Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 December 2017
The article analyses the interplay between agency problems at various stages in the parliamentary chain of delegation and external constraints related to corporatist negotiations in Norwegian agricultural policymaking. The combination of minority government and MPs tending to have more extreme preferences than the voters, and corporatist integration of specialized interests, may lead to an accumulation of agency costs. However, the study shows that we need to specify carefully the conditions under which this will occur. The article is based on official policy documents and a survey of citizens.
Hilmar Rommetvedt is Head of Research at the International Research Institute of Stavanger, and Adjunct Professor at the University of Stavanger. Contact email: hilmar.rommetvedt@iris.no.
Frode Veggeland is Professor at the University of Oslo and Adjunct Research Professor at the Norwegian Institute of Bioeconomy Research. Contact email: frode.veggeland@medisin.uio.no.