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Judging the Judges: The State of Judicial Reform in Eastern Europe on the Eve of Accession

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2019

Hollin K. Dickerson
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Extract

On May 1, 2004, ten new countries joined the European Union (EU), bringing the number of members from fifteen to a total of twenty-five. This expansion was the largest expansion ever undertaken by the EU, raising serious questions regarding the integration of different cultures, economies, political systems, and legal regimes into a very Westernized EU. These issues are further complicated by the fact that eight of the ten accession countries, namely Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, are all Eastern European nations that have only been independent states since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. Still coping with the transition from socialism to capitalism and from oppression to democracy, each of these nations encountered unique challenges as they approached the date of formal EU accession.

Type
Articles
Information
International Journal of Legal Information , Volume 32 , Issue 3 , Winter 2004 , pp. 539 - 581
Copyright
Copyright © 2004 by the International Association of Law Libraries. 

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215 The examination is prepared by the Court's Department of the Ministry of Justice and lacks a written component and assessment of legal reasoning and writing skills. The OSI notes that there appear to be no grading criteria or procedures. Id. at 126-127.Google Scholar

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227 Courts Act, supra note 149, at Chapter 7 §55; Under Article 19 of the Act on State President's Office, the President can only refuse an appointment if it would violate a law or harm State interest; OSI 2002, supra note 53, at 98 n.9.Google Scholar

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245 Id. at 191, note 7. Gajdúsek v. Slovakia [ECHR 400058/98, 18 Dec. 2001]. In this case, the court found a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, the right to a fair trial and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.Google Scholar

246 OSI 2002, supra note 53, at 190.Google Scholar

247 Id.Google Scholar

248 Commission of the European Communities, “2003 Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Slovakia's Preparations for Membership 12” (2003), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/cmr_sk_final.pdf [hereinafter Slovakia 2003].Google Scholar

249 Id. at 191.Google Scholar

250 Latvia 2002, supra note 89, at 22-23.Google Scholar

251 Id.Google Scholar

252 Waters, , supra note 170.Google Scholar

253 Id. at 24.Google Scholar

254 Slovakia 2003, supra note 248.Google Scholar

255 OSI 2002, supra note 53, at 196.Google Scholar

256 Id. at 197.Google Scholar

257 Slovakian Act on the Judicial Council, Art. 4; OSI 2002, supra note 57, at 197.Google Scholar

258 Estonia 2003, supra note 157.Google Scholar

259 Hungarian Judicial System, supra note 221.Google Scholar

260 Id, OSI 2001, supra note 5, at 208 n. 90.Google Scholar

261 Latvia 2003, supra note 193 at 13.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

262 Id.Google Scholar

263 Id.Google Scholar

264 Courts Act, supra note 149, Chapter 10, §75; OSI 2001, supra note 5, at 170.Google Scholar

265 See OSI 2001, supra note 5, at 46.Google Scholar

266 Id. at 49.Google Scholar

267 See Generally OSI 2001, supra note 5, at 51-53.Google Scholar

268 The EU Regular Report for 2003 stated that “[t]he new government recognized the need for the reform of the judiciary as a priority, and some steps have been taken to strengthen the effectiveness and independence of the judicial system. …” Latvia 2003, supra note 193, at 12.Google Scholar

269 See generally Ajani, Gianmaria “By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia and Eastern Europe,” 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 43 (1995): 2.Google Scholar

270 OSI 2001, supra note 5, at 66.Google Scholar

271 Vachudova, Milada Anna supra note 32, at 65.Google Scholar

272 OSI 2001, supra note 5, at 31.Google Scholar