Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
It is now more than twenty years since Peter Laslett argued that the Exclusion controversy and not the Revolution of 1688 was the occasion of the composition of Locke's Two treatises. Nevertheless, scholarly interpretations still resist treating Two treatises as mainly an activist tract and persist in characterizing it always as something loftier, viz. ‘political philosophy’, ‘systematic moral apologia’, and the like. Resistance to the implications of a rigorous historical mode of interpretation is surely part of the problem. The perennial or transcendent purposes with which the classics are haloed often get diminished in too specific an historical location of the motives and situation of the author. Oddly, however, even critics friendly to a strictly historical approach have hesitated before the implications of Laslett's dicta that Locke wrote as a whig pamphleteer and for Shaftesbury's purposes. This, in turn, parallels the widespread contempt felt by many contemporary English historians (Locke's interpreters among them) for the early whigs. Righteous indignation against the whigs is even detectable in those modern writings from which we take our view of the whig Exclusion pamphleteers.
1 Peter, Laslett, ‘The English Revolution and Locke's “Two treatises of government”’, Cambridge Historical Journal, xii, 1 (1956), 40–55.Google Scholar
2 See Stewart, Edwards, ‘Political philosophy belimed: the case of Locke’, Political Studies, xvii (1969), 273–93Google Scholar and Esmond S. deBeer, ‘Locke and English liberalism: the Second treatise of government in its contemporary setting’, in Yolton, John W. (ed.), John Locke: problems and perspectives (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 36–44.Google Scholar
3 Laslett himself led the way in this effort. See his ‘introduction’ to Locke's Two treatises of government (Cambridge, 1960), especially pp. 45–66; and John, Dunn, The political thought of John, Locke (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 43–76Google Scholar; Gough, J. W., John Locke's political philosophy (Oxford, 1973), pp. 134–53.Google Scholar
4 This barely controlled distaste and suspicion are widespread and tarnish nearly all recent historical writing on politics in England in the seventeenth century. Typically, the resistance offered by the whigs to the growth and assertion of royal prerogative is characterized as itself ambitious, jealous, vengeful, or merely short-sightedly partisan. Beyond the obvious and ubiquitous influence of Professor Butterfields's critique of the whig interpretation of history, the roots and extent of this current anti-whiggery is itself a topic worth pursuing, although one beyond the scope of this essay.
5 The established attitude toward the whig Exclusion pamphlets is contained in a quite small and circumscribed critical literature. Interest in the pamphlets has been, in the main, an off-shoot of a larger interest in the origins of English political parties, and the pamphlets themselves are individually neglected in favour of the more general curiosity about overall whig party tactics, etc. The standard surveys are B. Behrens, ‘The Whig theory of the constitution in the reign of Charles II’, Cambridge Historical Journal, vii (1941), 42–71 and Furley, O. W., ‘The Whig Exclusionists: pamphlet literature in the Exclusion campaign, 1679–81’, Cambridge Historical Journal, xiii (1957), 19–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Brief discussions can be found also in Jones, J. R., The first Whigs, the politics of the Exclusion crisis (London, 1961)Google Scholar; Clayton, Roberts, The growth of responsible government in Stuart England (Cambridge, 1966)Google Scholar; Caroline, Robbins, The eighteenth-century commonwealthman (Cambridge, Mass., 1959)Google Scholar; David, Ogg, England in the reign of Charles II, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1934)Google Scholar; Haley, K. H. D., Thefirst Earl of Shaftesbury (Oxford, 1968)Google Scholar. A thorough and interesting bibliography of pamphlets is given in Francis S. Ronalds, The attempted Whig revolution of 1678–1681 (Urbana, 111., 1937). Very interesting discussions of the pamphlet activity from the point of view of their respective writer-subjects are provided by James Ferguson, Robert Ferguson, the plotter (Edinburgh, 1887); Brown, F. C., Elkanah Settle, his life and works (Chicago, Ill., 1910)Google Scholar; Maurice, Ashley, John Wildman, plotter and postmaster (London, 1947)Google Scholar; and Sensabaugh, George F., That grand Whig Milton (Stanford, Calif., 1952).Google Scholar
6 See Behrens, ‘Whig theory’, p. 46; Furlen, ‘Whig exclusionists’, pp. 21, 28–30; Jones, First Whigs, pp. 67, 215; and Robbins, Commonwealthman, pp. 26–7.
7 Philip, Abrams (ed.), John Locke's two tracts on government (Cambridge, 1967), p. 120.Google Scholar
8 ‘A letter from a person of quality’, in Woodall, H.et al. (eds.), The works of John Locke (2 vols. London, 1768), iv, 539 (hereinafter, ‘Letter’). For an ironic parallel, see Andrew Marvell, ‘An account of the growth of popery and arbitrary government in England’, in Alexander B. Grosart (ed.), The complete prose works of Andrew Marvell (4 vols., n.p. and New York, 1875 and 1966), iv, 261–2, 303–4 (hereinafter, ‘Account’).Google Scholar
9 ‘Letter’, p. 568.
10 ‘Account’, p. 248.
11 ‘Letter’, p. 539.
12 Ibid. p. 540.
13 See ‘Account’, pp. 248–53, 261, 263, and ‘Letter’, pp. 540, 554, 568.
14 Specifically concerned with money, see ‘Account’, p. 367.
15 Ibid. pp. 249–50.
16 ‘Letter’, p. 554.
17 Ibid. p. 547.
18 Ibid. p. 554.
19 Ibid. p. 555.
20 ‘Account’, p. 307.
21 Ibid. p. 410.
22 ‘Letter’, p. 555.
23 Ibid. p. 568.
24 ‘Account’, p. 414.
25 The pamphlets used in this section, all but one from 1681, are the following;: ‘The character of a popish successour’, State tracts (London, 1689), pp. 148–64’ (hereinafter, ‘Character’); ‘A just and modest vindication of the proceedings of the two last parliaments of K. Charles the Second’, ibid. pp. 165–87 (hereinafter, ‘Vindication’); ‘A letter from a person of quality to his friend concerning His Majesties late Declaration’ (hereinafter, ‘Letter II’); ‘An appeal from the country to the city’, ibid. pp. 401–10 (hereinafter, ‘Appeal’); ‘An impartial account of the nature and tendency of the late addresses’, ibid, pp. 425–38 (hereinafter, ‘Account’); ‘Reasons for his Majesty's passing the Bill of Exclusion’, Somers tracts, viii, 211–16 (hereinafter, ‘Reasons’); and Henry Neville, ‘Plato Redivivus’, in Caroline Robbins (ed.), Two English republican tracts (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 61–200 (hereinafter, ‘Plato’).
26 Ronald, Whig revolution, pp. 24, 78, 82, 85, 159, calls attention to Charles's personal responsibility for the tactics used against the Exclusionists, a view challenged by Jones, First Whigs, p. 60. On the idea of Charles as a ‘temporizer’ and the reasonableness, therefore, of the view that he could be persuaded, see George Savile, ‘A Character of King Charles II’, in Walter Raleigh (ed.), The complete works of George Savile (Oxford, 1912, 1970), pp. 196, 200, 202–4. Savile stresses Charles's love of ease and his manipulability in that regard. See Jones, First Whigs, p. 8, regarding the belief, in 1681, that Charles was ready to acquiesce and (pp. 132–3) regarding Sunderland and the deception by which Charles led the whigs to believe he wished to be forced into accepting Exclusion. For Charles's speech stressing his willingness to compromise, see Bryant, Sir Arthur (ed.), The letters, speeches and declarations of Kings Charles II (New York, 1935, 1968), pp. 301, 318.Google Scholar
27 ‘Account’, p. 438.
28 See, for example, ‘Character’, p. 157, ‘Plato’, pp. 166–7, 1778, 185, ‘Reasons’, p. 213.
29 For example, ‘Appeal’, pp. 406ff.
30 ‘Plato’, pp. 166–7, 177~8, 185, ‘Reasons’, p. 213 and ‘Letter’, pp. 565, 567–8.
31 For examples of the truly grim assessments of those in the royal clique and the whig view of the falseness of their pretended loyalty to the king, see ‘Vindication’, p. 186, ‘Account’, pp. 427ff., and ‘Appeal’, pp. 403, 406–7.
32 See, for example, ‘Letter II’, p. 188, ‘Vindication’, pp. 166–7, 172, ‘Plato’, pp. 80ff. In regard to Shaftesbury's belief that Charles was, indeed, being manipulated, see Jones, First Whigs, p. 59. On the question of the reality of whig fears in general, see Roberts, Responsible government, p. 214.
33 ‘Vindication’, p. 168.
34 Ibid. p. 180.
35 ‘Account’, p. 429.
36 See ibid. pp. 425, 427–9, and ‘Vindication’, p. 176.
37 ‘Plato’, p. 136.
38 ‘Account’, p. 425.
39 Ibid. p. 426.
40 ‘Reasons’, p. 213, and see ‘Vindication’, p. 184, and ‘Account’, p. 426.
41 ‘Vindication’, pp. 173, 178, 185, ‘Plato’, pp. 68, 87, 194, ‘Account’, pp. 425–6, 430, 436.
42 Ibid. p. 177.
43 ‘Account’, p. 425.
44 ‘Appeal’, p. 407.
45 Contrast Dunn's view of the whig strategy as one of ‘blackmail’, Dunn, Political thought, p. 46.
46 Quoted in Ronald, Whig revolution, p. 159.
47 Quoted in Roberts, Responsible government, p. 242 n. 3.
48 ‘Letter II’, p. 188.
49 ‘Character’, p. 155.
50 ‘Plato’, pp. 124, 185ff., ‘Account’, p. 423. For Charles's speeches all but begging for money and supplies, see Bryant, Letters, speeches, pp. 290, 295–6. On the whig belief that they could force Charles to accept their interpretation of constitutional powers, see Roberts, Responsible government, p. 238. Jones, First Whigs, p. 153 discusses a secret negotiation with the king in which ‘supply on a generous scale’ was offered in return for the king's acceptance of exclusion. While Jones stresses that the belief that’ Charles could be persuaded to abandon his hostility to Exclusion’ was a mistaken one, it was a belief none the less. Strategy grows out of appreciation of the situation – the difference between successful and unsuccessful strategies often being a reflexion of the accuracy of that appreciation.
51 ‘Reasons’, p. 215.
52 ‘Plato’, p. 190, ‘Appeal’, p. 406, ‘Account’, p. 437, ‘Vindication’, pp. 174, 185–6, and ‘Character’, p. 154.
53 ‘Vindication’, p. 187.
54 ‘Character’, p. 161. For others, see ibid. pp. 154–5, 158 ‘Account’, p. 430, ‘Reasons’, p. 215. This is recognized, but somehow distortedly, in Behrens’ notion of a ‘gigantic bluff’, Behrens, ‘Whig theory’, pp. 44, 69; in Furley's discussion of the ‘threat of civil war’, Furley, ‘Whig exclusionists’, pp. 34–5; and in Dunn's remark that the whigs were prepared to threaten revolution to get their way, Dunn, Political thought p. 50. Roberts remarked that, in 1679, Englishmen ‘feared few things more than civil war’ (Roberts, Responsible government, p. 222). In some ways the potential effectiveness of the strategy of ‘threatening revolt’ may have rested upon just that general fear.
55 See Roberts, Responsible government, p. 222 n. 2, in regard to Charles's reading about the civil wars and his apprehensions about the possibility of similar occurrences during his reign. That this was not an entirely wrong concern is obvious in consideration of the consequences to come in the time of James II.
56 ‘Plato’, p. 126 (emphasis added).
57 ‘Appeal’, p. 403.
58 ‘Appeal’, p.403, and see, ‘Letter II’, p. 192.
59 ‘Account’, p. 435.
60 ‘Vindication’, p. 178.
61 ‘Plato’, pp. 184–5, 194–5 and see ‘Account’, p. 436, ‘Vindication’, pp. 178, 184, ‘Letter II’, p. 192.
62 ‘Letter II’, p. 192, ‘Account’, p. 431, ‘Vindication’, pp. 177, 184, ‘Plato’, pp. 68, 80. For other comments on the whigs’ view of themselves as restorers of the constitution, see Furley, ‘Whig exclusionists’, pp. 21, 25, Jones, First Whigs, p. 214, and Roberts, Responsible government, p. 227. For an alternative and more sceptical interpretation see Behrens, ‘Whig theory’, pp. 44, 50, 55ff., 64, and Dunn, Political thought, pp. 45ff.
63 See, however, Tarlton, Charles D., ‘A Rope of Sand: interpretating Locke's First treatise of government’, Historical Journal, xxi, 1 (1978), 43–73.Google Scholar
64 Laslett, Lockes two treatises, p. 160.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid. p. 168.
67 Ibid. p. 166.
68 Ibid. p. 286.
69 Ibid. p. 394.
70 Ibid. p. 287.
71 Ibid. pp. 289–94.
72 Ibid. pp. 304, 313, 317.
73 Ibid. pp 314–16, 318–19.
74 Ibid. pp. 394ff.
75 Ibid. pp. 341, 368–9.
76 Ibid. pp. 341–2.
77 Ibid. pp. 348–9.
78 Ibid. p. 256.
79 Ibid. p. 286.
80 Ibid. pp. 342–3. But, in a more stylized form, see pp. 354–5, and on the difference between single and united strength see p. 377.
81 Ibid. pp. 366, 371.
82 Ibid. p. 380.
83 Ibid. p. 391.
84 Ibid. pp. 360–1, 356–7.
84 Ibid. p. 394.
85 Ibid. pp. 360, 329–32, 394.
86 Ibid. p. 357.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid. p. 383.
90 Ibid. p. 384.
91 Ibid. pp. 315–16.
92 Ibid. pp. 391, 393.
93 Ibid. p. 395.
94 Ibid. pp. 393ff.
95 Ibid pp 395ff.
96 Ibid. p. 397.
97 Ibid. p. 398.
98 Ibid. p. 423.
99 Ibid. p. 47. Locke's biographer adopts the same argument, employing the terms ‘justify’ and ‘promote’. See, Maurice, Cranston, John Locke (New York, 1957), p. 208.Google Scholar
100 The literature dealing with Locke's theory of revolution is devoted almost entirely to an emphasis upon the theory's justification of revolt to the exclusion of any sustained discussions of the capabilities and likelihood for it. This is a clear case of presumptions about purposes leading to interpretive distortion.
101 Laslett, Locke's two treatises, p. 434.
102 Ferguson, Robert Ferguson, p. 411.
103 Quentin, Skinner, ‘History and ideology in the English Revolution’, Historical Journal, viii (1965), 153.Google Scholar
104 Laslett, Locke's two treatises, p. 402n.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid. p. 403n.
107 Pocock, J. G. A., The ancient constitution and the feudal law (Cambridge, 1967), p. 237.Google Scholar
108 ‘Reasons’, p. 216.
109 ‘Letter II’, pp. 189–90.
110 ‘Appeal’, p. 403.
111 ‘Vindication’, p. 178.
112 ‘Character’, p. 163.
113 Laslett, Locke's two treatises, pp. 414–15.
114 Although it may well have had a great deal to do with refuting conquest arguments that were put forward during the later revolution debate of 1688–93. That is, what had been originally an argument reflecting the fears and desperation of whig partisans in light of james's dangerousness could later be included in the published version of Two treatises because it suitably countered many of the arguments then being promoted to suggest that William III's title rested on the idea of a just conquest. While an interesting problem, this cannot here be explored further. It does point, up, however, some of the generally overlooked problems deriving from the neglect of issues surrounding the publication rather than merely the composition of Two treatises. On the idea of conquest during the debates after 1688 see Thompson, Martyn P., ‘On dating chapter xvi of the Second treatise of government’, Locke Newsletter, vii (1976), 95–100Google Scholar; Thompson, M. P., ‘The idea of conquest in controversies over the 1688 revolution’, Journal of tht History of Ideas, xxxviii, 1 (1977), 33–46; and Mark Goldie, ‘Edmund Bohun and jus gentium in the revolution debate, 1689–93’, Historical Journal, xx, 3 (1977), 569–586.CrossRefGoogle Scholar