Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 February 2019
In today's increasingly interdependent global society, international institutions formerly committed to operating as insular systems recognizing only states as legitimate participants have come under pressure to open their processes to public view and participation. The World Trade Organization (WTO) in particular has been widely criticized for its lack of transparency and democratic participation. Nowhere has this criticism been more prevalent than in the arena of dispute settlement. The controversy over the acceptance of amicus briefs at the WTO reflects the tensions among WTO members and non-members concerning greater public access to dispute settlement proceedings. This battle has been fought primarily through the Appellate Body and its important series of decisions on amicus briefs.
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