43) 387.

185 Art. 19 No. 16, 1980 CP.

186 Ibid. See also Art. 19 No. 19, 1980 CP.

187 Art. 19 No. 26, 1980 CP.

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191 See Constitutional Court Decision No. 2935/2015 and No. 3016-3026/2016.

192 See PNUD, Informe de Desarrollo Humano en Chile 1998, 210–13, <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/chile/docs/desarrollohumano/undp_cl_idh_informe1998.pdf>.

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195 Ibid.

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199 Ibid.

200 Ibid 62. As a consequence, citizens increasingly perceive their governments not as their agents, but as those of other states or of international organizations, immeasurably more insulated from electoral pressure than in the traditional nation-state. See W Streeck, ‘How will Capitalism End?’ (2014) 87 New Left Review 92.

201 Notably, former President Eduardo Frei Montalva would refer to the need for the election of a constituent assembly in 1980. The Alianza Democrática, the predecessor of the Concertación, in 1983 would also try to negotiate with the dictatorship convening a constituent assembly. See MA Garretón, Incomplete Democracy: Political Democratization in Chile and Latin America (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill NC, 2003) 125–31.

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205 Ibid 246. See Eisenstadt, TA, LeVan, AC, and Maboudi, T, Constituents Before Assembly: Participation, Deliberation, and Representation in the Crafting of New Constitution, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017) 104.Google Scholar

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207 See e.g. Atria, F et. al., El otro modelo: Del orden neoliberal al régimen de lo público (Random House Mondadori, Santiago, 2013).Google Scholar

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