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Gaslighting, First- and Second-Order

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 December 2020

Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky Open the ORCID record for Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky [Opens in a new window]
Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria 3010 Australia
*
Corresponding author. pmpodosky@gmail.com
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Abstract

In what sense do people doubt their understanding of reality when subject to gaslighting? I suggest that an answer to this question depends on the linguistic order at which a gaslighting exchange takes place. This marks a distinction between first-order and second-order gaslighting. The former occurs when there is disagreement over whether a shared concept applies to some aspect of the world, and where the use of words by a speaker is apt to cause hearers to doubt their interpretive abilities without doubting the accuracy of their concepts. The latter occurs when there is disagreement over which concept should be used in a context, and where the use of words by a speaker is apt to cause hearers to doubt their interpretive abilities in virtue of doubting the accuracy of their concepts. Many cases of second-order gaslighting are unintentional: its occurrence often depends on contingent environmental facts. I end the article by focusing on the distinctive epistemic injustices of second-order gaslighting: (1) metalinguistic deprivation, (2) conceptual obscuration, and (3) perspectival subversion. I show how each reliably has sequelae in terms of psychological and practical control.

Type
Article
Information
Hypatia , Volume 36 , Issue 1 , Winter 2021 , pp. 207 - 227
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Hypatia, a Nonprofit Corporation

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Footnotes

1

University of Melbourne occupies the land of the Wurundjeri people of the Kulin Nation.

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