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Britain, the United States, and the Security of the Sa‘udi Arabian Oilfields in 1942*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Daniel Silverfarb
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Extract

In the spring and summer of 1942 the German military forces in north Africa and southern Russia made significant advances. In June the German army reached EI Alamein, only seventy miles west of Alexandria, while in August the German army reached the outskirts of Stalingrad. As a result of these German advances, Britain, which was the allied country with primary responsibility for defending the Middle East against the Axis powers, became concerned about the possibility that the German air force might attempt to bomb the oilfields and oil refineries in the Middle East in order to deny the oil in that area to the allied governments. Britain was also alarmed about the possibility that, instead of bombing the oil installations, the Germans might attempt to capture them intact in order to utilize the oil for their war machine. In 1942 total Middle Eastern oil production constituted only about six per cent of total world oil production. However, all Middle Eastern oil was refined locally - about two-thirds at Abadan in Iran - and played a vital role in the conduct of British military operations in the Middle East and southeast Asia.1 In 1942 Britain had troops stationed in Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and Bahrain, the four main Middle Eastern oil-producing nations, and thus was well placed to defend and, if necessary, to destroy the oil facilities in those countries. However, at this time Sa'udi Arabia, the remaining Middle Eastern oil producing nation, was a neutral power with no British or American troops stationed on its territory. As a result of Sa'udi neutrality it was difficult for Britain to defend the Sa'udi oilfields against German air attack. It was also difficult for Britain to make the necessary preparations to destroy the Sa'udi oilfields in the event that the German army advanced into the Arabian peninsula. The purpose of this communication will be to discuss the manner in which the British government attempted to deal with these problems. It will also discuss the reaction of the United States government and the American-owned oil company in Sa'udi Arabia to this situation.

Type
Communications
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 26 , Issue 3 , September 1983 , pp. 719 - 726
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1983

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References

1 Memorandum by the economics division, headquarters, United States air force Middle East, ‘Oil in the Middle East’, 28 April 1943, RG 165, OPD, 463.7; Meeting in Iraq between British army officers, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company representative, and member of the petroleum board in London, 11 July 1942, W.O. 201/1340; Memorandum by the petroleum division, ministry of fuel and power, ‘Oil supplies in the East in the event of the destruction of the Persian Oilfields’, 15 July 1942, Adm. 116/4652.

2 Longrigg, Stephen, Oil in the Middle East: its discovery and development (3rd edn, London, 1968), pp. 106–10, 132–5;Google Scholar Arabian American Oil Company, Aramco handbook: oil and the Middle East, revised edn, (Haarlem, the Netherlands, 1968), pp. 120, 135; Memorandum by the economics division, headquarters, United States air force Middle East, ‘Oil in the Middle East’, 28 April 1943, RG 165, OPD, 463.7; Memorandum by L. W. Snyder (CASOC engineer), ‘Well denial program for Dammam field of CASOC’, 22 April 1942, RG 59, 890F.6363 Standard Oil Co./140.Google Scholar

3 Conversation in Washington between William Lenahan (CASOC official) and Ailing; 16 April 1942, U.S. department of state, Foreign relations of the United States 1942, iv (Washington, 1963), 576 (hereafter referred to as FRUS); Memorandum by F. W. Ohliger (CASOC manager at Dhahran), ‘Defense measures required at CASOC, 10 May 1942, RG 59, 890F.6363/27; Moose to secretary of state, 5 June 1942, FRUS 1942, iv, 577; Kirk to secretary of state, 19 May 1942, FRUS 1942, iv, 577; Ailing to Orme Wilson (liaison officer at the state department), 17 April 1942, RG 59, 890F.6363/34; Hull to Henry Stimson (secretary of war), 18 Sept. 1942, RG 59, 890F.6363/44.Google Scholar

4 H. A. Caccia (eastern department at the Foreign Office) to Major H. Mallaby (War Office), 30 April 1942, F.O. 371/31453, E2622/330/25; Commander-in-chief Persia and Iraq to War Office, 30 Sept. 1942, F.O. 371/31453, E5322/330/25.

5 Note by General G. C. Marshall (U.S. army chief of staff) and Admiral E. J. King (chief of naval operations), 13 Aug. 1942, RG 218, CCS, 660.2; Notes on the 42nd meeting of the joint planning staff and extract from the minutes of that meeting, 21 Oct. 1942, RG 165, ABC, 660.2.

6 Stonehewer Bird to minister of state, Cairo, 14 Sept. 1942, F.O. 371/31453, E5461/330/25; Jidda to Foreign Office, 26 April 1942, R/15/2/699, fo. 182; Stonehewer Bird to Foreign Office, 25 Feb. 1942, F.O. 371/31449, E1291/13/25.

7 Memorandum by Snyder, ‘Protection of facilities of CASOC against bombing’, 22 April 1942, RG 59,890F.6363 Standard Oil Co./140; Memorandum by Ohliger, ‘Defense measures required at CASOC’, 10 May 1942, RG 59, 890F.6363/27; Lieutenant Derwood Lockard (U.S. naval observer at Basra) to navy department, 29 April 1942, RG 59, 890G.6363/37.

8 Note by War Office, 29 May 1941, Cab. 80/28, fo. 146; John Gilmour (petroleum department) to A. W. Lumby (principal at the India office), 8 May 1942, L/P&S/12/3930, Ext. 2442/42; Memorandum by W. P. Anderson (chief local representative for the Bahrain Petroleum Company), 29 April 1942, RG 59, 890G.6363/37; Fortress commander Calcutta to army headquarters New Delhi, not dated but probably March 1942, W. O. 201/2108, fo. 31b; Note by Major E. Boaden, royal engineers (Middle East headquarters Cairo), 29 May 1942, W.O. 201/2106; Ailing to Wilson, 17 April 1942, RG 59, 890F.6363/34.

9 Major-general royal engineers, headquarters tenth army to Bale, 26 July 1942, R/15/2/662, fos. 216–7; Political resident Persian Gulf to British minister Jidda, 14 Aug. 1942, R/15/2/662. fo. 245; Stonehewer Bird to minister of state Cairo, 3 July 1942, R/15/2/662, fo. 154; Foreign Office to minister of state Cairo, 7 July 1942, R/15/2/662, fo. 155.

In Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain, Britain also tried to keep its oil-denial programme secret from the local government. Lieutenant-Colonel C. G. Prior (political resident Persian Gulf) to O. K. Caroe (secretary of the external affairs department of the government of India), 7 April 1942, R/15/2/662, fo. 31; Petroleum division representative, British embassy Baghdad to Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Abadan, Iraq Petroleum Co. Kirkuk, et al., 23 November 1942, R/15/2/663, fo. 90.

10 Meeting in Bahrain between CASOC officials from Sa'udi Arabia and British army officers, 12 Aug. 1942, W.O. 201/1354, fo. 31a; Political resident Persian Gulf to British minister Jidda, 14 Aug. 1942, R/15/2/662, fo. 245; Political agent Bahrain to political resident, 30 Aug. 1942, R/15/2/662, fo. 266.

James Moose, the United States chargé d’affaires at Jidda, was especially suspicious of Bale. Moose to secretary of state, 22 Aug. 1942, RG 59, 890F.6363/40.

11 Memorandum by Snyder, ‘Well denial program for Dammam field of CASOC’, 22 April 1942, RG 59, 890F.6363 Standard Oil Co./140; Meeting in Bahrain between CASOC officials from Sa'udi Arabia and British army officers, 12 Aug. 1942, W.O. 201/1354, fos. 31a–31b; Conversation in Washington between Lenahan and Gordon Merriam (assistant chief of the division of Near Eastern affairs at the state department), 24 Aug. 1942, RG 59, 890F.6363/40.

12 Conversation in Washington between Lenahan and Merriam, 24 Aug. 1942, RG 59, 890F.6363/40; Memorandum by Snyder, ‘Well denial program for Dammam field of CASOC’, 22 April 1942, RG 59, 890F.6363 Standard Oil Co./140.

13 Conversation in Washington between Lenahan and Merriam, 24 Aug. 1942, RG 59, 890F.6363/40; Maurice Bridgeman (petroleum department representative in the Middle East) to petroleum department, 20 Oct. 1942, R/15/2/663, fo. 34; F. A. Davies (CASOC president in San Francisco) to Roy Lebkicker (CASOC liaison officer with the Sa'udi government), undated but probably early Oct. 1942, RG 165, OPD, 004).

14 Conversation in Washington between Lenahan and Merriam, 13 July 1942, FRUS 1942, IV, 579–80; Hull to Kirk, 22 July 1942, FRUS 1942, iv, 581–2.

15 Conversation in Washington between Lenahan and Merriam, 13 July 1942, FRUS 1942, IV, 579–80; Davies to Lebkicker, undated but probably early Oct. 1942, RG 165, OPD, 004; Kirk to secretary of state, 13 July 1942; FRUS 1942, iv, 578; Kirk to secretary of state, 20 Aug. 1942, FRUS 1942, iv, 582; Hull to Kirk, 28 Aug. 1942, FRUS 1942, iv, 583.