Simulated worlds, physical eschatology, the finite nature hypothesis and the final anthropic principle

Abstract

Meaning and purpose can be given to life, consciousness, the laws of physics, etc. If one assumes that the Universe is endowed with some form of (strong) anthropic principle. In particular, the final anthropic principle (FAP) of Barrow and Tipler postulates that intelligent life will continue in the Universe until the far future when the computational power of descendent civilizations will be sufficient to run simulations of enormous scale and power. Tipler has claimed that it will be possible to create simulations with rendered environments and inhabitants, i.e. intelligent software constructs, which are effectively ‘people’. Proponents of this FAP claim that if both substrate independence and the pattern identity postulate hold, then these simulations would be able to contain reanimated individuals that once lived. These claims have been heavily criticized but the growing study of physical eschatology, initiated by Freeman Dyson in a seminal work, and the developments in computational theory have made some progress in showing that simulations containing intelligent information processing software constructs, which may be conscious, are not only feasible but may be a reality within the next few centuries. In this work, arguments and conservative calculations are given which concur with these latter more minimal claims. FAP-type simulations inevitably rely on cosmology type, but current observations would seem to rule appropriate models out. However, it is argued that dark energy, described in the recent forms of ‘quintessence’ cosmological models may show the current conclusions from observations to be too presumptive. In this paper some relevant physical and cosmological aspects are reviewed in the light of the recent propositions regarding the plausibility of certain simulations given by Bostrom, and the longer held postulate of finite nature – due to Fredkin – which has grown in credibility, following advances in quantum mechanics and the computational theory of cellular automata. This latter postulate supports the conclusions of Bostrom, which, under certain plausible assumptions, can imply that our Universe is itself already a simulated entity. It is demonstrated in this paper how atemporal memory connections could make efficient ancestor simulations possible, solving many of the objections faced by the FAP of Barrow and Tipler. Also, if finite nature is true then it can offer a similar vindication to this FAP. Indeed the conclusions of this postulate can be realized more easily, but only if the existence of life within the simulation/Universe is not merely incidental to the (currently unknown) purpose for which it was generated to fulfil.