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Mediation by Obfuscation: the Resolution of the Marseille Crisis, October 1934 to May 1935

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Bennett Kovrig
Bennett Kovrig
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
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Extract

The year 1934 was notable not only for the intense diplomatic activity throughout Europe that followed Hitler's coming to power but also for a spate of political assassinations. Among the victims were Austrian chancellor Dollfuss and the Rumanian politician Ion Duca, not to speak of Kirov and those purged in Russia in December. Perhaps the most notable of these acts of terror occurred in Marseille on 9 October when King Alexander of Yugoslavia and the French foreign minister, Louis Barthou, succumbed to the bullets of an assassin nicknamed Vlada the Chauffeur. The ensuing international crisis threw into sharp focus the evolving national interests and diplomatic styles of the European powers and serves as an illuminating case-study of a particular technique of conflict resolution.

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Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 19 , Issue 1 , March 1976 , pp. 191 - 221
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1976

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References

1 Research for this case-study was facilitated bv a grant from the Canada Council.

2 The evolution of Barthou's proposal is traced in Henderson (Belgrade) to Vansittart, 16 Apr. 1934 Fo 371/18458, public Record Office (PRO): Clerk (Paris)to F.O..20 June 1934, FO 371/17659, PRO; Lambert memorandum, 2 July 1934, FO 571/18389, PRO; Simon to Murray (Rome), 12 Sept. 1934, FO 371/18454, PRO; Carr (Geneva) to Sargent. 26 Sept. 1934, FO 371/18389, PRO.

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101 See Documents on German Foreign Policy, C, Series vol. III, nos. 408, 418, 423Google Scholar, and Count Louis Charles Pineton de Chambrun Traditions et souvenirs (Paris: Flammarion, 1952), pp. 192–7, 208–9.Google Scholar

102 See Hoptner, op. cit., pp. 30–1Google Scholar, and Aloisi, , op. tit., pp. 245–7.Google Scholar

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107 See Pacy, op. cit., pp. 267–317.Google Scholar Also relevant are the work of G éza Cserenyey, The Assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and the Political Background of the Crime, unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of London, 1954, and two journalistic accounts, Roger Colombani and Jean-René Laplayne, La mort d'un roi: La vérit ésur I'assassinat d'Alexandre de Yougoslavie, (Paris: Albin Michel, 1971)Google Scholar, and Roberts, AllenThe Turning Point: The Assassination of Louis Barthou and King Alexander I of Yugoslavia (New York: St Martin's, 1970).Google Scholar

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109 Compton Mackenzie, Dr. Benes (London: Harrap, 1946), p. 332.Google Scholar

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111 Ibid., p. 119.

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