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International Agricultural Trade Reform and Developing Countries: The Case of the European Community
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 January 2008
Extract
We are all aware that agriculture is important to developing countries as a source of income, employment and export earnings. To a far greater extent than in the OECD countries, agriculture it central to the economic performance of developing countries and the livelihood of their inhabitants. Rural societies in developing countries are directly dependent on the agricultural sector and urban dwellers rely on agriculture to provide food security and sustainable economic growth. Furthermore, many developing countries heavily rely on the export earnings or are highly dependent on food imports. Given the fact that the poorest and most threatened communities and countries are typically the most highly dependent, the resolution of pressing global agricultural policy and trade issues is critical to sustainable development and poverty alleviation.
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References
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