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REFLECTIONS ON MARITIME DELIMITATION IN THE CAMEROON/NIGERIA CASE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2008

Yoshifumi Tanaka
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Abstract

International courts and tribunals have played a predominant role in the development of the law of maritime delimitation.1 In fact, since the North Sea Continental Shelf cases of 1969, eleven judgments concerning maritime delimitations were given by international courts and tribunals. Owing to the richness of international decisions, one may currently speak of ‘case law’ in the field of maritime delimitations. Thus it is indispensable to consider the evolving process of the law of maritime delimitation on the basis of the practice of international courts and tribunals.

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Articles
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International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 53 , Issue 2 , April 2004 , pp. 369 - 406
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Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2004

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References

1 Many writers emphasized the importance of case law in this field.Weil, PPerspective du droit de la déelimitation maritime (ParisPedone 1988) 13.Google ScholarSee also Cahier, P ‘Les sources du droit relatif àa la déelimitation du plateau continental’, in Le droit international au service de la paix, de la justice et du déeveloppement, Méelanges Michel Virally (ParisPedone 1991) 175–82;Google ScholarJennings, RY ‘What Is International Law and How Do We Tell It When We See It?’ (1981) 37 ASDI 68;Google ScholarLucchini, L and Vœoelckel Droit de la mer, M, t. 2, Déelimitation (ParisPedone 1996) 200;Google ScholarChurchill, RR and Lowe, AVThe Law of the Sea (3rd ednManchesterMUP 1999) 185.Google Scholar Yet this does not mean that State practice is meaningless in the field of maritime delimitations. There is a rich State practice on this domain, and the analysis of that practice is highly important. For State practice relating to maritime delimitations, see Charney, JI et al. International Maritime Boundaries 4 vols (Nijhoff 1993, 1998, 2002).Google Scholar With respect to a comparative analysis between the case law and State practice, see Tanaka, Y Predictability and Flexibility in the Law of Maritime Delimitation, Thesis (GenevaIUHEI 2002).Google Scholar

2 Case concerning the land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), 10 Oct2002. The text of the decision is available on the Court's website <http://www.icj-cij.org>Memorial, Counter-Memorial, Reply and Verbatim Records are available at the above internet address. This analysis is based on the electronic version of the text. Regarding an overview of this decision, see Merrills, JG «Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening, Merits, Judgment of 10 October 2002)’ (2003) 52 ICLQ 788–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 All five States ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. In addition, according to the data presented by Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea of the United Nations, all those States claimed 12-mile territorial seas and 200-mile EEZs. United Nations (1999) 39 Law of the Sea Bulletin 40–50. Yet Nigeria indicated that Cameroon has not formally proclaimed an EEZ and has no EEZ legislation. Counter-Memorial of Nigeria, 562, para 20.9.Google Scholar

4 In 1999 Equatorial Guinea and Sãao Tomée and Pri´incipe drew a maritime boundary by agreement.Google Scholar

5 In arbitration, the Dubai/Sharjah BoundaryArbitration of 1989 and the Eritrea/Yemen arbitrations of 1998 and 1999 provide clear examples of such composite disputes.Google Scholar

6 Point G is indicated in Figure 2.Google Scholar

7 As no Judges from the Parties countries were included on the Bench of the Court, Cameroon chose Mr Kéeba Mbaye and Nigeria chose Mr Bola Ajibola as the Judges ad hoc in accordance with Art 31(3) of the Statute.

8 Case concerning the land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Request for the indication of provisional measures, ICJ Reports, 1996, p 24, para 49. Regarding the summary and comments on this order, see Merrills, JG ‘The Land and Maritime Boundary Case (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Order of 15 March 1996’ (1997) 46 ICLQ 676–81;Google ScholarBekker, PHF ‘Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening)’ (2003) 97 AJIL 387–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 In its judgment, the Court rejected seven of the preliminary objections arisen by Nigeria and declared that the eighth did not have an exclusively preliminary character. ICJ Reports (1998) 325–7, paras 118. For the analysis of this decision, see Merrills, JG ‘The Land and Maritime Boundary Case (Cameroon v Nigeria), Preliminary Objections’ (1999) 48 ICLQ 651–8;Google ScholarBarati, H ‘Frontiere terrestre et maritime (Cameroun v Nigeria), exceptions preliminaries, interpretation, intervention’ (1999) 45 AFDI 371–412;CrossRefGoogle ScholarBekker, PHF ‘Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, Judgment’ (1998) 92 AJIL 751–5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

10 Request for interpretation of the judgment of 11 June 198 in the case concerning the land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria), preliminary objections (Nigeria v Cameroon), para 19. The text is available on the Court's website. <http://www.icj-cij.org>..>Google Scholar

11 (2000) 38 ILM 112–16. The text is also available on the Court— website. For a generalcommentary on this judgment, see Merrills, JGThe Intervention by Equatorial Guinea’ (2000) 49 ICLQ 720–3;CrossRefGoogle ScholarSergio Marques Antunes, Nuno ‘The Pending Maritime Delimitation in the Cameroon v Nigeria Case: A Piece in the Jigsaw Puzzle of the Gulf of Guinea’ (2000) 15 IJMCL 163–92.Google Scholar

12 Judgment, op cit n 11, 115, para 12.Google Scholar

13 Ibid 116, para 18.

14 See also Sholanke, OO ‘Delimiting the Territorial Sea between Nigeria and Cameroon: A Rational Approach’ (1993) 42 ICLQ 398–411.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15 Judgment op cit n 2, 126, para 268. The Marouna Declaration was reproduced in Sholanke, opcit n 14,410–11.Google Scholar

16 In the operative part of the judgment, the Court did not refer to any datum. The omission of datum will make the coordinates indicated in the decision difficult to implement from a technical point of view. See INT-BOUNDARIES Archives, Oct 2002 <http://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/lists/intboundaries.hmt>..>Google Scholar

17 Judgment op cit n 2, 133, para 285. Nigeria has claimed 30 nautical miles territorial sea while Cameroon claimed that of 50 nautical miles. According to Cameroon, however, these claims were withdrawn when the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea entered into force. Cameroon stated that the two States have acceptedterritorial seas of 12 nautical miles since 1975. Memorial of Cameroon, 535, paras 5.79–5.80. Furthermore, Professor Pellet, Counsel of Cameroon, indicated the fact that the ‘assemblee nationale’ of Cameroon adopted law No 2000/2 in 17 Apr 2000, and Art 4 of the law fixed the breath of its territorial sea at 12 nautical miles. Argument of Professor Pellet, Counsel of Cameroon, CR 2002/5, 42, para 12.Google Scholar

18 Argument of Professor Pellet, , Counsel of Cameroon, CR 2002/1, 42, para 6.Google Scholar

19 Rejoinder of Nigeria, Jan, 2001, para 10.7. Reply of Cameroon, 389–92, para 9.08–9.19.Google Scholar Yet Cameroon has not formally proclaimed an EEZ. Counter-Memorial of Nigeria, vol. I, May 1999Google Scholar

20 Judgment op cit n 2, 134, para 286.Google Scholar

21 Cameroon ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea on 19 Nov 1985 and Nigeria ratified the Convention on 14 Aug 1986.Google Scholar

22 Judgment op cit n 2, 134, para 285. See also Memorial of Cameroon, 533–4, paras 5.75–5.78; argument by Professor Kamto, , Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/22, 43, para 24.Google Scholar

23 Memorial of Cameroon 533–4, paras 5.76–5.77; reply of Cameroon 409, para 9.63. See also argument of Professor Pellet, CR 2002/5, 43–6, paras 15–25.Google Scholar

24 The Judgment op cit n 2, 127, para 271. Cameroon used the words ‘equidistance principle’. Generally, this is not considered a principle but a method for delimitation.Google Scholar

25 Ibid 131, para 280; argument by Professor Crawford, Verbatim Record CR 2002/13, 53–9, paras 6–30.

26 In the Gulf of Maine case, the Chamber of the ICJ ruled that the delimitation of a single maritime boundary could ‘only be carried out by the application of a criterion, or combination of criteria, which does not give preferential treatment to one of [the zones] to the detriment of the other, and at the same time is such as to be equally suitable to the division of either of them’. The Gulf of Maine case, ICJ Reports 1984, p 327, para 194.Google Scholar

27 The Judgment op cit n 2, 135, para 288.Google Scholar

28 Ibid 135, para 290.

29 Ibid 127, para 272; argument by Professor Kamto, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/17, 50–60, paras 20–48.

30 The Judgment op cit n 2, 129, para 278; argument by Professor Georges Abi-Saab, Counsel of Nigeria, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/20, 40–5, paras 4–28 (in particular, pp 43–4, paras 18–20.) See also argument by Professor Crawford, Counsel of Nigeria, ibid 53, para 15.

31 The Judgment op cit n 2, 136, para 291.Google Scholar

32 Ibid 136, para 292.

33 Ibid 294

34 Ibid 138, para 296. Memorial of Cameroon, 545, para 5.98; 549, para 5.110; reply of Cameroon, 403–9, paras 9.54–9.60; argument by Professor Kamto, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record CR 2002/6, 39–41, paras 41–5; argument by Professor Mendelson, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record CR 2002/6, 46–9, paras 5–10; argument by Professor Cot, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record CR 2002/22, 28–9, paras 5–9; argument by Professor Kamto, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/17, 56–8, paras 37–9.

35 Judgment op cit n 2, 138, para 296; Counter-Memorial of Nigeria, 575–81, paras 21.14–21.23Google Scholar

36 Judgment op cit n 2, 138, para 297.Google Scholar

37 Ibid 138–9, para 297.

38 Ibid 128, para 274. Memorial of Cameroon, p 550, para 5.114; reply of Cameroon, p 409, paras 9.61–9.62; argument by Professor Kamto, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record CR 2002/6, 41–2, paras 48–51.

39 Judgment op cit n 2, 130, para 279; argument by Professor Georges Abi-Saab, Counsel of Nigeria, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/13, 36, paras 33–4; Ibid Verbatim Record, CR 2002–20, 42, paras 13–14.

40 Judgment op cit n 2, 139, para 299.Google Scholar

41 ibid.

42 Ibid 139, para 300; Memorial of Cameroon, 549–50, paras 5.111–5.113

43 In the second sector, the broken part of the construction line corresponding to the Equatorial Guinea coastline was not taken into account. In the third sector, the broken part of the construction line corresponding to Gabon's coastline was not considered. For the method of drawing Cameroon's line, see Memorial of Cameroon, 553–5, paras 5.119–5.128; reply of Cameroon, 421–6, paras 9.81–9.95; argument by Professor Mendelson, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/6, 51–5, paras 16–28; argument by Professor Kamto, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/7, 28–31, paras 31–2. Later, however, Cameroon explained that this line was an equidistance line adjusted to take into account the relevant circumstances so as to produce an equitable solution. Argument by Professor Kamto, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/17, 50–60, paras 20–8; judgment, op cit n 2, 127, para 272. Yet it is hard to understand how these totally different reasons could be compatible. On this issue, see argument by Professor Crawford, counsel of Nigeria, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/20, 53–54, para 15; 58–64, paras 29–48.Google Scholar

44 Rejoinder of Nigeria, Part IV, Chapter 13, para 13.13; para 13.41; Judgment op cit n 2, 129, para 278Google Scholar

45 Ibid 140, para 301. With respect to the concept of proportionality in the law of maritime delimitation, see Tanaka ‘Reflections on the Concept of Proportionality in the Law of Maritime Delimitation’ (2001) 16 UMCL 433–63.

46 Counter-Memorial of Nigeria, 581–7, paras 21.24–21.31; argument by Professor Crawford, , Counsel of Nigeria, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/20, 56–58, paras 23–8.Google Scholar

47 Rejoinder of Nigeria, Part IV, Chapter 10, para 10.19.Google Scholar

48 Reply of Cameroon, 427–40, paras 9.96–9.117; argument by Professor Pellet, , Counsel of Cameroon, 18–31, paras 3–42.Google Scholar

49 Judgment op cit n 2, 132, para 283. See also Reply of Cameroon 427–40, paras 9.96–9.117; argument by Professor Kamto, , Verbatim Record, CR 2002/7, 18–26, paras 3–24 and 32, para 45.Google Scholar

50 Judgment op cit n 2, 140–1, para 304.Google Scholar

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid 141, para 307.

53 Obviously, that dilemma arises in international law as well. In this connection, Charles de Visscher states that: ‘L'éevolution du droit international contemporain est marquéee par deux orientations opposéees. Un besoin de certitude du droit et de séecuritée travaille, depuis un sièecle, àa un developpment technique trèes poussée des regies du droit positif. Un besoin, plus réecemment ressenti, d'assouplissement de la rèegie, face àa des situations nouvelles et de plus en plus individualisees, porte àa rechercher dans les voies de l'éequite une justice adaptéee au cas concret, aux particularites de l'espèece.’ It appears that this view also points to a similar dilemma between the predictability and flexibility. de Visscher, CDe l'éequite dans le reglement arbitral ou judiciaire des litiges de droit international public (ParisPedone 1972) preface, i.Google Scholar

54 Thirlway, H ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, Part Six’ (1995) 65 BYIL 78.Google Scholar

55 This question has been considered in Tanaka, op cit n 1.Google Scholar

56 ICJ Reports (1969) 53, para 101. See also 49, para 90.Google Scholar

57 Ibid 50, para 92.

58 ICJ Reports (1982), 59, para 70.Google Scholar

59 Ibid 79, para 110.

60 ICJ Reports (1985) 38–9, para 45. As will be explained later, however, the Court adopted, at the operational stage, the corrective-equity approach for the delimitation of opposite coasts. In this sense, the Libya/Malta case has a hybrid character since two approaches were used.Google Scholar

61 ICJ Reports (1984) 299–300, para 112.Google Scholar

62 However, the distinction between equitable criteria and practical methods appears to be artificial.Google Scholar

63 ICJ Reports (1984) 312, para 157.Google Scholar

64 Ibid 313, para 158.

65 The Chamber stated that ‘there is no single method which intrinsically brings greater justice or is of greater practical usefulness’. Ibid 315, para 162. ‘Nor is there any method of which it can be said that it must receive priority.’ Ibid para 163.

66 89 RGDIP (1985) 521, para 89; 525, para 102.Google Scholar

67 31 ILM (1992) 1163, para 38.Google Scholar

68 18 Reports of International Arbitral Awards (New York United Nations) 45, para 70.Google Scholar

69 Ibid p 116, para 249.

70 Ibid pp 114–16, paras 245–9.

71 ICJ Reports (1993) 58, para 46.Google Scholar

72 Ibid 61, para 51.

73 Ibid 62, para 53.

74 Ibid para 56.

75 The Qatar/Bahrain case (Merits), para 230. The text of the decision is available on the Court's website <http://www.icj-cij.org>..>Google Scholar

76 Ibid, para 170.

77 With respect to an analysis on this decision, see Tanaka, ‘Reflections on Maritime Delimitation in the Qatar/Bahrain case’ (2002) 52 ICLQ 53–80.Google Scholar

78 Some consider the North Sea Continental Shelf cases of 1969 as an expression of corrective equity. See, for instance, the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Evensen in the Tunisia/Libya case, ICJ Reports, 1982, 292, para 12; M Bedjaoui ‘L'“éenigme” des “principes éequitables” dans le droit des delimitations maritimes’ (1990) 62 Revista Españnola de derecho internacional 370 and 378; Weil, op cit n 1, 205–6. In contrast, Judge Jiméenez de Arechaga rejected such an interpretation of the 1969 judgment. Separate Opinion of Judge Jiméenez de Aréechaga in the Tunisia/Libya case, ICJ Reports (1982) 104, para 15. In the same vein, B Kwiatkowska ‘The I.C.J. Doctrine of Equitable Principles Applicable to Maritime Boundary Delimitation and Its Impact on the International Law of the Sea’, in Bloed, A and van Dijk, P (eds) Forty Years International Court of Justice: Jurisdiction, Equity and Equality (UtrechtEuropa Institute 1988) 134–5.Google ScholarIt is difficult to assert that the ICJ, in that case, adopted the corrective equity approach, since the North Sea Continental Shelf judgment accepted neither the mandatory character of the equidistance method nor its application in specific cases.Google Scholar

79 In addition, even in the North Sea Continental Shelf judgment, which rejected the customary law character of the equidistance method, the Court had accepted the validity of the latter in the case of opposite coasts from the viewpoints of natural prolongation: ‘The continental shelf area off, and dividing, opposite States, can be claimed by each of them to be a natural prolongation of its territory. These prolongations meet and overlap, and can therefore only be delimited by means of a median line’, ICJ Reports (1969) 36, para 57.Google Scholar

80 In the Pierre, St and Miquelon, case, it was debatable whether the relationship of relevant coasts was opposite or adjacent. On this point, the Court of Arbitration held that the overall relationship was one of adjacency: the St Pierre and Miquelon case op cit, n 67, 1162, para 35.Google Scholar

81 In particular, this confrontation was clearly demonstrated by the two contrasting proposals made in Negotiating Group 7 (NG7) during the seventh session in 1978. One was based on equidistance as a general rule, and was presented by twenty States: ‘ l. The delimitation of the exclusive Economic Zone/Continental Shelf between adjacent or opposite States shall be effected by agreement employing, as a general principle, the median or equidistance line, taking into account any special circumstance where this is justified’, UN Doc NG 7/2, 20 Apr 1978, Platzoder, RThird United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Documents, vol IX (New YorkOceana 1986) 392–3.Google Scholar The other proposal relied on agreements concluded in accordance with equitable principles, and it was supported by twenty-seven States: ‘ l. The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between adjacent or/and opposite States shall be effected by agreement, in accordance with equitable principles taking into account all relevant circumstances and employing any methods, where appropriate, to lead to an equitable solution’, UN Doc NG 7/10, 1 May 1978, ibid 402. For the analysis of the legislative history of these provisions, see in particular, Nandan, SN and Rosenne, S (eds) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, A Commentary (Centre for Oceans Law and Policy, University of Virginia School of Law), vol II (DordrechtNijhoff 1993) 796–816; 948–85;Google ScholarCaflisch, L ‘Les zones maritimes sous juridiction nationale, leurs limites et leur delimitation’, in Bardonnet, D and Virally, M (eds) Le nouveau droit international de la mer (ParisPedone 1983) 92–6.Google Scholar

82 On this point, it should be noted that the confrontation between two groups was linked to another hard-core issue of peaceful settlement of disputes. The supporters of ‘equidistance’ were, as part of the package, in favour of establishing a compulsory, third-party system for the settlement of delimitation disputes. By contrast, the supporters of 'equitable principles' have generally rejected the idea of a compulsory judicial procedures.Adede, AOThe System for Settlement of Disputes under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (DordrechtNijhoff 1987) 182;Google ScholarIrwin, PC ‘Settlement of Maritime Boundary Dispute: An Analysis of the Law of the Sea Negotiations’ (1980) 8 ODIL 110.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

83 A/CONF.62/WP.11, Platzoder op cit n 81, vol IX, 474.Google Scholar

84 Doc A/CONF 62/L 78.Google Scholar

85 UNCLOS III, 17 Official Records 5Google Scholar

86 In fact, Judge Gros, in the Gulf of Maine case, called these provisions ‘an empty formula.’ Dissenting Opinion of Judge Gros, ICJ Reports (1984) 365, para 8. Furthermore, the Court of Arbitration in the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration stated that Arts 74 and 83 ‘were consciously designed to decide as little as possible.’ <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ERYE2chap5.htm>, para 116. See also Caflisch ‘The Delimitation of Marine Spaces between States with Opposite or Adjacent Coasts’, in Dupuy, R-J and Vignes, D (eds) A Handbook on the New Law of the Sea (DordrechtNijhoff 1991) 480.Google Scholar

87 It should be noted that the Arbitral Tribunal, in the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration (second phase), ruled that: ‘It is generally accepted view, as is evidenced in both the writings of commentators and in the jurisprudence, that between coasts that are opposite to each other the median or equidistance line normally provides an equitable boundary in accordance with the requirements of the Convention, and in particular those of its Arts 74 and 83 which respectively provide for the equitable delimitation of the EEZ and of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts.' The Eritrea/Yemen case (second phase) <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ERYE2chap5.htm>, para 131. It is suggested that the Tribunal of Arbitration considered that, so far as the maritime delimitation between States with opposite coasts is concerned, an equidistance line would provide an equitable maritime boundary under Arts 74 and 83 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Tanaka ‘Reflections on the Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration of 17 Dec 1999 (Second Phase: Maritime Delimitation)’ (2001) 48 NILR 200–1.,+para+131.+It+is+suggested+that+the+Tribunal+of+Arbitration+considered+that,+so+far+as+the+maritime+delimitation+between+States+with+opposite+coasts+is+concerned,+an+equidistance+line+would+provide+an+equitable+maritime+boundary+under+Arts+74+and+83+of+the+UN+Convention+on+the+Law+of+the+Sea.+Tanaka+‘Reflections+on+the+Eritrea/Yemen+Arbitration+of+17+Dec+1999+(Second+Phase:+Maritime+Delimitation)’+(2001)+48+NILR+200–1.>Google Scholar

88 Tanaka, op cit, n 77, 74–8.Google Scholar

89 At the same time, it should be recalled that, as early as 1977, the Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French Continental Shelf case held that the combined rule of ‘equidistance-special circumstances’ reflected the customary law of equitable principles, without distinguishing delimitation between opposite or adjacent coasts.Google Scholar

90 The Qatar/Bahrain case (Merits) op cit, n 75, para 231.Google Scholar

91 The delimitation of the contiguous zone was not at issue in the case law regarding maritime delimitations. Nor was it mentioned in the UN Convention text and, consequently, the rule applicable to the contiguous zone remains unclear. According to Caflisch, the possible solutions are: (1) to apply, by analogy, either Art 15 or Arts 74/83 of the UN Convention; (2) to resort to the equidistance method of Art 24 (3) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone; (3) allow for the joint exercise of the attributions provided for in Art 33 by the State concerned. Caflisch op cit n 86, 442–5. In the light of the close link between the contiguous zone and the territorial sea, Vukas favours the application of rule of territorial sea delimitation prescribed in Art 15 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.Vukas, B ‘The LOS Convention and Sea Boundary Delimitation’, in Vukas, B (ed) Essays on the New Law of the Sea (ZagrebSveucilisnanaklada Liber 1985) 163–4.Google Scholar On the other hand, Symonides advocates the application of Art 74 of the UN Convention where the economic zone and the contiguous zone are to be delimited. Symonides, J ‘Delimitation of Maritime Areas between the States with Opposite or Adjacent Coasts’ (1984) 13 PYIL 25.Google ScholarConsidering the assimilation between the law applicable to territorial sea delimitation and that applicable to the delimitation of continental shelf/EEZ, the same rule based on the corrective-equity approach will be applied to the delimitation of the contiguous zone where the States are not the parties to the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.Google Scholar

92 Tanaka op cit, n 77, 74–8.Google Scholar

93 See the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports (1969) 49, para 88; the Tunisia/Libya case, ICJ Reports (1982), 60, para 71; the Gulf of Maine case, ICJ Reports (1984).Google Scholar

94 Jennings, R ‘Equity and Equitable Principles’ (1986) 42 ASDI 29.Google ScholarSee also id ‘The Principles Governing Marine Boundaries’, in Stoat and Volkerrechtsordnung, Festschriftfiir Karl Doehring, (BerlinSpringer 1989) 401;Google ScholarHiggins, RProblem and Process: International Law and How We Use It (OxfordClarendon Press 1994) 228;Google ScholarMiyoshi, MConsiderations of Equity in the Settlement of Territorial and Boundary Disputes (DordrechtNijhoff 1993) 192.Google Scholar

95 On this point, the argument of Malta in the Libya/Malta case is worth noting. In its Counter-Memorial, Malta mentioned that ‘an excessive individualisation of the rule of law, which changes from one case to another, would be incompatible with the very concept of law. Every legal rule presupposes a minimum of generality. A rule which is elaborated on a case by case basis rests on the discretionary power of the judge, on conciliation, on distributive justice—in brief, on ex aequo et bono.’ The Libya/Malta case, Pleadings, vol II, p 293, para 111. Furthermore, in the article published in 1976, Akehurst stated that: ‘Although it is desirable that rules of law should be just, it is perhaps even more desirable that they should be certain, clear and predictable’,Akehurst, ‘Equity and General Principles of Law’ (1976) 25 ICLQ 809.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

96 The Libya/Malta case, ICJ Reports (1985) 39, para 45.Google Scholar

97 Bedjaoui expressly states that: ‘Us [les principes equitables] ne constituent pas une forme d'equite autonome, independante de la regie de droit et substituable a celle-ci, mais bien une equite correctrice intervenant de maniere endogene pour eviter que la regie de droit n'aboutisse a un resultat inequitable dans son application a un cas concret', Bedjaoui op cit, n 78, 384. More generally, Charles De Visscher considered the function of equity as corrective and supplementary. He mentioned that: ‘[l]a fonction de l'equite apprait tantot comme correctrice, tantot comme suppletive de la regie de droit. Correctrice, elle peut se limiter a une attitude general e d'application du droit positif dans un esprit liberal. Suppletive, elle remplit dans des cas individuels la fonction de completer la reglementation positive’, De Visscher op cit, n 53, 5–6.Google Scholar

98 ICJ Reports (1985) 35, para 39.Google Scholar

99 Ibid, pp 46–7, para 61.

100 Ibid, p 34, para 34.

101 Weil is the principal writer advancing this view: ‘[l[[[]a delimitation ne peut pas etre compriseen dehors du titre; elle est fille du titre.’ Op cit n 1, 53. Weil concludes that: ‘tous les cheminsconvergent en definitive vers l'equidistance.’ Ibid p 86. Lucchini and Voelckel take the same viewby saying that: ‘[l]e titre est, en effet, l'element fondamental de base. La delimitation ne peut avoirlieu qu'a partir de lui et en s'appuyant sur lui.’ Op cit, n 1, 211.Google Scholar

102 Speech by He judge Guillaume, Gilbert, President of the International Court of Justice, tothe Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 31 Oct 2001, 10.Google Scholar

103 Art 59 provides that: ‘The decision of the Court has no binding force except between theparties and in respect of that particular case.’Google Scholar

104 Argument by Mr N'Fube, Agent and counsel of Equatorial Guinea, Verbatim Record, CR2002/21, 19, para 5; argument by Professor P-M. Dupuy, counsel of Equatorial Guinea, ibid 52, para 4; argument by Colson, counsel of Equatorial Guinea, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/24, 38, para 30.Google Scholar

105 Written Statement of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, 4 April, 2001, 2, para 6.Google Scholar

106 Ibid, 15–19.

107 Argument by P-M Dupuy, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/21,59, para 16. see also ibid 61, para 22.

108 Written Statement of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, 4 April, 2001, 10, para 25.see alsoVerbatim of Equatorial Guinea, 4 Apr 2001, 10, para25. see also arument by Mr N'Fube, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/21, 26–8, paras 2.Google Scholar

109 Written Statement of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, 4 Apr, 2001, 16–17, paras 38–40.Google Scholar

110 Ibid 18, paras 44–5. According to P-M Dupuy, Counsel of Equatorial Guinea, ‘il n'y a pasplusieurs facon mais un seul moyen de ne pas oberer les droits du tiers, c'est de ne pas se pronon-cer sur des conclusions qui les remittent directement en cause’, argument by Professor P-MDupuy, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/24, 30, para 27.

111 Observations ecrites de la republique du Cameroun, 4 juillet 2001, 8, paras 17–18;13, para38. The overlapped zone is an area fixed with the points H”-I-I’-vi.Google Scholar See ibid carte No 2. (In otherparts, Cameroon said that the area was 34 square kilometres.) On this point, however, EquatorialGuinea considered that this was not an area of overlap of anything relating to Cameroon since thisarea would belong to Nigeria in Cameroon's scheme. Argument by Mr Colson, Counsel forEquatorial Guinea, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/21, 34–6, paras 15–22; argument by P-M Dupuy, Counsel of Equatorial Guinea, 52, para 2. Later, Cameroon accepted the argument of EquatorialGuinea on this matter. Argument by Professor Mendelson, Counsel of Cameroon, VerbatimRecord, CR 2002/22, 51, para 14.

112 Observations ecrites de la republique du Cameroun, 4 juillet 2001, 9, para 21; 27, para 85;argument of Professor Pellet, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/25, 26, para 26.Google Scholar

113 Observations ecrites de la republique du Cameroun, 4 juillet 2001,11, para 29.Google Scholar

114 Memorial of Cameroon, 546, para 5.100.Google Scholar

115 Observations ecrites de la republique du Cameroun, 4 juillet 2001, 16–17, para 50; 30, para 95. See also argument by Professor Pellet, , Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/22, 18–27, paras 1–27; argument by Professor Pellet, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/25, 19–28, paras1–32; argument by Professor Kamto, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/25,28–34, paras 1–26 (in particular, 34, paras 24–5.); argument by Professor Kamto, VerbatimRecord, CR 2002/7, 33, para 48; Replique de la Republique du Cameroun, Livre I, 4 avril 2000,440–53, paras 9.118–9.153.Google Scholar

116 Observations of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on the Written Statement of the Republicof Equatorial Guinea, July 2001, 4–5, paras 8–9.Google Scholar

117 Ibid. Judgment op cit, n 2, 114, para 229; argument by Professor George Abi-Saab, Counselof Nigeria, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/23, 22–3, paras 21–3.

118 Judgment op cit, n 2, 117, para 238.Google Scholar

119 The Court's view is not necessarily a new one. Some members of the Court had alreadyexpressed the similar opinion. For instance, Judge Jennings stated in the Libya/Malta case of 1984that: ‘[T]he slightest acquaintance with the jurisprudence of this Court shows that Art 59 does byno manner of means exclude the force of persuasive precedent. So the idea that Art 59 is protec-tive of third States’ interests in this sense at least is illusory’, Dissenting Opinion of JudgeJennings, ICJ Reports (1984) 157, para 27. See also 158–60, paras 28–34. In the same case, JudgeOda also stated that: ‘I would simply say that what the Court states regarding Art 59 does notlessen the concern of the third State, particularly where a right erga omnes is at issue between theoriginal litigants’, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oda, ibid 94, para 9. See also Dissenting Opinionof Judge Schwebel, 134, paras 9–10; Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sette-Camara, ibid 87, para 81.

120 ICJ Reports (1984) 26, para 42.Google Scholar

121 ibid 26, para 42.

122 ICJ Reports (1986) 577, para 46.Google Scholar

123 ICJ Reports (1986) 576–80, paras 44–50. The Court confirmed this view in the caseconcerning the territorial disputes between Libya and Chad. ICJ Reports (1994) 33, para 63.Google Scholar

124 ICJ Reports (1986) 578, para 47.Google Scholar

125 ibid, at 117, para 238.

126 The Court of Arbitration held that: ‘The Court's decision, it scarcely needs to be said, willbe binding only as between the Parties to the present arbitration and will neither be binding uponnor create any rights or obligations for any third State, and in particular for the Republic ofIreland, for which the Decision will be res inter olios acta’. The Anglo-French Continental Shelfcase, United Nations op cit, n 68, 27, para 28.Google Scholar

127 ICJ Reports (1982) 42, para 33.Google Scholar

128 ICJ Reports (1985) 26, paras 21–2.Google Scholar

129 ibid, para 22.

130 The Qatar/Bahrain case (Merits) op cit, n 75, paras 221 and 249. In addition, the Court ofArbitration in the Eritrea/Yemen dispute (second phase) of 1999 simply cut off the line so as notto involve the rights of third States <http://www.pca-capa.org/ERYE2chap5.htm>, paras 136,164, and 46. See also Merrills op cit, n 2, 796,+paras+136,164,+and+46.+See+also+Merrills+op+cit,+n+2,+796>Google Scholar

131 Argument by Professor Abi-Saab, George, Counsel of Nigeria, Verbatim Record, CR2002/23, 18, paras 3–4. Dupuy Counsel of Equatorial Guinea, used the words ‘l'effet indirect dechose jugee’. Argument by Professor P-M Dupuy, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/24, 19, para 2.Google Scholar

132 Argument by Mr Colson, , Counsel of Equatorial Guinea, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/24, 37, para 26.Google Scholar

133 ICJ Reports (1969) 22, para 19.Google Scholar

134 As an example, the result of a proportionality test will be changeable depending on thefuture delimitation between a party/parties and third State(s).Google Scholar

135 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, ICJ Reports (1985) 177.Google Scholar

136 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Mosler, ibid 117.

137 Argument by Professor George Abi-Saab, Counsel of Nigeria, Verbatim Record CR2002/23, 22–3, para 21.Google Scholar

138 Bowett, D ‘Islands, Rocks, Reefs and Low-Tide Elevations’, in JI Charney and LMAlexander International Maritime Boundaries, vol 1 (The HagueNijhoff 1993) 150;Google ScholarLucchini and Vœoelckel op cit, n 1, 170.Google Scholar

139 On this point, see in particular, Bardonnet, D ‘Frontiere terrestres et frontiers maritimes’ (1989) 35 AFDI 6–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

140 See also the Tunisia/Libya case, ICJ Reports (1982) 64, para 81.Google Scholar

141 Judgment op cit, n 2, 21, para 26, (c).Google Scholar

142 ibid, p 122, para 255.

143 ibid, p 124, para 261. Regarding a summary of the judgment relating to land disputes, seeMerrills op cit, n 2, 789–92.

144 Argument by Professor Crawford, , Counsel of Nigeria, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/12, 62, para 13.Google Scholar

145 ibid pp 62–4, paras 14–19. Crawford stated: ‘There was a clear acceptance by the twoParties that there was a de facto maritime border in the area, even though there was a dispute overthe Bakassi Peninsula itself.’ Argument by Professor Crawford, Counsel of Nigeria, VerbatimRecord, CR 2002/13, 26, para 31. See also Counter-Memorial of Nigeria, vol I, 613, para 23.18;Rejoinder of Nigeria, para 9.15.

146 The Court briefly stated that: ‘Since the Court has already found that sovereignty over theBakassi Peninsula lies with Cameroon and not with Nigeria [...], it is unnecessary to deal anyfurther with this argument of Nigeria’, Judgment op cit, n 2, 122, para 255. See also argument byProfessor Kamto, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/5, 66, para 43; argument by Sir Ian Sinclair, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/17, 41–3, paras 23–8.Google Scholar

147 Judgment op cit, n 2, 148, para 325, III (B).Google Scholar

148 ibid 149–50, para 325, IV (B) (C).

149 Judge Ajibola explained that ‘I considered the Court's decision to effect delimitation in the area beyond point ‘G’ to be just and valid, hence I voted in favour of the Court's decision’, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ajibola, para 172. Yet it is arguable that the location of maritimeboundary would be different if the Bakassi Peninsula were Nigeria's territory.Google Scholar

150 Judgment op cit, n 2, 105, para 210; Memorial of Cameroon, 502, para 5.14.Google Scholar

151 Reply of Cameroon, 350, para 7.23. Yet Nigeria disagrees on this point. Argument by Professor Brownlie, , Counsel of Nigeria, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/9, 37, para 101; rejoinder of Nigeria, Part I ch 3, para 3.20.Google Scholar

152 Judgment op cit, n2, 112, para 223. In the authentic text of the judgment in French, the sameparagraph stated that: ‘Le Cameroun et le Nigeria ont participée aux néegotiations qui, entre 1971et 1975, devaient deboucher sur les declarations de Yaoundée, Kano et Maroua, et qui portaient surune ligne maritime dont' il éetait clair qu'elle supposait Vexistence d'un titre camerounais surBakassi’ (emphasis added).Google Scholar

153 On 7 Nov 2002, Nigeria made a statement with respect to the judgment by the Court. In thestatement, Nigeria stated that: ‘Nigeria will do everything possible to maintain peace in Bakassior any other part of the border with Cameroon and will continue to avail itself of the good officeof the Secretary-General of the United Nations and other well-meaning leaders of the Internationalcommunity to achieve peace and to maintain harmony and good neighbourliness’, Nigeria'sReaction to the Judgment of the International Court of Justice at The Hague (Nigeria, Cameroonwith Equatorial Guinea Intervening). The text is available on the website of the Embassy of theFederal Republic of Nigeria <http://www.nigeriaembassyusa.org/findex.html>>Google Scholar