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Determinism, neuroscience and responsibility

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 February 2007

James Grant
James Grant*
Affiliation:
Senior Lecturer in Law, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa
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Abstract

Fears that new scientific advances on the mind and the brain which establish that behaviour is determined by causes in one’s mind/brain and/or various past and present internal and external environments will undermine the attribution of legal responsibility are misplaced. Taking responsibility to inhere where conduct reflects upon an individual and where, properly understood, the individual could have done otherwise, determinism, operating in the right sort of way, should be embraced as a condition for responsibility.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Journal of Law in Context , Volume 2 , Issue 3 , September 2006 , pp. 221 - 231
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2006

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