Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 May 2010
Is there a stable set of practices or assumptions surrounding dignity, and would these necessarily denote a single foundation sustaining that stability? Two contemporary debates offer contrasting approaches to these questions. In the first, two jurists, who share agreement over the appearances of dignity in post-1945 jurisprudence, disagree as to whether these appearances form an emerging ius commune or a contingent set of conceptions. The second, comparative, debate explores the functional consequences of dignity’s aristocratic resonances. One position posits a continuing relationship between dignity and aristocratic nobility; the other, a functional division between dignity-within-aristocracy and dignity-within-democracy. This article insists that clarification of these debates depends upon a distinction between the epistemology and ontology of dignity, and, further, a distinction between dignity’s genealogy and its grammar. It concludes that a complex genealogical inheritance is at the heart of much disagreement, and that attention to dignity’s use clarifies its deficiencies and its continuing appeal.