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Deformed Desires and Informed Desire Tests

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2020

Anita Superson
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Abstract

The formal theory of rational choice as grounded in desire-satisfaction cannot account for the problem of such deformed desires as women's slavish desires. Traditional “informed desire” tests impose conditions of rationality, such as full information and absence of psychoses, but do not exclude deformed desires. I offer a Kantian-inspired addendum to these tests, according to which the very features of deformed desires render them irrational to adopt for an agent who appreciates her equal worth.

Type
Research Article
Information
Hypatia , Volume 20 , Issue 4: Special Issue: Analytic Feminism , Fall 2005 , pp. 109 - 126
Copyright
Copyright © 2005 by Hypatia, Inc.

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