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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
When, in the last years of the nineteenth century, the United States shared the general expansive urge, the major Power with which she came most vigorously and immediately into conflict was Great Britain, which alone had a substantial footing in the western hemisphere. On at least three important occasions the two countries clashed–over Venezuela, over the building of an isthmian canal, and over the Alaskan boundary–and on each the United States won a complete diplomatic victory, as a natural result of power and strategic advantage. These victories roused little resentment in Britain and their significance was minimized. One important reason for the readiness with which Britain gave way to the United States was that the two countries were supposed to have some mystic community of interest which over-rode any conflicts and made them of no importance. Often the argument, if so it may be called, rested there, and it was merely asserted that ‘in the last resort’ the Anglo-Saxon nations would be found on the same side–not a prospect of much concern to the practising diplomatist. Sometimes, however, it was implied that the United States was on the brink of a great burst of international energy, which would, as a result of the similarity of race, ideology and tradition, be exerted in directions which the British would find good. The same American aggressiveness whose first victim was Britain would later check the rivals of Britain.
1 See, e.g.,‘The Anglo-Saxon Alliance’ in [The] Spectator, LXXX (21 May, 1898), 718–19Google Scholar; ‘Alliances’, ibid, LXXXI (17 Dec. 1898), 897–8; and ‘The Fate of the Philippines’, ibid, LXXX(7 May, 1898), 645–6.
2 See Smith, H. N., Virgin Land: the American West as Symbol and Myth (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), chs. I-IV; and Weinberg, A. K., Manifest Destiny (Baltimore, 1935).Google Scholar
3 America's Economic Supremacy (New York, 1900), 196Google Scholar; also Mahan, A. T., The Problem of Asia and its Effect upon International Policies (1900).Google Scholar
4 See Griswold, A. W., The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York, 1938), ch. II.Google Scholar
5 The section of this article dealing with the demands of British traders in China draws heavily on the admirable work of Pelcovits, N. A., Old China Hands and the Foreign Office (New York, 1948), especially chs. VI-IX.Google Scholar
6 The Far Eastern Question (1896), 180. Chirol wrote for The Times on Far Eastern matters. He was both popular with the China traders and influential with the public.Google Scholar
7 Letter to the General Committee of the Association, 10 July 1896 (cit. Pelcovits, op. cit. 197).
8 MeMo by the Shanghai Committee, 23 Jan. 1899 (cit. Pelcovits, op. cit. 247)
9 See especilly Pelcovits, op. cit. chs. VI, VII.
10 Speech at Swansea, 17 Jan, as reported in The Times, 18 Jan. 1898, 6.
11 A point made most explicitly by Balfour on 10 Aug. 1898, in answer to an attack by Sir William Harcourt in the House of Commons (Parliamentary] Deb[ates] (Fourth Series), 1898, LXIV, 829). In spite of Balfour's skill, his speech was widely taken to imply the abandonment of the ‘open door’ policy. For Salisbury's account of Anglo-German rivalry over one railway concession see Salisbury to Lascelles, no. 109 a (secret), n May 1898 (Pfublic] R[ecord] O[ffice], F.O. 64/1436) printed in full in Papadopoulos, G.S., ‘Lord Salisbury and the Projected Anglo-German Alliance of 1898’ in Bulletin [of the] Institute of] Historical] Research, xxvi (Nov. 1953), 216–18.Google Scholar
12 These agreements are to be found in MacMurray, J. V. A. (ed.), Treaties [and Agreements with and concerning China, 1894–1919] (New York, 1921), I, 28–30, 94–98.Google Scholar
13 Part. Deb. (Fourth Series), 1896 and 1897, XXXVII-LII
14 Speech, 28 Sept. 1899 (cit. Pelcovits, op. cit. 257). He was, of course, speaking of trade rather than concessions.
15 Though he never makes the point explicit, this seems to follow from the long analysis by Pelcovits (op. cit.), as well as from a study of contemporary debates and periodicals.
16 Curzon, G. N., The Problems of the Far East (1896)Google Scholar; see also The History of‘The Times’, in (1947), 186–7.Google Scholar
17 Lord Charles Beresford, The Break-up of China (1899).Google Scholar
18 Witte led the commercial, Muraviev the political, faction. Zabriskie, E. H., American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East, 1895–1914 (Philadelphia, 1946), 30–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Langer, W. L., The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890–1902 (2nd edn., New York, 1951), 454–8.Google Scholar
19 Those who favoured an arrangement with Russia were apt to argue that China would not break up. See, e.g., ‘The Fate of China’ in Spectator, LXXX (19 Mar. 1898), 400–1Google Scholar; and ‘The Dry Bones Stirring in China’, ibid, LXXXI, (24 Sept. 1898), 395–6.
20 Joseph, , Foreign Diplomacy in China, 1894–1900 (1928), 296Google Scholar; Langer, op. cit. 404, 460, 474–5; Gooch, G. P. and Temperley, H. (eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914, 1 (1927), nos. 30, 40,46Google Scholar; E-tu Zen, Sun, ‘The Lease of Wei-hai Wei’ in [The] Pacific H[istorical] R[eview], xix (Aug. 1950) which modifies the judgment of Langer, op. cit. 463.Google Scholar
21 To Chamberlain, 30 Dec. 1897 (cit. Garvin, J. L., The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, III (1934), 249).Google Scholar
22 Sun, loc. cit.; Langer, op. cit. 473.
23 Langer, op. cit. 472, following Baron Kato's memoirs.
24 ‘Lord Salisbury in China’ in LXXX (8 Jan. 1898), 38–9. The Spectator's views on this point are of particular interest as those of a leading pro-Russian journal.Google Scholar
25 Zabriskie, op. cit. 25–33, 35–44; Langer, op. cit. 397–404.
26 See Taylor, A. J. P., The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918 (Oxford, 1954), 356–8, 383, 391, 394; Langer, op. cit. 381–3, 389–96.Google Scholar
27 See Langer, op. cit. 492–6; Garvin, op. cit. ch. LVIII.
28 5 Apr. 1898. Parl. Deb. (Fourth Series), 1898, LVI, 232.
29 See Langer, op. cit. 496–503; Taylor, op. cit. 373–7.
30 Ibid. 377. The Chamberlain-Hatzfeldt negotiations of 1898 need not, therefore, be taken too seriously.
31 German policy is shrewdly analysed by Hargreaves, J. D., ‘Lord Salisbury, British Isolation and the Yangtze Valley, June-September, 1900’, (Bulletin Inst. Hist. Research, xxx (May 1957), 71–4).Google Scholar
32 Papadopoulos, loc. cit.
33 He was also much less worried than most of his colleagues by the cries of alarmists about the state of British trade. See his speech at the Albert Hall reported in The Times 18 Jan. 1898, 9.
34 German rivalry was real enough. See Kazuo, Kawai, ‘Anglo-German Rivalry in the Yangtze Region, 1895–1902’ (Pacific H.R. VIII, Dec. 1939). But the successes of Germany were successes for that standard–and fatal–tactic of German policy, making capital out of extraneous difficulties. Remove the difficulties and German policy would become ineffective.Google Scholar
35 Kennedy, A. L., Salisbury, 1830–1903 (1953), 275–6; and see Langer, op. cit. 460–2Google Scholar; Chung-fu, Chang, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Baltimore, 1931), 49–70; and Hargreaves, loc. cit. 62, 74. I am indebted to Mr F. H. Hinsley for the use of his unpublished chapter on ‘British Foreign Policy and Colonial Questions, 1895–1914’.Google Scholar
36 Campbell, C. S. Jr., Special Business Interests and the Open Door Policy (New Haven, 1951), ch. in. Rounsevelle Wildman (U.S. Consul-General at Hong Kong) to Hay, 6 Jan. 1899 (Library of Congress, John Hay Papers, Gen[eral] Correspondence], 1899).Google Scholar
37 Zabriskie, op. cit. 52 n.; Griswold, op. cit. 16, 61 and n.
38 Campbell, op. cit. ch. 1.
39 Ibid. ch. 11, p. 10. ‘The belief in the great potentialities of the Chinese market…had little rational basis.’
40 Ibid. chs. IV-VI.
41 Gelber, L. M., The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship (1938), 13Google Scholar; Dennis, A. L. P., Adventures in American Diplomacy, 1896–1906 (New York, 1928), 170–1; Henry White to Hay, 12 and 18 Mar. 1898 (Library of Congress, Henry White Papers).Google Scholar
42 The Times, 14 Mar. 1898, 5. It is fair to say that this may be special pleading by its New York correspondent, a pro-British American, designed (needlessly) to gain British support for the United States.
43 Campbell, op. cit. 46–8, 51; Griswold, op. cit. 47–55. Some letters from Beresford to Hay are in the Hay Papers, Gen. Corr. 1898.
44 See Pratt, J. W., ‘The “Large Policy” of 1898’ in The Mississippi Valley H[istorical] R[eview], xix (Sept. 1932); and his Expansionists of 1898. The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands (Baltimore, 1936), ch. VII.Google Scholar
45 See F. R. Dulles, America's Rise to World Power, 1898–1954 (1955), chs. 11 and in, which summarizes a great deal of evidence.
46 Ibid. 46; Griswold, op. cit. 8.
47 Campbell, op. cit. 40–1 and ch. vn.
48 Cassini, Russian Minister in Washington, to Muraviev, 22 June 1898; same to Lamsdorf, 23 June 1898 (cit. Zabriskie, op. cit. 48–9).
49 Ibid.
50 Zabriskie, op. cit. 51 n.; Dulles, op. cit. 46–8.
51 See Griswold, op. cit. 23–35.
52 Zabriskie, op. cit. 51.
53 De Wollant, first secretary of the Russian Embassy in Washington, to the Russian Foreign Office, 7 June 1900 (cit. Zabriskie, op. cit. 51–2). As will appear below, it was during the joint action of the Powers in the summer of 1900 that the United States was diplomatically most active.
54 See Braisted, W. R., ‘The Philippine Naval Base Problem, 1898–1909’ (The Mississippi Valley H.R. XLI (June 1954))Google Scholar; and Livermore, S. W., ‘American Naval-Base Policy in the Far East, 1850–1914’ (Pacific H.R. XLIII (June 1944)).Google Scholar
55 It should be remembered that the Panama Canal was not yet built. American goods had to be protected by a preferential tariff even in the Philippines. Wildman (at Hong Kong) to Hay, 6 Jan. 1899 (Hay Papers, Gen. Corr. 1899).
56 Griswold, op. cit. 6–7.
57 See Griswold, op. cit. 18–23; Gelber, op. cit. 30–4; Shippee, L. B., ‘Germany and the Spanish-American War’ in The American Historical Review, xxx (July 1925)Google Scholar; Eyre, J. K. Jr., ‘Japan and the American Annexation of the Philippines’ in Pacific H.R. xi (Mar. 1942).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
58 ‘The Fate of the Philippines’, in LXXX (7 May 1898), 646.Google Scholar
59 ‘Mr Chamberlain and Russia’, ibid. (21 May 1898), 717.
60 Leading article, 29 Mar. 1898.
61 See especially the influential speeches of Balfour in the House of Commons, 10 Aug. 1898, in Part. Deb. (Fourth Series), 1898, LXIV, 802–36, reported in The Times 11 Aug. 1898, 7, 8; and of Chamberlain at Wakefield, 8 Dec. 1898, reported in The Times 9 Dec. 1898, 7.
62 Printed in MacMurray, Treaties, 1, 204–5; see Joseph, op. cit. ch. XVII.
63 Campbell, op. cit. 51–2.
64 Speech to the New York Chamber of Commerce, 1 June 1899 (cit. Campbell, op. cit. 52).
64 Ibid.
66 Rockhill to Hay, 28 Aug. 1899 (Hay Papers, Box 22).
67 See Griswold, op. cit. ch. 11; Dennis, op. cit. ch. vm; Gelber, op. cit. 75–80; Varg, P. A., Open Door Diplomat–the Life of W. W. Rockhill (Urbana, 111., 1952), ch. iv.Google Scholar
68 Printed in [Papers Relating to the] Foreign Relations [of the United States] (Washington, D.C., annual), 1899. The important clauses have often been reprinted. See Joseph, op. cit. 401Google Scholar; Treat, P. J., Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan, 1895–1905 (Stanford, 1938), 72; Campbell, op. cit. 55–6Google Scholar. The earlier drafts may conveniently be found in Clyde, P. H. (ed.), United States Policy toward China. Diplomatic and Public Documents, 1839–1939 (Durham, N.C., 1940), ch. xxx.Google Scholar
69 For the Anglo-American exchanges on this, see P.R.O., F.O. 5/2408 and N.A., S.D., C8.4/50, C8.4/51, C8.5/50, C8.5/51. The changes made for publication are not important.
70 Printed in Parl[iamentary] Papers (1900), Cv, State Papers, China, no. 2 (1900), (Cd. 94), enclosure no. 6 in no. 5.
71 Enclosed in Buck (American Minister in Tokyo) to Hay, no. 434, 1 June 1900 (cit. Treat, op. cit. 87).
72 Treat, op. cit. 88. As he also points out, ‘the United States at this very time set up a closed-door policy in its recent Asiatic acquisitions, the Philippine Islands’ (ibid.).
73 Zabriskie, op. cit. 54; A. E. Hippisley to Rockhill, 21 Aug. 1899 (cit. Griswold, op. cit. 70–3).
74 See Zabriskie, op. cit. 52–4; Griswold, op. cit. 65–76; Campbell, op. cit. 54–5.
75 A point curiously under-emphasized by Zabriskie, op. cit. 55–60.
76 See Braisted, loc. cit.
77 See Hay to Foster, 23 June 1900 (Hay Papers, L[etter] B[ook], 1, 455) (quoted below, p. 173).
78 Varg, P. A., ‘The Foreign Policy of Japan and the Boxer Revolt’ (Pacific H.R. xv, Sept. 1946).Google Scholar
79 M. B. Jensen, ‘Opportunists in South China During the Boxer Rebellion’ (ibid, xx, Aug. 1951).
80 See Langer, op. cit. ch. xxi; also the immense amount of material in Parl. Papers (1900), CV, State Papers, China, no. 1 (1900), (Cd. 93) and no. 3 (1900), (Cd. 257). I have checked these publications against the copies of correspondence sent to Pauncefote in Washington at the time, and nothing of importance seems to have been omitted– further evidence of an unusual situation.
81 Ibid.; Varg, loc. cit. 282; Hardinge, Secretary at St Petersburg, to Bertie, 20 Sept. 1900; to Sanderson, 4 Oct. 1900 (both in Cambridge University Library, Hardinge of Penshurst Papers, Bound Volume, 1898–1903).
82 Hargreaves, loc. cit.
83 Hay to Conger (tel.), 10 June 1900 (printed in Foreign Relations (1900), 143).
84 Printed in Clyde, op. cit. ch. xxx.
85 See Griswold, op. cit. 81; Zabriskie, op. cit. 61–2.
86 Campbell, op. cit. 30.
87 Cit. Tyler, Dennett, John Hay: from Poetry to Politics (New York, 1934), 317.Google Scholar
88 Hay to White, 23 Dec. 1900 (Henry White Papers, and Hay Papers, L.B. II, 76); also the official correspondence between Hay and Choate, N.A., S.D., from London, vol. 201.
89 Zabriskie, op. cit. 65.
90 Hay to Foster (confidential), 23 June 1900 (Hay Papers, L.B. I, 455).
91 See Langer, op. cit. 700–3, 717–23. British efforts to get German support continued. See Grenville, J. A. S., ’Lansdowne's Abortive Project of 12 March 1901 for a Secret Agreement with Germany’ (Bulletin Inst. Hist. Research, xxvn (Nov. 1954)).Google Scholar
92 Sanderson to Hardinge, 24 Oct. 1900 (Hardinge Papers, 1898–1903); White to Hay, 27 Oct. 1900 (Henry White Papers); Hay to President McKinley, 26 Oct. 1900 (Hay Papers, L.B. II, 46); Choate to Hay (personal and confidential), 31 Oct. 1900 (Hay Papers, Box 19).
93 To White, 10 Mar. 1902 (Henry White Papers). See Griswold, op. cit. 89; Zabriskie, op. cit. 81.
94 Hay to President Roosevelt, 25 and 28 April 1903 (Hay Papers, L.B. II, 425, 428).