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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 July 2017
Every schoolboy knows that ‘England does not love Coalitions’; yet the briefest acquaintance with the history of British politics in the present century would reveal that Britain has been governed by self-styled coalitions for more than a third of the period, although the ministries which can be regarded as coalitions for the purposes of this essay cover a much shorter span: the Asquith coalition (May 1915-December 1916); the Lloyd George coalitions of December 1916-December 1918, and December 1918-October 1922; the MacDonald national government (August 1931-September 1932), and the Churchill coalition (May 1940-May 1945). It is also the case that, on the fifteen occasions since 1943 when Gallup Polls have questioned the electorate about their views on coalition government, the proportion of those regarding such ministries as desirable has never fallen below 22 per cent. If these magnitudes are not evidence of love, at least it is clear that the electorate is on some occasions prepared to engage in mild flirtation, and their politicians in not too-infrequent marriages of convenience.
1 The justification for treating the coalition of 1916-22 as two separate ministries and for regarding the 1931 national government as terminating in 1932 will emerge later.
2 Information provided by courtesy of Gallup Polls Ltd.
3 For such a view, see Beer, S.H., Modern British Politics, London, 1965 Google Scholar.
4 Smelile, K.B., The British Way of Life, London, 1955, p. 153 Google Scholar.
5 See, for example, Marshall, G. & Moodie, G., Some Problems of the Constitution, London, 1961 Google Scholar.
6 Gladstone.
7 Peel to J.W. Croker, 5 March 1833. Quoted in Thursfield, J.R., Peel, London, 1904, p. 125 Google Scholar.
8 Lowell, A. L., The Government of England, London, 1908. Vol. II, pp. 97–9 Google Scholar.
9 Hume, , ‘Of the Parties of Great Britain’, in The Works of David Hume, World Classics ed., London, 1903, Vol. I, esp. pp. 73-4Google Scholar.
10 Lecky, W.E.H., The Map of Life, London, 1900, p. 113 Google Scholar.
11 Chamberlain, Joseph, ‘The Caucus’, The Fortnightly Review, London, November, 1878, p. 741 Google Scholar.
12 Laski, H. J., Parliamentary Government in England, London, 1938, pp. 75, 83 Google Scholar.
13 MacDonald, J. R., Socialism and Government, London, 1909, 2 VolsGoogle Scholar.
14 The main protagonists are McKenzie, R.T., British Political Parties, 2nd ed., London, 1963 Google Scholar, and S. H. Beer, op. cit.
15 LordCecil, Robert, giving evidence to the Select Committee on Procedure. British Parliamentary Papers, Vol. VII, 1914, p. 645 Google Scholar.
16 For a useful survey of criticisms of the ‘mandate’, see Birch, A. H., Representa tive and Responsible Government, London, 1965, Part VGoogle Scholar. A more favourable account is Emden, C. S., The People and the Constitution, 2nd ed. Oxford, 1956 Google Scholar.
17 For an excellent discussion of Baldwin’s practice in this respect, see Bassett, R., ‘Telling the Truth to the People’, The Cambridge Journal, November 1948 Google Scholar.
18 Lord(later Lord) Campion, G., ‘H.M. Opposition, A Happy Solution’, The Canadian Liberal, Toronto, Vol. VI, No. 1, 1953, p. 9 Google Scholar. A more systematic account is Crick, B., The Reform of Parliament, London, 1964 Google Scholar.
19 MacDonald, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 18-19.
20 Quoted in Blake, R., The Unknown Prime Minister, London, 1955, p. 388 Google Scholar.
21 Amery, L. S., My Political Life, London, 1954, Vol. II, p. 224 Google Scholar.
22 He had resigned because of ill-health in 1921, and was succeeded by Austen Chamberlain.
23 Amery, Life, op. cit., p. 253.
24 Quoted in Blake, op. cit., p. 457.
25 Masterman, C.F.G., ‘Fusion: The First Phase’, The Contemporary Review, London, August 1920 Google Scholar. See also LordSwinton, , Sixty Years of Power, London 1966, p. 44 Google Scholar.
26 Quoted in Jenkins, R., Mr. Balfour’s Poodle, London, 1954, p. 114 Google Scholar.
27 Finer, , ‘Cabinet and Party, 1918-1921’, Economica, London Google Scholar.
28 For the most exhaustive (and the only constitutionally literate) account of the 1931 crisis, see Bassett, R., 1931: Political Crisis, London, 1958 Google Scholar.
28 Laski, H. J., The Crisis and the Constitution, London, 1932 Google Scholar.
30 See above, p. 7.
31 Laski, , Democracy in Crisis, London, 1933 Google Scholar, passim.
32 SirJennings, W. I., Cabinet Government, 1959 ed., Cambridge, p. 281 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
33 See Bassett, 1931, op. cit., pp. 101-2.
34 Ibid., passim.
35 See Pellingj, H. A Short History of the Labour Party, London, 1961 Google Scholar, Ch. V.
36 Rotsiter, C., Constitutional Dictatorship, London, 1948 Google Scholar.
37 Ibid., p. 16O.
38 Ibid., p. 183.
39 See Blake, op. cit., Ch. XV.
40 Ibid., p. 246.
41 Bassett, 1931, pp. 154-76.
42 The Times History of the War, 1915, Vol. V, p. 316, London Google Scholar.
43 Blake, op. cit., p. 385; for a similar view see Spencer, H., ‘The War and the Party System’, The Contemporary Review, February, 1918 Google Scholar.
44 The extent to which (with the exception of the communists) states such as France, Italy and Belgium possess a ‘party system, – in the sense of recognizable entities with significant electoral and parliamentary roles – may be doubted. In this case, to call their ministries ‘coalitions’ may be as misleading as using this term to describe, say, British ministries in the 18th century.
45 See above, p. 13.
46 Quoted in Lyman, R., The First Labour Government, London, 1958, p. 85 Google Scholar.
47 See Blake, op. cit., p. 388.
48 Bassetti 1931, pp. 54-6.
49 Ibid., p. 372-3.
50 See (later Sir Ivor)Jennings, W.I., ‘The Formation of Great Britain’s “Truly National” Government’, The American Political Science Review, August 1940 Google Scholar.
51 Op. cit., passim.
52 Blake, op. cit., Chs. XVI and XXI.
53 On Baldwin’s attitude to coalition in 1931 see Bassett, 1931, pp. 172, 188-9, 207-8.
54 Ibid., passim.
55 Utley, T. E., ‘Coalition Government’, The Cambridge Journal, July 1950, p. 581 Google Scholar.
56 Blake, op. cif., Ch. XV.
57 Taylor, A. J. P., Politics in Wartime, London, 1964, p. 31 Google Scholar.
58 Blake, op. cit.. Ch. XXI.
59 Ibid., pp. 384-5.
60 The ‘coupon’ was a letter of electoral recommendation sent by the coalition leaders on behalf of those candidates deemed likely to support them if elected.
61 See Wilson, T., ‘The Coupon and the British General Election of 1918’, The Journal of Modern History, March 1964 Google Scholar.
62 Addison, C., Politics from Within, London, 1924, Vol. II, Ch. XII.Google Scholar
63 See LordBeaverbrook, , The Decline and Fall of Lloyd George, London, 1963, pp. 213 Google Scholar et seq.
64 Lord Samuel, Memoirs, London, 1945, p. 205.
65 Amery, L. S., Life, Vol. III, p. 67 Google Scholar.
66 Ibid., p. 70.
67 See Bassett, 1931, Chs. XIV and XVI.
68 It is assumed that the view that the measures instituted by the national government immediately after its formation were measures originally favoured only by the conservatives (‘their own goods under other people’s labels’) can be held only in ignorance of the events prior to the creation of the national government. See Bassett, 1931, passim.
69 It is also necessary to bear in mind that no general election was held between 1935 and 1945.
70 For a useful discussion of the implicit ‘contract’ between the government and the working classes (promises of social reform in return for sacrifice for the war effort) see IIISaloma, J.L., Conservatism and the Welfare State, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard, 1958 Google Scholar.
71 See MacCallum, R.B. and Readman, A., The British General Election of 1945, London, 1946 Google Scholar.
72 For a serious discussion of this dominance, see Crick, B., ‘Some Reflections on the Late General Election’, Public Law, London, Spring 1960 Google Scholar.
73 See above, pp. 20-1.
74 See above, p. 12.
75 See Addison, op. cit., Vol. I, Ch. XVIII.
76 The conservan ve withdrawal from the coalition in 1922 was decided not by a vote on the floor of the House, but by a meeting of conservative MPs and peers at the Carlton Club. See Lord Beaverbrook, op. cit., Ch. X.
77 For an account of the ‘Maurice’ debate, see Blake, op. cit., Ch. XXIII. Since during the first world war so much depended on displaying a publicly united parliament, and since so little governmental action was open to public opposition in these circumstances, the identification of an ‘opposition’ was problematical; but Asquith was, clearly, dissatisfied after 1916. These factors hindered him in his only attempt to publicize this discontent, without ever causing much discomfort in the ministry.
78 Bassett, 1931, p. 329. In the period between the formation of the national government and the election, the opposition mustered between 200 and 250 votes.
79 See above, p. 8.
80 See Bassett, 1931, p. 294.
81 See Blake, op. cit., pp. 334-8.
82 Bolingbroke, , The Spirit of Patriotism, London, 1742, p. 61 Google Scholar.
83 It is the curious failure to recognize the incompatibility between ‘party’ and ‘institutional’ opposition that renders much of the current literature on parlia mentary reform explanatorily defective. See, for example, B. Crick, Reform, op. cit. passim.
84 Eaves, J., Parliament and the Executive in Britain, 1939-1951, London, 1957, p. 23 Google Scholar.
85 For evidence of the extent to which the Scrutiny Committee was at that time seen as a substitute for party opposition, see ibid., pp. 106-20.
86 It is relevant to this discussion to note that British participation in the first world war was opposed by a considerable section of the community. It was this division of opinion which made opposition in the House so delicate a matter, even for those whose criticisms of the government concerned the management, rather than the desirability of, the war. Pro-war hysteria, and the much-emphasized need to maintain an unbroken facade of parliamentary unity were to a great extent explicable as attempts to overwhelm or ignore the opposition in the country.
87 The argument that ‘party government’ is a formal constitutional rule is put forward, for example, by Moodie, G. C., ‘The Monarch and the Selection of a Prime Minister’, Political Studies, London, Vol. V, 1957 Google Scholar.
88 For a cogent account of the primacy of ‘constitution’ over ‘party’, see Bassett, R., The Essentials of Parliamentary Democracy, 2nd ed., London, 1964, pp. 179 Google Scholar et seq.