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FROM ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TO ADMINISTRATIVE LEGITIMATION? TRANSNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2012

Ming-Sung Kuo
Ming-Sung Kuo*
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor, University of Warwick School of Law; JSD, LLM, Yale Law School; LLM, LLB, National Taiwan University, M-S.Kuo@warwick.ac.uk.
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Abstract

Globalization redefines the relationship between law and space, resulting in the emergence of transnational administrative law in a globalizing legal space. I aim to shed light on transnational administrative law by examining how administrative law relates to the process of European integration. I argue that the idea of administrative legitimation is at the core of this relationship. In the European Union, transnational administration grounds its legitimacy on the fulfilment of administrative law requirements. However, given that in the European Union, administrative legitimation is rooted in Europe's constitutional transformation, I caution against the projection of Europe's experience onto global governance.

Keywords

administrative legitimationEuropean integrationformal and material constitutionalizationglobal governancetransnational administrative law
Type
Articles
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 61 , Issue 4 , October 2012 , pp. 855 - 879
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2012

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References

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12 The comparison of the revolutionary tradition of legitimacy and administrative legitimation will be further addressed in parts B and C of section III.

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17 In this article, I use European legal order to refer to the multilevel governance ordering centred on the EU structure. While it is underpinned by the process of integration leading to the establishment of the EU and the subsequent development, European legal order is a broader concept than the EU legal order. Cf N Walker, ‘Flexibility within a Metaconstitutional Frame: Reflections on the Future of Legal Authority in Europe’ in G de Búrca and J Scott (eds), Constitutional Change in the EU: From Uniformity to Flexibility? (Hart 2000).

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39 See FI Michelman, ‘Integrity-Anxiety?’ in M Ignatieff (ed), American Exceptionalism and Human Rights (Princeton University Press 2005).

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42 See Rose-Ackerman and Lindseth (n 40).

43 See also Kumm (n 22).

44 Administrative law is even more impenetrable to comparative analysis than constitutional law. See Schwarze, J, ‘Enlargement, the European Constitution, and Administrative Law’ (2004) 53 ICLQ 971–2CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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48 Thomas, R, Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality in Administrative Law (Hart 2000) 13–14Google Scholar.

49 See Kingsbury (n 9) 31.

50 See Morison and Anthony (n 13) 216–17, 229–31; B Kingsbury, ‘International Law as Inter-Public Law’ in HS Richardson and MS Williams (eds), Moral Universalism and Pluralism (NOMOS XLIX, NYU Press 2009). See also Habermas, J, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (W Rehg trans, MIT Press 1996) 168–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

51 See Morison and Anthony (n 13) 217–23.

52 See Kingsbury (n 9) 32–3; Kingsbury (n 50) 178–9.

53 See also Cassese, S, ‘Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure’ (2005) 68 LCP 109Google Scholar. Cf Esty (n 2) 1524.

54 See Morison and Anthony (n 13) 223–37.

55 See Kingsbury (n 9) 41–50.

56 Cf Krisch (n 4) 97–8.

57 Cf Habermas (n 50) 168–93.

58 See Frug, J, ‘Administrative Democracy’ (1990) 40 UTLJ 559CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fisher, E, Risk: Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism (Hart 2007) 32–5Google Scholar.

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62 5 USC sections 553(c), 556–57 (2006). The formal rule-making procedure applies only ‘[w]hen rules are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing’. 5 USC section 553(c). After United States v Florida East Coast Railway (410 US 224 (1973)), administrative regulations are almost exclusively made through the channel of informal rulemaking. See also Breyer et al (n 60) 492–4, 514–20.

63 5 USC section 553(c) (2006). See also DeLong, JV, ‘Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy’ (1979) 65 VaLRev 258Google Scholar.

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69 See Mehde (n 68). For an American account of the transmission-belt theory of legitimacy, see Stewart (n 45) 1675–6.

70 See Ziamou (n 67) 56–9.

71 The German conceptual equivalent of adjudication is Verwaltungsakt, while the closest German counterpart of the object of the rule-making procedures in APA is Rechtsverordnung. See Schmidt-Aßmann and Möllers (n 68) 275.

72 ibid 280–3.

73 ibid 281.

74 See Rose-Ackerman (n 66) 59–60.

75 See Schwarze (n 35) 18–20, 85–6. See also Nolte (n 45) 212; Rose-Ackerman (n 66); Lindseth, PL, ‘The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s–1950s’ (2004) 113 YaleLJ 1341Google Scholar.

76 See Rose-Ackerman (n 66) 12–13, 15–16. See also Nolte (n 45) 197–8.

77 See Rose-Ackerman (n 66) 1–3.

78 See B Ackerman, ‘Rooted Cosmopolitanism’ (1994) 104 Ethics 516.

79 ibid.

80 See also P Lindseth, ‘“Always Embedded” Administration: the Historical Evolution of Administrative Justice as an Aspect of Modern Governance’ in C Joerges et al (eds), The Economy as a Polity: The Political Constitution of Contemporary Capitalism (UCL Press 2005).

81 See Schwarze (n 35) 4–10.

82 See generally JHH Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 YaleLJ 2403. For recent literature on the constitutionalization of the EU, see, eg, Stone Sweet, A, The Judicial Construction of Europe (OUP 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rittberger, B and Schimmelfennig, F (eds), The Constitutionalization of the European Union (Routledge 2007)Google Scholar; Christiansen, T and Reh, C, Constitutionalizing the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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84 See A von Bogdandy and J Bast, ‘The Constitutional Approach to EU Law – From Taming Intergovernmental Relationships to Framing Political Processes’ in von Bogdandy and Bast (n 83); FC Mayer, ‘Multilevel Constitutional Jurisdiction’ in von Bogdandy and Bast (n 83). See also Everson, M and Eisner, J, The Making of a European Constitution: Judges and Law Beyond Constitutive Power (Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar. But see PL Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State (OUP 2010) 1 (urging an administrative rather than a constitutional account of the EU legal order).

85 See U Haltern, ‘On Finality’ in von Bogdandy and Bast (n 83). Needless to say, the sovereign debt crisis in Europe not only poses existential challenges to the eurozone but also calls the constitutional order of the EU into question.

86 See Weiler (n 82) 2413.

87 See Weiler, JHH, ‘Thinking about Rethinking’ (2005) EuConst 415–16Google Scholar; Walker, N, ‘Legal Theory and the European Union: A 25th Anniversary Essay’ (2005) 25 OJLS 581CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kuo, M-S, ‘From Myth to Fiction: Why a Legalist-Constructivist Rescue of European Constitutional Ordering Fails’ (2009) 29 OJLS 589–600CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

88 But see Lindseth (n 84) 4–14 (the legitimacy of the EU legal order is underpinned by a chain of legitimacy traced to the member states).

89 See Weiler (n 82). See also Krisch (n 4) 29–31.

90 For an extensive account of constitutionalization that includes both the legal and sociological aspects of constitution-making, see Cass, DZ, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization: Legitimacy, Democracy, and Community in the International Trading System (OUP 2005) 28–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also F Snyder, ‘The Unfinished Constitution of the European Union: Principles, Processes and Culture’ in JHH Weiler and M Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (CUP 2003) 55.

91 See B Ackerman, We the People: Foundations, vol 1 (Belknap 1990).

92 See C Walter, ‘International Law in a Process of Constitutionalization’ in J Nijman and A Nollkaemper (eds), New Perspectives on the Divide between National and International Law (OUP 2007) 192. See also Weiler, JHH, ‘On the Power of the Word: Europe's Constitutional Iconography’ (2005) 3 ICON 173–6Google Scholar.

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95 Case 26/62 [1963] ECR 1.

96 See Weiler (n 82) 2434.

97 See Walter (n 92) 192–4.

98 See Kuo (n 93).

99 ibid; Krisch (n 4) 33.

100 See C Möllers, ‘Pouvoir Constituant—Constitution—Constitutionalisation’ in von Bogdandy and Bast (n 83) 195. See also Kuo (n 94) 358–64.

101 Kuo (n 87) 585; Möllers (n 100) 195–6.

102 See Möllers (n 100) 196. On this view, whether the EU treaties constitute the EU constitution is beside the point. The EU treaties are constitutional to the extent that their provisions take on constitutional significance as construed by the ECJ. See also Case 294/83 Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v Parliament, [1986] ECR 1339, 1365, para 23. Cf Möllers (n 100) 189–95.

103 See Weiler (n 82) 292–8. See also Snyder (n 90) 62–7.

104 See Lindseth (n 84) 58–9.

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107 See Everson and Eisner (n 84).

108 See Möllers (n 100) 175–6, 185–8, 198–9, 201–3.

109 Federico Mancini, G, ‘The Making of a Constitution for Europe’ (1989) 26 CML Rev 595Google Scholar. But see B de Witte, ‘The European Union as an International Legal Experiment’ in G de Búrca and JHH Weiler (eds), The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (CUP 2012).

110 See Weiler (n 82); Snyder (n 90) 62–7.

111 Cf A von Bogdandy, ‘Founding Principles’ in von Bogdandy and Bast (n 83) 46; Snyder (n 90) 62–7.

112 See Möllers (n 100) 170–8.

113 ibid.

114 See Kuo (n 101).

115 See R Wahl, ‘In Defence of “Constitution”’ in Dobner and Loughlin (n 7) 221–2 (quoting and translating P Badura, Staatsrecht: Systematische Erläuterung des Grundgesetzes für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (3rd edn, CH Beck 2003) 7 (emphasis omitted)).

116 Even in British constitutional thought: see Kuo (n 93) 400; Kuo (n 94) 345. Cf Bogdanor, V, The New British Constitution (Hart 2009) 11Google Scholar.

117 See Möllers (n 100) 185–88. See also Everson and Eisner (n 84) 10.

118 Cf JHH Weiler, ‘In Defence of the Status Quo: Europe's Constitutional Sonderweg’ in Weiler and Wind (n 90).

119 See Kuo, M-S, ‘Cutting the Gordian Knot of Legitimacy Theory? An Anatomy of Frank Michelman's Presentist Critique of Constitutional Authorship’ (2009) 7 ICON 683–7Google Scholar. See also Kay, RS, ‘Constituent Authority’ (2011) 59 AmJCompL 715Google Scholar. But cf Everson and Eisner (n 84); Maduro (n 106).

120 See Schwarze (n 35) 4.

121 Case 26/62 [1963] ECR 1.

122 Case 6/64 [1964] ECR 585.

123 Case 29/69 [1969] ECR 419.

124 See also M Everson, ‘The Constitutionalisation of European Administrative Law: Legal Oversight of a Stateless Internal Market’ in C Joerges and E Vos (eds), EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics (Hart 1999) 281 (characterizing European administrative law as one ‘for or of the internal market’).

125 See Dehousse, R, The European Court of Justice: The Politics of Judicial Integration (Palgrave Macmillan 1998) 16–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Claes, M, The National Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution (Hart 2006) 399–423Google Scholar; Hinarejos, A, Judicial Control in the European Union: Reforming Jurisdiction in the Intergovernmental Pillars (OUP 2010) 1–14Google Scholar. But cf Schwarze (n 35) 60–1.

126 See T Koopmans, ‘Globalisation of Administrative Law—the European Experience’ in Anthony et al (n 4) 399. See also Morison and Anthony (n 13) 220–1.

127 See Schwarze (n 35) 1460–5.

128 See generally T Ginsburg, ‘Written Constitutions and the Administrative State: On the Constitutional Character of Administrative Law’ in Rose-Ackerman and Lindseth (n 40)

129 von Bogdandy (n 111) 23. See also Koopmans (n 126) 400–1.

130 See, eg, S Kadelbach, ‘Union Citizenship’ in von Bogdandy and Bast (n 83) 466.

131 For the types of and the nature of the ECJ's jurisdiction, see Dehousse (n 125) 7–28.

132 See Schwarze (n 35) 1455–65.

133 See Shapiro, M, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (p/b edn, University of Chicago Press 1986) 27Google Scholar. The allocation of power and competence between public agencies is also a part of administrative law. Accordingly, Case 22/70 Commission v Council (AETR) [1971] ECR 263 can be regarded as an administrative law case as well.

134 See also Everson (n 124) 283.

135 See J Küling, ‘Fundamental Rights’ in von Bogdandy and Bast (n 83) 499.

136 Möllers (n 100) 197; Everson (n 124) 283. See also Snyder (n 90) 63.

137 See generally Ladeur (n 41).

138 See Everson (n 124); Küling (n 135) 497, 499. Cf Fisher (n 58) (embedding the values of constitutionalism in administrative practice and regulatory culture).

139 See Möllers (n 100) 197–8. See also Snyder (n 90) 62–3.

140 Solange I, BVerGE 37, 271 2 BvL 52/71 (1974), [1974] 2 CMLR 540; Solange II, BVerfGE 73, 339 2 BvR 197/83 (1986), [1987] CMLR 225.

141 See, eg, Case 4/73 Nold v Commission [1974] ECR 491.

142 See Claes (n 125) 690–1.

143 ibid. 452–64.

144 See Schwarze (n 35) 1461–2.

145 See Lindseth (n 84) 6–14; Möllers (n 100) 170–2, 185–8, 198, 202–3. Cf Kuo (n 119).

146 See Mayer (n 84) 429–31.

147 See Lindseth (n 84) 53–57. Cf de Witte (n 109).

148 See JHH Weiler, ‘Dialogical Epilogue’ in de Búrca and Weiler (n 109) 262–70. See also Everson (n 124) 289–90.

149 For the uniqueness of the legitimacy challenge facing the EU, see Haltern, U, ‘Pathos and Patina: The Failure and Promise of Constitutionalism in the European Imagination’ (2003) 9 ELJ 14CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

150 See, eg, Pernice, I, ‘Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European Constitution-Making Revisited?’ (1999) 36 CML Rev 703Google Scholar; Pernice, I, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel Constitutionalism in Action’ (2009) 15 ColumJEurL 349Google Scholar. See also Mayer (n 84) 426–31.

151 See Krisch (n 4) ch 2; Kuo, M-S, ‘Between Law and Language: When Constitutionalism Goes Plural in a Globalising World’ (2010) 73 MLR 858CrossRefGoogle Scholar.