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VII. The Liberal Leadership and the Lords' Veto, 1907–1910

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Corinne Comstock Weston
Corinne Comstock Weston
Affiliation:
Herbert H. Lehman College of the City University of New York
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Extract

The official biographers of H. H. Asquith believed that his sole difference of any importance with Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in the period when Asquith served as his principal lieutenant rose in connexion with the Trade Disputes Act of 1906. In fact, another important difference divided them in the following spring, this one rising out of their respective views on the proper mode of limiting the veto of the house of lords. That of Campbell-Bannerman is well known. He sponsored a plan of suspensory veto that could conceivably limit the period in which the lords' veto operated to little more than six months. Under its terms a bill sent up to the house of lords would go to a small conference representing each house equally when the two houses were in disagreement. Should the conference fail, the bill or another like it could be reintroduced in the house of commons after an interval of at least six months, passed under drastic closure, and sent once more to the house of lords. The impasse continuing, a second conference might be held; and a second failure at this juncture could entail a repetition of the whole process. But if a third conference proved unsuccessful, the bill could become law without the consent of the house of lords. Known subsequently as the C-B veto plan, it was made public by the Prime Minister in a speech in the house of commons, on 24 June 1007, when he also introduced and carried by a large majority a resolution asserting that the power of the house of lords to alter or reject bills should be so restricted by law as to secure that the decision of the house of commons should prevail within the limits of a single parliament.

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Articles
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The Historical Journal , Volume 11 , Issue 3 , September 1968 , pp. 508 - 537
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1968

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References

1 Spender, J. A. and Asquith, Cyril, The Life of Herbert Henry Asquith, Lord Oxford and Asquith (London, 1932), 1, 184.Google ScholarJenkins, Roy, Asquith (London, 1964), p. 171.Google Scholar Nor does J. A. Spender's account of the evolution of Liberal policy on the lords' veto in 1907 ascribe to Asquith a viewpoint different from the Prime Minister's. Spender, The Life of the Right Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman (London, 1923), 11, 348–57.Google Scholar Interestingly, Randolph S. Churchill pointed out in the biography of his father that ‘Campbell-Bannerman's talk of a suspensory veto was probably considered too drastic by Asquith’. But no elaboration is offered. Winston S. Churchill (Boston, 1967), 11, 311.Google Scholar

2 Parliamentary Debates, fourth series, CLXXVI, columns 909–26. Spender, 11, 357.

3 This line of thought is not pursued by Spender, and Asquith, or by Jenkins, , either in his Asquith or in his earlier Mr. Balfour's Poodle: An Account of the Struggle between the House of Lords and the Government of Mr. Asquith (London, 1954)Google Scholar. Nor is it to be found in Allyn, Emily, Lords versus Commons (New York, 1931)Google Scholar. Ensor, R. C. K. linked Lord Ripon with the joint-sitting scheme discussed at the Constitutional Conference but made no reference to the events of 1907. England: 1870–1914 (Oxford, 1936), p. 423.Google Scholar

4 Campbell-Bannerman to Lord Knollys, 25 Mar. 1907, Campbell-Bannerman Papers, Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 41,208, fos. 30–31V. This letter, a copy, has been collated with the original, which is in the Royal Archives, Windsor Castle. Acknowledgement is due and is gratefully made to the gracious permission of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II to make use of materials from the Royal Archives. All references to these materials have the prefix RA. For Campbell-Bannerman's letter, see RA R28/33. Campbell-Bannerman stated that Loreburn was chairman of the Cabinet Committee, and this is substantiated by a notation on the typed copy of their report that is in the Asquith Papers. Apparently written by Asquith's secretary, Vaughan Nash, it reads: ‘Copy of the Lord Chancellor's suggested scheme for modifying relations of the two Houses’. MS. Asquith 102, fos. 140–5. The Asquith Papers have been used with the kind permission of Mr Mark Bonham Carter. I am also grateful to Mr D. S. Porter, Department of Western Manuscripts, Bodleian Library, where the Asquith Papers are deposited. The membership of the Cabinet Committee is given in a memorandum listing reform proposals affecting the house of lords that was prepared for the use of the House of Lords Committee appointed in 1921. House of Lords Committee, MS. Fisher 11, item 4. The Fisher Papers are in the Bodleian Library. The memorandum errs in listing Lord Ripon as chairman and leaving out Loreburn's name, not altogether a surprising mistake. The House of Lords Committee, after an unsuccessful attempt to secure a copy of the Cabinet Committee's report, were compelled to rely upon the recollections of a former member, Lloyd George, who was Prime Minister in 1921. That Lloyd George was a member is also suggested by the survival in his papers of one of the rare copies of the Cabinet Committee's report, which he was unable to locate in 1921. Private Papers of David, Earl Lloyd George of Dwyfor, B/2/2. These papers, cited hereafter as the Lloyd George Papers, are in the Beaverbrook Library. Access to the Lloyd George Papers was kindly granted by the Trustees of the Beaverbrook Foundations. A more accessible copy of the Cabinet Committee's report is in the Public Record Office. See P.R.O., Cab. 37/87/38 or Cab. 37/101/136. The Public Record Office has assembled printed Cabinet memoranda for the period from 1880 to 1914, many of them from private collections. These have been photographed, and the photographic copies now form part of a class (Cab. 37) in the Cabinet Office group of records. The documents cited above are in this class, to which an index has been supplied in List of Cabinet Papers 1880–1914 (London, 1964).Google Scholar

5 Ripon received the completed report by 19 March. Ripon to Crewe (copy), 19 Mar. 1907, Ripon Papers, Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 43,552, fos. 132–3. These are cited hereafter as the Ripon Papers. The printer's date on the copy of the report of the Cabinet Committee in the Lloyd George Papers is 20 Mar. 1907. Their charge is in their report. The Committee pointed out that it precluded any scheme for reconstructing the house of lords. Any change in its composition, they added, would tend to strengthen it and increase its powers. ‘Accordingly’, the report ran, ‘no proposals in this direction can be made.’

6 Campbell-Bannerman to Lord Knollys, 25 Mar. 1907, Campbell-Bannerman Papers, Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 41,208, fos. 30–31v. Crewe to Ripon, 21 Mar. 1907, Ripon Papers, fos. 134–5.

7 P.R.O., Cab. 37/87/38. At Harcourt's suggestion Loreburn later wrote to Campbell-Bannerman proposing an alteration in the second proposition so that only the house of commons could claim a joint vote. Lorebure to Campbell-Bannerman, 6 May 1907, Campbell-Bannerman Papers, Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 41,222, fo. 206. Sir Almeric Fitzroy, clerk to the privy council, recorded that the Cabinet Committee met on 16 March to decide between a plan of joint sittings and one for a suspensory veto by which the peers could delay legislation for two years. Memoirs (London, 1925), 1, 317. But the surviving letters of the principals and the Cabinet Committee's report offer no support for the idea that this type of suspensory veto ever received serious consideration.Google Scholar

8 Campbell-Bannerman to Lord Knollys, 25 Mar. 1907. Campbell-Bannerman Papers, Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 41,208, fos. 30–31v.

9 Ripon to Crewe (copy), 19 Mar. 1907, Ripon Papers, fos. 132–3. Same to same (copy), 22 Mar. 1907, ibid. fo. 138. Journals and Letters of Reginald Viscount Esher, ed. Brett, Maurice V. (London, 1934), 11, 227–8.Google Scholar

10 Ripon to Crewe (copy), 19 Mar. 1907, Ripon Papers, fos. 132–3.

11 Wolf, Lucien, Life of the First Marquess of Ripon (London, 1921), II, 296.Google Scholar Ripon offered to resign on 10 March 1907 at the height of the Cabinet Committee's activity, but Campbell-Bannerman persuaded him to remain. Ibid. pp. 286–7.

12 ‘Memorandum on Various Expedients for Adjusting the Relations between the Two Houses of Parliament’, P.R.O., Cab. 37/101/137. There was no ring of previous consultation with Ripon when Crewe wrote on 11 March 1907: ‘I am sending under another cover a short memorandum which states the various House of Lords solutions as I understand them. I hope you may agree generally with the preferences I express…’ Crewe to Ripon, Ripon Papers, fo. 128.

13 P.R.O., Cab. 37/87/38; Cab. 37/101/137. Crewe's hostility towards the referendum persisted long after the period in which the Parliament Act was born. He was directly responsible for the portion of the Bryce Report that explained why the Conference on the Reform of the Second Chamber in 1918 had rejected the referendum as a means of adjusting differences between the two houses. Crewe to G. F. M. Campion, 5 April 1918; Crewe to Lord Bryce, 8 April 1918, ‘Uncalendared Bryce Papers Box P.14’. The unpublished Crewe letters in the Bryce Papers have been used with the kind permission of the Bodleian Library and Mary, Duchess of Roxburghe, who is the daughter of Lord Crewe.

14 Asquith to Crewe (copy), 11 Mar. 1907, MS. Asquith 46, fo. 161. Crewe' Papers, which are in the University Library, Cambridge, cannot be consulted until 1973. But there is no doubt that the Asquith letter reached Crewe. James Pope-Hennessy used it in his biography of the Liberal leader. Crewe (London, 1955), p. 112.Google Scholar

15 Crewe to Ripon, 21 Mar. 1907, Ripon Papers, fo. 134. The Prime Minister stated that the Cabinet Committee were unanimous in their report. Campbell-Bannerman to Lord Knollys, 25 Mar. 1907, Campbell-Bannerman Papers, Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 41,208, fos. 30–31v.

16 Ibid. Yet the Prime Minister saw some advantage to the Ripon plan, in particular that it left the house of lords untouched.

17 Loreburn seemed to attribute this expression to Campbell-Bannerman when he wrote on 5 June 1907: ‘My view was that the Committee's proposal would be effective but if you think it too much in the spirit of the Abbé Sieyès or would not meet the legitimate grievance I shall have no sort of difficulty in supporting a suspensory veto as I have in fact always done.’ Loreburn to Campbell-Bannerman, Campbell-Bannerman Papers, Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 41,222, fo. 208.

18 Loreburn to Campbell-Bannerman, 6 May 1907, ibid. fo. 206. See also Lord Cawdor to A. J. Balfour, 17 June 1907, Balfour Papers, Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 49,709, fos. 34V–35V. Writing after Campbell-Bannerman entered on the notice paper on 14 June the resolution that he moved ten days later, Cawdor declared: ‘It really seems incredible that any 6 men of ordinary common sense should be able to put their hand to anything so silly. The amusing and also incredible thing is that the Lord Chancellor should have told B. of B. [Balfour of Burleigh?] before Whitsuntide [19 May], that they had some weeks before decided on their resolution, and that it was so moderate, that he was sure we should be quite ready to accept it—& yet, that it had been so framed that it would be acceptable to their extreme friends!— they must be mad!’

19 Spender and Asquith, 1, 191. Compare Spender, Life of Campbell-Bannerman, II, 351. The comment in Spender and Asquith is couched in stronger language. In view of the fact that Crewe read much of their manuscript and contributed ‘most valuable comment and criticism’, it is tempting to believe that Crewe's opinion on this point was being expressed.

20 Ilbert to Lord Bryce, 12 Aug. 1911, MS. Bryce 14, fos. 34V–35. Ilbert's statement is confirmed by his earlier letter to Bryce, 22 July 1907, ibid. 13, fos. 124v–5. The Ilbert letters have been used with the kind persmission of the Bodleian Library and Mrs Mary Bennett, Principal of St Hilda's College, Oxford, who is Ilbert's granddaughter.

21 ‘Relations of the Two Houses’, P.R.O., Cab. 37/101/136. Spender, , Life of Campbell-Bannerman, II, 351–5. Asquith reprinted the Cabinet Committee's report and the Ilbert memorandum, with a prefatory note, in 1909.Google Scholar

22 Harcourt to Campbell-Bannerman, 24 June 1907, Campbell-Bannerman Papers, Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 41,220, fo. 218. Ilbert may have opposed multiplying the number of conferences. He wrote: ‘The plan sketched out at the end of the speech was taken [from?] my memorandum though I had opposed [three?] conferences.’ Ilbert to Bryce, 22 July 1907, MS. Bryce 13, fos. 124v–5.

23 In October 1909 Asquith reprinted the rival plans of 1907, and at the same time Crewe reissued two memoranda that he had circulated in 1907. His revealing observations are in a prefatory statement dated 6 Oct. 1909. It looks very much as if Asquith and Crewe were engaged in a common enterprise in 1909. P.R.O., Cab. 37/101/137.

24 Campbell-Bannerman to the King, 5 June 1907, RAR 28/54.

25 Campbell-Bannerman to the King, 11 June 1907, RAR28/S7.

26 Campbell-Bannerman to the King, 14 June 1907, RAR28/58.

27 Campbell-Bannerman to the King, 19 June 1907, RAR 28/60. Spender, , Life of Campbell-Bannerman, 11, 355Google Scholar. May, T. E., The Constitutional History of England, ed. and cont. Francis Holland (London, 1912), III, 348.Google Scholar

28 Loreburn to Campbell-Bannerman, 5 June 1907, Campbell-Bannerman Papers, Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 41,222, fo. 208. They were old friends, bound together by memories of their disagreement with Lord Salisbury's Government on the events leading to the Boer War, and perhaps this tie helps explain the ease with which Loreburn changed sides. On the other hand, Asquith, Haldane, and Grey (who favoured the Ripon plan) had been of the Chamberlain-Milner persuasion; and Loreburn may have disliked being found on the question of the lords' veto on the side of the former Liberal Imperialists. Spender, , Life of Campbell-Bannerman, 1, 244–5, 264, 384. For the split in the Liberal leadership during and after the Boer War, see Jenkins, Asquith, chaps, IX-XI. But Ripon, to whom much the same reasoning could be applied, did not change his mind.Google Scholar

29 P.R.O., Cab. 37/101/140. The memorandum is dated 25 Oct. 1909. If the lords' veto were to be considered in relationship to other pressing questions, Loreburn now favoured the plan known as ‘Home Rule all round’ that Crewe had dismissed without a discussion.

30 Parliamentary Debates, fourth series, CLXXVI, column 1507. Asquith's biographers, while recognizing that he was not the originator of the C-B veto plan, credit him with using his influence to unify the Cabinet behind it but supply no substantiating details. Spender and Asquith, 1, 191; Jenkins, , Asquith, p. 173. Jenkins follows Spender, Life of Campbell-Bannerman, 11, 355, in asserting that the Cabinet discussed the possibility of adop ing the referendum after the Ilbert memorandum, in Jenkins' words, ‘effectively killed the joint session plan of the Cabinet committee’. This is very unlikely.Google Scholar

31 The pertinent papers are in MS. Asquith 102, fos. 137–53. See also P.R.O., Cab. 37/101/136.

32 Quoted in Pope-Hennessy, Crewe, pp. xi-xii. The words are Herbert L. Samuel's. See also ibid. p. 64.

33 P.R.O., Cab. 37/101/137. Crewe to Campbell-Bannerman, 3 June 1907. Campbell-Bannerman Papers, Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 41,213, fo. 341. Pope-Hennessy described Crewe's deep dislike of the Parliament Act. Crewe, pp. 124–5.

34 P.R.O., Cab. 37/101/137. See the prefatory statement.

35 Ilbert to Bryce, 22 July 1907, MS. Bryce 13, fos. 124V–125.

36 P.R.O., Cab. 37/101/137.

37 P.R.O., Cab. 37/101/140.

38 Spender and Asquith, I, 272. Lloyd George Papers, C/6/10/3. Fitzroy, 1, 395–8. The changed position of the Irish Nationalists is discussed by Beckett, J. C., The Making of Modern Ireland (London, 1966), pp. 422–3.Google Scholar

39 Harcourt to Asquith, 7 Feb. 1910, MS. Asquith 12, fos. 114–15. According to the chief Liberal whip, the Master of Elibank, Harcourt was ‘part author with Ilbert of the famous C. B. resolutions’. He also described him as the most irreconcilable of the vetoists but lacking in the persistence required for forcing his opinions through the conflicting views of others. Murray, Arthur C., Master and Brother: Murrays of Elibank (London, 1945), pp. 38 and 40. Despite Harcourt's close association with Campbell-Bannerman during the appropriate months of 1907 and his later ardent advocacy of the C-B veto plan in the Asquith Government where such ardour was rare, there seems to be no substantiating evidence for the Master of Elibank's statement of Harcourt's co-authorship. The diary and letters of Harcourt himself are closed to scholars until 1972. English Historical Review, LXXVII, no. 304 (July 1962), 491.Google Scholar

40 Spender and Asquith, I, 277. Jenkins, Asquith, p 208. Asquith to t h e King, 26 Feb., 9 Mar., and 11 Mar. 1907. MS. Asquith 5, fos. 194–8v. Pope-Hennessy, Crewe, pp. 124–5.

41 Asquith, pp. 205–6, 270. Mr. Balfour's Poodle, pp. 82–3.

42 Grey to Asquith, 25 Mar. 1910, MS. Asquith 23, fos. 82–82V. Trevelyan, G. M., Grey of Fallodon (London, 1937), pp. 171–3.Google Scholar

43 Gollin, Alfred M., The Observer and J. L. Garvin 1908–1914 (London, 1960), pp. 190–1.Google Scholar

44 The House of Lords Reform Committee of 1921 concluded that there were no available official papers on the subject of the Constitutional Conference. And Chamberlain's, Austen, Politics from Inside (London, 1936), pp. 289–90Google Scholar, contains a letter, dated 22 August 1912, in which Lansdowne wrote: ‘I am… reminded of a conversation with you on the subject of the Constitutional Conference of 1910. We were both shocked at the absence of all record of its proceedings, and I think we both believed that from the notes which we had made… it might be possible and desirable to draw up a kind of procès verbal of great value for historical purposes.’ The notes made by Chamberlain and Lansdowne are in the Chamberlain Papers, which have been used in this article with the kind permission of the Librarian, Birmingham University Library, on behalf of the Chamberlain Trustees. Chamberlain's notes, under the title ‘Notes of Conference on the Constitutional Question’, are found in the Chamberlain Papers Ac 10/2/35-Ac 10/2/64. Lansdowne's notes, under the title ‘Constitutional Conference 1910: Notes on A. C.'s record by L.’, are listed as Chamberlain Papers Ac 10/2/65. The Lansdowne notes have been used in this article with the kind permission of the present Lord Lansdowne. The materials in the Chamberlain Papers supersede the accounts found in the standard biographies of the participants, which have provided historians with the main lines of what took place but have left many puzzling gaps. See the comment in Jenkins, , Mr. Balfour's Poodle, pp. 102–6.Google Scholar

45 Balfour, ‘A Note on the Constitutional Question’, P.R.O., Cab. 37/102/23. Lansdowne recorded Asquith's suggestion on 23 June that special safeguards for constitutional legislation might prove to be unnecessary if a satisfactory procedure were devised for ordinary legislation. ‘Constitutional Conference 1910’, Chamberlain Papers Ac 10/2/65. On the importance attached to agreement on home rule legislation see, for example, second sitting, 23 June 1910, ‘Notes of Conference’, Chamberlain Papers Acio/2/30; eleventh sitting, 26 July 1910, ibid. Ac10/2/45; thirteenth sitting, 28 July 1910, ibid. Ac10/2/47; sixteenth sitting, 13 Oct. 1910, ibid. Ac10/2/50; seventeenth sitting, 14 Oct. 1910, ibid. Ac10/2/51; and eighteenth to twentyfirst sittings, 1–4 Nov. 1910, ibid. AC10/2/52-AC10/2/61. There is pertinent comment in Sir Petrie, Charles, The Life and Letters of Austen Chamberlain (London, 1939), 1, 254.Google Scholar

46 ‘A Note on the Constitutional Question’, P.R.O., Cab. 37/102/23. Lansdowne to J. S. Sandars, 25 Feb. 1910, Balfour Papers, Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 49,730, fos. 65–7. Lansdowne to Balfour, 27 Mar. 1910, ibid. fos. 68–70V. The Unionist interest in the referendum at this stage of the party's history was due essentially to the activity of Lord Selborne.

47 Sixteenth sitting, 13 Oct. 1910, ‘Notes of Conference’, Chamberlain Papers Ac 10/2/50.

48 Third sitting, 27 June 1910, ibid. Ac 10/2/37. See also the account of the first sitting, 17 June 1910, ibid. Ac 10/2/35.

49 Lloyd George made his suggestion at the first sitting, ibid. The memorandum was compiled by a Mr Hawtrey. P.R.O., Cab. 37/103/24.

50 Third sitting, 27 June 1910, ‘Notes of Conference’, Chamberlain Papers Ac 10/2/37.

51 Eighth sitting, 15 July 1910, ibid. Ac10/2/41. Lansdowne's comment is in ‘Constitutional Conference 1910’, ibid. Ac10/2/65.

52 The ‘Suggested Scheme’ is in P.R.O., Cab. 37/103/34. Dated 21 July 1910, it has on its face a statement written by Chamberlain: ‘Produced & Read by Mr. Asquith at our 9th meeting, July 19th’. See also ninth sitting, 19 July 1910, ‘Notes of Conference’, Chamberlain Papers Ac 10/2/43 and ibid. Ac 10/2/78. Early versions of the ‘Suggested Scheme’ dated 7 July 1910 may be seen in MS. Asquith 104, fos. 90–90V. The Asquith Papers also contain a handwritten ‘Suggested Scheme’, to which the Prime Minister had given his personal attention. The title was written by Asquith himself as were the word ‘Secret’ at the top and various emendations throughout the paper (as, for example, the introduction of the words ‘First Session’, the substitution of ‘Obligatory Conference’ for ‘Joint Sitting’, etc.). Otherwise the paper is in someone else's writing, perhaps that of an amanuensis. I am indebted for this analysis to Mr Porter, Department of Western Manuscripts, Bodleian Library.

53 ‘Note’, 19 July 1910, ‘Notes of Conference’, Chamberlain Papers Ac10/2/42. See also eleventh sitting, 26 July 1910, ibid. Ac 10/2/45. The Unionist memorandum is not in the Chamberlain Papers, but the main points may be surmised from Chamberlain' s ‘Note’ and his account of the eleventh sitting.

54 Document A (‘Joint Session’;), ‘Notes of Conference’, Chamberlain Papers Ac10/2/81. Lloyd George expressed his view of the referendum at the nineteenth sitting, 2 Nov. 1910, ‘Notes of Conference’, Chamberlain Papers Ac 10/2/53. Regarding it as ‘a good means for preventing things being done’, he would apply it to the monarchy and the constitutional pact coming out of the Constitutional Conference, which he wished to remain unchanged.

55 ‘Note’, 19 July 1910, ibid. Ac10/2/42. A private meeting of t he Unionist delegation had earlier (18 July) considered whether to insist upon a reconstruction of t he house of lords. The main obstacle, as Balfour noted, was that the Government would ask the Unionists for their plan and they had none on which they were agreed. The matter was then left for settlement at a Shadow Cabinet meeting at Lansdowne House, where the decision was taken to insist upon the reform of the house of lords, or so it would appear from Lansdowne' s tone at the eleventh sitting, 26 July 1910, ibid. Ac 10/2/45. But Lansdowne had been perfectly willing for a time to abandon this item of the Unionist programme. Lansdowne to Balfour, ‘Note on suggested scheme for dealing with Deadlocks’, 25 July 1910, Balfour Papers, Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 49,729, fos. 89–96. He wrote at one point: ‘If … H.M. Government take the responsibility of asking the Conference to deal with the question of Deadlocks (Conferences plus Joint Sittings) leaving House of Lords Reform for further consideration, I would offer no opposition, although we ought, I think, to place it upon record that we are in favour of House of Lords reform and shall take up the question ourselves should we have an opportunity of doing so.' Ibid. fo. 94.

56 Thirteenth sitting, 28 July 1910, ‘Notes of Conference’, Chamberlain Papers Ac 10/2/47.

57 ‘Copy of Sir R. Finlay's Notes of the Meeting of the Unionist Leaders to hear Balfour's Report of the Proceedings at the Constitutional Conference’, in Chamberlain, , Politics from Inside, p. 295.Google Scholar This was the Lansdowne House meeting of 8 November 1910, which by rejecting Liberal terms for a settlement played a part in bringing the Constitutional Conference to a close. Finlay's ‘Notes’ are also in ‘Notes of Conference’, Chamberlain Papers Ac 10/2/57; Ac 10/2/63. See also eleventh sitting, 26 July 1910, ibid. Ac 10/2/45; fourteenth sitting, 11 Oct. 1910, ibid. Ac10/2/48; fifteenth sitting, 12 Oct. 1910, ibid. Ac10/2/49; twenty-first sitting, 4 Nov. 1910, ibid. Ac10/2/61; Document D (‘Parliament’), ibid. Ac10/2/79; and Document C (‘Parliament’), ibid. Ac 10/2/83. The comments on the financial settlement should be seen in the memorandum that Balfour prepared at the ending of the Conference for George V, to which Asquith added marginal notes. ‘The Constitutional Conference: Memorandum by Mr. Balfour with marginal comments by the Prime Minister’, 14 Nov. 1910, MS. Asquith 104, fos. 183–5 v.

58 Asquith, p. 214. Mr. Balfour's Poodle, p. 103. This would have been easier for Jenkins to accept if he had consulted the full copy of Finlay's notes in Politics from Inside, pp. 295–7, rather than relying on the limited version in Lord Newton's Lord Lansdowne (London, 1929), pp. 402–3.

59 Fifteenth sitting, 12 Oct. 1910, ‘Notes of Conference’, Chamberlain Papers Ac10/2/49. ‘Constitutional Conference 1910’, ibid. Ac10/2/65.

60 Twenty-second sitting, 10 Nov. 1910, ‘Notes of Conference’, Chamberlain Papers Ac 10/2/64.

61 Asquith to the King, 14 Oct. 1910, Spender and Asquith, I, 290. MS. Asquith 23, fos. 136–136V.

62 Balfour to Asquith, 3 Nov. 1910, ibid. fos. 142–3V. Chamberlain Papers Ac10/2/60.

63 ‘Copy of Sir R. Finlay's Notes’, Politics from Inside, p. 296.

64 Balfour to Chamberlain, 28 Nov. 1910, ibid. p. 303. Balfour to Chamberlain, 13 Dec. 1910, ibid. p. 306. To arrange for a referendum on constitutional legislation only at such times as the two houses were in disagreement penalized the Liberals. Whenever the Unionists were in office, the two houses worked in unison. This was the nub of the matter.

65 Seventeenth sitting, 14 Oct. 1910, ‘Notes of Conference’, Chamberlain Papers Ac 10/2/51. See also Chamberlain's Document E, ibid.

66 Eighteenth sitting, 1 Nov. 1910, ‘Notes of Conference’, Chamberlain Papers Ac10/2/52. Lloyd George actually advanced three proposals, of which only the one mentioned above received serious consideration from the Unionists. But the third of these proposals is of particular interest in view of his abortive attempt outside the Conference to form a coalition government that would carry an agreed home rule bill. Lloyd George proposed an agreed home rule bill or an agreed alternative. Chamberlain wrote that this proposal was not again mentioned but left an interesting exchange of notes about it. He asked Balfour: ‘Do you mean to ask Lloyd George to develop his third alternative i.e. that we should see whether we could not agree upon Home Rule or some alternative?’ Balfour replied: ‘I rather thought not: but am not sure that my instinct is right.’ Lloyd George's attempt at coalition-making is described in Ensor, p. 424, and in Jenkins, Asquith, pp. 215–17.

67 Nineteenth sitting, 2 Nov. 1910, ‘Notes of Conference’, Chamberlain Papers Ac 10/2/53; twentieth sitting, 3 Nov. 1910, Ibid. Ac 10/2/54. During the nineteenth sitting Asquith stated that the Liberals could not accept home rule as a suitable subject for a referendum. They had to think of those with whom they worked, and the Irish would never accept it.

68 Twentieth sitting, Ibid.

69 ‘Constitutional Conference 1910’, Chamberlain Papers Acio/2/65.

70 Ibid. Twentieth sitting, 3 Nov. 1910, ‘Notes of Conference’, Chamberlain Papers Ac 10/2/54.

71 Ibid. Writing to Lloyd George before the Liberal offer regarding home rule was formulated, Winston Churchill complained of the obstacles in the way of carrying home rule if such an arrangement were made. Since the new machinery contemplated by the Constitutional Conference was to work only after another election, the Liberals would need to win four elections in succession before home rule became law. Churchill to Lloyd George, 14 Oct. 1910, Lloyd George Papers C/3/15/2. Accordingly, it would have been very difficult for him and Lloyd George to contemplate accepting the Unionist counter-offer. On the other hand Crewe and Birrell had felt differently; and it is worth remembering that Lord Rosebery in 1894, at the time Prime Minister, had imposed a more drastic restriction on home rule bills than the one proposed by the Unionists in 1910. He had stated that 'before Irish Home Rule is concluded by the Imperial Parliament, England as the predominant member of the membership of the Three Kingdoms will have to be convinced of its justice and equity. The Marquess, of Crewe, , Lord Rosebery (London, 1931), 11, 444–5.Google Scholar

72 MS. Asquith 23, fos. 141–141 v. This is a copy of a letter that the Prime Minister sent to Balfour, which as Jenkins observes, was ‘most uncharacteristically undated but presumably written towards the end of the conference’. Mr. Balfour's Poodle, p. 103. Some help in dating it is provided by Balfour's answering note, also in the Asquith Papers, which is dated 3 Nov. 1910. Balfour wrote that he had ‘just received’ Asquith's letter and circulated it to his three colleagues. MS. Asquith 23, fos. 142–143 v. Chamberlain kept his copies of the Asquith letter, dated 3 Nov. 1910, Balfour's reply, similarly dated, and Balfour's covering note, also dated 3 Nov. 1910, that reads: ‘Mr. Balfour encloses copies of letters which have passed between the Prime Minister & himself this afternoon’. ‘Notes of Conference’. Chamberlain Papers Ac 10/2/58; Ac 10/2/59; Ac 10/2/60.

73 Ibid. MS. Asquith 23, fos. 142–143 v. ‘Copy of Sir. R. Finlay's Notes’, Politics from Inside, p. 296.

74 Twenty-first sitting, 4 Nov. 1910, ‘Notes of Conference’, Chamberlain Papers Ac 10/2/61.

75 Politics from Inside, p. 298. The comment is dated 13 Nov. 1910. See also ‘Copy of Sir R. Finlay's Notes’, ibid. p. 296. The account in Gollin, , The Observer and J. L. Garvin, pp. 231–2Google Scholar, implies that the decision remained in doubt as late as the Lansdowne House meeting, but this is misleading. See also ‘Memo. (Between 21st and 22nd Sitting)’, ‘Notes of Conference’, Chamberlain Papers Ac 10/2/62. Lord Esher apparently saw Balfour not long after the Lansdowne House meeting and described him as caught between elements of his own party and Asquith's failure to make sufficient concessions on the other side. Journals and Letters of … Esher, ed. Oliver, , Esher, Viscount (London, 1938), III, 30. The comment is dated 9 Nov. 1910.Google Scholar

76 Lloyd George Papers C/6/11/8. Asquith to Sir Arthur Bigge, 10 Nov. 1910, RAGVK2552(I)/38. MS. Asquith 23, fo. 150.

77 RAGVK25S2(I)/43.

78 Mackintosh, John P., The British Cabinet (London, 1962), chap. 11.Google Scholar

79 Jenkins, , Asquith, p. 177.Google Scholar

80 Ripon to Campbell-Bannerman, 25 Mar. 1907, Campbell-Bannerman Papers, Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 41,225, fo. 206 v. Wolf, , Life of Ripon, 11, 303.Google ScholarSpender, , Life of Campbell-Bannerman, 11, 284–6.Google Scholar

81 Ilbert to Arthur Ponsonby, Campbell-Bannerman Papers, Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 41,239, fo. 276. The letter though not dated appears to have been written just before the Prime Minister's speech. Ponsonby was principal secretary to Campbell-Bannerman.

82 Ensor, p. 423.

83 Chamberlain had thought Asquith inclined to give a little, and there was the disparity between the estimates of 1907 and 1910. Moreover, Winston Churchill at one time adopted the Ripon plan and even recommended a delegation of 120 peers with the aim of reducing dependence upon the Irish vote. His memorandum, printed 10 Nov. 1909, is in MS. Asquith 102, fos. 185's7V. The importance of his advocacy of an enlarged lords' delegation lies in the fact that he was a leader in the left wing of the party, in close communication with Lloyd George. If Churchill could contemplate with equanimity an enlargement of the lords's delegation, so could other Liberals. Lloyd George's position in opposition to such a concession is understandable in the light of his rejection of the Unionist condition regarding home rule bills. Presumably the two were interdependent. But it is difficult to believe that a Lloyd George overruled on home rule bills would have held out on this point. Some notion of what the Unionists would have asked can be gleaned from Lansdowne's private memorandum of 10 Sept. 1910. After stating that Lord Ripon's figures were inadequate, he proposed pressing for 150 peers in the lords' delegation but settling for less. Lansdowne to Balfour, 16 Sept. 1910, Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 49,729, fo. no. See also Balfour's ‘The Constitutional Conference’, MS. Asquith 104, fos. 183–5V for the arguments that were prepared for the King.

84 See notes 5 and 55 in this article. Jenkins concluded that agreement on the reform of the house of lords was a precondition for determining the nature and composition of the lords' delegation to the joint sitting. Mr. Balfour's Poodle, p. 104; Asquith, p. 215. Yet the assumption of the Liberal delegation was the contrary. Its members entered the Conference with the intention of carrying the Ripon plan without the reform of the house of lords: they shared the viewpoint of the Cabinet Committee of 1907, of which three of them had been members. At one point in the Conference Asquith stated explicitly that he was ‘not a Grey man’ and that he regarded reform of the house of lords as a second chapter. And Lloyd George asserted that if the question of deadlocks or veto were satisfactorily settled, the reform of the house of lords would take care of itself, indicating that the reduction of numbers and exclusion of those who really took no part in that house's work would be a sufficient reform. One rather suspects that Balfour and Lansdowne, who disliked the idea of an elective element in that house, found cogency in Lloyd George's argument. Another point to be remembered is implicit in Asquith's statement that a later reform of the house of lords would result in a readjustment in the lords' delegation. ‘Constitutional Conference 1910’, Chamberlain Papers Ac10/2/65. Eighteenth sitting, 1 Nov. 1910, ‘Notes of Conference’, Chamberlain Papers Ac10/2/52. Balfour, ‘The Constitutional Conference’, MS. Asquith 104, fos. 183–5V. Walter Long, for one, wanted the question of the house of lords settled outside the party arena. SirPetrie, Charles, Walter Long and His Times (London, 1936), p. 144.Google Scholar

85 Ensor, pp. 423–4.

86 Chamberlain, , Politics from Inside, p. 293. The occasion was Balfour's breaking off of the negotiations for a coalition that were being conducted outside the Conference.Google Scholar

87 Asquith, p. 215.

88 Gollin, , The Observer and j. L. Garvin, p. 190.Google Scholar

89 Ensor believed that Birrell in these months provided a liaison between the Liberal delegation and the Irish Nationalists. Ensor, p. 422, note 1. But too much should not be made of this since Lloyd George was likewise in touch with the Irish leadership.

90 Asquith told Sidney Low in 1913 that almost the greatest disappointment of his life was the breakdown of the Constitutional Conference in the autumn of 1910. Desmond, MajorChapman-Huston, , The Lost Historian: A Memoir of Sir Sidney Low (London, 1936), pp. 245–6.Google Scholar