CANADA, SANCTIONS AND THE ABYSSINIAN CRISIS OF 1935

Abstract

This article attempts to place the Canadian contribution to the collapse of the sanctions front against Italy in 1935 in perspective. It argues that Canadian policy on the question was powerfully conditioned by, and conditioned in turn, imperial policy taken as a whole. There is no attempt to assess blame, but rather, an effort at a modest redistribution of responsibility from the shoulders of British statesmen, over-burdened, onto those of Canadian leaders, the contribution of whom to the formation of general imperial policy has largely escaped notice. The Canadian contribution is instructive in an examination of the Ethiopian crisis, in particular, because Canada alone amongst the dominions invariably opposed a ‘forward’ policy against Italy and alone amongst its fellow dominions consistently failed to support a common front against fascism. It is not without significance that this policy – or lack of policy, perhaps more properly – also became Britain's own.