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The Politics of Anti-Bolshevism: the French Government and the Russo-Polish War, December 1919 to May 1920*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Michael Jabara Carley
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Extract

On 26 April 1920 the Polish army launched a major offensive against Soviet Russia. The question of the French government's role in the unleashing of this attack has long been a matter of historical debate. P. S. Wandycz, whose work is the most recent detailed account of French eastern policy during the early twenties, attributes no major responsibility to the French for the outbreak of all-out war on Poland's eastern frontier. He states that the Quai d'Orsay was unenthusiastic about a Polish campaign and that the Poles had acted on their own initiative. N. Davies asserts that ‘Allied policy sought to discourage Poland from attacking Russia.’ ‘Without formally forbidding a Polish offensive,’ he writes, the Allies ‘emphasized that it “the offensive’ could not enjoy their support. On the other hand, Soviet and European Left-wing opinion has long condemned the Polish attack as a direct result of French influence. Vladimir Potemkin noted that Poland was incapable of waging a full-scale war with its own resources and that consequently Allied influence had to be decisive in determining Warsaw's attitude toward a continuation of the war.

Type
Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 19 , Issue 1 , March 1976 , pp. 163 - 189
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1976

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References

1 Wandycz, P. S., France and her Eastern Allies, 1919–1925 (Minneapolis, 1962), pp. 146–7.Google Scholar

2 Davies, Norman, White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919–1920 (New York, 1972), p. 92.Google Scholar

3 France and her Eastern Allies, p. 145.

4 Potiemkine, V., Histoire de la diplomatie, III (Paris, nd), 89.Google Scholar

5 France and her Eastern Allies, p. 142.

6 Ullman, R., Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917–1921, Britain and the Russian Civil War, II (Princeton, 1968), 313–15.Google Scholar

7 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Woodward, E. L. and Butler, R. (eds.), British Documents on Foreign Policy, Ist series (BDFP), vol. II (London, 1949), ‘Secretary's notes of a Conference held at 10 Downing Street…on December 12th at 10.30 a.m.’, no. 56, pp. 744–6.Google Scholar

8 As has been suggested by Ullman, see II, 314.

9 Z - Russie, v. 213, Action des Alliés, 1 nov. - 31 déc 1919, ‘Conditions dans lesquelles pourrait être réunie une conférence sur les affaires de Russie’, nn, ns, 6 Dec. 1919, p. 127.

10 Ibid., ‘Action en Russie’, nn, ns, 25 Nov. 1919, p. 94.Google Scholar

11 Ibid., ‘Idées pour les conversations avec les anglais sur la Russie’, nn, ns, 9 Dec. 1919, p. 153.Google Scholar

12 Ibid., ‘Note sur l' en Russie en 1920’, nn, SAR, ns, 20 Nov. 1919, p. 1971.Google Scholar

13 Ullman, R., Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917–1921, Intervention and the War, I (Princeton, 1961), 8.Google Scholar

14 Respectively Directeur Politique, Chief of the Service des Affaires Russes, and Sous-Directeur d'Europe.

15 Curzon Papers, India Office, London, box 22, diary entry, Friday, 14 Nov. 1919.

16 Ibid., Derby to Curzon, 3 Oct. 1919, 5 Jan. 1920; see also Laroche, J., Au Quai d'Orsai aver Briand et Poincaré, 1913–1926 (Paris, 1957), pp. 95–6.Google Scholar

17 See Z - Russie, v. 286, Pologne et Russie, 12 août 1919–29 fév. 1920, Fouchet (French Chargé d'Affaires in Warsaw), no. 94, 31 July 1919, p. 1: and Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (FR), Paris Peace Conference, vol. VI, ‘Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations…, Paris, 15 Sept. 1919 at 10.30 a.m.’, pp. 200 ff.

18 Z - Russie, v. 213, ‘Note pour M. Kammerer’, nn, signed Laroche, 26 Dec. 1919, p. 210, and which enclosed a résumé of the conservation between de Romer and Jules Laroche.

19 Ibid., ‘Visite du Général Mannerheim’, nn, initialled Laroche, 18 Dec. 1919, p. 185. The French Minister in Warsaw, Eugène Pralon, had reported the previous day that Mannerheim told him that Pilsudski ‘was perhaps not hostile to the idea of a Polish offensive’ against the Bolsheviks. See Z - Russie, v. 286, Pralon, no. 450, 17 Dec. 1919, p. 47.

20 Z - Russie, v. 704, Provinces baltiques, dossier général, conférence baltique d'Helsingfors, 8 déc. 1919–27 août 1920, ‘Note divers’, nn, ns, 31 Dec. 1919, p. 21.

21 Z - Russie, v. 286, Pralon, nos. 1–2, 3 Jan. 1920, p. 64.

22 Ibid., Berthelot (Pichon, the Foreign Minister, was ill) to Clemenceau, no. 26, 6 Jan. 1920, p. 89.

23 Z - Russie, v. 236, Action des Alliés dans le sud de Russie, déc. 1919, Mangin, nos. 687–91, 6 Dec. 1919, p. 31; nos. 801–4, 27 Dec. 1919, p. 177; and Franchet d'Esperey, no. 3598, 29 Dec. 1919, p. 192.

24 See Kammerer's marginal note on Franchet d'Esperey's 29 Dec. telegram, Ibid., p. 192; and Z - Russie, v. 286, Berthelot to Clemenceau, no. 33, 7 Jan. 1920, p. 92. Pilsudski told Mannerheim that he could not launch an offensive before the spring because of the weather and the insufficient readiness of his troops. See note 16. But Kammerer's remark also stemmed from the realization that Pilsudski had no intention of serving the interests of the White Russians.

25 Z - Russie, v. 237, Action des Alliés dans le sud de la Russie, jan. 1920, Clemenceau to Franchet d'Esperey, no. 1343/11 - S.O.,8 Jan. 1920, p. 94; and two other similar dispatches dated 10 Jan., pp. 140–1.

26 Z - Russie, v. 69, Blocus, dossier général, 16 fév. - 31 mars 1920, Paul Cambon (French Ambassador in London), no. 104, received, 20 Feb. 1920, p. 13.

27 Z - Russie, v. 214, Action des Alliés, 1920, Millerand (signed Paléologue) to Cambon, no. 2124,6 Mar. 1920, p. 174; see also Z - Russie, v. 239, Action des Alliés dans lesudde Russie, avril 1920, ‘Note pour S.E. Monsieur Paléologue’, nn, SAR, initialled Grenard, 11 Apr. 1920, p. 93.

28 Z - Russie, v. 239, Millerand to Cambon, no. 3763, 10 Apr. 1920, p. 90.

29 Ibid., ‘Note pour S.E. Monsieur Paléologue’. p. 93.

30 France and Her Eastern Allies, p. 155.Google Scholar

31 Z - Pologne, v. 70, Politique étrangère, dossier général, 21 juillet 1919–10 mai 1920, Henrys, nos. 221–9, 12 Feb. 1920, p. 139; and Z - Russie, v. 306, Potogne-Russie, communiqués du Ministère de la Guerre, 20 nov. 1919–30 juillet 1920, Henrys, no. 232, 12 Feb. 1920, p. 34.

32 France and her Eastern Allies, p. 147.Google Scholar

33 Z - Russie, v. 286, Pralon, nos. 69–70, 5 Feb. 1920. p. 161; nos. 72–73, 7 Feb. 1920, p. 168; Pralon, no. 50, 16 Feb., received 19 Feb. 1920 (pc), p. 201.

34 Z - Pologne, v. 70, Pralon, nos. 127–8, 29 Feb. 1920, p. 163.

35 Z - Roumanie, v. 34, Politique étrangère, dossier général, jan.-août 1920, H. Cambon, nos. 86–8, 19 Feb. 1920, p. 18.

36 Z - Roumanie, v. 55, Roumanie-Russie, 1 fév. 1920–31 déc. 1921, H.Cambon, no. 24, 25 Mar., received 29 Mar. 1920 (pc), p. 10. These characterizations of Polish policy are more or less borne out in Wandycz's Soviet-Polish Relations, 1917–1921 (Cambridge, 1969), passim.

37 Z - Russie, v. 286, Millerand to J. J. Jusserand (French ambassador in Washington), no. 494, 16 Feb. 1920, p. 200.

38 Z - Pologne, v. 23, Matériel de guerre et ravitaillement de l'armée, 1 Jan. - 15 juillet 1920, A. Lefévre (Minister of War) to Millerand. no. 870 BS/I. 18 Feb. 1920, p. 28; and Millerand to Lefévre, nn, 22 Feb. 1920, p. 30.

39 MG (sr), Fonds Pologne, carton no. 12, dos. ‘sorties 2e’ Bureau 1920’, Buat to Foch, nn, nd (Jan. 1920); see also attached note ‘avis de la section NE’, nn, nd, ns; and Bulletins mensuels, 2eBureau, EMA, Bulletin du ler fév., du ler mars, du ler avril 1920.

40 MG (sc), Bulletin du ler mars 1920.

41 Ibid., Bulletin du ler avril 1920.

42 See especially Ibid., Bulletin du ler juin.

43 France and her Eastern Allies, p. 143.

44 MG (sc), Bulletin du ler avril.

45 Soviet-Polish Relations, p. 182.

46 Wandycz's characterization of Pilsudski and Polish foreign policy is much less severe than the impression which emerges from the French documents. These archives paint a picture of a bellicose, bullying Polish state - submissive when weak, but constantly biting off the neighbouring territories of weaker governments when strong. Pilsudski emerges as a small-time East European imperialist whose visions of a revived Greater Polish state led him at times to lose all sense of reality.

47 Soviet-Polish Relations, pp. 169–71 and passim.

48 Z - Pologne, v. 70, Millerand to Panafieu, instructions, 4 Mar. 1920, p. 165.

49 France and Her Eastern Allies, pp. 141, 147.

50 MG (sc). Bulletin du ler mars, borne out by Soviet-Polish Relations, p. 177.

51 For the development of this affair see Z - Russie, vols. 294–5, Pologne - Russie, 16 août - 30 sept. 1920.

52 Soviet-Polish Relations, pp. 180–1.

53 Ibid., p. 182; see also MG (sc). Bulletin du ler mai.

54 Z - Russie, v. 287, Pologne-Russie, 1 mars - 30 avril 1920, Panafieu, no. 101, 9 Apr., received 15 Apr. 1920, p. 100; see also Soviet-Polish Relations, p. 182.

55 Ibid., Panafieu, nos. 184–90, 13, 14 Apr., received 17, 18, 19 Apr. 1920. p. 108.

56 Ibid., Panafieu, no. 208, 21 Apr., received 21 Apr. 1920, 145.

57 France and her Eastern Allies, pp. 141–2, 146–7.

58 DBFP, vol. 2, ‘Notes of a meeting held in M. Pichon's room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Monday, 19 Jan. 1920, at 10.30 a.m.’, p. 922; also FR, Paris Peace Conference, VIII, 211. When General Henrys submitted a plan for the extension of Polish frontiers to the Dnieper in early January 1920, Foch wrote to Clemenceau that such a proposal, whatever its merits, could not be usefully examined until the Allies had settled upon a general line of conduct toward Soviet Russia and upon the role which the Poles were to play within this context. See Z - Russie, v. 286, Henrys to Foch, no. 4081/0, Paris, 4 Jan. 1920, p. 69, and enclosures; also Foch to Clemenceau, no. 12/2, 15 Jan. 1920, p. 116.

59 Soviet-Polish Relations, p. 166.

60 Probably written by Colonel Alphonse Joseph Georges because it is in a small collection of his private papers. Georges was a member of Foch's staff at this time.

61 Henri Cambon reported on 31 March that Warsaw had approached the Rumanian government in view of an accord which would leave Poland free to attain its 1772 frontiers, and permit Rumania to advance to Odessa. The Rumanian government responded negatively, noting ‘that the Dniester was too good a defence line to abandon for adventures beyond it’. No date was given for the Polish démarche. See Z - Pologne, v. 70, H. Cambon, no. 168, 31 Mar. 1920, p. 199.

62 MC (sc), Fonds Georges, ‘Observations sur une action polonaise en Russie’, nn, ns. 10 Jan. 1920.

63 In connexion with the Morstin telegram, Wandycz notes that ‘the French government was hardly enthusiastic about Poland's eastern territorial ambitions, and considered that Poland as a state had not crystallized sufficiently to become a centre of power in Eastern Europe’ (Soviet-Polish Relations, p. 171). But it was Foch who had stated that Poland was not a fully developed state capable of undertaking on its own a military action against the Bolsheviks (in Sept. 1919, in response to the Polish Premier Paderewski's proposal for a Polish march on Moscow). See FR, Paris Peace Conference, VIII, 211.

64 MG(sc), Fonds Pologne, carton no. 12 ‘Au sujet de la situation militaire en Pologne et du remplacement du chef de la Mission Militaire Françcaise à Varsovie’, nn, 2e Bur., EMA, signed Buat, nd.

65 MG(sc), Bulletin du ler mai. It should be noted that the author did not gain access to the outgoing correspondence registers of the 3e Bureau for 1920. If indeed these registers still exist they would be found in the section contemporaine of the Service Historique de l' Armée at the Château de Vincennes. Unfortunately, the archives of the 3e Bureau after 1919 remain ‘en vrac’ in one of the stack areas of the section contemporaine, and until they are sorted out, there is no way to determine whether the registers for 1920 still exist.

66 Two Quai d'Orsay notes written in January 1920, drew attention to the dangers of a ie continued Polish militarv advance to the East. Both notes warned that the Polish 1O f government risked uniting Germany and Russia against it, and one raised the spectre of a new partition of Poland. See Z - Russie, v. 214, ‘Note sur la question russeénard, Paris, 24 Jan. 1920, p. 38; and ‘Russie’, nn, SAR, ns, 27 Jan. 1920, p. 58. Fernand Grénard, the former Consul General in Moscow during 1918, appears to have become chief of the SAR at the end of Jan. 1920. Since Grenard never again spoke of the dangers of a Polish offensive, it is possible he found it unfashionable to do so in the Quai d'Orsay. However, it is hard to believe that men like Berthelot and Kammerer, who were extremely astute diplomats, would have approved the offensive given the arguments raised against it. On the other hand, the Quai d'Orsay's hatred of Bolshevism was intense. Perhaps this sentiment blinded it to the dangers of Pilsudski's ambitions.

67 MG (sc), Bulletin du ler juin.

68 These two considerations were in a sense connected, since in either case, should the Poles be defeated, a major prop of the Versailles settlement would be lost.

69 Z - Russie, v. 288, Pologne-Russie, 1 mai - 30 juin 1920, Millerand to Panafieu, nos. 845–6, 15 May 1920, p. 33.

70 Z - Pologne, v. 71, Politique étrangère, dossier général, 11 mai - 31 déc. 1920, Millerand to Panafieu, nos. 890–3; and elsewhere, 25 May 1920, p. 16.

71 France and her Eastern Allies, p. 147.

72 Z - Russie, v. 289, Pologne-Russie, 1–21 juillet 1920, ‘Lettre de M. Barthou’ (reply), nn, ns, 21 July 1920, p. 208.

73 Z - Russie, v. 290, Pologne-Russie, 22–20 juillet 1920, Millerand to Beam (French Chargé d'Affaires in Washington), nos. 2079–81; and elsewhere, 26 July 1920, p. 95.

74 Z - Pologne, v. 23, Henrys to General Kazimierz Sosnkowski (Polish Minister of War), no. 121 R/4P, 29 June 1920, p. 150.

75 Ibid., Patek to Millerand, no. 10787/D, 2234/11, 10 Feb. 1920, p. 8.

76 France and her Eastern Allies, p. 141; Soviet-Polish Relations, p. 350, n. 63.

77 It is interesting to note that the French General Staff had shown a similar pragmatism toward the Bolsheviks in early 1918; and that in this instance the Quai d'Orsay had worked against the Ministry of War's efforts to reach a limited accommodation with Trotsky based on the need to hold down German troops in Russia. See the author's ‘The Origins of the French Intervention in the Russian Civil War, January-May 1918: A Reappraisal’, to appear in The Journal of Modern History in September 1976.

78 These questions will be dealt with in more detail in subsequent work.

79 Z - Russie, v. 289, Conference de Spa, no. 7A, ‘Notes du Secrétaire français prise aucours d'une conversation interalliés…Spa, 10–7–20…’.

80 France and her Eastern Allies, p. 142.

81 Z - Russie, v. 239, Millerand to Landry (Minister of the Navy), no. 293, 20 Apr. 1920, p. 144.

82 Ibid., Millerand (ns, Paléologue's stamp) to Lefévre, no. 1023, Landry, no. 293, 20 Apr. 1920. p. 143.

83 Z - Russie, v. 240, Action des Alliés dans le sud de Russie, 1 mai-15 juin 1920, Millerand to Landry, no. 347, 8 May 1920, p. 25, Paléologue to Krivoshein, nn, 8 May 1920, p. 26.

84 Z - Russie, v. 239, Mangin, nos. 1160–61, 24 Apr. 1920, p. 156.

85 Z - Russie, v. 250, Gouvernement de la Russie du sud, ravitaillement et matériel de guerre, 9 avril 1919–30 juin 1920, Buat to Millerand, no. 2373BS/1, 8 May 1920.

86 Ibid., Kammerer to Laroche, nn, 17 May 1920.

87 Ibid., Millerand to Lefévre, no. 1270, 22 May 1920.

88 7N 804, EMA, section russe, Russie méridionale, 1919–1920, Lefévre to Mangin, no. 8411 2/11 S.M. 14 May 1920. Millerand approved this action on 11 May - See Z - Russie, v. 240, Millerand to Lefévre, no. 1177, 11 May 1920, p. 45.

89 Laroche, p. 127.

90 Curzon Papers, Derby to Curzon, 29 Sept., 11 Oct., 18 Nov. 1920.

91 Laroche, p. III.

92 Z - Russie, v. 672, Ukraine, politique étrangère, mai-juillet 1920, Millerand to Pieyre, no. 1, instructions, 8 June 1920, p. 223.

93 France and her Eastern Allies, p. 147.

94 This was particularly true in regard to the Lithuanian crisis of the autumn of 1920. Millerand was not prepared to mediate in the Polish-Lithuanian dispute because he felt it would only offend Polish amour-propre and diminish French influence in Warsaw. See Z - Lituanie, v. 14, Liluanie-Pologne, 1 jan.-31 août 1920, Millerand to Panafieu, nos. 1434–35; and elsewhere, 27 Aug. 1920, p. 181.

95 See, for example, Z - Lituanie, v. 1, Politique étrangère, dossier général, jan. 1918-jan. 1919, Pichon to P. Dutasta (French Minister in Berne), nn, 25 Sept. 1918, p. 178; 16N 3069, GQG, 3e Bureau A, Entrées du Ministère des Affaires Etrangeres, 14 fév-mai 1919, Pichon to Clemenceau, no. 1000, 18 Feb. 1919; Z - Russie, v. 619, Bessarabie, 19 mai 1918–30 sept. 1919, ‘Note pour M. Laroche’ nn, signed Kammerer, 4 Mar. 1919, p 45; Z - Russie, v. 704, Berthelot to Fabre (French Minister in Helsingfors), no. 341, 19 Dec. 1919, p. 10; Z - Lettonie, v. 2, Politique étrangère, dossier général, août 1919-juillet 1920, Millerand to Gaiffier d'Hestroye (Belgian Ambassador in Paris), nn, 5 Feb. 1920, p. 146. This was more or less the view of A. I. Gukovskii, Frantsuzskaia interventsiia na iuge Rossii, 1918–19 (Moscow, 1928), pp. 11–14.

96 Z - Russie, v. 213, ‘Action en Russie’, nn, ns, 25 Nov. 1919, p. 94.

97 This supposition is not at all implausible in view of the fact that the French government had once before on 5 Jan. 1918 recognized the de facto independence of the Ukraine. See MAE - ‘Guerre, 1914–1918’, v. 697, Russie: Ukraine, 10 fév. - mars 1918, ‘La France, a-t-elle reconnu le gouvernement ukrainien?’, Note de Clément-Simon, 20 Feb. 1918, p. 112.

98 This was how Derby put it; see Curzon Papers, Derby to Curzon, 12 Oct. 1920.

99 Z - Russie, v. 252, Gouvernement de la Russie du sud, ravitaillement et matériel de guerre, oct. 1920–31 jan. 1925, ‘Note pour le secrétaire-général du départment’, nn, Europe, ns, 13 Oct. 1920. This represented a return to earlier policy because during the height of the Polish crisis in August, Millerand had ordered credit extended to Wrangel. See Z - Russie, v. 251, Gouvernement de la Russie du sud, ravitaillement et matériel de guerre, 1 juillet - 30 sept. 1920, Millerand to Foch, no. 50, 23 Aug. 1920 This was an important step because it meant Millerand was prepared either to violate at least temporarily government statutes forbidding such credits to non-de jure recognized governments without parliamentary sanction, or to accept a stiff fight in the Chamber of Deputies to obtain approval for the credits. It is also interesting to note that the Quai d'Orsay opposed a Wrangel visit to Paris in September because it threatened to provoke ‘polemics’ and ‘perhaps even very troublesome demonstrations’. See Z - Russie, v. 242, Action des Alliés dans le sud de Russie, 16 août - sept, 1920, Note le by Paléologue, nn, 12Sept. 1920, p. 413; and an unlabelled note, nn, signed by Paléologue, 10 Sept. 1920, p. 406.

100 See Carley, ‘The Origins of the French Intervention in the Russian Civil War…’, for a discussion of the interrelationship between the anti-German and anti-Bolshevik motivations of French policy.

101 This at least was the view of the 2e Bureau. See Z - Russie, v. 289, ‘La Pologne en danger’, nn, EMA, 2e Bureau, 11 July 1920, p. 104.