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LET'S WORK TOGETHER! ECONOMIC COOPERATION, SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND CHANCES OF SOCIAL MOBILITY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 September 2014

Marloes Deene
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In the early fourth century bc, a slave of possibly Phoenician origin, called Pasion, was owned by the Athenian bankers Antisthenes and Archestratos (Dem. 36.43). During the course of his slavery, Pasion quickly rose to become the trusted manager of his owners' money-changing and banking firm in Piraeus. After having been manumitted (Dem. 36.48), he took over the running of this bank (Isocr. 17, passim), became a very successful banker, and established a shield factory. His businesses prospered to the extent that by the time of his death in 370/369 he had assembled a fortune estimated at around 70 talents. With this money, Pasion made a number of generous benefactions to the Athenians, as a reward for which the Athenians passed a decree in his favour granting him a gold crown and the right of citizenship to him and his descendants ([Dem.] 59.2). As soon as he received his grant of citizenship, Pasion started to make use of his citizen rights and invested in real property. Although he was probably never actively involved in politics, he is known to have been a close friend of several members of the political elite, such as Agyrrhius of Collyte (Isocr. 17.31) and Callistratus of Aphnida (Dem. 49.47). Moreover, he had dealings with important public figures, such as Timotheus, son of Conon (Dem. 49, passim).

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Research Article
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Greece & Rome , Volume 61 , Issue 2 , October 2014 , pp. 152 - 173
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Copyright © The Classical Association 2014 

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References

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8 Thus, in [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 2.18, the so-called Old Oligarch reports how Attic comedy attacks not only well-born Athenians but also common citizens seeking to rise above their standing. Similarly, Aristotle describes how men tend not to be made indignant and envious by attainable virtues, such as courage and justices, but rather by attributes which they cannot hope to acquire, especially wealth and power (Rhet. 1387a6–15). Eur. Suppl. 176 and Thuc. 2.40.1 are notable exceptions, stating it to be wise or honourable to seek economic advancement through honest, hard work.

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11 Just as social mobility is referred to in this article as a multifaceted concept, so the concept of social status should be interpreted as the position which one holds in a given society and which can be influenced by birth, wealth, honorific assets, legal status, social standing or connections, etc. Contrary to how the concept has been used in Hunter, V. J. and Edmondson, J. C., Law and Social Status in Classical Athens (Oxford, 2000)Google Scholar, it should not be equated with legal status.

12 Müller (n. 4), 9918–24.

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22 Lysias' family property was worth 70 talents before 404 bce, which gave him the reputation of being ‘the richest metic in Athens’ (P.Oxy. XIII, 1606, line 30, 153–5).

23 Among them were, for instance, Charmantides of Paeania (Davies [n. 1], no. 15502); Plato's own brothers Euthydemus and Glaucon (Davies [n. 1], no. 8792 X), who were descendants of Solon, close relatives of the oligarchic leaders Charmides and Critias, and stepsons of the Periclean democratic eminence Pyrilampes; Nicaretus; the impoverished Socrates; the sophist Thrasymachus; and Cleitophon son of Aristonymus, who is usually identified as a supporter of the oligarchic regime of 411 ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 34).

24 Whitehead (n. 3), 150, and see also 120.

25 For the agora as respectively a ‘democratic’ or ‘free space’, see Millett, P., ‘Encounters in the Agora’, in Cartledge, P., Millett, P., and von Reden, S., Kosmos. Essays in Order, Conflict and Community in Classical Athens (Cambridge, 2002), 220Google Scholar; Vlassopoulos (n. 15), 38. For the deep politicization of Athenian culture as a result of this particular ‘free space’, see Vlassopoulos (n. 15), 45–7.

26 See Eubulus in Ath. 12.640b–c (= Kock ii.190).

27 Millett (n. 25), 215. For a selection of attestations of the merging of businesses in the agora, see Wycherley, R. E., The Athenian Agora. Results of Excavations Conducted. Vol. 3. Literary and Epigraphical Testimonia (Princeton, NJ, 1957)Google Scholar. See also Wycherley, R. E., ‘The Market of Athens’, G&R 3.1 (1956), 2–23Google Scholar.

28 Notwithstanding the fragmentary nature of surviving records, metics are attested in more than forty separate demes scattered around Attica, including many rural, while fewer than 20 per cent appear to have lived in the Piraeus: see Whitehead, D., The Demes of Attica, 508/7–ca. 250 b.c. A Political and Social Study (Princeton, NJ, 1986), 82–5Google Scholar; Cohen (n. 16), 122–3, esp. n. 106. For a detailed account of the demes, see – in addition to Whitehead (this note) – the complementary study by Osborne, R., Demos. The Discovery of Classical Attika (Cambridge, 1985)Google Scholar.

29 IG II2 1590.

30 Despite the fact that, throughout the classical period, many Athenian demesmen moved away from their ancestral demes (Damsgaard-Madsen, A., ‘Attic Funeral Inscriptions: Their Use as Historical Sources and Some Preliminary Results’, in Christiansen, E., Damsgaard-Madsen, A., and Hallager, E. [eds.], Studies in Ancient History and Numismatics Presented to Rudi Thomsen [Aarhus, 1988], 55–68Google Scholar; Osborne, R., ‘The Potential Mobility of Human Populations’, OJA 10 [1991], 231–52Google Scholar; Taylor, C., ‘A New Political World’, in Osborne, R. [ed.], Debating the Athenian Cultural Revolution. Art, Literature, and Politics, 430–380 bc [Cambridge, 2007], 84–7Google Scholar; Taylor, C., ‘Migration and the Demes of Attica’, in Holleran, C. and Pudsey, A. [eds.], Demography and the Graeco-Roman World. New Insights and Approaches [Cambridge, 2011], 117–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar), the Athenians who had moved oikos still maintained strong ties with their ancestral demes. See Cohen (n. 16), 49–78 and 104–29, for an examination of the heterogeneity of the Athenian and deme community.

31 This is acknowledged by Hansen, M. H., ‘The Polis as an Urban Centre: The Literary and Epigraphical Evidence’, in Hansen, M. H. (ed.), The Polis as an Urban Centre and as a Political Community (Copenhagen, 1997), 15Google Scholar; and by Fisher, N., ‘Citizens, Foreigners and Slaves in Greek Society’, in Kinzl, K. H. (ed.), A Companion to the Classical Greek World (Oxford, 2010), 343Google Scholar.

32 Roberts, J. W., City of Sokrates. An Introduction to Classical Athens (London, 1998), 27Google Scholar.

33 The assertion in Miller, W., Greece and the Greeks. A Survey of Greek Civilization (New York, 1941), 133Google Scholar, that the Cynosarges, one of the three gymnasia in Athens, was reserved for nothoi (those of illegitimate birth) and metics, thus suggesting that metics were not allowed in other gymnasia, is based on no evidence at all. On the contrary, not only do foreigners appear to have visited other gymnasia, but well-born Athenians are also known to have visited the Cynosarges (And. 1.61; Ps.-Plut. Ax. 364a).

34 Morris, I., Burial and Ancient Society. The Rise of the Greek City-state (Cambridge, 1987) 54Google Scholar; Morris, I., ‘The Archaeology of Ancestors: The Saxe-Goldstein Hypothesis Revisited’, CArchJ 1 (1991), 157–8Google Scholar.

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37 In Athenian law, the truth of an allegation was not a sufficient defence. See Todd (n. 10), 260.

38 Bücher, K., Hansay, A., and Pirenne, H., Études d'histoire et d'économie politique (Brussels, 1901), ;249–84Google Scholar; Weber, M., ‘Die Stadt’, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft 47 (1921), 756Google Scholar; Weber, M., Agrarverhältnisse im Altertum (Tübingen, 1924), 32–3Google Scholar.

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40 Millett, P., ‘Maritime Loans and the Structure of Credit in Fourth-century Athens’, in Garnsey, P., Hopkins, K., and Whittaker, C. R. (eds.), Trade in the Ancient Economy (Berkeley, CA, 1983)Google Scholar, 38; C. Mossé, ‘The “World of the Emporium” in the Private Speeches of Demosthenes’, in ibid., 53–63; Hansen, M. V., ‘Athenian Maritime Trade in the 4th Century b.c.: Operation and Finance’, C&M 35 (1984), 88 and 92 n. 74Google Scholar; also Oertel's much earlier criticism in his review of Hasebroek (n. 39), Deutsche Literaturzeitung 49 (1928), 1624–5Google Scholar In fourth-century Athens in particular, numerous Athenians were self-employed in manufacturing and trade: see Ehrenberg, V., The People of Aristophanes. A Sociology of Old Attic Comedy (Oxford, 1943), 162Google Scholar; Hopper, R. J., Trade and Industry in Classical Greece (London, 1979), 140Google Scholar; Finley, M. I., Economy and Society in Ancient Greece, ed. Saller, R. P. and Shaw, B. D. (London, 1981), 99Google Scholar; Davies (n. 7), 38–72; Osborne, R., ‘The Economics and Politics of Slavery at Athens’, in Powell, A. (ed.), The Greek World (London, 1995), 30Google Scholar; Reed, C. M., Maritime Traders in the Ancient Greek World (Cambridge, 2003), 27–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a contemporary attestation of Athenian citizens exercising trade, see Xen. Mem. 3.73.6. Many others were professionally engaged in entrepreneurial activities: see Garnsey, P., Non-slave Labour in the Greco-Roman World (Cambridge, 1980)Google Scholar; Davies (n. 7), 38–72; Thompson, W. E., ‘The Athenian Entrepreneur’, AC 51 (1983), 53–85Google Scholar.

41 Apollodorus moved from Piraeus to the countryside after his father's death (Dem. 53.4) and seems to have embraced the rather extravagant lifestyle and ideology of the long-standing landed Athenian elite (Dem. 36.8, 45). See Trevett (n. 1), 164–79; Deene (n. 3), 169–74, for discussion.

42 Davies (n. 7), 37–8. The mixed holdings of Apollodorus' own father, Pasion, of Arizelus of Sphettus (Aeschin. 1.97–101), of Ciron (Davies [n. 1], no. 8443), and of Euctemon of Cephisia (ibid., no. 15164) appear to have been standard for the fourth-century propertied class, while those of men such as Demosthenes the elder (ibid., no. 3597.XIII) and of Diodotus (ibid., no. 3885) were probably exceptional.

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44 Aristotle's disapproval of the so-called ‘market mob’ (agoraios ochlos), allegedly based on the grounds that their low-status lifestyle does not encourage proper virtues (Pol. 1328b40), reverberates in several texts written by and for the Athenian elite, assuming that men operating outside the norms of philia relationships were inclined towards deceit (e.g. Pl. Resp. 289e and 371c; Prt. 347c; Xen. Cyr. 1.2.3; Mem. 3.7.5). See Millett (n. 25), 218–19.

45 An exception is without any doubt the Athenian army. For the participation by metics in the Athenian armed forces, see Whitehead (n. 3), 83–6; Cohen (n. 16), 73–4; Adak (n. 15), 67–72; Engen, D. T., Honor and Profit. Athenian Trade Policy and the Economy and Society of Greece, 415–307 b.c.e. (Ann Arbor, MI, 2010), 197–202Google Scholar.

46 For ‘the tragedy of the commons’ as a sociological concept, see Hardin, G., ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, Science 162 (1986), 1243–8Google Scholar. The ‘prisoner's dilemma’ as a fundamental problem in game theory was originally framed by Flood and Dresher in 1950. Tucker formalized the game with prison sentence payoffs and named it the ‘prisoner's dilemma’ (see Poundstone, W., Prisoner's Dilemma [New York, 1993]Google Scholar, for discussion).

47 For the use of social networks for collecting information among Athenian citizens, see Ober, J., Democracy and Knowledge. Innovation and Learning in Classical Athens (Princeton, NJ, 2008), 118–67Google Scholar.

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49 See e.g. Scheidel, W., Morris, I., and Saller, R. P. (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World (Cambridge, 2007), 374–5CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ober (n. 47), 17, 23–4. The concept of ‘transaction costs’ is most comprehensively described by North (n. 48), 27, as ‘the costs of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs of protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreements’. For transaction-cost economics, see Williamson, O. E., ‘The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach’, American Journal of Sociology 87 (1981), 548–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Coase, R. H., The Firm, the Market, and the Law (Chicago, IL, 1988)Google Scholar; Benkler, Y., The Wealth of Networks. How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom (New Haven, CT, 2006), 106–16Google Scholar.

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51 As early as 1985, Granovetter, M., ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness’, American Journal of Sociology 91.3 (1985), 481–510CrossRefGoogle Scholar, condemned ‘new institutional economics’ because of its failure to acknowledge the importance of solid personal relations and networks of relations – what he called ‘embeddedness’ – in generating trust, in establishing expectations, and in creating and enforcing norms.

52 It is known that the Athenians were remarkably prosperous on a per capita basis, and much wealthier than they had formerly been: Morris, I., ‘Economic Growth in Ancient Greece’, Journal of the Institute of Theoretical Economics 160.4 (2004), 709–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Morris, I., ‘Archaeology, Standards of Living, and Greek Economic History’, in Manning, J. G. and Morris, I. (eds.), The Ancient Economy. Evidence and Models (Stanford, CA, 2005), 91–126Google Scholar; Kron, G., ‘Anthropometry, Physical Anthropology, and the Reconstruction of Ancient Health, Nutrition, and Living Standards’, Historia 54 (2005), 68–83Google Scholar; S. von Reden, ‘Consumption’, in Scheidel, Morris, and Saller (n. 49), table 15.1. By the 330s, Athenian revenues appear to have been equal to or higher than what they had been in the 430s, at the height of the empire (for Athenian fourth-century prosperity and its relationship to overseas trade, see Burke, E. M., ‘Lycurgan Finances’, GRBS 26 [1985], 251–6Google Scholar; Burke, E. M., ‘The Economy of Athens in the Classical Era: Some Adjustments to the Primitivist Model’, TAPhS 122 [1992], 199–226Google Scholar). Moreover, the polis again actively financed building projects and provided welfare benefits for its citizens (Ober [n. 47], 65–6, 254–58), while the earnings of both skilled and unskilled labourers were remarkably high when compared to other pre-industrial societies (Scheidel, W., ‘Real Wages in Early Economies: Evidence for Living Standards from 1800 bce to 1300 ce’, JESHO 53.3 [2010], 425–62Google Scholar).

53 IG II² 2934: οἱ πλυνῆς : Νύμφαις : εὐξάμενοι : ἀνέθεσαν : καὶ θεοῖς πᾶσιν Ζωαγόρας : <Ζ > ωκύπρου : Ζώκυπρος : Ζωαγόρου : Θάλλος : Λεύκη Σωκράτης Πολυκράτους : Ἀπολλοφάνης : Εὐπορίωνος : Σωσίστρατος Μάνης : Μυρρίνη : Σωσίας : Σωσιγένης : Μίδας (‘To the nymphs and all the gods, fulfilling a vow, the fullers set up this tablet: Zoagoras the son of Zokypros, Zokypros the son of Zoagoras, Thallos, Leuke, Sokrates son of Polykrates, Apollophanes, the son of Euporion, Sosistratos, Manes, Myrrhine, Sosias, Sosigenes, Midas’). See Vlassopoulos, K., ‘Two Images of Ancient Slavery: The “Living Tool” and the Koinônia’, in Herrmann-Otto, E. (ed.), Sklaverei und Zwangsarbeit zwischen Akzeptanz und Widerstand (Hildesheim, 2011), 467–8Google Scholar, for discussion.

54 Although all of these associations had some connection to cult worship, Leiwo, M., ‘Religion, or Other Reasons? Private Associations in Athens’, in Frösén, J. (ed.), Early Hellenistic Athens. Symptoms of Change (Helsinki, 1997), 103–18Google Scholar, considers their main purpose to have been not religion but synousia, with common meals, and social and financial support. According to him, the connection to a cult was necessitated by the lack of any (legal) model for other kinds of associations. Others scholars persist in believing that the religious meaning of these associations must have been primary, while other aims, such as economic or social support, were of minor importance: see Vondeling, J., Eranos (Groningen, 1961), 261Google Scholar; Millett (n. 7), 151. Nevertheless, even if their primary purpose was not necessarily economic in nature, membership of these religious associations which cut across economic strata and class boundaries might still have been economically fruitful.

55 See Adkins, A. W. H., ‘Friendship and Self-sufficiency in Homer and Aristotle’, CQ 13 (1963), 30–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Herman, G., Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City (Cambridge, 1987)Google Scholar; Millett (n. 7), 109–26; Konstan, D., ‘Greek Friendship’, AJPh 117 (1996), 71–94Google Scholar; Konstan, D., Friendship in the Classical World (Cambridge, 1997), 1–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mitchell, P., ‘Philia, Eunoia and the Greek Interstate Relations’, Antichthon 31 (1997), 28–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Konstan, D., ‘Reciprocity and Friendship’, in Gill, C., Postlewaite, N., and Seaford, R. (eds.), Reciprocity in Ancient Greece (Oxford, 1998), 279–301Google Scholar, for discussion.

56 Aristotle considered the Greek polis to be both a community or association (koinonia) and a network of interconnecting koinoniai. For an analysis of the Greek city in view of the Aristotelian concept of koinonia, see Murray, O., ‘Polis and Politeia in Aristotle’, in Hansen, M. H. (ed.), The Ancient Greek City-state (Copenhagen, 1993), 197–210Google Scholar; J. Ober, ‘The Polis as a Society: Aristotle, John Rawls and the Athenian Social Contract’, in ibid.), 129–60; Vlassopoulos, K., ‘Beyond and Below the Polis: Networks, Associations, and the Writing of Greek History’, MHR 22.1 (2007), 11–22Google Scholar.

57 Granovetter (n. 51), 485–7; Granovetter, M. and Swedberg, R., The Sociology of Economic Life (Oxford, 1992), 12Google Scholar; Sahlins, M. D., Culture and Practical Reason (Chicago, IL, 1976), 55–6Google Scholar.

58 For a detailed discussion of the implications of this kind of intermingling in Athenian society, see Deene, M., Aspects of Social Mobility in Classical Athens (Ghent, 2013), 221–52Google Scholar.

59 An impression of the kind of intermingling which this state of affairs may have resulted in, might most vividly be obtained when considering the deme Rhamnous, where the arguably exceptional circumstances, particularly well attested for the latter half of the third century, present a vivid picture of the mingling of highly different individuals, which, as acknowledged by R. Osborne, ‘must have been an invariable characteristic of life in classical and Hellenistic Athens’. In Rhamnous, the continuously changing population seems to have formed groups and taken corporate actions easily, despite being unclassifiable in terms of conventional legal or social categories. While connecting in order to cooperate, residents at Rhamnous openly disregarded both the formal and informal divisions within Athenian society, such as divisions of legal status (most importantly between citizen and non-citizen), wealth, occupation, etc. See Osborne, R., ‘The Demos and its Divisions in Classical Athens’, in Murray, O. and Price, S. R. F. (eds.), The Greek City. From Homer to Alexander (Oxford, 1990), 284–5Google Scholar, for discussion.

60 For the assertion that in a networked structure, the holes between solidly linked sub-networks are points of entrepreneurial opportunity because the individuals who bridge those holes gain social capital, see Burt, R. S., Structural Holes. The Social Structure of Competition (Cambridge, MA, and London, 1992)Google Scholar; Burt, R. S., ‘The Contingent Value of Social Capital’, Administrative Science Quarterly 42 (1997), 355–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Burt, R. S., Brokerage and Closure. An Introduction to Social Capital (Oxford, 2005), 10–57Google Scholar.

61 The amount of information that we have concerning the granting of timai to both citizen and non-citizens is relatively abundant. Decisions of honour-granting institutions, such as the council or the assembly, phylai, demes, and other associations, to honour certain individuals for their services towards the state can be traced down in honorary decrees, private dedications established by former honorands, and literary texts. For collections of fifth- and fourth-century honorary decrees, see Henry, A. S., Honours and Privileges in Athenian Decrees. The Principal Formulae of Athenian Honorary Decrees (Hildesheim and New York, 1983)Google Scholar; Veligianni-Terzi, C., Wertbegriffe in den attischen Ehrendekreten der klassischen Zeit (Stuttgart, 1997), 14–151Google Scholar; Lambert, S. D., ‘Athenian State Laws and Decrees 352/1–322/1: I. Decrees Honouring Athenians’, ZPE 150 (2004), 85–112Google Scholar; Lambert, S. D., ‘Athenian State Laws and Decrees, 352/1–322/1: III. Decrees Honouring Foreigners. A. Citizenship, Proxeny and Euergesy’, ZPE 158 (2006), 115–58Google Scholar; Lambert, S. D., ‘Athenian State Laws and Decrees, 352/1–322/1: III. Decrees Honouring Foreigners. B. Other Awards’, ZPE 159 (2007), 101–54Google Scholar; Lambert, S. D., Inscribed Athenian Laws and Decrees 352/1–322/1 bc (Leiden, 2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an overview of the private dedications recording grants of honours and privileges, see Veligianni-Terzi (this note), 152–62. For recent discussions of the granting of timai to non-citizens (including metics), see in particular Adak (n. 15); Engen (n. 45); Deene (n. 58), 144–62.

62 Gauthier, P., Les Cités grecques et leurs bienfaiteurs (Athens and Paris, 1985), 83 ff. and 184 ffGoogle Scholar.; Zelnick-Abramowitz, R., ‘Supplication and Request: Application by Foreigners to the Athenian Polis’, Mnemosyne 51.5 (1998), 554–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Adak (n. 15), 196–7. The only honour which could not be requested was the grant of citizenship: see Osborne (n. 2), iv.147.

63 According to Zelnick-Abramowitz (n. 62), 557, official requests differed from private requests in that official emissaries according to the customary law had access to the boule and to the ekklesia.

64 For grants of prosodos, see IG I³ 28.16–18 (450–440); I³ 55.18 (c. 431); I³ 70.9–11 (c. 430–420); I³ 159.20–7 (c. 430); I³ 65.17–20 (c. 427/426); I³ 73 (424/3); I³ 101 I.37–9 (410/409); II² 1.72–3 (403/402); II² 145 I.4–5 (403/402); SEG 14.36.6–7 (c. 400); IG II² 86 (early fourth century); II² 24b.10–12 (c. 387/386?); Pecirka 29/31.9–13 (c. 380–370); IG II² 74 (ante 378/377); II² 180.10–15 (c. 375–350); II² 103 (369/368); II² 107 (368/367); II² 151 (ante 353/352); II² 185 (ante 353/352); II² 660 I.13–15 (c. 350–300?); II² 579.8–12 (c. 350–300?); II² 1186 (mid-fourth century); II² 226.14–17 (c. 343/342); II² 238.b (338/337); II² 426 (336–334); SEG 19.119.15–20 (c. 334–330); Hesp. 29.81–157 + IG II2 564 (c. 329–322); IG II² 549 + 306 (323/322?); II² 448 II (323/322); II² 456b.19 (307/306); II² 505 (302/301); II² 571 (late fourth century).

65 See IG II² 109, line 9 (363/362); II² 226, lines 34–5 (342); II² 408, lines 6–8 (ante 330).

66 Zelnick-Abramowitz (n. 62), 555–62; Gauthier (n. 62), 181 f. Gauthier believes that, since some of the inscriptions do not refer to the involvement of citizens, foreigners could also appear on their own in the boule or ekklesia in order to submit or defend their requests (ibid., 183 f., 187 f.). See also the criticism by Zelnick-Abramowitz, R., Not Wholly Free. The Concept of Manumission and the Status of Manumitted Slaves in the Ancient Greek World (Leiden, 2005), 560Google Scholar.

67 For the citation, see Whitehead (n. 3), 90. On connections between Athenian politicians and foreigners and on the motives for moving proxeny decrees, see Perlman, S., ‘A Note on the Political Implications of Proxenia in the Fourth Century b.c.’, CQ 8 (1958), 185–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

68 For multiplex relationships, see Coleman, J., ‘Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital’, American Journal of Sociology 94 Suppl. (1988), 95–120CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The fact that membership to an association cut across both economic strata and legal stratus groups has led some scholars to consider corporate entities and associations as being characterized by clientelistic relationships: see Gallant, T. W., Risk and Survival in Ancient Greece. Reconstructing the Rural Domestic Economy (Cambridge, 1991), 143–69Google Scholar; Arnaoutoglou, I., ‘Associations and Patronage in Ancient Athens’, AncSoc 25 (1994), 5–17Google Scholar. However, the fact that the business success of Athenian citizens' depended on the cooperative attitude of and sustainable corporate networks with their non-citizen colleagues refutes the assumption that all of these relationships between citizens and non-citizens were automatically of asymmetrical nature.

69 Cohen (n. 15), 65–6.

70 This may be one of the explanations behind the observation that, although bankers were not the only businessmen who successfully used their gains in order to obtain Athenian citizenship (e.g. the salt-fish seller Chaerephilus: see Davies [n. 1], no. 15128), they above all appear – if one is allowed to make any conclusion concerning the matter from the scant amount of evidence – to have been likely to be candidates for this rarest and most valuable of all timai that could be conferred upon non-citizens. See, for instance, the lives of Pasion (ibid., no. 11672; Osborne [n. 2], T30), Pasion's ex-slave Phormion (Davies [n. 1], no. 11675.IX; Osborne [n. 2], T48), Conon (Osborne [n. 2], T81), and Epigenes (ibid., T80). Additionally, it has been presumed that the trierarch Aristolochus of Erchia was the same man as the banker Aristolochus of Dem. 45.63 (Davies [n. 1], no. 1946), and that the victorious choregos Timodemus is to be identified with the banker Timodemus of Dem. 36.29, 50 (ibid., no. 13674). See also Davies (n. 7), 65–6; Cohen (n. 15), 88–9; Osborne (n. 2), iv.196.

71 [Lys.] 8 was presumably never intended for a law court, but may have been composed to address the members of the association of which the speaker (i.e. possibly Lysias himself) was a member.