Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
In June 1890 Lord Salisbury negotiated an agreement with Germany ceding Heligoland in return for the renunciation of German claims to Uganda, the cession of the German protectorate over the East African coast north of Witu, and the recognition of a British protectorate over Zanzibar. Although France was a party to the Joint Declaration of 1862 which guaranteed the independence of Zanzibar, Salisbury did not consider himself bound to consult her about the proposed change in the island's status. More surprisingly, he offered no assurance that French rights in Zanzibar would continue to be respected. When the French protested, Salisbury apologized for this oversight and entered into negotiations with their ambassador, W. H. Waddington. On 5 August a new agreement was signed whereby France recognized the British protectorate over Zanzibar in exchange for the recognition of her own protectorate over Madagascar and of her sphere of influence ‘south of her Mediterranean Possessions, up to a line from Say on the Niger, to Barruwa on Lake Tchad, drawn in such a manner as to comprise in the sphere of action of the [Royal] Niger Company all that fairly belongs to the Kingdom of Sokoto’.
1 The reasons for this decision are obscure. Salisbury's excuse that he had simply forgotten to inform the French seems improbable, and his claim that he had forgotten about French rights in Zanzibar is certainly untrue. Yet there is no apparent reason why he should have deliberately neglected to inform Paris. He had nothing to lose by a formal notification such as the one which he actually gave to the Italian Government. The question of notification, however, is quite distinct from that of consultation. Salisbury resolutely denied any obligation to consult France on the grounds that the 1862 Declaration only guaranteed the independence of Zanzibar from the Sultanate of Muscat, and that it did not apply in any case to the voluntary acceptance of a protectorate by the Sultan. Salisbury to Lytton, 7 July 1890, no. 125, Public Record Office, F.O. 84/2026.
2 Hertslet, E., The Map of Africa by Treaty, 3rd ed. (London, 1909), II, 738–9.Google Scholar
3 Terrier, A., review of Eugène Etienne, son aeuvre coloniale, algérienne et politique, Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Française [B.C.A.F. hereafter], 11 1907;Google Scholaridem, ‘Afrique Equatoriale Française’, in Hanotaux, G. and Martineau, A. (eds.), Histoire ties colonies françaises et de l'expansion de la France dans le monde (Paris, 1931), IV, 430,Google Scholar 442.
4 Robinson, R.E. and Gallagher, J., Africa and the Victorians (London, 1961), pp. 301–2;Google Scholaridem, ‘The Partition of Africa’, in Hinsley, F.H. (ed.), The New Cambridge Modern History, XI, 611,Google Scholar 621.
5 E.g. Vignes, K., ‘Etude sur les relations franco-britanniques qui conduisirent à la convention du 14 juin 1898’, Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer, LII (1965), 370:Google Scholar ‘…notre diplomatic [était] fautive pour avoir insumsamment préparé ses approches, sans avoir peutêtre su tirer un parti suffisant des éléments dont elle disposait pour faire pression sur [Lord Salisbury]’.
6 Flint, J.E., Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria (London, 1960), pp. 158,Google Scholar 166–8.
7 Ibid. p. 167.
8 Brunschwig, H., Mythes et réaltiés de l'impérialisme colonial français, 1871–1914 (Paris, 1960), p. 116.Google Scholar This view is based on Blanchard, M., ‘Français et Anglais au Niger (1890–1898)’, Le Monde Français, XII (1948), 412–13.Google Scholar
9 Ganiage, J., L'expansion coloniale de la France sous la Troisième République (Paris 1968), pp. 166–8,Google Scholar acknowledges the ‘tenacity’ of Waddington and the advantages secured from the Agreement but still accepts conventional arguments about the reactions of Etienne and the colonialists.
10 Baring to Salisbury, 19 Mar. 1890, Foreign Office Confidential Print [F.O. Pr. hereafter] 5986, no. 39; Lytton to Salisbury, 1 Apr. 1890, F.O. Pr. 5982, no. I.
11 Lytton to Salisbury, 1 Apr. 1890, ibid.; same to same, 6 May 1890, F.O. Pr. 5987, no. 34; French Note to the Egyptian Government, 8 May 1890 [Copy], F.O. 27/3020.
12 Ribot to Waddington, 17 June 1890 (handed to Salisbury, 21 June 1890), F.O. Pr. 5982, no. 57; Lytton to Salisbury, 16 June, 19 June 1890, F.O. Pr. 5987, nos. 97A, 102. Ribot agreed to the allocation in principle but was prepared to approve it only on a yearly basis.
13 Ribot to Waddington, 25 June 1890, Documents diplomatiques français, Ière série [D.D.F. hereafter], VIII, no. 95; Lytton to Salisbury, 6 July 1890, F.O. Pr. 6019, no. 5. On an earlier occasion, Ribot had described the proposal to levy a new tax as ‘un mauvais procédé’.
14 de Freycinet, C., Souvenirs, 1878–1893, 3rd ed. (Paris, 1913), p. 45.Google Scholar
15 When the conversion was first proposed in 1889, the French withheld their approval because Salisbury refused to reaffirm the temporary character of the British occupation or to withdraw British troops from Cairo to Alexandria.
16 Egyptian Delegates to Egyptian Ministry of Finance, 15 Apr. 1890, encl. in Egerton to Salisbury, 23 Apr. 1890, F.O. Pr. 5987, no. 24: ‘Nous sommes sortis…avec la conviction que nous nous sommes trouvés en présence d'un Ministre [Ribot] tres bien disposé…et animé du désir de trouver une combinaison qui obtiendrait un accueil favorable dans le public, à la Chambre, et dans le monde de la finance.’
17 Lytton to Salisbury, 26 June 1890, Afr. no. 84, F.O. 84/2027.
18 Same to same, 26 June 1890, Teleg. Afr. no. 5, F.O. 84/2029.
19 Same to same, 26 June 1890, Afr. no. 84, F.O. 84/2027.
20 L'Intransigeant, 21 June, 23 June 1890; La France, 23 June, cited in La Cocarde, 24 June 1890.
21 La Cocarde, 29 June 1890: ‘L'Affaire de Zanzibar—La Note de l'Angleterre—Graves Complications’; 3 July 1890: ‘Préparatifs Menaçants de rAllemagne et de l'Angleterre’ 5 July 1890: ‘Est-ce la Paix?’.
22 Le Temps, 20 June 1890.
23 This was true even of newspapers generally favourable to the government. See: Le Temps, 19 June 1890; La République Franfaise, 22 June, 23 June 1890.
24 The Freycinet Ministry was a classic example of ‘replâtrage’. All but four members of the Tirard Ministry remained in office. Constans, whose resignation as Minister of the Interior had marked the beginning of the end for Tirard, resumed his post. Bourgeois, who had replaced Constans at the Ministry of the Interior, was shifted to the Ministry of Public Instruction.
25 Le Gaulois, 18 Mar. 1890; La Justice, 18 Mar. 1890; L'Intransigeant, 19 Mar., 21 Mar. 1890.
26 The most famous examples of this were the defeat of the first Ferry Ministry over Tunisia in November 1881 a nd of the second over Tonkin in March 1885. In both cases, however, the success of the tactic depended on defections from the Centre.
27 Lytton to Salisbury, 6 May 1890, Salisbury MSS. A/58/68: ‘But of course we must remember that Ribot is treading on eggs. He and Freycinet are not at all in an easy position…, and they can do nothing which could expose them to the charge the Opposition Parties will be eager to make if they can of having lost an opportunity of scoring some advantage to France…in reference to Egypt.’ I am grateful to the Marquess of Salisbury for permission to use the papers of the third Marquess.
28 Annales de I'Assemblée Nationale, Débate Parlementaires, Chambre [Annales hereafter], séance du 21 juin 1890, pp. 529–32. According to La Cocarde, Deloncle acted on Spuller's advice in a deliberate attempt to embarrass the new Foreign Minister. But Deloncle was a convinced colonialist, and his concern over the Anglo-German Agreement was undoubtedly genuine.
29 Ibid. séances du 23 juin, 24 juin 1890, pp. 536, 563–4. Brisson intended to ask: ‘si un pareil abandon de nos droits n'aurait pas, au point de vue de notre prestige comme grande puissance africaine, une répercussion redoutable dans toute l'Afrique’; but he reluctantly withdrew his interpellation when Ribot urged him not to prejudice the negotiations with Britain.
30 E.g. L'Intransigeant, 26 June, 29 June, 4 Aug. 1890: ‘La diplomatic représentée par les Herbette et les Waddington, et le Gouvernement de M. Ribot font…encore plus triste figure au dehors qu'en France. Les hommes d'Etat de la Triple Alliance ont beau jeu avec de tels fantoches.’
31 Ribot to Waddington, 21 June 1890, D.D.F. VIII, no. 90; same to same, 25 June 1890, no. 131, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Correspondance Politique [AE hereafter], Angleterre 850; Lytton to Salisbury, 26 June 1890, Afr. no. 84, F.O. 84/2027.
32 Lytton to Salisbury, 26 June 1890, Teleg. Afr. no. 5, F.O. 84/2029; same to same, 27 June 1890, Afr. no. 85, F.O. 84/2027. Ribot added with a laugh that he ‘hoped for something substantial and not just for show’.
33 Sir James Fergusson's statement to the Commons on 23 June, denying any obligation to consult France over the Zanzibar protectorate, seriously embarrassed Ribot and made it more difficult for him to deal with Brisson's interpellation. Ribot to Waddington, 24 June 1890, D.D.F. VIII, no. 93; Lytton to Salisbury, 27 June 1890, Afr. no. 85, F.O. 84/2027.
34 Lytton to Salisbury, 6 July 1890, F.O. Pr. 6019, no. 5.
35 Same to same, 28 June 1890, Most Secret, Afr. no. 86, F.O. 84/2027; Waddington to Ribot, 29 June, 1 July 1890, D.D.F. VIII, nos. 97, 101. Waddington was doubtful about the possibility of concessions in Tunisia and did not formally make them a sine qua non. Ribot's other two conditions, the recognition of the Madagascar protectorate and the delimitation of spheres of influence in West Africa, were not expected to raise serious difficulties.
36 Waddington to Ribot, 22 July 1890, D.D.F. VIII, no. 127; Münster [German ambassador, Paris] to German Foreign Ministry, 25 July 1890, Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871–1914 [G.P. hereafter], VIII, no. 1883; Ribot to Montebello [French ambassador, Constantinople], 26 Aug. 1890, D.D.F. VIII, no. 163. For the views of the Tunisian administration and the majority of the colonists, see: Drummond Hay [Consul-General, Tunis] to Salisbury, 25 Jan. 1890, F.O. Pr. 6063, no. I.
37 Waddington to Ribot, 29 June 1890, D.D.F. VIII, no. 97. Ribot wished to modify the Anglo-Tunisian Perpetual Treaty so that it would expire in 1896 at the same time as the Italo-Tunisian Treaty, or earlier if the French reached an agreement with the Italians.
38 ‘Lettres de la Tunisie', Le Temps, 10 Jan., 18 Jan., 11 Feb. 1890.
39 Drummond Hay to Salisbury, 25 Jan. 1890, F.O. Pr. 6063, no. 1; Pontois, interview with, Le Gaulois, 25 June 1890.
40 Annales, séance du 4 juillet 1890, p. 728; Le République Française, 25 May 1890.
41 Münster to Caprivi, 12 July 1890, G.P. VIII, no. 1691.
42 La Justice, 13 June 1890. Tunisian wines were subject to a duty of 4.50 fr. a hectolitre, Spanish wines to one of 2 fr. The duty on Tunisian grain in France was 5 fr. per 100 kg; in Italy it was 1.40 fr.
43 Algerian opposition had already forced the postponement of tariff reductions in 1889. When Spuller finally submitted proposals after the elections, the commission des douanes, again under Algerian influence, demanded reciprocal reductions. Given the existence of most-favoured-nation clauses in Tunisia's foreign treaties, this was tantamount to a rejection. See: Le Figaro, 2 July 1890.
44 Annales, séance du 4 juillet 1890, pp. 730–1. Ribot turned the debate away from the question of compensation by concentrating on the issues of principle raised by the Anglo-German Agreement. But he had implicitly to recognize the connexion between Tunisia and Zanzibar.
45 Ribot to Waddington, 17 July 1890, Teleg. no. 86, AE Angleterre 851. Commercial considerations were so unimportant that Ribot was ready to guarantee Britain continued most-favoured-nation treatment.
46 Ribot to Waddington, 15 July 1890, D.D.F. VIII, no. 116; Münster to German Foreign Ministry, 27 June 1890; Münster to Caprivi, 12 July 1890, G.P. VIII, nos. 1866, 1691.
47 Lytton to Salisbury, 29 June 1890, F.O. Pr. 6063, no. 51; Marschall to Hatzfeld [German ambassador, London], 26 June 1890; Hatzfeld to German Foreign Ministry, 27 June 1890; Hatzfeld to Caprivi, 4 July 1890, G.P. VIII, nos. 1865, 1867, 1868.
48 Hatzfeld to German Foreign Ministry, 16 July 1890; Caprivi to Hatzfeld, 17 July 1890; Caprivi, Note, 17 July 1890, G.P. VIII, nos. 1870, 1871, 1872. On 9 July the Bey was supposed to have signed a secret agreement whereby his heir would renounce his right of succession to the French in return for a civil list of 2,000,000 fr. a year. Although Drummond Hay vouched for the authenticity of the agreement, both Waddington and Ribot strenuously denied its existence, and the editors of the Documents diplomatiques claim to have found no trace of it in the archives of the Quai d'Orsay. D.D.F. VIII, p. 176 n. I.
49 Papermakers' Association to Salisbury, 9 July 1890, F.O. 27/3024; Waddington to Ribot, 16 July 1890, AE Angleterre 851; same to same, 19 July 1890, D.D.F. VIII, no. 123; Summers (Huddersfield), Commons, 17 July 1890, Hansard, 3rd ser. CCCXLVI, col. 82.
50 See: Kennedy, Memorandum, 1 July 1890; Fergusson, Minute, 18 July 1890, F.O. 27/3024.
51 Waddington to Ribot, 14 July 1890; Ribot to Waddington, 15 July 1890, D.D.F. VIII, nos. 113, 116; Salisbury to Lytton, 14 July 1890; Lytton to Salisbury, 16 July 1890, F.O. Pr. 6026, nos. 17, 26. Ribot was only prepared to approve the allocation of funds for the abolition of the corvée until 1894.
52 Ribot to Waddington, 24 July 1890, D.D.F. VIII, no. 131.
53 Salisbury to Portal, 6 July 1890, F.O. Pr. 6026, no. 9: ‘The French Government have announced that…they will consider the imposition of a tax in lieu of corvée an unfriendly act. They are greatly irritated…and if the corvée tax were levied it is quite possible that the Minister might be driven by the feeling in the Chambers into taking some step that would cause much embarrassment.’
54 Waddington to Ribot, 26 July 1890, D.D.F. VIII, no. 132.
55 Lytton to Salisbury, 28 June 1890, Most Secret, Afr. no. 86, F.O. 84/2027.
56 Ribot to Waddington, 10 July 1890, no. 76, AE Angleterre 851.
57 Waddington to Ribot, 14 July 1890, D.D.F. VIII, no. 113. According to the Quai d'Orsay, Britain's acceptance of this claim amounted to ‘la reconnaissance de notre influence exclusive sur toute la région comprise entre nos possessions du nord de l'Afrique et une ligne à tracer entre le Niger et le lac Tchad’. Draft despatch, n.d., AE Angleterre 851.
58 Ribot to Waddington, 24 July 1890, D.D.F. VIII, no. 131. The French accepted Say as the farthest point of British penetration up the Niger.
59 Le Figaro, 11 May 1890; Le Gaulois, 5 July 1890: ‘La Chambre se trouve prise d'une passion aussi violente qu'inattendue pour la Tunisie. II semble que la politique coloniale ne rencontre plus d'adversaires. Cette politique a triomphé hier, et il n'a manqué à ce triomphe que la présence de M. Jules Ferry.’
60 Le Figaro, 11 Mar. 1890.
61 For the earlier popularity of African expansion, see Newbury, C.W. and Kanya-Forstner, A.S.,‘French Policy and the Origins of the Scramble for West Africa’, Journal of African History, X (1969), pp. 253–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
62 Projet de Loi, 16 July 1890, no. 841; Picard to Président du Conseil 20 Aug. 1890, Archives Nationales, Section Outre-Mer. [ANSOM hereafter] Afrique XII, 21/6; The Times, 8 Aug. 1890.
63 Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.hereafter], Débats Parlementaires, Chambre, séance du 10 mai 1890, p. 750: ‘Si vous abaissez une perpendiculaire qui, partant de la limite de la Tunisie et passant par le lac Tchad, vienne aboutir au Congo, vous pouvez dire que la plus grande partie des territoires compris entre cette perpendiculaire et la mer…sont à la France ou destinés à entrer dans la sphère d'influence de la France.’
64 The Times, 12 May 1890.
65 Le Siècle, 10 July, 22 July, 23 July, 24 July 1890. At the height of the campaign The Times, in exasperation, called Deloncle ‘an irresponsible politician…who sets up for an authority on Africa and is in reality a fanatic on the subject’. The Times, 23 July, 28 July 1890.
66 La République Française, 10 July 1890.
67 J. A. Crowe to Salisbury, Very Secret, 10 July 1890, Salisbury MSS. A/60/51: ‘Mr. Ribot is in a very despondent mood and expressed himself…as convinced that he was marked out to be badgered and if possible ousted by the radical party who to effect this purpose made foreign politics a stalking horse to prepare a change in home politics.’
68 Annales, séance du 10 juillet 1890, pp. 845, 866. Ribot was saved from defeat by the Right, over 100 of whom abstained.
69 Ribot to Waddington, 10 July 1890, no. 76, AE Angleterre 851; Waddington to Salisbury, 13 July 1890, D.D.F. VIII, p. 154 n. 1. Commenting on Waddington' s letter, Lytton confirmed that Ribot' s position was ‘certainly critical’; but he doubted whether the Government would actually be brought down. Lytton to Salisbury, 14 July 1890, Salisbury MSS. A/58/93.
70 Etienne to Ribot, 18 June 1890, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Mémoires et Documents [AEMD hereafter], Afrique 123. Etienne based his claim on the theory of hinterland, justifying its extent by the size of the territories already under French protectorate.
71 Desbuissons, Note, 18 Apr. 1890, ibid.
72 Ribot to Herbette, 1 July 1890, no. 27, AE Allemagne 97. The claim rested on the fact that the Anglo-German Agreement provided for the outright sale of the island of Mafia and certain Zanzibari territories on the East African coast which the Germans had previously held on lease from the Sultan.
73 Ribot to Herbette, 21 Aug. 1890, D.D.F. VIII, no. 156; Ribot to Etienne, 29 July 1890, ANSOM, Afrique VI, 84/a.
74 See: Münster to Caprivi, 12 July 1890, G.P. VIII, no. 1691.
75 Herbette to Ribot, 17 July 1890, no. 34, AE Allemagne 97; same to same, 13 Aug., 27 Aug. 1890, D.D.F. VIII, nos. 146, 164.
76 Herbette to Marschall, 17 Nov. 1890; Marschall to Herbette, 17 Nov. 1890, G.P. VIII, nos. 1704, 1705.
77 On one occasion, Salisbury claimed that Waddington mistook a line on the Foreign Office map indicating Mungo Park' s route down the Niger for the Niger Company' s frontier. Salisbury to Lytton, 24 July 1890, Teleg. Afr. no. 5, F.0.84/2029. On questions of map-reading, however, Salisbury was not the most reliable witness.
78 Waddington to Ribot, 26 July 1890, D.D.F. VIII, no. 132.
79 Same to same, 11 July 1890, no. 47; 24 July 1890, nos. 7 1, 72, AE Angleterre 851.
80 Salisbury to Lytton, 28 July 1890, Teleg. Afr. no. 6, F.O. 84/2029; Waddington to Ribot, 29 July 1890, no. 76, AE Angleterre 851. The initiative for claiming Burrum had come from Goldie. See: Goldie to Anderson, Pte., 25 July 1890, F.O. 84/2087.
81 Salisbury to Lytton, 30 July 1890, Teleg. Afr. no. 8, F.O. 84/2029; Waddington to Ribot, 30 July 1890, no. 78, AE Angleterre 851; same to same, 1 Aug. 1890, D.D.F. VIII, no. 136. Ribot wanted the line moved south from Barruwa to the mouth of the Bosso river, but Salisbury refused to consider any further concessions.
82 Waddington to Ribot, 1 Aug. 1890, ibid.
83 Lords, 11 Aug. 1890, Hansard, 3rd ser. CCCXLVIII, cols. 458–9: ‘Anyone who looks at the map and merely measures the degrees will perhaps be of the opinion that France has laid claim to a very considerable stretch of country. But it is necessary to judge land not merely by its extent but also by its value. This land is what agriculturalists would call “very light land”; that is to say, it is the desert of Sahara, and, therefore, of course, the value of that part which France has asserted dominion over is to that extent diminished.
84 Waddington to Salisbury, 13 Aug. 1890, cited in Lady Cecil, G., Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury (London, 1932), IV, 324;Google Scholar Waddington to Ribot, 12 Aug. 1890, no. 229; 13 Aug. 1890, no. 231, AE Angleterre 852.
85 Considérations sur le projet d' arrangement franco-anglais, 13 Aug. 1890, AEMD Afrique 129. These considerations, probably drafted as basis for a Parliamentary statement, represent an optimistic but still fairly accurate summary of the Foreign Ministry' s views.
86 Deloncle, interview with L'Indépendance Beige, cited in Le Siècle, 22 July 1890.
87 Flint, op. cit. pp. 162–3.
88 Waddington to Ribot, 29 July 1890, no. 76, AE Angleterre 851.
89 Cf. Flint, op. cit. p. 165. Waddington transmitted a copy of Aberdare's speech to the Quai d'Orsay but made no comment on it.
90 Mattei to French Foreign Ministry, 5 Nov. 1883, 13 Oct. 1884, AEMD Afrique 86.
91 Viard to directeur politique, Quai d'Orsay, 1 Sept. 1886; Note pour le Ministre, 24 Jan. 1887, AEMD Afrique 85. The report caused considerable alarm in the Foreign Ministry.
92 Le Siècle, 10 July 1890.
93 Desbuissons, Note, 18 Apr. 1890; ‘La pénétration vers Tombouctou’, July 1890, AEMD Afrique 123.
94 Cf. Vignes, ‘Etude sur les relations diplomatiques franco-britanniques’, loc. cit. p. 360. The ambassador did raise the question of British penetration from Morocco with Salisbury, who promised to put an end to it. Waddington to Ribot, 17 July 1890, AE Angleterre 851.
95 On these grounds, the Colonial Department later denied any obligation to recognize British influence even over Sokoto. Colonial Department to Foreign Ministry, 2 Feb. 1894, ANSOM Afrique vi, 115/c.
96 Hargreaves, J.D., Prelude to the Partition of West Africa (London 1963), p. 344.Google Scholar
97 La Justice, 8 Aug., 13 Aug. 1890; L'Intransigeant, 14 Aug. 1890: ‘En effet, l'Angleterre…s'est fait un malin plaisir de reconnaître “nos droits sur le Sahara”, c'est à dire sur le grand désert où nous ne pourrons récolter que du sable et des insolations. …Lord Salisbury se tord et le Chancellier de Caprivi se tient les côtes.’
98 Egerton to Salisbury, 11 Aug. 1890, Afr. no. 112, F.O. 84/2028.
99 Le Figaro, 7 Aug. 1890. This statement, of course, was incorporated almost word for word into the Quai d'Orsay's Considérations.
100 La Cocarde, 13 Aug. 1890:' Et voilà le beau triomphe de MM. Ribot et Waddington… A la Chambre de Lords personne n'a présenté aucune objection à l'exposé quelque peu pince sans rire de Lord Salisbury. Nous imiterons les nobles lords.'
101 Annales, séances du 4 novembre, 6 novembre 1890, pp. 210, 213–15, 226–8. Le Figaro, 5 Nov. 1890: ‘M. Ribot a obtenu un très vif succès parce qu'il a compris que tout l'art oratoire consiste à prononcer souvent, dans ses discours, les mots d'honneur et de dignité.' Ribot's speech was based on the Considérations.
102 L'Intransigeant, 6 Mar. 1890; La Cocarde, 9 Mar. 1890; La Justice, 14 Aug. 1890. The stock arguments were that France could not afford to disperse her military forces overseas or to meet the cost of colonial expansion.
103 Lytton to Salisbury, 28 June 1890, F.O. Pr. 5982, no. 64. The French press, on the other hand, maintained that Brisson refused to serve as Freycinet's Minister of Justice because of his long-standing personal hostility toward the Minister of Finance, Maurice Rouvier. According to Le Figaro, Freycinet's offer of the Ministry of Justice was itself a subtle political manoeuvre since he knew that Brisson would have to refuse it. Whatever the reasons for Brisson's animosity, its strength cannot be questioned.
104 Le Gaulois, 11 July 1890.
105 Le Temps, 6 Nov. 1890; La République Française, 5 Nov. 1890: ‘Seulement chers néophytes, prenez garde d'aller trop vite. Au train dont allait hier M. de Lamarzelle, les Tonkinois auraient beau courir au triple galop; ils ne pourraient plus rattraper La Droite sur cette nouvelle route de Damas.’ The Marquis de La Ferronays was a genuine colonialist who later joined the groupe colonial, but his criticisms were directed against the Anglo-French Agreement of 10 August 1889 rather than the Agreement of 5 August 1890.
106 Annales, seance du 6 novembre 1890, pp. 223–6.
107 Le Siècle, 12 Aug., 18 Aug. 1890.
108 Votes of Groupe Colonial Sources: For membership: Revised membership list drawn up by Professor Jean Ganiage, to whom I am grateful for this information, supplemented by my own research.
For political affiliations: Bertrand, A, La Chambre de 1889 (Paris, 1890).Google Scholar
Note: In the absence of a strict party system, the political affiliations of French Deputies at this time cannot be determined with complete accuracy. The figures given above, despite their apparent precision, are approximate. They are based on affiliation at the time of election in 1889; by 1892 the affiliation of several members had changed markedly.
109 In order to minimize its importance, Ribot deliberately took no part in the debate on Laur's interpellation, and all the members of the Government abstained when the vote was taken.
110 E.g. Leroy-Beaulieu, P., De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes, 3rd ed. (Paris, 1885), p. 447:Google Scholar ‘Nous sommes de ceux qui croient que l'avenir de la France est en grande partie sur la terre d'Afrique et que, par l'Algérie jointe au Sénégal, nous arriverons un jour à dominer et à civiliser tout le nord-ouest de ce continent, c'est-à-dire toute la partie qui s'etend de Tripoli à l'Atlantique, de la Méditerranée au nord à la Gambie au sud et a l'equateur, en y comprenant tout le cours du Niger et de ses affluents et les contrees qui bordent le lac Tchad.' Leroy-Beaulieu later became a founding member of the Comité de l'Afrique française.
111 B.C.A.F. January, September 1891.
112 Alis to Etienne, 19 July 1890, ANSOM Missions 6, Mizon; Alis, H., A la conquête du Tchad (Paris, 1891), p. 164Google Scholar. See also: Monteil, Projet de mission, 21 Feb. 1890, Archives Nationales [AN hereafter] 66 AP 4, Monteil Papers.
113 d'Arenberg, circular letter, 15 Jan. 1896, AN 81 AP 6 iv, Rambaud Papers. See also: Manifesto of the Comité de l'Afriquefrançaise, B.C.A.F. January 1891.
114 B.C.A.F. February 1891.
116 Alis to Etienne, 19 July 1890, ANSOM Missions 6, Mizon; Arenberg to Alis, 31 July, 18 Sept. 1890, 13 Apr. 1891, Terrier Papers. I am grateful for these references to Dr C. M. Andrew of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge.
117 Etienne to Monteil, Instructions, 15 Sept. 1890, ANSOM Missions 4, Monteil.
118 Rapport au sous-secrétaire, 25 Aug. 1890; Note, n.d. [with postscript dated 13 Feb. 1896], ANSOM Missions 6, Mizon.
119 Etienne to Ribot, 19 Aug., 5 Nov. 1890, ibid.
120 Same to same, 3 Sept. 1890, ANSOM Afrique vi, 84/a.
121 Ribot to Etienne, 29 July 1890; Etienne to Ribot, 3 Sept. 1890, ibid. Etienne may well have been seeking to strengthen France's hand in a future delimitation of influence around the south-western shores of Chad; Alis certainly foresaw the possibility of using Mizon's treaties as bargaining counters in future negotiations. There was also an undoubted attraction in having missions from the Western Sudan, the Niger and the Congo converge on the lake simultaneously.
122 The issue of military control was finally settled in the Colonial Department's favour by the Decree of 3 February 1890.
123 Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Ministry of Marine, 29 June 1889; Etienne to Spuller, 4 July 1889; Spuller to Etienne, 11 July, 7 Aug. 1889; Spuller to Krantz [Minister of Marine], 17 Aug. 1889, AEMD Afrique 128. The incident was provoked by the Ministry of Marine which inadvertently passed the note on to Etienne. Spuller denied any intention to offend and did his best to soothe the Under-Secretary's feelings. But his true opinions can be deduced from the scathing rebuke which he subsequently delivered to the Ministry of Marine.
124 Directeur politique, Quai d'Orsay to Etienne, 30 May 1890; Colonial Department to Foreign Ministry, n.d. [Draft], ANSOM Sénégal 1 90/e. Etienne replied that he had already informed the Cabinet and could see no point in transmitting details which had already appeared in the press.
125 In 1897 Etienne wrote of ‘l'arrangement du 5 août 1890 … conclu, malgré son caractère éminemment colonial, en dehors de toute entente avec le sous-secrétariat des colonies, qui n'en eut connaissance qu'après sa signature’. Les compagnies de colonisation (1897), cited in Engène Etienne, son oeuvre coloniale, algérienne et politique, 1881–1906 (Paris, 1907), 11, 19 n. 2.Google Scholar
126 Monteil to Delcassé, 7 Apr. 1893 [Copy], AN 66 AP 9, Monteil Papers.
127 Jean-Louis Deloncle, Note, 29 Sept. 1894, AEMD Afrique 131; Casimir-Perier, Entretien avec l'Ambassadeur de l'Angleterre, 21 Mar. 1894; Note du Ministre, 29 Sept. 1894; Hanotaux to Phipps, 10 Oct. 1894; Hanotaux to d'Estournelles, 28 Oct. 1894, D.D.F. xi, nos. 78, 237, 245, 257.
128 Les compagnies de colonisation, loc. cit. p. 19 n. 2: ‘Nous ne voudrions pas qu'on pût se meprendre…sur notre pensée. Nous n'avons pas entendu…donner une approbation sans réserves au protocole du 5 août 1890…Nous estimons…que la clause qui fait arrêter le prolongement des possessions méditerranéennes de la France à la ligne Say-Barroua ne tenait pas suffisamment compte de nos légitimes revendications.’.