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Neo-Confucian Hermeneutics at Work:Cheng Yi's Philosophical Interpretation of Analects 8.9 and 17.3*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2008

Yong Huang
Yong Huang*
Affiliation:
Kutztown University of Pennsylvania
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In this article, I discuss the Song 宋 Neo-Confucian Cheng Yi's 程頤 (1033–1107) interpretation of two related controversial passages in the Analects, the recorded sayings of Confucius. The term “neo-Confucianism” was coined by Western scholars to refer to the Confucianism of the period from the Song dynasty to the Ming 明 dynasty (and sometimes through the Qing 清 dynasty). Among Chinese scholars, neo-Confucianism is most commonly referred to as the Learning of Principle (li xue 理學). Although before Cheng Yi and his brother Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032–1085) there were three other philosophers who are normally also regarded as neo-Confucians— Shao Yong 邵雍 (1011–1077), Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (1017–1073), and Zhang Zai 張載 (1020–1077)—we can justifiably regard the Cheng brothers as the real founders of neo-Confucianism in the sense that principle becomes the essential philosophical concept for the first time in their works. There is no consensus among scholars as to the relationship between the philosophies of these two brothers. The traditional view regards them as substantially different due to the two different schools of neo-Confucianism that developed from their teachings, the realistic school synthesized by Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) from the teachings of Cheng Yi and the idealist school culminating in Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529) from the teachings of ChengHao. I, however, tend to think that the philosophical positions of the two brothers are largely similar. Unfortunately, since Cheng Hao did not live as long as Cheng Yi, there is insufficient material to create a systematic picture of his view of the Analects passages with which this article will deal.

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ARTICLES
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Harvard Theological Review , Volume 101 , Issue 2 , April 2008 , pp. 169 - 201
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Copyright © President and fellows of Harvard college 2008

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References

1 For Shao, the essential concept is number; for Zhou, it is taiji 太極, the ultimate; and for Zhang, it is qi 氣, the vital energy.

2 The following is a sample of representative English translations of this passage: “The Common people can be made to follow a path but not to understand it” (The Analects [trans. D. C. Lau; Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1979]); “You can make the people follow the Way, but you can't make them understand it” (The Analects [trans. David Hinton; Washington, D.C.: Counterpoint, 1998]); “The common people can be induced to travel along the way, but they cannot be induced to realize (zhi 知) it” (The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation [trans. Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr.; New York: Ballantine, 1998]); “People can be made to sprout (produce, act, follow), they cannot be commissioned to know” (Confucian Analects [trans. Ezra Pound; London: Peter Own, 1956]); “The common people can be made to follow it [the way]; they cannot be made to understand it” (The Analects of Confucius [trans. Arthur Waley; London: Allen & Unwin, 1971]); “The common people can be made to follow it, but they cannot be made to understand it” (Confucius Analects: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries [trans. Edward Slingerland; Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003]); “The people may be made to follow a path of action, but they may not be made to understand it” (Confucius: Confucian Analects, The Great Learning & The Doctrine of the Mean [trans. James Legge; New York: Dover, 1971]).

3 Some representative English translations of this passage are: “It is only the most intelligent and the most stupid who are not susceptible to change” (Lau); “Those of the loftiest wisdom and those of the basest ignorance: they alone never change” (Hinton); “Only the most wise (zhi 知) and the most stupid do not move” (Ames and Rosemont); “Only those of highest intelligence, and lowest simplicity do not shift” (Pound); “It is only the very wisest and the very stupidest who cannot change” (Waley); “Only the very wise and the very stupid do not change” (Slingerland); “There are only the wise of the highest class, and the stupid of the lowest class, who cannot be changed” (Legge).

4 There are three such schools: the New Text school (jin wen xue pai 今文學派), the Old Text school (gu wen xue pai 古文學派), and the General Learning school (tongxue pai 通學派). See Zhou Yutong 周予同, “漢學與宋學” (Han Learning and Song Learning), in Zhou Yutong jingxue shi lunzhu xuanji 周予同經學史論著選集 (ed. Zhu Weizheng 朱維錚; Collected Works on the History of Confucian Hermeneutics; expanded edition; Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1996) 322–37.

5 See Cheng Hao 程顥 and Cheng Yi 程頤, Er Cheng ji 二程集 (Collected Writings of the Two Chengs; Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2004; Yishu, fascicle 18) 232.

6 Ibid.. (Wenji, Yiwen) 671.

7 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 6) 95.

8 Ibid.. (Yishu , fascicle 2a) 13. It is not clear whether this passage is to be attributed to Cheng Yi or to Cheng Hao. Here I follow Pang Wanli 龐萬里, Er Cheng de zhexue tixi 二程的哲學體系 (The Philosophical System of the Two Chengs; Beijing: Beijing hangkong hangtian daxue chubanshe, 1992) 348.

9 Ibid.. (Yishu , fascicle 2a) 13.

10 Er Cheng Ji (Yishu, fascicle 1) 2.

11 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 6) 95.

12 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 2a) 13. Commenting on this passage, Peter K. Bol argues that “the classics are ancient, and usage has changed. Anyone who had to study them to know tao would get stuck in the medium. . .. The true meaning of the classics can be understood only by those who know the truth already” (This Culture of Ours: Intellectual Transitions in T'ang and Sung China [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992] 308). We may modify this as saying that “the true meaning of the classics can be understood only by those who have already had some grasp of the truth,” as one does not need to understand the classics if he or she already knows the full truth contained therein.

13 Er Cheng Ji (Waishu, fascicle 6) 378.

14 For a more detailed discussion of Cheng Yi's philosophical hermeneutics, see Yong Huang, “Cheng Yi's Neo-Confucian Ontological Hermeneutics of Dao,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27 (2000) 69–92.

15 See the interpretation in Qing dynasty scholar Shi You's 史佑 Jingyi zaji 經義雜記 (Miscellaneous Notes on the Meanings of Classics), cited in Cheng Shude 程樹德 (1877–1944), Lunyu jishi 論語集釋 (Collected Interpretations of the Analects; Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1990) 531.

16 See the comments by the Qing scholar Liu Baonan 劉寶南 (1791–1855) in his Lunyu zhengyi 論語正義 (Correct Meanings of the Analects), cited in Cheng Shude, Lunyu jishi, 532.

17 See, for example, Yang Rongguo 楊榮國 (1907–1978), Fandong jieji de shengren: Kongzi 反動階級的聖人﹕孔子 (The Sage of the Reactionary Class: Confucius; Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1973) 59.

18 Cited in Cheng Shude, Lunyu jishi, 533.

19 Cited in ibid., 532.

20 Slingerland, The Analects.

21 Chen Daqi, Lunyu yijie 論語臆解 (A Subjective Interpretation of the Analects; Taipei: Shangwu yingshuguan, 1996) 153. In one of the bamboo strips excavated at Guodian 郭店, Zun deyi 尊德義 (Respecting Virtue and Rightness)—which some scholars speculate may have been written around Confucius's time—there is a related statement: “People may not be deluded.” See strip no. 31, in Guodian Chumu zhujian 郭店楚墓竹簡 (Bamboo Strips Excavated from the Chu Tombs at Guodian; Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 1998) 174.

22 This, of course, does not mean that we absolutely cannot accept this interpretation, as Confucius or the Analects may indeed be self-contradictory at times. However, unless we can find a more plausible interpretation, as John B. Henderson points out, we should adhere to the common commentarial assumption that the classics are coherent. See Henderson, Scripture, Canon, and Commentary: A Comparison of Confucian and Western Exgesis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) 106.

23 Guo Moruo 郭沫若 (1897–1978) also thinks that if we interpret bu ke as “not permitted to,” then in this passage Confucius must be advocating a policy of keeping people in ignorance, but this is obviously incompatible with Confucius's consistent involvement in education. Accordingly, Confucius's statement should be understood as factual rather than normative: people cannot be made to know it. See Guo Moruo, Shi pipan shu 十批判書 (Ten Critiques; Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1996) 100.

24 Cited in Cheng Shude, Lunyu jishi, 532.

25 Cited in ibid., 533.

26 Lau, trans., The Analects, 36. Hou Wailu 侯外廬 (1930–1987) argues that this Analects passage shows that, for Confucius, common people do not have the capacity to have such knowledge. See Hou Wailu et al., Zhongguo sixiang tongshi 中國思想通史 (A General History of Chinese Thought; vol. 1; Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1995) 169–70. Tu Weiming also denies that Confucianism, like Daoism and Legalism, advocates a policy of keeping people in ignorance. Commenting on Analects 8.9, Tu claims that this is “primarily a lamentation and is not a basic Confucian policy” (Ruxue disan qi fazhan de qianjing wenti 儒學第三期發展的前景問題 [The Prospect of the Third Epoch of the Development of Confucianism], in tu Weiming wenji 杜維明文集 [Collected Works of Tu Weiming; Wuhan: Wuhan chubanshe, 2002] 1:277).

27 Commenting on this passage, Wing-tsit Chan says: “Confucius was the first to pronounce this principle in Chinese history. Among his pupils there were commoners as well as nobles, and stupid people as well as intelligent ones” (Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963] 44).

28 See Hu Shi 胡適 (1891–1962), Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang 中國哲學史大綱 (Outline History of Chinese Philosophy), in Hu Shi xueshu wenji: Zhongguo zhexueshi 胡適學術文集﹕中國哲學史 (Collected Scholarly Works by Hu Shi: History of Chinese Philosophy; Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1998) 1: 87–88.

29 See Cai Shangsi 蔡尚思, Kongzi sixiang tixi 孔子思想體系 (Confucius's System of Thought; Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1982) 192.

30 Xu Fuguan 徐复觀, Zhongguo renxinglunshi: XianQin pian 中國人性論史﹕先秦篇 (A History of Chinese Theories of Human Nature: The Pre-Qin Period; Taipei: Shangwu yingshuguan, 1999) 64.

31 Cited in Cheng Shude, Lunyu jishi, 445.

32 See Yang Rongguo, Fandong jieji de shengren, 58;Cai Shangsi, Kongzi sixiang tixi, 193. According to Cai Shangsi, although Analects 15.39 indeed claims that education should be provided for all without distinctions, this is a principle that Confucius did not follow. In addition to the limit he set on access to education in terms of property, Cai also claims that Confucius set a limit in terms of class, as Confucius said that “common people can be made to follow the Way but cannot be made to understand it,” and a limit in terms of sect, as he asked people “not to associate with those who follow different ways” (Analects 15.40). Thus, “although in appearance Confucius talks about education for all without any discrimination, in reality there is still discrimination” (Cai Shangsi, Kongzi sixiang tixi, 193–94).

33 Cited in Cheng Shude, Lunyu jishi, 447.

34 Ibid.., 446.

35 Li Zehou 李澤厚, Lunyu jindu 論語今讀 (Reading the Analects Today; Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu gongsi, 1999) 171. Here, the “learning” refers to “great learning,” the learning of the Way, in contrast to “elementary learning” (xiaoxue 小學), the learning of language. Thus Cheng Yi also tells us that “in ancient times people started elementary learning at the age of eight and great learning at the age of fifteen” (Er Cheng ji [Yishu, fascicle 15], 166). Admittedly, Cheng Yi himself does not follow this interpretation of the Analects. Commenting on this passage in his Lunyu jie 論語解 (Interpretation of the Analects), he simply says that Confucius never refused to teach anyone who came with li (yi li lai zhe 以禮來者) (Er Cheng ji [Jingshuo, fascicle 6], 1144). It is not clear whether he means a gift or propriety by the word li 禮. It is worth noting, however, that Chen Daqi 陳大齊 mentions the interpretation of shu xiu as a type of propriety: self-discipline. See Chen Daqi, Kongzi xueshuo 孔子學說 (Confucius's Doctrines; Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1984) 280. This interpretation is also consistent with Analects 15.39.

36 See Yang Bojun 楊伯峻, Lunyu yizhu論語譯注 (Translation and Annotation of the Analects; Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1980) 81.

37 37 Yu Zhihui 俞志慧, “Lunyu Taibo 'Min ke shi you zhi bu ke shi zhi zhi' zhang xinjie《論語》泰伯 ‘民可使由之不可使知之’ 章心解” (Interpretation of Analects8.9), KongMeng yuekan (1997) 1; see also Wu Pi 吳丕, “Zai lun rujia 'shi min' sixiang 再論儒家 ‘使民’ 思想” (On Analects 8.9 Again), Guangming ribao, June 3, 2000. For criticism of this interpretation, see Zhou Qian 周乾, “Ye lun min ke shi you 也論民可使由” (Also on Analects 8.9), Guangmingribao, October 24, 2000.

38 Peng Zhongde 彭忠德, “Ye shuo 'min ke shi you zhi' zhang 也说 '民可使由之'章” (Also on Analects 8.9), Guangmingribao, May 16, 2000; see also Pang Pu 龐樸, “Shi you shi zhi jie 使由使知解” (Interpretation of Analects8.9), Guangming Daily, October 22, 1999. For criticism of this interpretation, see Yin Zhenhuan 尹振環, “Bie wujie 'min bu ke shi zhi zhi 別誤解 ‘民不可使知之” (Do Not Misunderstand Analects 8.9), Guangming ribao, July 18, 2000, and Wu Pi, “Zai lun rujia 'shi min' sixiang.”

39 Kong Deming 孔德明, “Li jing bian zhi yu Kongzi yanjiu 離經辨志與孔子研究” (Distinguishing Intention Independent of the Text and the Study of Confucius), in Chuantong wenhua de zonghe yu chuangxin 傳統文化的綜合與創新 (Synthesis and Creation in Traditional Culture; Beijing: Jiaoyu kexue chubanshe, 1990). For criticism of this interpretation, see Peng Zhongde, “Ye shuo 'min ke shi you zhi' zhang.”

40 See Wang Changming 王昌銘, “Dui 'min ke shi you zhi' de liji 對民可使由之的理解” (Understandings of Analects 8.9), in Language and Character Weekly 語言文字周報, August 24, 2004. Wang himself points out some problems with this reading in the same article.

41 Er Cheng ji (Yishu, fascicle 18) 220.

42 Thus Cheng Yi states: “Common people are permitted to be enlightened but not to be made stupid, to be taught but not intimidated; to follow but not be forced; to be made to do things but not cheated” (Er Cheng ji [Yishu, fascicle 25] 319).

43 Zhu Xi 朱熹, Lunyu jizhu 論語集注 (Collected Annotations of the Analects), in Sishu wujing 四書五經 (Four Books and Five Classics; Beijing: Zhongguo shudian, 1985) 1:33.

44 Along the same lines, Chen Daqi argues that in order to make people do anything, it is also necessary for them to have some knowledge, the knowledge of how to do it. In Zhu Xi's terminology, this is knowledge of dangran. They do not, however, need to have knowledge of why. In Zhu Xi's terminology, this is knowledge of suoyiran. Common people have very limited intellectual abilities and so can only know the former but not the latter. On this point, see Chen Daqi, Lunyu yijie, 154.

45 See Pang Pu, “Shi you shi zhi jie.”

46 Er Cheng ji (Yishu, fascicle 15) 164.

47 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 2a) 16. It is not entirely clear whether this passage should be attributed to Cheng Yi or to Cheng Hao. However, on the basis of similar passages that are clearly attributed to Cheng Yi, we can reasonably assume that it belongs to Cheng Yi.

48 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 25) 317.

49 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 17) 178.

50 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 25) 321.

51 Mencius (trans. D. C. Lau; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970; translation modified) 6A15. Perhaps it is from Cheng Yi's notion of ti er de zhi that Tu Weiming developed his conception of tizhi體知, a subject on which he has recently written quite extensively (see thevarious articles in Tu Weiming wenji, vol. 5). Although the word ti literally means “body”, as Tu correctly points out, its meaning is not fully conveyed by this English word. Tu explains that “recognition through ti (tiren 體認), awareness through ti (ticha 體察), justification through ti (tizheng 體證), understanding through ti (tihui 體會), tasting through ti (tiwei 體味), appreciation through ti (tiwan 體玩), inquiry through ti (tijiu 體究), and knowledge through ti (tizhi 體知) are all very different from knowledge, observation, verification, taste, and understanding in general sense” (Tu Weiming wenji, 5:331–32).

52 It is interesting to note that, while in the Western philosophical tradition, body and mind have usually been considered as two separate entities, in this Confucian tradition, they are both regarded as ti: one is the small ti, and one is the great ti.

53 Er Cheng ji (Yishu, fascicle 8) 1154.

54 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 2a), 20. Some scholars attribute this passage to Cheng Hao. It is difficult but also not imperative to determine to whom it should be attributed, since the idea of zide was advocated by both brothers.

55 For a more detailed discussion of Cheng's distinction between these two types of knowledge and its philosophical implications, see Yong Huang, “How Is Weakness of the Will Not Possible? Cheng Yi's Neo-Confucian Conception of Moral Knowledge,” in Educations and Their Purposes: A Philosophical Dialogue Among Cultures (ed. Roger Ames and Peter Hershock; Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008).

56 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 1) 316.

57 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 1) 2.

58 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 22a) 279.

59 Analects 6.22; English translation based on the Chinese version annotated by Yang Bojun, Lunyu yizhu, throughout this article.

60 Ibid.., 4.1.

61 Ibid.., 4.2. In Analects 4.1 Confucius states, “Of neighborhoods, humaneness (ren) is the most beautiful. How can a person be considered wise who, when having choices, does not settle in humaneness?”

62 Ibid.., 5.19.

63 Ibid.., 15.4.

64 Hall and Ames's translation of zhi 知 as “realize” captures this sense of knowledge, as “to realize the tao is to experience, to interpret, and to influence the world in such a way as to reinforce, and where appropriate extend, a way of life established by one's cultural precursors” (David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking Through Confucius [Albany: SUNY Press, 1987] 227).

65 Er Cheng ji (Jingshuo, fascicle 6) 1144.

66 Mencius 4B14.

67 Er Cheng ji (Jingshuo, fascicle 6) 1144. In developing his idea of attaining knowledge on one's own, Cheng Yi was also inspired by Analects 6.27: “Superior persons are broadly versed in learning and regulated by rules of propriety. Thus they will not overstep what is right.' This shows that they have not attained it on their own” (Er Cheng ji [Yishu, fascicle 6] 95). The passage is not attributed specifically to Cheng Yi. It is difficult to determine to whom it should be attributed because the idea of zide was advocated by both brothers. Cheng Hao, for example, stated: “What is crucial in learning is attaining it on one's own. . .. Therefore Confucius says that 'when I have pointed out one corner of a square to anyone and he does not come back with the other three, I will not point it out to him a second time'” (Er Cheng ji [Yishu, fascicle 11] 122). In Cheng Hao's view, only by interpreting this Analects passage in this way can it be made consistent with Confucius's self-description: “to teach without growing weary” (Analects 7.2, 7.34).

68 Er Cheng ji (Yishu, fascicle18) 208.

69 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 22a) 296.

70 Analects 2.15.

71 Er Cheng ji (Yishu, fascicle 2a) 22. The passage is not attributed specifically to Cheng Yi. It is, however, consistent with other passages in which Cheng Yi discusses zide.

72 Cited in Cheng Shude, Lunyu jishi, 1185.

73 Chen Daqi, Kongzi xueshuo lunji 孔子學說論集 (Collected Essays on Confucius's Doctrines; Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1970) 86.

74 Tu Weiming, Ruxue disan qi fazhan de qianjing wenti, 280.

75 After discussing the same paragraph from the Mencius, Tu Weiming correctly points out that, “while it is perfectly understandable that a respectable person may not be aware of the unrealizable potential in his nature, such as scientific and artistic talents, it is inconceivable, in the Mencian sense, that a mature member of our society can be ignorant of his germs and, therefore, not be responsible for his acts as a moral agent” (Tu Weiming, “Akrasia and Self-Cultivation in Mencius,” in Philosophy and Culture [ed. Venant Cauchy; Montreal: Ed-Montmorency, 1983] 4:222–23).

76 Cited in Cheng Shude, Lunyu jishi, 1188.

77 Analects 6.21.

78 Ibid.., 17.2.

79 Cited in Cheng Shude, Lunyu jishi, 1185.

80 Ibid..

81 Cited in Cheng Shude, Lunyu jishi, 1186.

82 Such as solids suspended in a liquid.

83 Cited in ibid., 1187. In order to make “Confucius's” three-grades theory of human nature consistent with Mencius's theory of human nature as good, Gu Tinglin 顧亭林 (1613–1682) argues that, just as the nature of water is cold and yet there are still warm springs, so, too, it is normal for heaven to give birth to people in the middle and it is atypical to have wise people above and stupid people below. Mencius focuses on normal people, while Confucius (in 17.3) focuses on the atypical (cited in Cheng Shude, Lunyu jishi, 1186).

84 On Analects 5.13, Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909–1978) argues that Confucius's views on the Way of heaven and human nature were rarely heard because before Confucius, the Way of heaven and human nature were considered to be in opposition, whereas Confucius did not regard them to be so. Thus, Zigong means only that Confucius rarely contrasted these two concepts rather than that he hardly ever talked about them. See Tang Junyi, Zhongguo zhexue yuan lun 中國哲學原論: 原性篇 (On the Sources of Chinese Philosophy: Human Nature; Taipei: xuesheng shuju, 1991) 32.

85 Xu Fuguan, Zhongguo renxinglun shi, 97–98.

86 Zhongyong 中庸 (Doctrine of the Mean), in Liji yizhu 禮記譯注 (Annotated Translation of the Book of Rites; Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2004) 700.

87 Tang Junyi also argues that Confucius holds the view that human nature is good: “Confucius says that humans are born with uprightness [Analects 6.19], that humaneness (ren) is here whenever I desire it [Analects7.30], that a humane person can feel at home in humanness [Analects 4.2]. . .. So it is appropriate to think that he regarded the human heart/mind as the place where good human nature resides. His claim that humans are relatively similar by nature is no different from Mencius's claims that 'things of the same kind are relatively similar' and that 'sages and I are of the same kind.' They all mean that human nature is good” (Tang Junyi, Zhongguo zhexue yuan lun, 31).

88 Er Cheng ji (Zhouyi Chengshi zhuan, fascicle 4) 956.

89 Ibid..

90 Er Cheng ji (Yishu, fascicle 25) 319.

91 Ibid.. (Zhouyi Chengshi zhuan, fascicle 4) 956.

92 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 18) 204.

93 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 18) 81.

94 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 25) 323.

95 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 19) 253.

96 Ibid.. (Zhouyi Chengshi zhuan, fascicle 4) 956.

97 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 4), 69. This passage is not specifically attributed to cheng Yi, but it is consistent with other passages on zibao and ziqi that are attributed to Cheng Yi.

98 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 18) 213; see also (Yishu, fascicle 25) 325.

99 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 15) 152.

100 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 19) 253.

101 His brother Cheng Hao held the same view: “Although there must be people who are born with knowledge, I have not seen any” (Ibid. [Yishu, fascicle 4] 141).

102 Cai Shangsi, Kongzi sixiang tixi, 99.

103 Er Cheng ji (Yishu, fascicle 18) 204.

104 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 9) 107.

105 Cited in Cheng Shude, Lunyu jishi, 1188. Pang Wanli also claims that “the two Chengs implicitly disagree with Confucius's claim that 'only the wise above and the stupid below do not change'” (Er Cheng de zhexue tixi, 147).

106 Er Cheng ji (Yishu, fascicle 19) 252.

107 Cheng Hao also states that “while time is something that sages cannot counteract, sages can certainly show us the way to change from ignorance to wisdom and from disorder to order” (ibid. [Yishu, fascicle 11] 122). Pan Fu'en 潘富恩 and Xu Yuqing 徐余慶 comment that “Cheng Yi's 'principle of changeability' about the wise above and the stupid below refers to a one-way change: the change of the stupid below to the wise above. In no time and under no condition will the wise above be changed to the stupid below” (Pan and Xu, Cheng Hao Cheng Yi lixue sixiang yanjiu 程顥程頤理學思想研究 [A Study of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi's Neo-Confucianism; Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 1988] 356). This interpretation makes sense. If people are wise, they know that they cannot stop learning, and they will therefore not become stupid. Anyone who does stop learning can never have truly been one of the wise above.

108 Er Cheng ji (Yishu, fascicle 25) 316.

109 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 25) 321.

110 Mencius 2A6.

111 Er Cheng ji (Yishu, fascicle 25) 325.

112 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 25) 318.

113 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 25) 319.

114 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 18) 189.

115 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 1) 2. This passage is not specifically attributed to Cheng Yi, but it is consistent with views that he expresses in other passages, e.g., “Wang Yanlin says: 'People can become good only because they have the sincere heart/mind to be so. It is only by being so that they can attain it on their own. If they do not have the will, the good cannot be imposed upon them.' The master said: 'No. If we leave people alone and do not care about their unwillingness to become good, then there are many people below the middle level who will give up on themselves and lack confidence. This is why the sages emphasize education” (Ibid. [Cuiyan, fascicle 1] 1188).

116 Ibid.. (Wenji, fascicle 9) 593.

117 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 2a) 32. This passage is not specifically attributed to Cheng Yi. Some scholars attribute it to Cheng Hao.

118 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 1) 5. This passage is likewise not specifically attributed to Cheng Yi. Some scholars attribute it to Cheng Hao.

119 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 25) 322.

120 Ibid.. (Zhouyi Chengshi zhuan, fascicle 1) 720.

121 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 2a) 14. Although this passage is not specifically attributed to Cheng Yi, a very similar passage is found in his commentary on the Book of Change; see ibid. (Zhouyi Chengshi zhuan, fascicle 2) 831.

122 Ibid.. (Zhouyi Chengshi zhuan, fascicle 2) 830–31.

123 Ibid.. (Zhouyi Chengshi zhuan, fascicle 2) 831.

124 Mencius 4B5.

125 Er Cheng ji (Waishu, fascicle 6) 390.

126 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 15) 165.

127 Ibid.. (Chengshi jingshuo, fascicle 8) 1155.

128 Analects 12.17.

129 Analects 13.4.

130 Analects 2.1.

131 Analects 12.19.

132 Er Cheng ji (Yishu, fascicle 18) 221.

133 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 2a) 13. Although this passage is not specifically attributed to Cheng Yi, we can attribute it to him on the basis of a similar passage in Er Cheng ji (Yishu, fascicle 15) 164.

134 Ibid.. (Yishu, fascicle 22a) 279.

135 Ibid.. (Chengshi jingshuo, fascicle 6) 1144.

136 Ibid.. (Wenji, fascicle 8) 579–80.

137 Ibid.. (Zhouyi Chengshi zhuan, fascicle 8), 720; see also ibid. (Wenji, fascicle 5) 591.

138 See ibid. (Wenji, fascicle 5) 593.

139 Thus, it is important to view punitive laws as supplementary rather than alternative to the moral education of even those people who have abandoned themselves. Lionard Shihlien Hsü argues that “since this lowest class of the people cannot be changed by learning or the teaching of virtue, such forceful methods as law and punishment must be used to rectify them, or, using the Confucian terminology, to 'bring them to the level of good people' [Analects 2.3]. In other words, law and the system of justice are to supplement political education, li, and moral discipline, in completing the function of rectification” (Hsü, The Political Philosophy of Confucianism [London: Curzon Press, 1975] 163).

140 What, precisely, is the source of immorality in people born to be good? This is a complicated issue that Cheng makes a great effort to deal with. I am currently working on a separate paper discussing this issue.