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Questions of Ethics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 June 2011

Arthur J. Dyck
Arthur J. Dyck
Affiliation:
Harvard University
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Extract

“Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by teaching or by practice; or if neither by teaching or practice, then whether it comes to men by nature or in what other way?” These questions were once put to Socrates by Meno. How did Socrates, the patron saint of moral philosophy, reply? Leaving aside his ironic profession of ignorance, he proposed that the answer would only come once the nature of virtue was understood and defined.

Type
Research Article
Information
Harvard Theological Review , Volume 65 , Issue 4 , October 1972 , pp. 453 - 481
Copyright
Copyright © President and Fellows of Harvard College 1972

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References

1 Frankena, W. K., Ethics (1963)Google Scholar, refers to Socrates as “the patron saint of moral philosophy.”

2 Fletcher, Joseph, Situation Ethics (1966).Google Scholar

3 W. K. Frankena, op. cit., Chapter 3.

4 See the discussion of prima facie duties in W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (1930), Chapter 2.

5 Dyck, A. J., Referent-Models of Loving: A Philosophical and Theological Analysis of Love in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Harvard Theological Review 61 (1968), 525–45Google Scholar. (See pp. 527–28 in particular.)

6 Pp. 483–494.

7 I refer here to the work of Lawrence Kohlberg. For a brief introduction to it, see The Child as a Moral Philosopher, Psychology Today 2:4 (Sept., 1968), 25–30. See also footnote 49.

8 Pp. 495–508.

9 For a very thorough analysis of rule utilitarianism, see Lyons, David, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (1965).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

10 Our argument is based on W. D. Ross, op. cit.

11 Sittler, Joseph, The Structure of Christian Ethics (1958).Google Scholar

12 See Lehmann, Paul, Ethics in a Christian Context (1963).Google Scholar Lehmann, of course, would not speak of finding out what we ought to do from what we ought to be but rather prefers to say that we discover what we are to do from what we are given to be.

13 W. K. Frankena, op. cit., 53.

14 Ibid., 55.

15 W. D. Ross, op. cit., 21.

16 See, for example, Soddy, Kenneth (ed.), Mental Health and Infant Development (1956), Vols. 1 and 2.Google Scholar

17 Documentation is too voluminous to be necessary or expedient. An interesting perspective on the training of psychotherapists and the ideology that guides it, is found in Halmos, Paul, The Faith of the Counsellors (1966)Google Scholar. A “Rogerian” technique for training parents has been developed in Gordon, Thomas, Parent Effectiveness Training (1970).Google Scholar

18 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (1971)Google Scholar, Chapter VIII.

19 Traditional theological formulations of the necessity for loving persons are found in discussions of the need, given the sinful condition of human beings, for redemption or salvation. For a more thorough consideration of how moral virtue, in the form of love, contributes to the maintenance and enhancement of our moral life, see A. J. Dyck, A Unified Theory of Virtue and Obligation (forthcoming).

20 Ibid.

21 Bentham, Jeremy, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789)Google Scholar, and Mill, J. S., Utilitarianism (1863).Google Scholar

22 Moore, G. E., Principia Ethica (1903)Google Scholar, and Rashdall, Hastings, The Theory of Good and Evil (1907).Google Scholar

23 By “fideism” I mean a theory that holds that what is good is known by faith in God and through the authority of divine revelation known to the faithful. It would take us too far afield to state all the reasons why fideism is not seriously considered in our essay. In general, the problem with reliance on revelation is that what is accepted as revelatory on moral matters is, in the final analysis, determined by one's moral judgments and these require independent validation if they are not to be based on circular reasoning.

24 See W. D. Ross, op. cit., and Foundations of Ethics (1939).

25 Pp. 509–530.

26 A. J. Dyck, A Unified Theory of Virtue and Obligation, op. cit.

27 One of these instances has been documented in “Who Shall Survive,” a film sponsored by the Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. Foundation.

28 For a discussion of this point, see Dyck, A. J., Perplexities for the Would-Be Liberal in Abortion, The Journal of Reproductive Medicine 8 (1972), 351–54.Google ScholarPubMed

29 See the essay by Charles Reynolds in this volume pp. 509–530.

30 See, for example, Baler, Kurt, The Moral Point of View (1958)Google Scholar, Brandt, Richard B., Ethical Theory (1959)Google Scholar, Firth, Roderick, Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12 (1952), 317–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar, William Frankena, op. cit., Hare, R. M., Freedom and Reason (1963)Google Scholar, and Mandelbaum, Maurice, The Phenomenology of Moral Experience (1955)Google Scholar. The significance of impartiality is greatly emphasized in Niebuhr, H. R., The Responsible Self (1963)Google Scholar, and, as we shall note later, in the works of Reinhold Niebuhr.

31 Pp. 495–508.

32 Summa Theologica.

33 Brunner, Emil, The Divine Imperative: A Study in Christian Ethics (1947).Google Scholar

34 Roderick Firth, op. cit.

35 Pp. 509–530.

36 This is one of the central theses of Niebuhr, Reinhold, Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932).Google Scholar

37 See A. J. Dyck, A Unified Theory of Virtue and Obligation, op. cit., and Referent-Models of Loving, op. cit., for detailed accounts of the meaning of “love of God.”

38 ibid.

39 See A. J. Dyck, Referent-Models of Loving, op. cit., 530–32.

40 Op. cit.

41 Robertson, D. B., Love and Justice: Selections from the Shorter Writings of Reinhold Niebuhr (1967), 33.Google Scholar

42 Ibid., 35.

43 Ibid., 41.

44 Ibid., 35.

45 Ibid., 13.

46 Pp. 561–575.

47 D. B. Robertson, op. cit., 27.

48 Op. cit.

49 See Lawrence Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive Developmental Approach to Socialization, in Goslin, D. (ed.), Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research (1969)Google Scholar; Kohlberg, L. and Turiel, E., Moral Development and Moral Education, in Lesser, G. (ed.), Psychology and Educational Practice (1971)Google Scholar; and Hickey, H., Stimulation of Moral Reasoning in Delinquents, in Kohlberg, L. and Turiel, E. (eds.), Recent Research in Moral Development (1971).Google Scholar

50 War and Moral Discourse (1969), Chapter 2.

51 One of the major exceptions has been the long and continuous discussion of policies regarding the punishment of lawbreakers. Recently, philosophers have taken up the issue of civil disobedience. See Bedau, H. A. (ed.), Civil Disobedience: Theory and Practice (1969)Google Scholar, and John Rawls, op. cit.

52 Barth, Karl, Church Dogmatics (1961), III/4, pp. II–13.Google Scholar

53 Pp. 531–559.

54 D. B. Robertson, op. cit., 37.

55 Formulating moral policy as recommended here is, of course, highly relevant for personal decisions and for use by individuals. The stricture to limit moral policy to problems of social significance is addressed to ethicists in their professional role as social consultants and critics.

56 R. B. Potter, op. cit., Chapter 5, a highly refined and complete list of the explicit guidelines provided by just-war theory. Potter also provides a comprehensive bibliography.

57 Ibid.

58 Pp. 577–589.

59 A Survey of Christian Ethics (1967), Part III, 167–290.