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Is there a Deduction in Hegel's Science of Logic?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 June 2021

Charlie Cooper-Simpson
Charlie Cooper-Simpson*
Affiliation:
Independent Scholar c.cooper.simpson@gmail.com
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Abstract

Robert Pippin's recent study of Hegel's Logic, Hegel's Realm of Shadows, argues that we should read Hegel as rejecting the need for a Transcendental Deduction in logic because he takes Hegel, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, to have ruled out the scepticism that motivates Kant's Deduction. By contrast, I argue, we cannot understand what Pippin calls the ‘identity’ of logic and metaphysics in the Science of Logic unless we see how Hegel does provide a kind of Deduction argument in the Logic, albeit one stripped of the psychologism present in the Kantian version. Accordingly, I provide a sketch of what such an ‘absolute’ Deduction must look like, and argue that Hegel's presentation of the ‘absolute idea’ functions as the conclusion of such an argument.

Type
Research Article
Information
Hegel Bulletin , Volume 43 , Issue 1 , April 2022 , pp. 69 - 92
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Hegel Society of Great Britain

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