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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
In March 1786 a special envoy from Great Britain, William Eden, notified the French foreign minister, the comte de Vergennes, of his arrival. Eden's appearance in France represented the culmination of three years of careful diplomacy designed to force the British government into serious commercial negotiations. Ostensibly, the negotiators were to replace the moribund commercial convention of Utrecht (1713) with a new agreement that would extend Anglo-French trade. But for Vergennes, the negotiations involved more than trade: they formed an essential part of his post-war English policy – a policy designed to maintain British isolation and demonstrate the possibilities of Anglo-French co-operation while bringing Great Britain under French influence through penetration of the British economy. Discussions during the next ten months produced a commercial treaty, an additional convention and a draft consular agreement. When the new commercial arrangements were promulgated in May 1787, the French economy was depressed and the French government was in disarray following the death of Vergennes and the dismissal of two other ministers. Hopes for rapprochement vanished when the Dutch crisis ended in a French humiliation at British hands a few months later, but the treaty continued to govern Anglo-French commercial relations until 1793.
1 Vergennes' English policy was designed to preserve the status quo in western Europe (by excluding the British) and thwart Russian ambitions in eastern Europe (by using a British counterweight). This policy rested on three premises: (1) that together Britain and France could be the arbiters of Europe – an idea that harked back to the Anglo-French alliance of the 1720s but was tempered by the realization that after so many years of rivalry, reconciliation would take time; (2) that France would be confronted by war or diplomatic humiliation if Great Britain found a continental ally during the interim – a nightmare that came true in 1787 when the British used Prussia to rout pro-French forces in the Dutch Republic; and (3) that British foreign policy decisions were based on commercial considerations – a notion that was not too different from the ones that underlay Napoleon's continental system. The rapprochement that Vergennes had in mind would be dominated by France and in the French interest. For a fuller discussion of this see Donaghay, Marie, ‘The Anglo-French negotiations of 1786–1787’, Ph.D. diss. (University of Virginia, 1970)Google Scholar.
2 Dumas, François, Etude sur le traité de commerce de 1786 (Toulouse, 1904)Google Scholar, considered the standard account and Bloch, Camille, ‘Le traité de commerce de 1786 entre la France et l'Angleterre’, Etudes sur I'histoire économique de la France, 1760–1989 (Paris, 1900), pp. 239–69Google Scholar, are based (in large part) on an uncritical reading of the Eden correspondence. Both conclude that Vergennes and his agent were ill-prepared and conceded too much. Butenval, C. A., Précis hislorique et économique de traité de commerce entre la France et la Grande Bretagne (Paris, 1869)Google Scholar, and Cahen, Leon, ‘Une nouvelle interprétation du traité Franco-Anglais de 1786–1787’, Revue Historique, CLXXXV, 2 (1939), 257–85Google Scholar, are based on documents at the Quai d'Orsay. While Butenval sees the commercial treaty as the last act of the French ascendency over Britain gained in 1783, Cahen thinks that Vergennes wanted to impose a political and economic regime on the British. Both feel that all was lost after Vergennes' death. Three British accounts – Browning, Oscar, ‘The treaty of commerce between England and France, 1786’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, N.S. II (1885), 349–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ehrman, John, The British government and commercial negotiations with Europe, 1783–1793 (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 28–69Google Scholar; and Rose, J. H., ‘The Franco-British commercial treaty, 1786’, English Historical Review, XXIII, 92 (1908), 709–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar, are based on research in British archives and focus on the British side of the negotiations. Henderson, W. O., ‘The Anglo-French commercial treaty of 1786’, Economic History Review, 2nd series, x, 2 (1957), 104–12CrossRefGoogle Scholar, is based on secondary sources and provides a review of the economic aspects of the commercial treaty.
3 Rose, ‘Treaty’, p. 722.
4 Dakin, Douglas, Turgot and the ancien régime in France (New York, 1972Google Scholar reprint), pp. 124, 131.
5 de Witte, Jehan (ed.), Journal de l'Abbé Veri (2 vols., Paris, 1933), 1, 157–8Google Scholar.
6 Hailes to Carmarthen, 25 Oct. 1786, Browning, Oscar, Despatches from Paris, 1784–1790 (2 vols., London, 1909–1910), 1, 152Google Scholar.
7 de Castries, René duc, Le maréchal de Castries (1727–1800) (Paris, 1956), p. 26Google Scholar; de Castries, Réne due, Le testament de la monarchie (Paris, 1958), pp. 254–345Google Scholar. Castries' connections with Necker and Choiseul did not help further his ambitions either. After 1783, Vergennes became first minister in all but name.
8 ‘Journal du maréchal de Castries’, Bibliothèque de la Marine, MS 182/2. Castries was most critical of Vergennes' conduct in the Dutch question, but the disagreement had more to do with style than substance. The journal does not mention the Anglo-French commercial negotiations.
9 Dull, Jonathan R., The French navy and American independence (Princeton, 1975), p. 202Google Scholar.
10 Castries, Testament, p. 304.
11 ‘Note anonyme au sujet d'un projet d'alliance entre la France et l'Angleterre’, 17 10 1784, papiers de Castries, Archives Nationales, 306 AP 19: no. 4 (microfilm copy of papers held by the present due de Castries)Google Scholar.
12 Vergennes, to Castries/controller general, 25 10 1783, Archives des Affaires Etrangéres, correspondance politique, Angleterre 545, fo. 225Google Scholar.
13 Calonne, to Vergennes, , 18 11 1783, Angleterre 546, fos. 51–4 vGoogle Scholar.
14 Vergennes, to Castries, , 30 09 1784, Angleterre 550, fo. 82 vGoogle Scholar.
15 Castries to Vergennes, 10 Oct. 1784, ibid., fo. 122 v.
16 Vergennes to Castries, 21 Oct. 1784, ibid., fos. 183–3 v.
17 Archives Nationales, fonds marine, B7 456, 465.
18 ‘Observations sur le commerce extérieur maritime’, fonds marine, B7 511. Despite reports to the contrary, the Anglo-French commercial negotiations accomplished nothing in 1785.
19 Ibid. Two other mémoires in this series deal with ways to better co-ordinate ministerial efforts. One, edited by Castries, suggests that only the efforts of finance and the marine needed to be co-ordinated as foreign affairs had no role in commercial negotiations.
20 Du Pont/Boyetet to Calonne, the Calonne papers, Public Record Office, PC 1/123: no. 14. The commission was dated 29 March 1785 and this letter was probably written in the fall of that year. ‘Extrait de l'arret du conseil’, 29 03. 1785, the papers of de Nemours, P. S. du Pont, Eleutherian Mills Historical Library, Wilmington, Delaware, Winterthur MS 2/31Google Scholar.
21 ‘Commerce entre la France et l'Angleterre’, 1783–84, Archives Nationales, F12 1835.
22 Castries, to Vergennes, , 7 06 1786, Angleterre 556, fo. 300Google Scholar.
23 Castries, ‘Observations relatives á la navigation frančaise au sujet du traité de commerce avec l'Angleterre’, Archives Nationales, M662: no. 7. Draft corrected in Castries' hand: fonds marine, B7 546. According to the draft, navigation was the ‘base unique de toutes les puissances maritimes’, but the finished memoire read ‘base unique actuellement de toutes puissances en Europe’.
24 Jarrett, Derek, The begetters of revolution (Totowa, N.J., 1973), pp. 40–1Google Scholar.
25 While Castries twisted the facts to suit his arguments in the ‘Observations’, he knew better. See ‘Sur le traité de commerce de France et de l'Angleterre en 1713’, 22 05 1783, fonds marine, B7456Google Scholar (title in Castries' hand), which discusses the British opposition's arguments against the eighth and ninth articles – all of which were economic, such as the loss of Portuguese trade and an unfavourable balance of trade with France.
26 Rayneval, , ‘Observations de M. le Mal. de Castries/réponse’, 8 06 1786, Angleterre 556, fo. 301–11Google Scholar. Based on ‘Observations’, Archives Nationales, M662: no. 7. Apparently, the foreign ministry did not retain a copy of the maréchal's observations for its files.
27 Rayneval, , ‘Résumé’, 8 06 1786, Angleterre 556, fo. 316Google Scholar.
28 Rayneval to Castries, 8 June 1786, ibid. fos. 314–14 V.
29 Eden to Carmarthen, 8 June 1786, Eden, William, first Auckland, Baron, The journal and correspondence of William, Lord Auckland (2 vols., London, 1861), 1, 124Google Scholar.
30 Calonne, to Vergennes, , 18 11 1783, Angleterre 546, fo. 54Google Scholar.
31 ‘Lu au conseil d'état’, 6 04 1786, Angleterre 556, fo. 33Google Scholar; ‘Note’, Apr. 1786, ibid., fo. 113–3 V.
32 Vergennes to Calonne, 9 Apr. 1786, ibid., fo. 41.
33 Eden, to Carmarthen, , 6 05 1786, Auckland, Journal, I, 115–16Google Scholar. Under the Navigation Law of 1651 goods had to be carried in English bottoms or those of the country of origin. While the act of 1660 modified this requirement, limiting it to enumerated goods, those included roughly 50% of Europe's trade with England, and when these enumerated goods were carried in the ships of the country of origin, they were subject to substantial additional duties. All in all, these and subsequent regulations meant that even under the rule of most favoured nation, most goods would travel in British bottoms for the simple reason that French participation in carriage would be unprofitable. Harper, Lawrence A., The English Navigation Laws (New York, 1939), pp. 38, 53, 277–8, 294–8Google Scholar.
34 Eden, to Pitt, , 15 06 1786, Chatham papers, Public Record Office, 30/8/110, fo. 52 vGoogle Scholar. Eden heard about Breteuil's eulogy indirectly and apparently did not know the basis for that minister's impression.
35 Rayneval, to Eden, , 8 06 1786, British Museum, Additional MS 34421, fo. 317 vGoogle Scholar; ‘Esquisse d'une déclaration’, no. 3. Add. MS 34423, fo. 204.
36 Eden, to Rayneval, , 9 06 1786, Add. MS 34421, fo. 322Google Scholar; Eden, to Pitt, , 8 06 1786, Chatham papers, 30/8/110, fo. 50 vGoogle Scholar; ‘Quelques parties des principes loix’, fonds marine, B7 456. Appears to be in Eden's hand.
37 Eden, to Rayneval, , 7 09 1786, Add. MS 34422, fo. 198Google Scholar; Eden to Rayneval, 22 Sept. 1786, ibid., fo. 279; Vergennes, to Adhemar, , 13 06 1784, Angleterre 547, fos. 132–3 vGoogle Scholar.
38 Eden, to Pitt, , 20 07 1786, Add. MS 34421, fo. 406Google Scholar. Instructions arrived the next day.
39 Rayneval, , ‘Lu au conseil d'état et approuvé’, 21 05 1786, Angletere 556, fos. 193–216Google Scholar; Eden, to Pitt, , 25 05 1786, Chatham papers, 30/8/110, fo. 38 vGoogle Scholar. Bickering in council soon became public knowledge.
40 Eden, to Carmarthen, , 13 08 1786. P.R.O., F.O. 27/19, fo. 221Google Scholar.
41 Eden, to Pitt, , 23 08 1786, Auckland, Journal, 1, 156–7Google Scholar.
42 Eden, to Pitt, , 24 08 1786, Add. MS 34422, fo. 137Google Scholar; Eden, to Carmarthen, , 8 09 1786, F.O., 27/20, fos. 53–8Google Scholar.
43 ‘Observations sur le traité de commerce’, fonds marine, B7 546: no. 10. Sewn with another mémoire to Castries' observations on navigation and captioned ‘Sur le Traité de Commerce’ in his hand.
44 ‘No. 6: the appointment, functions and privileges of consuls’, 11 1786, Add. MS 38346, fos. 332–2 vGoogle Scholar.
45 Hawkesbury, to Eden, , 6 06 1787, Add. MS 34423, fo. 228Google Scholar.
46 ‘Observations relatives aux suites du traité de commerce’, Angleterre 558, fos. 354–7.
47 ‘Fonctions et privilèges des consuls’, fonds marine, B7 518.
48 Carmarthen, to Eden, , 5 10 1786, F.O., 27/20, fos. 239–40Google Scholar; Eden to Carmarthen, 1 Nov. 1786, ibid., fo. 290; Eden, to Rayneval, , 31 11 1786. Add. MS 34423, fo. 47 (probably October)Google Scholar.
49 Castries to Eden, 20 Nov. 1786, ibid, fo. 33.
50 ‘Convention’, fonds marine, B7 456. Annotated by Castries.
51 ‘Consular treaty project’, Add. MS 34422, fos. 415–18 v.
52 Eden to Vergennes, Angleterre 558, fo. 366 v.
53 Eden, to Carmarthen, , 28 12 1786, F.O. 27/20, fo. 324Google Scholar.
54 Ardent, et al. , to the Lords of the Committee, 27 06 1787, Add. MS 34423, fos. 379–80 vGoogle Scholar.
55 Carmarthen, to Eden, , 7 06 1787, F.O., 27/24, fos. 14 v–15Google Scholar.
56 Eden, , ‘Proposal no. 1’, 10 06 1787, Angleterre 559, fo. 27 vGoogle Scholar.
57 Eden, to Carmarthen, , 13/15 06 1787, F.O., 27/24, fo. 19 vGoogle Scholar.
58 Barthelemy, to Castries, , 22 06 1787, Angleterre 559, fo. 70 vGoogle Scholar.
59 Eden, to Carmarthen, , 18 06 1787, F.O., 27/24, fo. 62Google Scholar.
60 Eden, to Carmarthen, , 2 09 1787, F.O., 27/25, fo. 386 vGoogle Scholar. Allowances for ‘hindsight’ should be made here.
61 Castries, ‘Journal’, pp. 343–96 passim. Castries advocated a ‘frank’ and ‘strong’ approach to foreign policy conducted by a man of ‘character’ such as himself. Montmorin met the royal requirement of pacifism, but not the maréchal's standards, p. 343.
62 Eden, to Carmarthen, , 25 03 1787, F.O., 27/24, fo. 266 vGoogle Scholar.
63 Eden to Montmorin, 1 May 1787, ibid., fos. 347–7 v.
64 Eden to Carmarthen, 17 May 1787, ibid., fo. 389.
65 Eden, to Carmarthen, , 24 05 1787, F.O., 27/25, fos. I–IVGoogle Scholar.
67 Eden, to Carmarthen, , 31 05 1787, F.O., 27/25, fo. 7 vGoogle Scholar.
68 Eden to Dorset, Wednesday, F.O., 148/5.
69 Eden's attempts to raise French hopes for a negotiated settlement and keep them from taking steps to support their friends were not likely to soften the maréchal's stance in other negotiations. The maréchal's ‘Journal’ only mentions Eden once, and that passage deals with efforts to initiate Anglo-French discussions on the Dutch question. Castries, ‘Journal’, p. 382. The best account of the British role in reversing the Dutch situation is Cobban, Alfred, Ambassadors and secret agents (London, 1954)Google Scholar. The most recent study of the ‘patriot revolt’ appears in Schama, Simon, Patriots and liberators (London & New York, 1977), pp. 64–135Google Scholar.
70 Eden, to Carmarthen, , 24 05 1787, F.O., 27/25, fo. 1 vGoogle Scholar.
71 ‘Travail du roy’, 25 06 1789, fonds marine, B1102, fo. 351Google Scholar.
72 La Luzerne to Leeds, 30 Apr. 1789, F.O., 27/31; Scott, et al. to Leeds, 12 05 1789, F.O., 27/32Google Scholar.
73 ‘Etat général des consuls’, 1789–1793, fonds marine, B7517Google Scholar.
74 Cahen, ‘Interprétation’, p. 257, comments on the poverty of the files at the Quai d'Orsay and the excellence of those in London (which he did not consult). These remarks have led historians to believe that there is little material on the Anglo-French negotiations in France.
75 Dumas noted that the consular negotiations were stalemated but never knew that a consular treaty had been drafted, pp. 110, 169.
76 Vergennes had vivid memories of the fall of the apparently friendly Shelburne administration following the signature of the preliminary peace. To him, the inherent weakness of the British system of government made it difficult if not impossible to redirect the foreign policy of that country. Ironically, the Pitt administration proved more durable than the French monarchy after Vergennes' death.