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Jack, Tommy, and Henry Dubb: The Armed Forces and the Working Class*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

David Englander  and
James Osborne
David Englander
Affiliation:
Corpus Christi College, Oxford
James Osborne
Affiliation:
University of Warwick
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Extract

The five years 1917–21 are commonly regarded as a period of unusual turmoil in Britain when fears of revolution reached an intensity unknown in more than three generations. In explaining this unrest, historians have naturally concentrated upon the organized Labour movement; upon the complex dialectics of a conservative rank-and-file marshalled behind creative revolutionary leaders in the engineering trades; and, in the trades unions and Labour party, upon the genesis and meaning of Clause IV. In all such studies the state's most powerful servants have, however, commanded relatively little attention. Other than as an instrument of public order intruding into industrial disputes, historians of the working class have shown scant interest in the serviceman who remains very much the ‘candy man’ in uniform. This article, by way of redress, is concerned to examine the character of unrest in the armed forces, to compare and contrast disaffection in the army and navy, and to review Labour's response to both veteran and serviceman.

Type
Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 21 , Issue 3 , September 1978 , pp. 593 - 621
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1978

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References

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12 Although it was subsequently denied, Colonel J. C. F. Fuller, the distinguished military historian, a man of extreme right-wing disposition, unlikely to impugn the honour of the army, had ‘direct evidence’ that British troops deserted to the enemy ‘in considerable numbers’ during the battle of the Ancre in August 1916, as they were again to do the following October. The problem got worse as the war progressed. ‘During the present war a large number of surrenders have taken place, which if evidence could be produced, would be found to have been without any justification’, bemoaned the Army Council in March 1918. Worse still, it was a tendency which misguided patriots seemed likely to encourage: ‘The recent exchange of prisoners while the war is in progress and the campaign largely undertaken in the Press of this country, in order to influence the nation to look upon prisoners of war indiscriminantly as objects of sympathy, and indeed, almost as heroes, will in the opinion of the Army Council go far towards undermining the fighting discipline of the Army.’ Report of the war office committee of enquiry into ‘shell-shock’, Cmd. 1734, Parl, papers 1922, XII, 28Google Scholar; Guinn, Paul, British strategy and politics, 1914–1918 (Oxford, 1965), p. 162Google Scholar; ‘Prisoners of war’ memorandum by the Army Council, 31 May 1918, Public Record Office Cab. 24/53 G.T. 4715. Cf. official view, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for war relating to the army estimates for 1920–21, Cmd. 565, Pari, papers 1920, XXVIII, 10–11Google Scholar; Major-General SirChilds, Wyndham, Episodes and reflections (London, 1930), p. 163.Google Scholar

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31 War Cabinet Minute 232 (14), 13 September 1917, Cab. 23/4. Leave was indeed an extremely sore point with the troops and their dependents. A month earlier, a letter appeared in a Middlesbrough newspaper calling for the formation of committees throughout the north of England to agitate for an immediate improvement in furlough arrangements. It was with some relief that Colonel Henry Williams told the House of Commons in October that nothing had so far been done to implement his aggrieved constituents' suggestion. At the same time, he counselled against complacency: there was, he said, ‘a very large quantity of very inflammable material lying about the question’ which ill-disposed persons could ‘by stirring up trouble’ concoct a ‘first class outcry’. In the absence of detailed man-power studies for the armed forces it is difficult to assess the extent of the problem. However, some fragmentary information disgorged by a reluctant War Office suggests that complaints of this sort were not unjustified. In June–July 1917 there were more than 107,000 men who had been without leave for 18 months, and more than 403,000 who had not seen home in 12 months. H.C. Deb., 31 10 1917 (XCVIII), 1553Google Scholar; Morning Post, 8 10 1917.Google Scholar

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34 See, for example, Haig, to Derby, Lord, 3 10 1917, Cab. 24/79 G-T. 6874.Google Scholar

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36 In the German and Austrian armies too, militant soldiers showed an equal concern for a rapid and orderly demobilization, but differed from the British mutineers in seeking to extend organization beyond this purpose. For a useful account, see Garsten, F. L., Revolution in central Europe 1918–1919 (London, 1972).Google Scholar

37 Blatchford, for example, in the last week of October 1916 began a five-part series in the popular Sunday weeklies exposing the ‘stupid bestial-savagry’ of the disciplinary code in general and Field Punishment No. 1 in particular. His blistering attacks aroused a good deal of public unease and shook the War Office, but failed to elicit the kind of response from organized Labour which might have ensured a meaningful reform, there-and-then. Ironically, the principal beneficiaries of the campaign were those for whom it was least intended. In consequence of the public outcry against F.P. 1, it was considered unwise to proceed with proposed tougher measures against those persuading or assisting soldiers to go absent without leave: ‘The introduction of an amendment bill now’, the Army Council was advised, ‘might call undue attention to the Army Act.’ Minutes of the proceedings of the Army Council, 18 December 1916, Precis No. 847, W.O. 163/21; for public response to Blatchford's campaign, see W.O. 32/5460.

38 For Cameronians, Terraine, John, ed., General Jack's diary 1914–1918 (London, 1964), p. 256Google Scholar; for Shoreham, bishop of Oxford to Curzon, Lord, 3 09 1917Google Scholar, Cab. 24/25 G.T. 2852; for Portsmouth riots, Adm. 116/1022.

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41 Here our scepticism is reinforced by what is known of the myopic tendencies of allied generals confronted with unrest. In France G.Q.C, wrongly attributed the mutinies of 1917 to the subversive activities of pacifists and socialists; in Russia too Order No. 1 was interpreted as the denial of discipline when it amounted to the eradication of a certain conception of discipline. But Russia had no Pétain; the collapse of the Russian armies was, in large measure, precipitated by the officer corps itself. For France see Pedroncini, , Les mutineries de 1917Google Scholar; for Ferro, Russia Marc, ‘Le soldat russe en 1917’, Annales E.S.C., I, 26 (1971), 14–39.Google Scholar

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43 This Act empowered the British government to conscript Russian nationals resident in Britain and the Russians vice versa. A full account of its origins can be found in our forthcoming article ‘Aliens in Britain 1914–1918’, to appear elsewhere.

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15/7/14 15/11/18

Regulars (inc. Marines) 146,047 188,537

Hostilities only 74,437

Retired officers/pensioners 12,346

Fleet Reserve 19,180

Naval Reserve 23,453

Naval Reserve (trawler section) 37,145

Volunteer Reserve 50,218

Colonial Reserve 2,000

146,047 407,316

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84 Kenworthy, J. M., Soldiers, sailors and others (London, 1936), pp. 99–100.Google Scholar

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98 Speaking at Cardiff on 17 July 1917, ex-Sergeant-Major Blythe, who played a not insignificant part in organizing veterans, told an audience of about 200 ex-servicemen: ‘There were now 843,000 discharged soldiers and sailors, and none of them were going back until every available man had done his duty. There were thousands of malingerers in munitions factories, and they were going to see that these men were brought out. He urged them to defy the local military. He had, he said, thirty years in a Trade Union. In Sheffield anarchy is always mentioned with his name. They were all trained men and could use a rifle, and if they did not get what they wanted they had sufficient power, and Blythe would lead them to revolution.’ W.O. 32/5455.

99 The object of the Comrades was frankly set forth by its moving spirit in the following letter to a highly placed friend at the War Office ‘…this…should act as a check to extremists and syndicalists in their efforts to try and capture the discharged soldier for their political ends. There are some 230 odd organisations working with this deplorable end in view, and I suggest it is up to all soldiers to make a sustained effort to fight this pernicious propaganda, and that we keep and work together for the good of the country by keeping soldiers clear of politics. Unless we do this in the true interests of the Army, I feel sure, as things are going now, that we shall soon be face to face with discontent and revolution.’ Lieut-Col. Sir John Norton-Griffiths, M.P., to Brigadier-General B. E. W. Childs, 20 July 1917, ibid; also Wootton, Graham, Official history of the British legion (London, 1956), pp. 3–5.Google Scholar

100 See, for example, Labour Leader, 22 11 1917Google Scholar; Report of the 17th annual conference of the Labour Party (1918), p. 121.Google Scholar

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106 The mutiny at Invergordon is one of those tales which has not improved with the telling. Captain Roskill provides the most recent scholarly assessment: see Naval policy between the wars II, ch. 4.