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VI. Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War. Second Thoughts on the Status of Some of the Documents1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

H. W. Koch
H. W. Koch
Affiliation:
University of York
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Extract

Ernst Nolte in his Die Epoche des Faschismus writes that Hitler undoubtedly in principle had wanted war ‘but hardly that war at that time’, meaning the war of 1939. This somewhat muddled thesis conceals two distinct issues, namely the argument that in 1939 contingencies were not entirely to Hitler's liking and the argument that in 1939 contingencies were so little to his liking that we must conclude that Hitler took no conscious steps to risk a general war.

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Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 11 , Issue 1 , March 1968 , pp. 125 - 143
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1968

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References

2 Nolte, Ernst, Die Epoche des Faschismus (Munich, 1963), p. 432Google Scholar (now also available in English as The Three Faces of Fascism, London, 1965). See also footnote no. 189, p. 604 of the German original.

3 Hofer, Walter, Die Entfesselung des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Buecheri, Fischer (Frankfurt, 1960).Google Scholar

4 D. L. Hoggan's Der Erzwungene Krieg does not warrant inclusion here as it is more of a historical curiosity than a work of scholarship.

5 Trevor-Roper, H. R., ‘A. J. P. Taylor, Hitler and the War’, Encounter, xvii (06 1961), 88–96.Google Scholar

6 Hitler, Adolf, Mein Kampf (227–31 Auflage, Duenndruckausgabe, Munich 1937), pp. 726–58;Google Scholar see also pp. 687–712

7 Hitler, Adolf, op. cit. p. 743.Google Scholar

8 Ibid. p. 743.

9 Ibid. p. 749.

10 See also Maser, Werner: Hitler's Mein Kampf, Entstehung, Aufbau Stil, Änderungen Kommentierte Auszüge (Munich, 1966),Google Scholar an example of systematic omission of all those passages of chapter xiv which contradict Maser's attempt at demonstrating a clear detailed continuity between the arguments set out in Mein Kampf, and the policy Hitler pursued.

11 See Gehl, Jürgen, Austria, Germany and the Anschluss 1931–1938 (Oxford, 1964).Google Scholar

12 General Warlimont's evidence, I[nternational] M[ilitary] T[ribunal], xv, 562 ff. See also Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegsführung (ed. Hubatch, Walter), dtv-Taschenbuchausgabe, Weisung no. 18, 12 November 1940, p. 77,Google Scholar which makes reference to Russo-German talks the aim of which it was to clarify Russia's attitude ‘for the immediate future’.

13 Hitler, Adolf, Mein Kampf, p. 743.Google Scholar

14 Reitlinger, Gerald, The House Built on Sand (London, 1960), p. 10.Google Scholar

15 Heiden, Konrad, Der Führer (London, 1944), p. 226.Google Scholar

16 Hitler, Adolf, Mein Kampf, p. 687.Google Scholar

17 DGFP, Series D, I, 29, note 25 a.

18 Taylor, A. J. P., The Origins of the Second World War (London, 1961);Google Scholar Gehl, Austria, Germany and the Anschluss, also BBC transcript of the Taylor-Trevor-Roper debate, 9 July 1961; T. W. Mason in Past and Present, no. 29 (December, 1964).

19 H. R. Trevor-Roper, ‘A. J. P. Taylor, Hitler and the War’, also see letter by Margaret Lambert to The Times Literary Supplement, 2 June 1961.

20 Gehl, , op. cit. p. 162,Google Scholar see also Taylor, , op. cit. pp. 131–4Google Scholar and Meinck, Gerhard, Hitler und die deutsche Aufrustung 1933–37 (Wiesbaden, 1957).Google Scholar

21 Hossbach, Friedrich, Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler (Hannover, 1949), p. 213.Google Scholar

22 IMT, XLII, 228 ff.

23 Hossbach, Friedrich, Von der militärischen Verantwortlichkeit in der Zeit vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Göttingen, 1948), p. 28.Google Scholar

24 Meinck, , op. cit. pp. 236–7.Google Scholar

25 IMT, XLII, 218.

26 Ibid. 236.

27 T. W. Mason in his article in Past and Present, no. 29 (December, 1964), contendsthat the Hossbach memorandum, i.e. the Nuremberg version, corresponds with the notes taken at the time by General Beck. This is substantially true but for one significant omission. Beck in his notes makes no reference whatsoever to Hitler's plan to drive out large parts of the populations of Austria and Czechoslovakia, the kind of plan which because of its inherent inhumanity one would have expected a man of Beck's character to take exception to and to comment upon. See also Forster, Wolfgang, Ein General kämpft gegen den Krieg (Munich, 1949)Google Scholar

28 SeeNolte, , op. cit. pp. 602–3,Google Scholar note 177, for a pertinent assessment of the value of the Hossbach memorandum in a general sense.

29 Bracher, K. D., Sauer, W., Schulz, G., Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung (Cologne, 1962), pp. 745 ff.;Google Scholar Meinck, op. cit.; Buchheim, H., Das Dritte Reich (Munich, 1958), pp. 27 ff.;Google ScholarErbe, Rene, Die nationalsozialistische Wirtschaftspolitik im Lichte moderner Theorie (Zurich, 1958).Google Scholar

30 Klein, Burton H., Germany's Economic Preparations for War (Harvard Economic Studies. Harvard, 1959). See n. 68, below.Google Scholar

31 Treue, Wilhelm, ‘Rede Hitlers vor der deutschen Presse (10 November 1938)’, Vierteljahrsheft für Zeitgeschichte, VI (1958), 175–91.Google Scholar

32 Bracher, , Sauer, , Schultz, , op. cit. p. 759;Google ScholarGisevius, B., Adolf Hitler (Munich, 1963), p. 440;Google ScholarDamerus, , Hitlers Reden (Würzburg, 1962), i, 973.Google Scholar

33 Bracher, , Sauer, , Schulz, , op. cit. p. 758.Google Scholar

34 See also DGFP, Series D, iv, Doc. 400, recording a conversation between Ribbentrop and Ciano, 28 October 1938, in which a conflict with the western democracies is regarded ‘within the bounds of possibility in 4 to 5 years time’.

35 Bracher, , Sauer, , Schulz, , op. cit. p. 759.Google Scholar

36 Treue, Wilhelm, op. cit. p. 182.Google Scholar The mutation of a distortion of this nature is amply demonstrated in Hitler and Nazi Germany (ed. Waite, R. G. L., European Problem Studies, New York, 1966), p. 91.Google Scholar The editor, who has translated the work of Bracher, Sauer, and Schultz, quotes Hitler in direct speech that it was necessary ‘to explain certain events to the German people in such a way that the inner voice of the people will itself cry out for force’. R. G. L. Waite is not only taking great liberty with the original of Hitler's speech but also with the text of the work he has translated. At least, Wolfgang Sauer does not put the present tense begin under quotation marks, but the immediate part which follows. Waite, who has obviously never looked at the original, not only mistranslates that but his secondary source as well.

37 Kordt, Erich, Wahn und Wirklichkeit (Stuttgart, 1948), p. 135.Google Scholar

38 Dietrich, Otto, 12 Jahre mit Hitler (Cologne, 1955), pp. 250 ff.;Google ScholarMeissner, O., Staatssekretär unter Ebert, Hindenburg, Hitler (Hamburg, 1950), p. 470.Google Scholar

39 Bramsted, Ernest K., Goebbels and National Socialist Propaganda 1925–1945 (London, 1965), PP. 101–2, 176–7.Google Scholar

40 Hale, Oron J., The Captive Press in the Third Reich (New Jersey, 1964), pp. 319–20.Google Scholar

41 (a) Nuremberg Documents 798–PS and 1014–PS.

(b) N.D. L–3.

(c) Admiral Boehm's version, Raeder Defence Document Book no. 2, Doc.

42 DGFP, Series D, vn, Docs. 192, 193.

43 Ibid. pp. 557 ff. Haider, Generaloberst, Kriegstagebuch, Stuttgart (1964) i,Google Scholar entry for 22 August 1939; Ritter, Gerhard, Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung, dtv-Taschenbuch (Munich, 1964), p. 498 n. 54.Google Scholar

44 D[ocuments on] B[ritish] F[oreign] P[plicy], 1919–1939, 3rd Series, vn, Doc. 314 (Enclosure).

45 Bullock, Alan, Hitler, a Study in Tyranny (Odhams Edition 1954), p. 482;Google Scholar IMT, XLI, 16 ff.; Bennett, Wheeler, The Nemesis of Power (London, 1954), p. 447 n.Google Scholar

46 Warlimont, , Im Hauptquartier der Wehrmacht 1939–1945 (Frankfurt, 1964), p. 40.Google Scholar

47 DGFP, Series D, vu, Doc. 192. This passage also corresponds with Boehm's account. See also Schlabrendorff, Fabian von, Offiziere gegen Hitler (Frankfurt, 1959), pp. 49 ff.Google Scholar

48 Ibid.; also Warlimont, p. 40 and Manstein, , Verlorene Siege (Bonn, 1958), p. 19.Google Scholar For the view that as late as 29 August 1939 Hitler still considered a negotiated settlement possible, see D.G.F.P., Series D, vn, Appendix 1, p. 567.

49 See for instance Winston Churchill's B.B.C. Broadcast on 17 October 1938, in which he, in the words of Hans Rothfels, ‘divulged in a manner hardly justifiable confidential information which in this case was primarily based on that provided by Ewald von Kleist’ (Rothfels, Hans, Die deutsche Opposition gegen Hitler, Frankfurt, 1958, pp. 137–8Google Scholar).

50 Taylor, , Origins, p. 264.Google Scholar

51 DBFP, loc. cit.

52 Also Haider, who was present, denies emphatically Hitler's display of brutality; Ritter, loc. cit.

53 DBFP, loc. cit.

54 Ibid.

55 Raeder, Erich, Mein Leben (Tübingen, 1957), pp. 165 ff.;Google Scholar Manstein, loc. cit.; Ritter, , op. cit., p. 498.Google Scholar

56 Reitlinger, Gerald, The SS—Alibi of a Nation (London, 1956),Google Scholar and Bullock, , op. cit. p. 482,Google Scholar state in accordance with statements of the Nuremberg prosecutors that these sheets of typescript (N.D. 798–PS and 1014–PS) were taken from OKW files captured in the Tyrol. Reitlinger goes on to say that these were based on shorthand notes taken surreptitiously by Admiral Canaris. As his source he quotes Greiner, H., Die Oberste Wehrmachtsführung 1939–1943 (Wiesbaden, 1951), p. 38.Google Scholar What Greiner states, however, is that he himself made these notes on the evening of 22 August 1939 and based them on the account which General Warlimont supplied, who had just returned from Berchtesgaden. These notes, so Greiner goes on, were supplemented the next day by those which Canaris had made ‘surreptitiously’. Incidentally, Greiner's own account does not mention the words Saukerl or Schweinehund.

57 Hoggan, , op. cit. p. 624.Google Scholar

58 According to Lochner the document originated from an unnamed officer who handed it to Beck, who in turn through Hermann Maass, a former youth movement official, forwarded it to Lochner. Ritter, , op. cit. p. 498.Google Scholar

59 Schlabrendorff, loc. cit.

60 A good example of the manipulation of sources examined here is provided by Clark's, Alan recent book, Barbarossa (London, 1965).Google Scholar On page 20 Hitler's conference of 22 August 1939 is reported in the light of document L–3, i.e. Doc. 314, DBFP, 3rd Series, vn, without reference being made to differing and less sensational versions. Goering's alleged war dance is mentioned, and supplemented by a footnote which reproduces Manstein's acid remark on Goering's extravagant attire. To the unsuspecting reader this juxtaposition appears very much as confirmation by Manstein of Goering's extraordinary behaviour. What he does not know, without actually referring to Manstein, is that the latter categorically denies this performance having taken place.

61 DGFP, Series D, vi, Doc. 433.

62 DGFP, Series D, IV, Docs. 400, 421, 426, 542, 543, 547, 549.

63 DGFP, Series D, vi, Doc. 70.

64 ProfessorDeutsch, Harold C., ‘Strange Interlude: The Soviet-Nazi liaison of 1939–41’ in Historian, ix, 1946–1947 (Brauchitsch's testimony to Professor Deutsch in his capacity as chief of the State Department Special Interrogation Mission).Google Scholar

65 DGFP, Series D, vi, Doc. 433.

66 DGFP, Series D, vn, Docs. 360, 383, 387, 388, 413, 414, 424, 446.

67 Robertson, E. M., Hitler's Pre-war Policy and Military Plans 1933–1939 (London, 1963).Google Scholar

68 Since completing this article my attention has been drawn to a document recently discovered in the Hungarian National Archives which bears on p. 134 above. If this document is genuine in all respects it seems that the ‘appeasers’ were more realistic and accurate about the pace of German rearmament than Churchill before 1939 or others since 1945. See Haraszti, Ëva, ‘Two Secret Reports from the Hungarian Archives’, The New Hungarian Quarterly, vol. vii, No. 27, pp. 107–34.Google Scholar