Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gvvz8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T10:12:24.110Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Food for Thought: Systems of Categorization in Leviticus 11*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2008

Naphtali S. Meshel
Naphtali S. Meshel*
Affiliation:
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

In two interconnected theoretical works published in 1962, Lévi-Strauss argued that the tendency among primitive societies to formulate animal classification systems and to express these systems ritually cannot be explained as a side-effect of social classification, as Durkheim and Mauss had argued, nor can it be explained on the narrow materialistic grounds posited by Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski. The negative evidence adduced by Lévi-Strauss is empirical: animal classification systems are neither limited to societies in which there exists a fixed correlation between social groups and animal species, nor do they pertain to species that are of significant material or symbolic value to the classifying culture. According to Lévi-Strauss, the ritual expression of the mental act of classification functions like a language, containing “stressed” and “unstressed” elements and aiming to convey theoretical messages.

Type
ARTICLES
Information
Harvard Theological Review , Volume 101 , Issue 2 , April 2008 , pp. 203 - 229
Copyright
Copyright © President and fellows of Harvard college 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1  Claude Lévi-Strauss, Le Totémisme aujourd'hui (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962); translated into English by Rodney Needham as Totemism (Boston: Beacon, 1963); and idem, La Pensée sauvage (Paris: Plon, 1962), translated into English anonymously as The Savage Mind (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966).

2 Émile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, Primitive Classification (trans. Rodney Needham; London: Cohen and West, 1963), originally published as “De quelques formes primitives de classification: contribution à l'étude des représentations collectives,” Année Sociologique 6 (1903) 1–72.

3 A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, “The Sociological Theory of Totemism,” in Structure and Function in Primitive Society (London: Cohen and West, 1952) 117–32; Bronislaw Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays (Boston: Beacon, 1948) 27–28; Lévi-Strauss, Totemism, 56–71; The Savage Mind, 3.

4 Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, 103.

5 Four years after the publication of these essays, and without explicitly referring to them, Mary Douglas (Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Pollution and Taboo [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966]) attempted to demonstrate how such a system of categorization might serve as a medium for conveying an ideological or religious message. Since 1966, Douglas has reformulated and revised several of the insights of Purity and Danger, without abandoning the general theory regarding the relation between impurity and anomaly.

6 Lévi-Strauss, Totemism, 135–36. The core of this argument was already intimated by Durkheim and Mauss (Primitive Classification, 7–8). For a lucid discussion of the problem see Edmund Leach, “Anthropological Aspects of Language: Animal Categories and Verbal Abuse,” in New Directions in the Study of Language (ed. E. H. Lenneberg; Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964) 34–36.

7 According to Daniel Sperber (“Pourquoi les animaux parfaits, les hybrides et les monstres sont-ils bons à penser symboliquement?,” L'Homme 15 [1975] 5–34), taxonomy differs from other systems of classification in that the categorization of each element is exclusive and absolute: a single element cannot belong to two distinct categories simultaneously (unless one is a subset of the other), nor can it belong to a particular category to a greater or lesser extent. Empirical findings show that most known societies—modern as well as primitive—prefer taxonomy to cross-classification for animal categorization.

8 The original context of this well-known aphorism is Lévi-Strauss's criticism (Totémisme, 128) of the materialistic interpretation offered by Radcliffe-Brown: “On comprend enfin que les espèces naturelles ne sont pas choisies parce que 'bonnes à manger' mais parce que 'bonnes à penser.' ” The wording used above, “a useful model for differentiating thought” demands clarification in light of the general context of Lévi-Strauss's writings. Animal classification systems are not a model external to logic, which logic imitates; rather, thinking with the aid of animal species and ritual values, like the performance of mathematical operations using algebraic variables and operators, is an expression of the mental operation itself.

9 Marvin Harris, Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches (New York: Vintage Books, 1974); idem, Cultural Materialism (New York: Random House, 1979); idem, Good to Eat: Riddles of Food and Culture (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985).

10 S. J. Tambiah, “Animals are Good to Think and Good to Prohibit,” Ethnology 8 (1969) 453. Another problem is the lack of clarity regarding the question, what exactly is meant by les espèces naturelles, regarding the question of the so-called totemism. At times, it would seem that the term is designed to refer narrowly to fauna (e.g., Lévi-Strauss, Totemism, 20), but in many cases it obviously includes flora as well, in accordance with the empirical data (17, and the distinction regarding the Tikopia, 29).

11 Totemism, 100–1. A similar intuition seems to underlie Genesis Rabbah 17, 4 (on Gen 2:19), which views the naming of the animals as an act which established human subjugation of the animal world.

12 Biblical law expressly distinguishes between the categories “pure” and “impure,” and the stems and are found, with diverse semantic values, throughout Biblical literature. By contrast, there is no precise legal terminology in Biblical Hebrew for the categories “prohibited” and “permitted” (MH and are not attested in this sense in BH), although these legal categories do underlie Biblical legislation and may serve as an organizing principle of a set of rules (e.g., Lev 21:1–4). Biblical law distinguishes between these categories by juxtaposing two verbal clauses, e.g., two yiqtōl verbs, one of which is negated (see Exod 12:16; Deut 23:21a); or the form w eqātal . . . welō yiqtōl (Deut 23:25, 26); see GKC §107s, and Aba Bendavid, Biblical Hebrew and Mishnaic Hebrew (Hebrew: Leshon mikra u-leshon hakhamim; 2 vols.; 2d ed.; Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1967–1971) 2.518. The adjectives “permitted” and “prohibited” may be formulated periphrastically, e.g., (Lev 17:13); (11:39) or (as opposed to 11:47, compare Lev 4:2,13, 22, 27)

13 Paul Ricœur, The Symbolism of Evil (trans. Emerson Buchanan; Religious Perspectives 17; New York: Harper and Row, 1967) 31: “The world of defilement is a world anterior to the distinction between the ethical and the physical.”

14 The term “Priestly” (capitalized) will be used in what follows to mean “pertaining to the document P (as distinct from H),” whereas the term “priestly” will be used in a more inclusive sense, to include H as well.

15 David P. Wright, “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” in Priesthood and Cult in Ancient Israel (ed. Gary A. Anderson and Saul M. Olyan; JSOTSup 125; Sheffield: JSOT, 1991) 150–81. An earlier attempt is Frymer-Kensky's distinction between “moral” and “ritual” impurities (Tikva Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification and Purgation in Biblical Israel,” in The Word of the Lord Shall Go Forth: Essays in Honor of David Noel Freedman in Celebration of his Sixtieth Birthday [ed. Carol L. Meyers and M. O'Connor; Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1983] 399–413 and, with slight changes, eadem, “Pollution and Sacrifice: An Homage to Jacob Milgrom” [Seminar paper for the SBL Annual Meeting, 2001]). The same terminology is adopted by Jonathan Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 21–42. Both Wright and Frymer-Kensky echo D. Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus übersetzt und erklärt (2 vols.; Berlin: M. Poppelauer, 1905–1906), 1.340.

16 Milgrom has elaborated on this point extensively; the locus classicus of this argument is perhaps Jacob Milgrom, “Israel's Sanctuary: The Priestly 'Picture of Dorian Gray' ” RB 83 (1976): 390–99. Although the term is not explicitly mentioned in the sacrificial instructions in Leviticus 4–5, Leviticus 16 explicitly states that the blood sprinkled “inside the veil” (v. 15) and elsewhere in the Tent of Meeting (16b) is used to purge () the adytum and the Tent “of the pollutions () and transgressions of the Israelites, including all of their sins” (v. 16). For a detailed discussion and evaluation of Milgrom's theory see Roy Gane, Cult and Character: Purification Offerings, Day of Atonement, and Theodicy (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2005).

17 See Lev 12:6–8; 14:19, 31; 15:15–30; 16; Num 6:11. Apparently, tolerated impurities within the camp affect the sanctum from a distance immediately, even if the impurity is removed from the individual (or vessel) soon after defilement. However, in order to minimize its effect, impure individuals are required to undergo purification as soon as possible, and if they fail to do so they pose a threat to the sanctum and to themselves (note the formula “he has defiled the Tent/Temple of YHWH,” Num 19:13, 20). It is possible that P makes no ontological distinction between the impurity which applies to individuals and vessels, and the impurity which spreads out to affect the sanctum, especially when the two occur simultaneously (e.g., from touching a corpse). However, functionally they are clearly distinct, as is evident from the diverse rituals for their eradication.

18 These laws assume that such flesh is impure, though this is not explicitly stated; see below, n. 70.

19 In other situations, impurity and the prohibition may coincide, though they are of a different order, e.g., in the case of sexual prohibitions involving also “tolerated” ritual impurity, which Biblical law may refer to, perhaps figuratively, as “defilement” (Lev 18:20, 23; Num 5:13).

20 Karl Elliger (Leviticus [HAT 1.4; Tübingen: Mohr, 1966] 150) correctly argues that, in contrast to other ritual impurities in the Bible, the ritual impurity attributed to animal species has “nicht immer religionsgeschichtliche Hintergründe.” Elliger, however, adopts a rather narrow definition of Religionsgeschichte here, limited to theological views. According to this particular view, he assumes, all other impurities hark back to a common intuition—proximity to the sphere of Death, which stands in contrast to the “Living God.” However, impurities stemming from death and bodily secretions, too, have a pre-theological history, and are in this sense no different from the “impurity” of animal species. Wright (“Spectrum,” 154, 165–69) includes this subsystem among the “death-related impurities,” but lists four reasons for regarding this group of impurities as exceptional within the spectrum of impurities. Clearly, the impurity of animal species is somewhat related to the general conceptions of impurity in ancient Israel, since impure species are not considered defiling while alive.

21 See Gen 7:2, 8, Lev 27:11, 27, Num 18:15, all of which refer to live animals.

22 Although all impurities discussed above are, strictly speaking, ritual, and though any system of categorization based upon them will be termed, in what follows, a “ritual classification system,” the terms “ritually impure/defiling” will be used narrowly, only with reference to those impurities which, as described above, accumulate in physical bodies and are removed by a fixed set of rituals such as bathing.

23 See Lev 11:8, 24b–25, 32. Furthermore, note that the term “their carcass” () and the pronoun “they” (masculine, i.e., the animals) are interchangeable (24b//26b [MT]; 33a//35aá; note the clarification “when they are dead” in vv. 31, 32; and Ibn-Ezra, The Commentary of Abraham ibn Ezra on the Pentateuch [trans. J. F. Schachter; vol. 3; Hoboken: Ktav, 1986] on v. 26). Martin Noth (Leviticus: A Commentary [trans. J. E. Anderson; OTL; London: SCM, 1965] 95) presumed that v. 26b refers to living beasts, but see Elliger, Leviticus, 152–53. LXX (or its Vorlage), apparently wishing to prevent such a misunderstanding, replaced in 26b by των θνçσéμαων αντων. In other ancient Near Eastern cultures, some animals were considered defiling while alive; see Herodotus, Historia 2.47; the Hittite “Instructions for Temple Officials,” (ANET 3 207–10); and James C. Moyer, “Hittite and Israelite Cultic Practices: A Selected Comparison,” in Scripture in Context (ed. William W. Hallo, James C. Moyer and Leo G. Perdue; vol. 2: More Essays on the Comparative Method; Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1983) 29–33. The Temple Scroll (46:1–3), according to Elisha Qimron's reasonable reconstruction (The Temple Scroll [Beer Sheva: Ben-Gurion University Press; Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 1996] 66), requires that impure birds be kept away from the temple precincts (see m. Mid 4.6). This implies not only that the author considered impure birds to be ritually defiling (contrary to Mishnaic halacha), but also that they were considered defiling even while alive.

24 Some data concerning the range of species commonly raised or hunted for food in different periods in ancient Israel, and concerning the more limited range of species commonly sacrificed, may be gleaned from historiographic and prophetic literature (e.g., Num 11:32, Judg 13:4, 7, 14, 1 Kgs 5:3, 2 Kgs 6:25, Isa 33:4, Hos 9:4). The general picture that emerges from such passages roughly accords with the custom in Middle and Late Bronze Canaanite cities, to the extent that it is known from the osteonic findings from these periods and from the textual evidence from Ugarit, mostly regarding large mammals. Regarding non-mammals, birds and fish, evidence is particularly scanty. For a zooarchaeological survey of osteonic findings in Palestinian and Syrian cities, see Anneke T. Clason and Hilke Buitenhuis, “Patterns in Animal Food Resources in the Bronze Age in the Orient,” in Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on the Archaeozoology of Southwestern Asia and Adjacent Areas(ed. H. Buitenhuis, L. Bartosiewicz and A. N. Choyke; Archaeozoology of the Near East 3; Groningen: ARC, 1988), 233–42. For a comprehensive summary, see Walter Houston, Purity and Monotheism: Clean and Unclean Animals in Biblical Law (JSOTSup 140; Sheffield: JSOT, 1993) 124–80.

25 This piece of evidence deserves a separate study. For a short survey of the relation between the two accounts of the Flood, see Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 1–15 (WBC; Waco: Word, 1987), 168.

26 John Skinner (A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Genesis [ICC; 2d ed.; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1930] 152) and Claus Westermann (Genesis 1–11 [trans. J. J. Scullion; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994] 428, following Gunkel, contra Dillmann) correctly assert that the J narrative accords with the history of religion better than does the P version. However, their assumption that, according to P, the distinction is an innovation of Israelite religion is incorrect. There are other considerations which lead P to ignore the distinction between pure and impure species in the Flood story; see Baruch J. Schwartz, The Holiness Legislation: Studies in the Priestly Code (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1999 [in Hebrew]) 79. In the Creation narratives, neither P nor J refer to this distinction; Pseudo-Jonathan, disturbed by this, supplied this extra piece of information (1:21, 24–25).

27 August Dillmann, Die Bücher Exodus und Leviticus (3d ed.; Leipzig: Hirzel, 1897) 525–26; S. R. Driver, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Deuteronomy (ICC; 3d ed., 1902; repr. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1951) 157, 163–64; Elliger (Leviticus, 143–44). It is possible that priestly literature was transmitted orally at first, and that the presumed common Vorlage never existed in writing (Houston, Purity, 64. However, the literal similarity between the two passages justifies the use of the term Vorlage, implying at least a fixed oral text. For a brief review of scholarly literature, see Willian L. Moran, “The Literary Connection between Lev 11:13–19 and Deut 14:12–18,” CBQ 28 (1966) 271–77; Meir Paran, Forms of the Priestly Style in the Pentateuch (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1989 [in Hebrew]) 340.

28 There is some disagreement among scholars regarding the precise difference between the holiness of priests and that of Israelites in H. According to Jacob Milgrom (Leviticus: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary [3 vols.; AB 3, 3A, 3B; New York: Doubleday, 1991–2001] 2:1803), H considered only the priests to be holy, but required lay Israelites to strive for holiness, which may be attained through obedience to YHWH. Saul M. Olyan (Rites and Rank: Hierarchy in Biblical Representations of Cult [Princeton: University Press, 2000] 121–22, 173–34) has argued against this that the holiness of lay Israelites cannot be merely potential in H, since YHWH is often described in H as continually sanctifying the Israelites. However, he admits that there is a difference, at least in degree, between the holiness of priests and that of lay Israelites in H, as the laws concerning the consumption of holy meat clearly indicate. Although Olyan is correct in pointing out the similarity between the language employed in H to describe the holiness of priests and that used to describe the holiness of lay Israelites, there is an important linguistic distinction, which can hardly be fortuitous, namely that the predicate “holy” is attributed, even in H, only to the priests (21:23), never to lay Israelites. Hence it is reasonable to assume that the holiness of the priests in H (as in P) is viewed as inherent (or, at least, as resulting from a single act of sanctification at some point in history), whereas that of lay Israelites depends on constant activity on the part of YHWH. Note that neither the imperative, (21:8aα rendered correctly as: “you must treat [him] as holy” [JPS]), nor the command (he shall be holy to you; 8bα) imply that the priest is not holy to begin with. See Baruch J. Schwartz, “Israel's Holiness: The Torah Traditions,” in Purity and Holiness: The Heritage of Leviticus (ed. M. J. H. M. Poorthuis and J. Schwartz; JCPS 2; Leiden: Brill, 2000) esp. 52–58.

29 See below, n. 70.

30 See page 226–27 in this article.

31 In the terminology of Lévi-Strauss, Deuteronomy 14 reflects a rather “poor,” or rudimentary system of categorization, inasmuch as it is based on a single binary opposition: pure and permitted on the one hand, impure and prohibited on the other hand (Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, 63, 161, 217). However, it should be noted that this relative “poverty” pertains to the number of possible ritual values attached to the categories of species, not to the physiological characteristics that are taken into account in this taxonomy.

32 The appendix of Leviticus 11 (vv. 43–45), attributed to H, reflects a similar view.

33 See above, n. 24.

34 In this case, in particular, there are a number of insurmountable difficulties: many of the species mentioned by name are unidentifiable; one is often at a loss regarding any symbolic or other meaning which these species may have had; it is unclear whether the physical and behavioral characteristics listed for some of the species were considered to be the reason for their classification as pure or impure, or merely a means of identification; and a structural interpretation is impeded by the fact that one lacks information about the structure of the system of purity/impurity in ancient Israel beyond what the text offers. For a general discussion of the methodological difficulties in applying anthropological tools to the study of Biblical texts, see Anthropological Approaches to the Old Testament (ed. Bernhard Lang; Issues in Religion and Theology 8; Philadelphia: Fortress; London: SPCK, 1985) 1–20.

35 The English translation cited here closely follows that of Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 1:643–45. Where my own translation departs significantly from Milgrom's, reason is given below.

36 This tendency is logical enough, for evidently the legislators did not deem it necessary to offer purification instructions where contamination should not exist. Interestingly, the tendency is consistently carried through even in the absence of these logical considerations. This is true especially in the case of the Nazirite (Num 6), who is forbidden to come into contact with the dead. The priestly legislator discusses the possibility of inadvertent defilement of the Nazirite (v 9), and prescribes the measures to be taken by the Nazirite in order to perform expiation and renew his oath; however, nothing is said of the (apparently obvious) need for the Nazirite to purify himself. This tendency may even underlie the much disputed case of the menstruant and the in P; see Milgrom, Leviticus 1:940–41 and below, n. 72.

37 See below, n. 64.

38 The term “the main body of the chapter” is used here to designate the P section. This does not include the concluding exhortation (vv. 43–45 at least), long recognized as stemming not from P but from H. See Israel Knohl, The Sanctuary of Silence: The Priestly Torah and the Holiness School (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 69; Milgrom, Leviticus 1.683–88, 694.

39 Hoffmann, Leviticus, 1:340; Jacob Milgrom, “Two Biblical Hebrew Priestly Terms: Šeqes and Tām ē ',” Ma'arav 8 (1992) 107–16.

40 This view is found even in the writings of the “Milgrom school.” Milgrom himself is at times somewhat unclear about the matter. In one place, for example, he states that the animals termed “defile not by contact but only by ingestion” (Leviticus 1:648, see also 656, 694), insinuating that these animals are ritually impure, though defiling only through ingestion (like the flesh of an animal that dies of itself in most strata of P, except for Lev 11:39–40, on which see below, n. 43). However, he also explicitly states that “šeqes animals are cultically pure” (656), indicating that in the above-mentioned use of “defile”, he may have meant metaphoric defilement. Wright, however, presumes that “all the prohibited animals . . . probably polluted by eating” (“Spectrum”, 167, n. 1; see also idem, The Disposal of Impurity: Elimination Rites in the Bible and in Hittite and Mesopotamian Literature [SBLDS 101; Atlanta: Scholars, 1987] 203–4), meaning that the prohibited water animals, birds and flying insects conveyed ritual impurity by ingestion, though not by contact. I find little textual evidence for this presupposition.

41 All three texts indicate that some but not all land swarmers convey ritual impurity. Lev 5:2 mentions “the carcass of an impure swarming thing,” implying that there are also (carcasses of) pure swarm. Similarly, 22:5 speaks of “ a man who touches a swarming thing by which he is made unclean or any human being by whom he is made unclean” (), indicating that not every swarming thing conveys impurity (just as not every human conveys impurity). The precise wording of 11:29a, “The following shall be impure for you from among the things that swarm on the earth” (), with its use of the partitive - b, unambiguously implies the same.

42 See above, n. 16.

43 As opposed to D and E; see Milgrom, Leviticus 2:1484–86. The law in vv. 39–40, however, diverges from the commonly accepted law in priestly literature in one aspect. Whereas elsewhere P and H imply that the of “pure” animals ritually defiles only by ingestion, the law in vv. 39–40 explicitly states that it ritually defiles by external contact as well; see idem, Leviticus 1:681–82, where the proof from Lev 5:2; 7:21; 22:8 (but not the additional argument based on 7:24; 22:5) is conclusive.

44 Klawans, Impurity and Sin, notably in his discussion of Tannaitic literature, e.g., 93.

45 The question of whether the criteria for a quadruped's purity are formally counted as two (having split hoofs; chewing its cud) or three (being hoofed; the hoofs being split; chewing its cud) may remain unanswered, as the grammar of Lev 11:3, Deut 14:6 allows both readings. For the sake of clarity, the former method of counting is followed here.

46 In this I refer to commentators who were aware of the general distinction between impurity and prohibition in P. Paradoxically, commentators such as Noth (Leviticus, 93), who simply assumed that in the dietary system, every species that is or is also ritually defiling and furthermore—must not be contacted, had no qualms about interpreting this verse literally.

47 See Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 654, who suggests that this prohibition is not punishable; Edwin Firmage (“The Biblical Dietary Laws and the Concept of Holiness” in Studies in the Pentateuch (ed. J. A. Emerton; VTSup 41; Leiden: Brill, 1990) 207; B. A. Levine, Leviticus (The JPS Torah Commentary; Philadelphia: JPS, 1989) 67. Some medieval commentators, following the Sifra, offer a constrictive interpretation of the verse, applying it only to the time of the festivals, when pilgrims were in constant contact with the sancta; see Houston, Purity, 40.

48 Sifra (Shemini, 2) suggests this reading and rejects it. Ibn Ezra [Commentary, 3:42] adheres to the literal sense of the verse, contrary to rabbinic halakhic tradition. Many scholars who understand this prohibition literally simply suppose that defilement by contact with any impure animal is prohibited, some even extending this supposition to the carcass of a “pure” animal that died of itself. See C. F. Keil and F. Delitzsch, The Pentateuch (vol. 1 of Commentary on the Old Testament; trans. J. Martin; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986) 361; Noth, Leviticus, 93; and more recently J. E. Hartley, Leviticus (OTL; Dallas: Word, 1992) 158. David P. Wright correctly proposes that the legislators prohibited contact with the carcasses of these four animals only (“Spectrum,” 166). For an appraisal of Mary Douglas's interesting insight on the special significance of these four exceptional species, see Houston, Purity, 40, 98.

49 It is unlikely that the law is a late interpolation (thus A. B. Ehrlich, Leviticus—Numeri—Deuteronomium (vol. 2 of Randglossen zur hebräischen Bibel [Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1909; repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1968] 38), since it appears in Deuteronomy 14 as well.

50 The formula , as most commentators note, is the beginning of a new passage. See Rolf Rendtorff, Die Gesetze in der Priesterschrift. Eine gattungsgeschichtliche Untersuchung (FRLANT, n.F. 44; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1954) 41–42 and n. 15; Noth, Leviticus, 94; Levine, Leviticus, 69; Milgrom, Leviticus 1:667. However, several scholars adopt the view held by Ibn Ezra, that the demonstrative here refers back to the species mentioned in the previous verses; see B. D. Eerdmans, Das Buch Leviticus (Alttestamentliche Studien 4; Giessen: A. Töpelmann, 1912) 60. Dillmann and Wright opine that two readings are possible: a minimalist reading, according to which the demonstrative refers only to what follows, and a more inclusive reading, according to which both what precedes and what follows are intended. See Dillmann, Exodus und Leviticus, 545; Wright, Disposal, 204.

51 Regarding the use of a simple yiqt⊘l to connote permission, see above, n. 12. Note that the idiom indicates becoming impure by (i.e., by coming in direct of indirect contact with) a ritually contaminating person or object (see Lev 22:5). In the case of Lev 21:3 (though clearly not in 11:24), the idiom may carry overtones of becoming defiled for the sake of (burying) a person, though this is probably not the primary reading (see Num. 9:6–7). For an attempt to draw important theoretical conclusions from the distinction between and , see Hoffmann, Leviticus, 1.340. However, the linguistic data adduced by Hoffmann are inconclusive (see for example Lev 5:3).

52 Again, I refer here only to those commentators who were in fact aware of the legal distinction between and . Paradoxically, commentators who were not aware of this distinction had no qualms about understanding this command literally, and therefore interpreted it correctly (e.g., Noth, Leviticus, 93).

53 The assumption that no particular prohibition is implied here, or that these words are a stylistic device intended to mirror v. 8 or to lend force to the prohibition of consumption (Hoffmann, Leviticus, 333; Milgrom, Leviticus 1:656), is unlikely, considering the legal, technical nature of the text. It is even less likely that an interpolator or “editor” would insert an unequivocal prohibition only in order to create a link with v. 8 (Ehrlich, Randglossen, 38; Houston, Purity, 41). Pseudo-Jonathan did attribute a legal force to this command, which he understood as a prohibition against profiting from such flesh. Houston (Purity, 40) admits that it is difficult to assume a practical distinction between the two commands, (v. 8) and (v. 11).

54 The distinction between (“flesh”) and (“carrion, carcass”) here is not in the way in which the animal is killed (contra Milgrom, Leviticus 1:653), as Exod 22:30 indicates, but in the point of view of the writer. The cadaver of an animal may be termed only inasmuch as it is conceived as potential food (even prohibited food, 8aα, libα, or food for animals Gen 40:19, II Kgs 9:36). When it is viewed not as food, but as a physical body carried or touched, it is termed (8aβ, llbβ, 25).

55 Some of the law codes in the Bible and in the ancient Near East were apparently never implemented, see the opening caveat in David Daube, Studies in Biblical Law (Cambridge: University Press, 1947). This is true even if one rejects the radical approach of Cohen and Haran, that P was a secret document (Chayim Cohen, “Was the P Document Secret?,” JANESCU 1 [1969] 39–44; Menahem Haran, “Behind the Scenes of History: Determining the Date of the Priestly Source,” JBL 100 [1981] 321–23; Milgrom, Leviticus 2:1410–11). Leviticus 11, as opposed to Chapter 16 and the Babylonian New Year's ritual text published by Thureau-Dangin, is explicitly addressed to the whole community (11:1).

56 The ancient prohibition of “impure” animal species recorded in Leviticus 11 and Deuteronomy 14 appears to have had little affect on the eating habits of the society in Palestine in the Late Bronze Age. The sole exception is the pig, which was eaten to a small extent in some Canaanite cities, see above, n. 24.

57 See Wright, “Spectrum,” 153, and Houston, Purity, 231, who views the laws as “utopian.” At first glance, the verses seem to contain further evidence of this. It has been noted that the legislators choose examples based on numbers divisible by four (four exceptional impure quadrupeds, four types of locust, eight impure land swarmers, twenty birds, four of which are followed by ). This would corroborate the view that the authors are interested in theoretical formulations, not merely in practical legislation. However, textual evidence is somewhat uncertain (LXX has fve , and the reading may be preferable to , thus making twenty-one birds). Furthermore, some of these “quadruples” were not formulated by P but were dictated by the Vorlage (twenty birds) or determined by the zoological horizons of the authors (four quadrupeds lacking partial criteria for purity). At best, the authors of Leviticus 11 may have noticed the (fortuitous) phenomenon in the Vorlage and imitated it, as in the case of the locusts and the eight land swarmers (assuming that this list is not a legacy from an earlier source). In Deut 14 this numerical order is not observed, since D inserted a list of ten permitted quadrupeds.

58 For an interesting attempt to couch the distinction between “pure” and “impure” species in the context of Creation, see Milgrom, “Two Biblical Hebrew Priestly Terms,” esp. 110–11.

59 Houston (Purity, 224, 243–4, 249) ascribes to D and P the position that the distinction between pure and impure species is universal and inherent in Creation. There is much truth in his assertion that the difference between the two sources is that D forbade Israelites to eat impure flesh for considerations of national dignity, whereas P forbade them since they were cultically unacceptable. See also idem, “Towards an Integrated Reading of the Dietary Laws of Leviticus,” in The Book of Leviticus: Composition and Reception (ed. Rolf Rendtorff and Robert A. Kugler; VTSup 93; Leiden: Brill, 2003) 159, where he argues that this conception was common to J and H as well; see Howard Eilberg-Schwartz, The Savage in Judaism: An Anthropology of Israelite Religion and Ancient Judaism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990) 195–99, whose theoretical model regarding “status assignation” (ascription vs. achievement) is only imperfectly applicable here.

60 The wording of the recurrent phrase, “it is (or: they are) impure for you” ( vv. 4, 5, 6, 8, etc.), should not mislead one to conclude that the authors considered the animals to be impure only from an Israelite point of view. By the specification, “for you,” the authors wished to indicate that the legal implications of this universally acknowledged impurity apply to Israelites only. A telling example of such usage is found in Exod 31:12–17. Although the holiness of the Sabbath is clearly believed to be inherent in nature, stemming from Creation (v. 17), the legislator still refers to it as holy “for you” (v. 14), since the legal implications of this natural holiness apply to Israelites alone.

61 Regarding the relative dating of the colophons (vv. 46–47), see Milgrom, Leviticus 1.694–5. Theoretically, 47b may be read as an explanation of 47a (“between the impure and the pure, that is, between animals which may be eaten and animals which may no be eaten”), but this is syntactically unlikely. Elsewhere in Hebrew Bible, the syntactic chain Y X B A always designates two distinct dichotomies which do not overlap, as in Gen 13:8, where the two dichotomies refer to two distinct aspects of a conflict; in Lev 10:10; 20:25, 1 Sam 20:42, where two distinct applications of a single treaty are indicated; and in Ezek 22:2; 44:23. When two dichotomies fully overlap, the structure is asyndetic (see Mal 3:18). Thus, the colophon perfectly summarizes the two main distinctions made in the chapter, between pure and impure animals on the one hand, and between animals prohibited and permitted for consumption on the other hand.

62 J. Milgrom, “The Composition of Leviticus, Chapter 11,” in Priesthood and Cult in Ancient Israel (ed. G. Anderson and S. M. Olyan; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991) 182–91; idem, Leviticus 1:691–8; vs. Wright, Disposal, 201; “Spectrum,” 168 n. 1; and quoted in Milgrom, Leviticus 1:698 (“postscript”).

63 We will follow Milgrom and Wright (n. 62) in using these sigla. It should be noted that the distinction between three strata which are closely related in language and in ideology, and one which is distinct in these respects, derives from the internal evidence of Leviticus 11 alone and is therefore independent of Milgrom's distinction between P1 and P2 elsewhere in Leviticus (Leviticus 1:61–63).

64 For a reevaluation of the opinions of Milgrom and Wright and an alternative relative dating of the strata in the chapter, see N. S. Meshel, “The Structure and Composition of Leviticus 11: A New Proposal” [forthcoming].

65 See above, 209–12.

66 See above, n. 43.

67 The accepted law in P, according to which consumption of is permitted though ritually contaminating, is no innovation of P3 and would have sufficed to complete the symmetry demonstrated in Table 3. However, the symmetrical distribution of the elements in the following diagram is attained—incidentally or intentionally—by the stringent legislation, according to which the communicates impurity not only by consumption but also through contact.

68 The same tendencies towards exceptional stringency and attainment of symmetry are found both in vv. 39–40 and in vv. 10–11; however, one need not suppose that P3 inserted vv. 10–11. The interpolator of vv. 10–11 refers to the consumption of prohibited water animals as eating “from their flesh” (, 11bα), whereas P3 speaks of the consumption of permitted quadrupeds as eating “from its carcass” (, 40aα); see above, n. 54.

69 The fact that Exod 21:29 specifically prohibits the consumption of the flesh of a bull stoned to death suggests that this ancient law assumes that animals do not normally have to be slaughtered in a particular manner in order to be eaten; it is likely that these legislators permitted the consumption of an animal that died of itself. The laws of P and H, like the Book of the Covenant, do not acknowledge a possibility of non-sacral killing of cattle for food. Therefore, they assume that if mutton or beef are eaten outside the sacrificial system, it is usually because the animal died a natural death. The law in D, permitting non-sacral killing of cattle for food, demanded that in such cases, too, the animal be slaughtered (Deut 12:15–21), so that its blood may be drained; the legislators probably expected game to be slaughtered when captured alive, or drained of its blood after its death; see Schwartz, The Holiness Legislation, 121–23.

70 This does not mean that the formulation of these laws in E and in D postdates that of the laws of the in Leviticus. However, the wording of the rationale for prohibiting the consumption of the and in E (Exod 22:30a) and in D (Deut 14:21aβ) respectively suggests that the impurity of such flesh preceded its prohibition logically and chronologically. Both legislators presuppose that the holy may not consume impure flesh; and since both require of the Israelites what is normally expected only of the holy (e.g., the priests), they prohibit all Israelites to consume such flesh. On the other hand, the wording of P suggests that the legislator assumed the to be permitted, since P does not find it necessary to explicitly permit it, but only provides the instructions for purification from eating it (Lev 11:30a). Furthermore, several other laws in priestly literature suggest that the permission for Israelites to eat the flesh of an animal that died of itself is not an innovation but a presupposition (7:24; 17:15; 22:8).

71 See above, n. 28.

72 Another case which deserves a separate study is that of the menstruant in P. If one assumes that P permitted sexual relations with the (impure) menstruant, then this permission is presented not as an innovation but as a given fact (Lev 15:24). If P did not permit sexual relations with the menstruant but only chose to discuss her impurity independently of the prohibitions stemming from it, then P seems to be driving at a logical distinction between impurity and prohibition. If so, P might be considered innovative in this case as well (vis-à-vis the law preserved in H [Lev 18:19; 20:18] and apparently reflected in Ezekiel [22:10]). Regarding the many difficulties involved in solving this problem, see Milgrom, Leviticus 1:940–41.

73 The use of the terms and as such labels is found in Lev 27:11, 27, Num 18:15, referring to live animals. However, the argument cannot be proved from these verses, since the use of the label would not be a mistake in the system of P, since the “impure” animals really are, in a sense, more (ritually) impure than the “pure” animals. Firstly, an “impure” animal is always ritually defiling after death, regardless of how it is killed. Secondly, in P (with the exception of P3) the impurity of the carcass of “impure” animals is graver than that of “pure” animals.

74 For a short survey and classification of some of these interpretations see Houston, Purity, 123–68. Note that many structuralist interpretations, beginning with Mary Douglas's Purity and Danger, attempt to explain why particular species are categorized as impure whereas others are categorized as pure. This question is distinct from the question we have addressed here.

75 The Savage Mind, 102–3.

76 Ibid.., 115.

77 But cf. idem, “Structuralism and Ecology, “Social Science Information 12 (1972) 20–23.

78 Fore examples, see The Savage Mind, 115–17.

79 See Claude Lévi-Strauss, “Structural Analysis in Linguistics and Anthropology” in Structural Anthropology (trans. B. G. Schoepf; New York: Basic Books, 1963) 31–54; The Savage Mind, 18–19, 102, 131, 158–60; and esp. 223.

80 The Savage Mind, 35–75 (passim), 153, 251–52, 267–68. In some cases, Lévi-Strauss asserts that the logical edifice is consciously acknowledged in the society where it is found (9–10) or, at least, that their interpretation of their own praxis corresponds with that of the anthropologist (57).

81 Ibid.., 251–52. The concession, “or their philosophers,” gives the theory an unexpected twist; cf. 263–64.

82 The fact remains that the vast majority of the examples quoted in Totemism and in The Savage Mind are of practices performed by preliterate societies, without their conscious awareness of the contents of a message which their practices encode. In a number of instances, their own interpretation actually excludes the possibility of such awareness (e.g., 115–16). However, Lévi-Strauss does offer at least one clear example of a scheme which is more theoretical than practical (the Yoruba sexual taboos, The Savage Mind, 132–33).

83 Above, p. 212.