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1958 RECONSIDERED: STATE FORMATION AND THE COLD WAR IN THE EARLY POSTCOLONIAL ARAB MIDDLE EAST

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 July 2013

Cyrus Schayegh
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Abstract

Using Arabic, English, and French sources, and engaging Middle East and Cold War historians, this article makes a threefold argument. First, in United Arab Republic (UAR)–Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, the 1958–59 explosion of domestic and regional tensions triggered state-formation surges. Second, these formed one process, which made those states more alike, with state-led socioeconomic planning playing a key role. Third, that process partook of a global Third World trend intersecting with the early Cold War. I draw three conclusions. Although existing scholarly readings that the events of 1958–59 in the Arab Middle East formed a crisis but not an ideological or political watershed are correct, from the viewpoint of state formation this crisis was a milestone. Moreover, UAR–Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon had persisting affinities and shared regional positions—notably, the fact that all were sandwiched between the unstable poles of the Arab state system, Iraq and Egypt—that shaped their individual postindependence histories of state formation. Last, Washington's low-profile involvement in this state-formation surge illustrates how domestic sociopolitics and regional geopolitics—including the UAR's peaking popularity and influence in 1958–59—affected U.S. policy in the Cold War postcolonial world.

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International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 45 , Issue 3 , August 2013 , pp. 421 - 443
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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References

NOTES

Author's note: I thank Naghmeh Sohrabi as well as Andrew Arsan, Michael Cook, Ellen Fleischmann, Roger Owen, and Bob Vitalis for their comments on various drafts. Four IJMES referees asked incisive questions, as did IJMES editors Beth Baron and Sara Pursley, who also polished my prose. This article is a spin-off product of my current book project, Lands of Sham: A Transnational History of the Middle East, 1850–1950.

1 This insecurity crystallized in the mid-1940s. On its high “level of interaction” across the region, see Gerges, Fawaz, The Superpowers and the Middle East (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), 9Google Scholar. See also Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce, The Crystallization of the Arab State System, 1945–1954 (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1993)Google Scholar.

2 Podeh, Elie, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World (Leiden: Brill, 1995)Google Scholar.

3 Podeh, Quest, chaps. 6–8, 10; Kalawoun, Nasser, The Struggle for Lebanon (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 41–72Google Scholar.

4 Rathmell, Andrew, “Syria's Intelligence Services: Origins and Development,” Journal of Conflict Studies 16 (1996): 77Google Scholar; idem, Secret War in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995), 146Google Scholar; Drysdale, Alasdair, “Transboundary Interaction and Political Conflict in the Central Middle East,” in The Middle East and North Africa, ed. Schofield, Clive and Schofield, Richard (London: Routledge, 1994), 22–29Google Scholar.

5 For an overview, see Owen, Roger and Louis, Roger, eds., A Revolutionary Year: The Middle East in 1958 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002)Google Scholar. For a recent study of effects on U.S. policy, see Popp, Roland, “‘Accommodating to a Working Relationship’: Arab Nationalism and US Cold War Policies in the Middle East, 1958–60,” Cold War History 10 (2010): 397–427CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For regional perspectives, see Roger Owen, “Conclusion,” in Owen and Louis, A Revolutionary Year, 294, 299; and Khalidi, Rashid, “The Impact of the Iraqi Revolution on the Arab World,” in The Iraqi Revolution of 1958, ed. Fernea, Robert and Louis, Roger (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), 106–17Google Scholar. See also Blackwell, Stephen, British Military Intervention and the Struggle for Jordan (London: Routledge, 2009)Google Scholar; Gendzier, Irene, Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945–1958 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997)Google Scholar; Kerr, Malcolm, The Arab Cold War (London: Oxford University Press, 1965)Google Scholar; Jankowski, James, Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism and the United Arab Republic (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 101–60Google Scholar; and Dann, Uriel, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Nationalism, 1955–1967 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 78–98Google Scholar.

6 Kerr, Arab Cold War; Owen, “Conclusion,” 299; Albert Hourani, “Foreword,” in Fernea and Louis, Iraqi Revolution, viii.

7 Egypt and Iraq had started to expand their state apparatuses earlier, for domestic reasons and to strengthen their regional position. See Adil Agha, “Economic Planning in Iraq, 1951–1968” (PhD diss., Claremont University, 1971), 20, 22, 28; and Owen, State, Power and Politics, 24. Hence, 1958–59 was somewhat less of a milestone for their state apparatuses. But no doubt they, too, expanded; on Iraq, see Owen, Roger, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (London: Routledge, 2004), 25Google Scholar; on Egypt, whose first “comprehensive” plan was that of 1960–65, see Hansen, Bent, “Planning and Economic Growth in the UAR (Egypt), 1960–5,” in Egypt since the Revolution, ed. Vatikiotis, P. J. (London: George Allen, 1968), 19Google Scholar.

8 For that view, see Ayubi, Nazih, Over-stating the Arab State (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995), 291, 310Google Scholar; Jabbra, Joseph, “Bureaucracy and Development in the Arab World,” in Bureaucracy and Development in the Arab World, ed. Jabbra, (Leiden: Brill, 1989), 1–3Google Scholar; and Owen, State, Power and Politics, 23–31.

9 This has implications for periodization, highlighting that Middle Eastern historians’ favorite turning points—for example, 1918, 1948, 1952, 1967, 1979, 2001—focus on territorial and/or ideological change, which is sometimes linked to regime change. Such periodizations usefully encapsulate the region's ideological landscape and instability. But they also illustrate that although we Middle Eastern historians often “tell” our readers that the region is not really extraordinary, with some exceptions (e.g., Gelvin, James, The Modern Middle East [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011], 300–306, 223–24Google Scholar) we do not yet consistently “show” its global contexts.

10 This is how historians of these countries have often seen them. See Jankowski, Nasser's Egypt, 101–60; Madani, Sulayman, Suriya fi Zill al-Wahda (Beirut: Dar al-Yusuf, 1996Google Scholar); Robins, Philip, A History of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 102–14Google Scholar; Susser, Asher, On Both Banks of the Jordan (Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 1994)Google Scholar; Traboulsi, Fawwaz, History of Modern Lebanon (London: Pluto, 2007), 138–55Google Scholar; and Malsagne, Stéphane, Fouad Chéhab (Paris: Karthala, 2011)Google Scholar.

11 Another was security apparatus expansion. See Tal, Lawrence, Politics, the Military, and National Security in Jordan, 1955–1967 (London: Palgrave, 2002), 67CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nasif, Niqula, al-Maktab al-Thani (Zalqa, Lebanon: Mukhtarat, 2005), 44–65Google Scholar; Rathmell, “Syria's Intelligence Services,” 77; and Caroz, Yaacov, The Arab Secret Service (London: Corgi, 1978), 10, 87–89, 254Google Scholar.

12 Earlier attempts were toothless. On Syria's 1956 freezing of its timid 1955 economic plan, see Muwaffak Challah, “Economic Development and Planning in Syria, 1950–1962” (PhD diss., University of Oklahoma, 1965), 66–95; on Lebanon's “powerless” Development Board (founded in 1953) and Planning Ministry (1955), Corm, Georges, Politique économique et planification au Liban (Beirut: Universelle, 1964), 11Google Scholar; on how the Jordan Development Board (1952) did not function as a planning board, Tesdell, Loren, “Planning for Technical Assistance: Iraq and Jordan,” Middle East Journal 15:4 (1961): 391, 400Google Scholar. Arab planning has been studied by economic specialists who mostly neglect sociopolitics; see Nimrod Raphaeli, “Development Planning in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon and the U.A.R.” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 1965); Sharayha, Wadiʿ, al-Tanmiya al-Iqtisadiyya fi al-Urdunn (Cairo: al-Nahda al-Jadida, 1968), 45–54Google Scholar; Mazur, Michael, Economic Growth and Development in Jordan (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1979), 243–72Google Scholar; Keilany, Ziad, “Economic Planning in Syria, 1960–1965,” Journal of Developing Areas 4 (1970): 361–74Google Scholar; Hansen, “Planning”; and Wilson, Rodney, “Development Planning in the Middle East,” Conflict Studies 156 (1983): 1–20Google Scholar. Exceptions are Corm, Politique; and, partly, Issawi, Charles, “Economic Development and Liberalism in Lebanon,” Middle East Journal 18 (1964): 279–92Google Scholar.

13 This is an old insight. Scholars of state formation have highlighted the role of interstate relations, such as when probing Charles Tilly's argument that in premodern Europe (and possibly elsewhere), war made states, that is, those state types survived that organized for endemic warfare. See Tilly, Charles, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Evans, Peter (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Vu, Tuong, “Studying the State through State Formation,” World Politics 62 (2010): 148–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Examples include Ertman, Thomas, Birth of the Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Reynolds, Michael, Shattering Empires (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Mufti, Malik, Sovereign Creations (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996)Google Scholar.

14 Engerman, David, “The Romance of Economic Development,” Diplomatic History 28 (2004): 31CrossRefGoogle Scholar, quoting Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama (1967), 2:711.

15 For both points, see Engerman, “Romance,” 23–24. For U.S. support of planning, see, on economists, Ekbladh, David, The Great American Mission (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010), 163–64Google Scholar; and, on government, Maxfield, Sylvia and Nold, James, “Protectionism and the Internationalization of Capital,” International Studies Quarterly 34 (1990): 49–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On planning's supra-ideological nature, see Döring-Menteuffel, Anselm, “Ordnung jenseits der politischen Systeme: Planung im 20. Jahrhundert,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 34 (2008): 398–406CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16 Owen, State, Power and Politics, 23; Gelvin, Modern Middle East, 225–26.

17 Döring-Menteuffel, “Ordnung”; van Laak, Dirk, “Planung. Geschichte und Gegenwart des Vorgriffs auf die Zukunft,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 34 (2008): 305–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Eckert, Andreas, “‘We Are All Planners Now.’ Planung und Dekolonisation in Afrika,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 34 (2008): 375–97CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Engerman, David and Unger, Corinna, “Towards a Global History of Modernization,” Diplomatic History 33 (2009): 375–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Latham, Michael, The Right Kind of Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2011)Google Scholar.

18 UAR–Syria's planners hired at least one economist, Muhammad Diab, from the American University of Beirut. See Diab, Muhammad, “The First Five Year Plan of Syria—An Appraisal,” Middle East Economic Papers (1960): 13Google Scholar. But they did not ask for outside help. On how the big U.S. NGOs were not simply U.S. government “handmaidens,” see Unger, Corinna, “Towards Global Equilibrium: American Foundations and Indian Modernization,” Journal of Global History 6 (2011): 121CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Still, they were systemically interwoven with the U.S. state; see Parmar, Inderjeet, Foundations of the American Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 1–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 Popp, “Accommodating,” 397, 400.

20 National Security Council report 5820/1, Washington, 4 November 1958, points 4, 12, document 51, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS] (1958–1960) vol. XII. See also n. 110. This argument feeds into a growing literature on the Cold War in the Third World. Odd Arne Westad has shown how crucial an arena the Third World was for the Cold War, and how important development concepts were for Washington and Moscow's battles there. See Arne Westad, Odd, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)Google Scholar; Duara, Prasenjit, “The Cold War as a Historical Period,” Journal of Global History 6 (2011): 457–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Smith, Tony, “New Bottles for New Wine,” Diplomatic History 24 (2000): 567–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Similarly, historians are illustrating how momentous not only First and Second World policy but also Third World actors were in shaping that arena, taking seriously regional particularities and developing our understanding of how broad processes like decolonization overlapped with the Cold War. See Bradley, Mark, “Decolonization, the Global South, and the Cold War, 1919–1962,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, ed. Westad, Odd Arne and Leffler, Melvyn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1:464–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Statler, Kathryn and Johns, Andrew, eds., The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War (Lanham, Md.: Rowman, 2006)Google Scholar. For the Middle East, see Citino, Nathan, From Arab Nationalism to OPEC (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2002)Google Scholar; Yaqub, Salim, Containing Arab Nationalism (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2004)Google Scholar; and Hahn, Peter, Caught in the Middle East (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2006)Google Scholar. As Westad states, historians “who are not primarily preoccupied with studying the Cold War (or its immediate effects) will help develop patterns for how the different segments of twentieth-century international history can be put together in ways that incorporate the Cold War but do not attempt to subsume all other incongruities under it.” Westad, Odd Arne, “The Cold War and the International History of the Twentieth Century,” in Westad and Leffler, The Cambridge History of the Cold War, 1:8Google Scholar.

21 On how the East Ghor agricultural project was largely financed by the U.S. Agency for International Development, see Sutcliffe, Claud, “The East Ghor Canal Project,” Middle East Journal 27 (1973): 471Google Scholar. On how U.S. funding for Jordan rose, see Tal, Politics, the Military, and Natinal Security, 69, 75. On Lebanon, see n. 150.

22 Latham, Michael, Modernization as Ideology (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2000)Google Scholar; Blaufarb, Douglas, The Counterinsurgency Era (New York: Free Press, 1977)Google Scholar; McMahon, Robert, “US National Security Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy,” in Westad and Leffler, The Cambridge History of the Cold War, 1:288–311Google Scholar. The U.S. government presence in Latin America and especially southeast Asia was incomparably more massive (and open), though Washington also supported certain Arab counterinsurgency programs; see, for example, Matthews, Weldon, “The Kennedy Administration, Counterinsurgency, and Iraq's First Baʿthist Regime,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 43 (2011): 635–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23 Syria's Baʿth party launched “social structural transformation(s)” and its “struggle with the opposition [w]as reflective of the wider conflict [with] . . . agrarian oligarchies.” Hinnebusch, Raymond, “Modern Syrian Politics,” History Compass 6 (2008): 268CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In Lebanon, “the social distribution of revenues . . . gradually became more even” in the 1960s and early 1970s; see Labaki, Boutros, “L’économie politique du Liban indépendant, 1943–1975,” in Lebanon, ed. Shehadi, Nadim and Haffar Mills, Dana (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988), 167, 174–76Google Scholar. In Jordan, “plans for economic and social development” faced high population growth and the limits of what a still patrimonial elite around King Husayn was willing to accept. Kingston, Paul, “Rationalizing Patrimonialism,” in The Resilience of the Hashemite Rule, ed. Tell, Tariq (Beirut: CERMOC, 2001), 115–44Google Scholar. Even so, those plans “resulted in better standard of living.” Shihan, Muhammad, Development Bureaucracy in Jordan (Amman: al-Hamid, 1999), 14Google Scholar. On expansions in public health action from 1960 to 1966 and educational projects from 1959 to 1969, see U.S. Department of Labor (hereafter USDL), Labor Law and Practice in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Washington, D.C.: USDL, 1967), 14–15Google Scholar; and Sharayha, al-Tanmiya, 163.

24 al-Khazen, Farid, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967–1976 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000Google Scholar). In Jordan, from 1967 to 1970 the “fragile” economy “suffered serious damage, as development projects were halted and ordinary enterprise . . . came to a virtual standstill in almost every field.” Salibi, Kamal, The Modern History of Jordan (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993), 244Google Scholar.

25 On public sector growth after 1960, see Shair, Khaled, Planning for a Middle Eastern Economy: Model for Syria (London: Chapman, 1965), 13Google Scholar. On planning, see al-Takhtit, Wizarat, The Second Five-Years Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1966–1970 (Damascus: Centre d’études et de documentation, 1965)Google Scholar; and ʿAbd al-Daʾim, ʿAbdallah, al-Takhtit al-Ishtiraki (Damascus: Wizarat al-Thaqafa, 1965), 39–47, 79–98Google Scholar.

26 Hinnebusch, Raymond, Syria: Revolution from Above (London: Routledge, 2001)Google Scholar; Heydemann, Steven, Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999)Google Scholar; Waldner, David, State-Building and Late Development: Turkey, Syria, Korea and Taiwan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999)Google Scholar; Longuenesse, Elisabeth, “The Class Nature of the State in Syria,” MERIP Reports 9, no. 4 (1979): 3–11CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

27 ʿAbduh, Samir, Dirasa fi al-Biruqratiyya al-Suriyya (Damascus: Dar Dimashq li-l-Tibaʿa wa-l-Nashr, 1972), 32–33Google Scholar; Hinnebusch, Raymond, Peasant and Bureaucracy in Ba'athist Syria (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), 1–15Google Scholar.

28 Susser, On Both Banks; Abdel-Rahman Sabbah, “Entwicklungsverwaltung in Jordanien” (PhD diss., Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, 1975), 53–62, 67–96.

29 In 1963–64, the original plan was revised and extended to cover 1963–70. Mazur, Economic Growth, 246, 243. See also, for example, Jordan Development Board (JDB), Seven Year Program for Economic Development (Amman: JDB, 1964)Google Scholar; National Planning Council (NPC), Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (Amman: NPC, 1981Google Scholar); and Yusuf ʿAbd al-Haqq, al-Takhtit wa-l-Tanmiya al-Iqtisadiyya fi al-Urdunn (n.p., 1979).

30 Gottheil, Fred, “Iraqi and Syrian Socialism: An Economic Appraisal,” World Development 9 (1981): 835Google Scholar.

31 Naqib, Khalil, Biruqratiyya wa-Inmaʾ (Beirut: Maʿhad al-Inmaʾ al-ʿArabi, 1976Google Scholar); Salem, Elie, Modernization without Revolution (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1973Google Scholar); Bashir, Iskandar, Planned Administrative Change in Lebanon (Beirut: American University of Beirut Press, 1965Google Scholar).

32 Endres, Jürgen, Wirtschaftliches Handeln im Krieg. Zur Persistenz des Milizsystems im Libanon (1975–1990) (Wiesbaden, Germany: VS Verlag, 2004), 81–158Google Scholar.

33 On the post-1991 state apparatus and its “Horizon 2000” plan focused on Beirut, see Najem, Tom, Lebanon's Renaissance (Reading: Ithaca, 2000), 57–156Google Scholar. For a critique, see Khalidi-Beyhum, Ramla, Poverty Reduction Policies in Jordan and Lebanon (New York: Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, United Nations, 1999)Google Scholar.

34 Daghir, Albert, Hawla Binaʾ al-Dawla fi Lubnan (Beirut: al-Markaz al-Lubnani li-l-Dirasat, 2008), 21–22Google Scholar. Lebanon maintained its post-1958 National Security Fund (NSF) and its Ministry of Social Affairs, which together with other government agencies provide “basic social safety nets.” See Jawad, Rana, “A Profile of Social Welfare in Lebanon,” Global Social Policy 2 (2002): 323CrossRefGoogle Scholar. However, these nets operate beside or through powerful local NGOs, and NSF “membership fell from 38% in 1974 to 28% in 1996.” See ibid., 324. On health, see Ammar, Walid, Health Systems and Reform in Lebanon (Beirut: Entreprise universitaire d’études et de publications, 2003), 29–41Google Scholar.

35 “Nasir Addresses Victory Day Gathering,” Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (hereafter FBIS), 24 December 1958, B12–13.

36 Batatu, Hanna, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), 729Google Scholar.

37 Devlin, John, The Ba'th Party (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover, 1976), 35Google Scholar.

38 Bakdash, Khalid, “For the Successful Struggle for Peace,” Middle East Journal 7 (1953): 206, 207Google Scholar.

39 Beling, Willard, Pan-Arabism and Labor (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), 32Google Scholar; Ayyub, S., al-Hizb al-Shuyuʿi fi Suriya wa-Lubnan (Beirut: al-Hurriyya, 1959), 181Google Scholar. For sociopolitical mobili-zation, see Schumann, Christoph, Radikalnationalismus in Syrien und Libanon: politische Sozialisation und Elitenbildung 1930–1958 (Hamburg, Germany: Deutsches Orient-Institut, 2001), 179–312Google Scholar.

40 Washington quietly accepted this as more desirable than a communist win in Syria.

41 Riad, Mahmud, Mudhakkirat (Beirut: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-ʿArabi, 1986), 2:207–33Google Scholar; Hawrani, Akram, Mudhakkirat (Cairo: Madbuli, 2000), 4:2705Google Scholar.

42 A ten-year economic development program and a five-year industrial plan for Syria were promised in the fall of 1958. See “Five-year Industrial Plan,” Mideast Mirror, 9 November 1958, 9; and Challah, “Economic Development,” 96. For the ministry, see Khayata, A., “Planning in Syria,” L’économie et les finances de la Syrie et des pays arabes 104 (1966): 32Google Scholar.

43 “Platform of the Syrian Communist Party,” World Marxist Review 2 (1959): 58.

44 “Ziraʿat al-Qutun fi al-Iqlim al-Suri,” al-Nur, 2 December 1958, 2.

45 See, respectively, “Dhaʿr al-Istithmar al-Amriki min Harakat al-Shuʿub al-Taharruriyya,” al-Nur, 22 November 1958, 1; and “al-Hadhar Yadfaʿ al-Khatar,” al-Nur, 6 December 1958, 1.

46 “Muhawalat Badhr al-Shiqaq baina al-Jumhuriyyatain,” al-Nur, 14 November 1958, 1.

47 “Syrian Paper Wants Communists Eliminated,” FBIS, 22 December 1958, B6; “Paper Declares UAR Currency Is Solid,” FBIS, 19 December 1958, B1.

48 Dann, Uriel, Iraq under Qassem (New York: Praeger, 1969), 99Google Scholar; Franzén, Johan, Red Star over Iraq (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 87–92Google Scholar.

49 For the quotes, see Dann, Qassem, 61; and Devlin, Ba'th, 123. For the significance of the reforms to the ICP's self-understanding, see Khairy, Zakiet al., Dirasat fi Tarikh al-Hizb al-Shuyuʿi al-ʿIraqi (London: Jadid, 1984), 289–309, 317–22Google Scholar; and ʿAdil, Salam, Sirat Munadil (Damascus: al-Mada, 2001), 1:257–58Google Scholar.

50 Dann, Qassem, 103. For radio broadcasts celebrating the “speed” of Iraq's land reform, see “Paper Lauds Achievements since July 14,” FBIS, 15 December 1958, C3.

51 Hawrani, Mudhakkirat, 4:2772; Jankowski, Nasser's Egypt, 116, n. 9. For al-Nasir's alarm, since August, about the ICP's rise, see Hawrani, Mudhakkirat, 4:2710, 2723.

52 Memorandum, Roundtree to Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, 27 December 1958, document 52, FRUS (1958–1960) vol. XI.

53 “Nasir Addresses Cooperative Congress,” FBIS, 28 November 1958, B14–15. Al-Nasir also felt forced to show understanding for Syria's merchants. See “Nasir Reassures Syrian Economic Group,” FBIS, 22 December 1958, B1–5.

54 “ʿIndama Yaltaqi al-Shuyuʿiyyun bi-l-Istiʿmar,” al-Sihafa, 17 December 1959, 1.

55 See n. 35.

56 “Communist Newspaper,” Mideast Mirror, 4 January 1959, 3.

57 “Voice of Reform Defines Objectives,” FBIS, 21 January 1959, C2; “Broadcast Jammed,” Mideast Mirror, 22 March 1959, 4–5; “Suffering Syria,” Mideast Mirror, 22 March 1959, 5.

58 “Plots and Calumnies,” Mideast Mirror, 4 October 1959, 2. See also Bikdash, Khalid, “Two Trends in the Arab National Movement,” World Marxist Review 2, no. 11 (1959): 28–34Google Scholar.

59 “ʿAbd al-Hamid Sarraj Yatahaddath ila al-Ahram,” al-Ahram, 26 December 1958, 6.

60 ʿAbd al-Nasir, Jamal, Nahnu wa-l-ʿIraq wa-l-Shuyuʿiyya (Beirut: Dar al-Nashr al-ʿArabiyya, 1961[?])Google Scholar; “UAR Paper Condemns Syrian Communist Role,” FBIS, 9 January 1959, B4; “Flagrant Interference by Russia,” Mideast Mirror, 5 April 1959, 6; “Syrian Comment,” FBIS, 14 July 1959, B2.

61 al-Latif al-Baghdadi, ʿAbd, Mudhakkirat (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Masri al-Hadith, 1977), 2:57Google Scholar. The SCP accused Sarraj of torturing noncommunist as well as communist Syrians. See “Savage Repression against the Syrian People,” World Marxist Review 2, no. 4 (1959): 93.

62 For the two quotes, see “Three Reform Supervisors,” Mideast Mirror, 4 January 1959, 2; and “al-Lajna al-Thulathiyya,” al-Ahram, 17 January 1959, 6.

63 “Nasser Starts Group to Work on Syrian Reds,” Christian Science Monitor, 5 January 1959, 5.

64 “Mahamma fi Dimashq,” al-Ahram, 4 January 1959, 5.

65 However, al-Nasir closely supervised the committee's work. See al-Baghdadi, Mudhakkirat, 2:64; and Hawrani, Mudhakkirat, 4:2762.

66 For the decision, see “Muʾassasa li-l-Mashariʿ al-Kubra,” al-Ahram, 12 January 1959, 1. Implementation began in February. See Khayata, “Planning,” 34.

67 “Sayed Wajih al-Samman,” Mideast Mirror, 1 February 1959, 22; Khayata, “Planning,” 32; “Prochaine Reprise,” Bulletin de la presse arabe, 29 August–1 September 1959, II:2; Diab, “Syria,” 14.

68 Ministry of Planning, Syrian Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1960/61–1964/65 (Damascus: n.p., 1960), 2Google Scholar.

69 al-Ayyubi, Sadiq, Tahqiq al-Ishtirakiyya fi Iqtisad al-Iqlim al-Shimali (Damascus: Kutub Qawmiyya, 1960), 3–5Google Scholar; al-Munʿim al-Qaysuni, ʿAbd, Siyasatuna al-Iqtisadiyya fi Suriya (Damascus: Matbaʿat Jamiʿat ʿAyn Shams, 1961), 14–15Google Scholar.

70 Keilany, “Economic Planning,” 361.

71 On Egypt's 1957 five-year industrial plan being drawn up hastily and hence replaced by a more detailed plan in 1960, see Raphaeli, “Development Planning in Iraq,” 136, n. 2. For similarities and, conversely, the fact that Egypt's plan foresaw 80 percent of all new investments as coming from the public sector while in Syria the forecast was only 63 percent, see O'Brien, Patrick, The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 109Google Scholar; and Keilany, “Economic Planning,” 369. Syria's plan did not envision the nationalization of foreign-owned firms, a step undertaken in Egypt in 1957 (where there were many such firms).

72 Owen, State, Power and Politics, 25. See also Jankowski, Nasser's Egypt, 115–36.

73 Major welfare programs were also launched in 1959. The first Damascus food and consumer goods cooperative opened in May 1959; social insurance was launched in August. See “First Cooperative Center,” Mideast Mirror, 10 May 1959, 21; and “Social Security,” FBIS, 1 September 1959, B2.

74 Syrian Five-Year Plan, 6–7. 1,000 million SP was to be private investment, the rest public. The private sector over-fulfilled while the public sector under-fulfilled its quota, the latter averaging out at 94 percent. See Keilany, “Economic Planning,” 369.

75 Keilany, “Economic Planning,” 373, 371–72.

76 See n. 25–27.

77 Letter, Hugh Walker to Champion Ward, 2 June 1959, grant file (hereafter GF) 59–229, Ford Foundation Archives, New York (hereafter FFA).

78 Letters, Walker to Ward, 3 June and 1 July 1959, GF/59–229, FFA. For Khairi, see letter, Hugh Walker to Champion Ward, 1 July 1959, GF/59–229, FFA. See also Nuseibeh, Hazim, Dhikrayat Muqaddasiyya (Beirut: Rayyes, 2010), 173–74Google Scholar.

79 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 5 Year Program for Economic Development, 1962–1967 (Amman: JDB, 1961), 9, 13. See also International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Jordan (Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins University Press, 1957Google Scholar).

80 Robins, A History of Jordan, 83.

81 Ibid., 79.

82 For Egypt/Sawt al-Arab, see “Husayn Betrays Refugees on US Orders,” FBIS, 5 November 1957, B3–5; and United Kingdom, Records of Jordan, 1919–1965, ed. Priestland, Jane (London: Archive Editions, 1996), 10:395Google Scholar. For communists, see Ziyadin, Yaʿqub, Laysat al-Nihayyat (Amman: Karmil, 2006), 44–56Google Scholar. Some actions took place already in the early 1950s; see United Kingdom, Records of Jordan, 7:825–28, 10:567–70.

83 Sayigh, Yezid, Armed Struggle and the Search for State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 71–80Google Scholar. Palestinians, with Syrians, were UAR intelligence's main “case officers, agents and paramilitaries” in Jordan and Lebanon. See Rathmell, Secret War, 146.

84 Jordan, Program, 5.

85 For concerns, see Hussein, King, Uneasy Lies the Head (New York: Random House, 1962), 209–17Google Scholar; U.S. Embassy Amman, “US Policy Objectives in Jordan,” 24 June 1958, Jordan Subject Files (1953–60), box 14, Record Group (hereafter RG) 469, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Md. (hereafter NARA); and United Kingdom, Records of Jordan, 9:204–5, 10:384–5.

86 Rathmell, Secret War, 149–51. For the UAR-run Jordanian People's Radio, see “New Station Calls on Jordanians to Rise,” FBIS, 22 July 1958, G1. See also “Crush King Hussein,” FBIS, 17 September 1958, G1; and “Devastating Revolt in Store for King,” FBIS, 22 October 1958, G2.

87 Shlaim, Avi, Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace (New York: Vintage Books, 2009), 164Google Scholar, an interview with Prince Talal bin Muhammad.

88 Ibid., 167.

89 Memo, Walker, 19 December 1958, GF/59–229, FFA.

90 U.S. Embassy Amman, Weekly Economic Report, 21–27 May 1959, reel 7, Jordan 1955–59, Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files (hereafter CSDCF), RG/59, NARA. For Nuseibeh, see Nuseibeh, Dhikrayat, 136–38. Other JDB specialists studied at AUB, UC-Davis, and Indiana. See letter, Walker to Ward, 2 June 1959, GF/59–229, FFA; and Memo, Walker, 19 December 1958, GF/59–229, FFA.

91 Memo, T. Nadeau, 15 October 1958, GF/59–229, FFA. See also Memo, Harvey Hall, 25 November 1957, GF/59–229, FFA.

92 Letter, F. Hill to Walker, 9 December 1958, GF/59–229, FFA. See also letter, Walker to Ward, Beirut, 1 July 1959, GF/59–229, FFA.

93 Letter, Hill to Walker, 21 November 1958, GF/59–229, FFA. For the consultants, see letter, Walker to Ward, 8 July 1959, GF/59–229, FFA.

94 For the interim account, see letter, Lewis to Ward, 3 May 1960, GF/59–459, FFA. For plan expenditures, see Jordan, Program, 353.

95 Kingston, “Rationalizing Patrimonialism,” 118, 123, states that already by 1958 King Husayn understood that he needed to attract new talent to stabilize his rule. See also al-Tawisi, Basim, “al-Dawla wa-l-Tajnid al-Siyasi,” in Dirasat fi Tarikh al-Urdunn al-Ijtimaʿi, ed. collective editors (Amman: Sindbad, 2003), 429–30Google Scholar. For 1962 as a milestone, see, for example, Robins, A History of Jordan, 105, 108; Dann, King Hussein, 120; and Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, 187.

96 Letter, Walker to Ward, 1 July 1959, GF/59–229, FFA. See also U.S. Embassy, “Ford Foundation,” 18 September 1959, reel 7, Jordan 1955–59, CSDCF, RG/59, NARA. Also, see Husayn's reference to raising living standards in “Khitab al-Husayn fi Iftitah Muʾtamar al-Ittihad al-Taʿawuni al-Markazi fi ʿAmman,” 25 ʿAman min al-Tarikh (Khutab li-l-Malik Husayn) (London: Mutawiʿ, 1970), 1:301.

97 Letter, Walker to Ward, 8 July 1959, GF/59–229, FFA.

98 “King Husayn Speaks at Parliament Opening,” FBIS, 1 October 1959, D1–5.

99 Hussein, Uneasy, 282, refers to these broadcasts as a whole.

100 “Hadith al-Husayn ila al-Shaʿb al-Urdunni min Dar al-Idhaʿa al-Urdunniyya,” in 25 ʿAman, 1:537. Likewise, the government asked for private sector support. See “Premier Opens Five-Year Plan Conference,” FBIS, 19 May 1961, D3.

101 Jordan, Program (my italics), 16, 10, 13, 10, 21.

102 Dees, Joseph, “Jordan's East Ghor Canal Project,” Middle East Journal 13 (1959): 358Google Scholar. For the acceleration of this and other investments including in Port Aqaba, roads, electricity, and the phosphate industry, see U.S. Embassy Amman, “Annual Economic Assessment,” p. 21, 27 April 1959, Jordan Subject Files (1953–60), box 16, RG/469, NARA.

103 Shihan, Development, 14.

104 Mazur, Economic Growth, 23, 145, 189, 229–30; Nuseibeh, Dhikrayat, 174; Odeh, Hanna, Jordan. Economic Development (Amman: Ministry of Culture and Information), 3–5Google Scholar.

105 Mazur, Economic Growth, 235.

106 Ibid., 9.

107 Popp, “Accomodating,” 401.

108 NSC report 5820/1, point 6.

109 Letter, John Bell (ICA) to Alfred Wolf (FF), 26 November 1957, GF/59–229, FFA.

110 First, by “encouraging allocation of indigenous resources to economic development”; second, by “encouraging private organizations and Free World governments interested in the area to contribute financial and technical assistance”; third, by “supporting loans by international organizations where consistent with relevant US loan policies”; fourth, by “being prepared to support a soundly-organized Arab development institution”; and only last by “being prepared to provide U.S. loans for projects which are consistent with relevant U.S. loan policies; and continue technical assistance.” See NSC report 5820/1, point 12.

111 Letter, Lewis to Walker, 22 June 1959, GF/59–229, FFA.

112 Letter, Walker to Ward, 3 June 1959, GF/59–229, FFA. The trip apparently did not take place.

113 For the shah's shock about Iraq, see Gesandtschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Tehran, “Politischer Lagebericht,” Tehran, 2 October 1958 (Document Po1 708.81/92.18, Nr. 2050/58), box 3013, Neues Amt (Av), Politisches Archiv, Berlin. For the meetings, see “Mideast Peace Backed,” The New York Times, 7 November 1959, 4; and “Padishahi-yi Shujaʿ, Mihman-i Shashinshah-i Buzurg-i Ma,” Ittilaʿat-i Haftagi, 8 April 1960, 1–3, stressing Husayn's and the shah's shared concerns.

114 For Libya, see letter, Earl Hald (Chief Economist, UN Mission to Libya) to Lewis, (June?) 1960, GF/59–459, FFA; letter, Lewis to Hald, 22 June 1960, GF/59–459, FFA. For India, see U.S. Embassy Amman, “Memorandum of Conversation (US Ambassador in Jordan),” 8 July 1959, reel 7, Jordan 1955–59, CSDCF, RG/59, NARA. I received the information on Sudan from Mr. Alden Young, 21 February 2012, Princeton, N.J.

115 www.lebret-irfed.org/spip.php?article86 (accessed 5 November 2010).

116 Delprat, Raymond, La mission IRFED Liban (Paris: Les amis du Père Lebret, 1983), 9–12Google Scholar.

117 Traboulsi, History of Modern Lebanon, 115. See also Gendzier, Notes from the Minefield, 80–88; Gates, Carolyn, Merchant Republic of Lebanon: Rise of an Open Economy (London: I. B.Tauris, 1998), 109–35Google Scholar; and Kassir, Samir, Histoire de Beyrouth (Paris: Fayard, 2005), 417–43Google Scholar.

118 Dubar, Claude, Les classes sociales au Liban (Paris: Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1976), title of chap. 3Google Scholar.

119 Churchill, Charles, The City of Beirut (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab, 1954), 23–27Google Scholar.

120 Chader, M., “Action Sociale,” in Mélanges proche-orientaux d’économie politique (Beirut: Université de Saint Joseph, 1956), 165, 180–84Google Scholar; Traboulsi, History of Modern Lebanon, 124.

121 Letter, Ambassador Louis Roché to Foreign Ministry, Beirut, 28 March 1956, p. 4, box LA639, Dossier Liban (hereafter DL)/1953–1959, Archive du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, La Courneuve, France (hereafter MAE).

122 Bikdash, Khalid, al-Hizb al-Shuyuʿi (Damascus: Dar al-Taqaddum, 1955[?]), 8Google Scholar.

123 Ishti, Faris, al-Hizb al-Taqaddumi al-Ishtiraki (Mukhtara, Lebanon: Dar al-Taqaddumiyya, 1989), 2:807–1087Google Scholar.

124 Malsagne, Fouad Chéhab, 271–72. See also Badre, Albert, Muhadarat fi al-Iqtisad al-ʿArabi (Beirut: Dar al-Hana, 1955), 39Google Scholar.

125 al-Juburi, Fathi, Nashʾat al-Hizb al-Taqaddumi al-Ishtiraki (Mukhtara, Lebanon: Dar al-Taqaddumiyya, 2009), 126Google Scholar.

126 For criticism of corruption, see Junblat, Kamal, Haqiqat al-Thawra al-Lubnaniyya (Beirut: Dar al-Nashr al-ʿArabiyya, 1959), 10Google Scholar. See also Salibi, Kamal, “Lebanon under Fuad Chehab,” Middle Eastern Studies 2 (1966): 213Google Scholar. For PSP administrative and electoral reform demands, see Ishti, al-Hizb, 2:807–1087.

127 This feeling was most acute in 1958, pressuring community leaders to criticize Chamoun. See Johnson, Michael, Class and Client in Beirut (London: Ithaca, 1986), 123–28Google Scholar.

128 Kalawoun, Struggle, 63–64.

129 This support was less substantial than Lebanese Christians in particular claimed, however. See ibid., 50, 58, 66–67; and Gendzier, Notes from the Minefield, 297.

130 “Journal du Père Lebret au Liban: Année 1960” (12 and 14 August 1960), reprinted in Malsagne, Stéphane, Le Père Louis-Joseph Lebret o.p. et le Liban 1959–1964 (Paris: Les amis du Père Lebret, 2004), 34, 36Google Scholar. “Nasir Addresses Lebanese Youth Groups,” FBIS, 11 March 1959, B9; “Lebanese Meet Nasir,” FBIS, 23 March 1959, B18. Letters, Ambassador Louis Roché to Foreign Ministry, Beirut, 23 January 1959, p. 4–5, and 6 February 1959, p. 1–2, box LA639, DL/1953–1959, MAE.

131 Corm, Politique, 20.

132 Mideast Mirror, 26 November 1958, 2.

133 “Méssage . . . à l'occasion de la fête nationale d'indépendance” (21 November 1961), p. 1, in box 134, Fonds Lebret, Centre des archives contemporaines, Fontainebleau, France (hereafter FL-CAC).

134 Malsagne, Fouad Chéhab, 311.

135 Chéhab, Fouad, “Awwal Tasrih li-l-Sihafa,” in Majmuʿat Khutab (Beirut: n.p., n.d. [1960s?]), 7–9Google Scholar.

136 Corm, Politique, 11. For Chéhab's evaluation of the 1958 plan, see Malsagne, Fouad Chéhab, 315.

137 For Lebret's position, see Malsagne, Fouad Chéhab, 246. For the friendship, see letter, Lebret to Chéhab, Paris, 19 August 1965, and letter, Chéhab to Lebret, Juniyya, Lebanon, 10 November 1965, box 134, FL-CAC.

138 Institut de formation en vue du développement (hereafter IFD), Le Liban face à son développement (Beirut: IFD, 1963), 4, 5Google Scholar.

139 Malsagne, Fouad Chéhab, 303, 306–11.

140 Delprat, La Mission, 14.

141 Ibid, 18–19. For later public successes, see letter, de Boisseson to MAE, Beirut, 23 January 1964, box 950, DL/1960–1965, MAE.

142 Corm, Politique, 65; for the ministry's problems, see pp. 45–65; for analyses of the plan, see pp. 45–133. See also Raphaeli, Nimrod, “Development Planning: Lebanon,” Western Political Quarterly 20 (1967): 714–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

143 Raphaeli, “Development Planning: Lebanon,” 725.

144 Delprat, La Mission, 30.

145 Rizk, Charles, Le régime politique libanais (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et jurisprudence, 1966)Google Scholar.

146 Salibi, Kamal, Crossroads to Civil War (Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan, 1976)Google Scholar; Fouad Boustany, “Les réalités libanaises et l'utopie Chéhabiste” (PhD diss., Université Paris-IV, 1987); Nawaf Kabbara, “Shehabism in Lebanon, 1958–1970: The Failure of a Hegemonic Project” (PhD diss., University of Essex, 1988).

147 See notes 31 and 34 above.

148 Malsagne, Fouad Chéhab, 297, 269–98.

149 Ibid., 282, 320–32.

150 U.S. Embassy Beirut, “A 5-Year Plan for Development Works,” 8 June 1961, reel 6, Lebanon 1960–63, CSDCF, RG/59, NARA. Also, in 1958–59 Washington slightly increased economic aid, including development loan funds for private investors. See U.S. Embassy Beirut, “Summary of Economic Development,” 1 July 1959, pp. 27–28, Lebanon Subject Files (1953–60), box 17, RG/469, NARA.

151 See Vaïsse, Maurice, La grandeur (Paris: Fayard, 1998)Google Scholar; Nuenlist, Christianet al., eds., Globalizing De Gaulle (Lanham, Md.: Rowham, 2010)Google Scholar, especially the essay by Carolyne Davidson, “Dealing with De Gaulle: The United States and France,” 111–34.

152 Chehdan-Kalifé, Michel, Les relations entre la France et le Liban (1958–1978) (Paris: PUF, 1983), 17–50Google Scholar.

153 Ibid., 22.

154 Only by 1963 did this presence start to seriously ruffle Lebanese feathers. See letter, de Boisseson to MAE, Beirut, 10 October 1963, box 950, DL/1960–1965, MAE.

155 There were U.S. reservations about Lebret's “somewhat doctrinaire influence on Lebanese economic planning.” See dispatch, Embassy Beirut to State Department, 6 June 1962, reel 5, Lebanon 1960–63, CSDCF, RG/59, NARA.

156 Lebret met Ambassador de Boisseson “from time to time.” See letter, de Boisseson to MAE, Beirut, 24 January 1963, p. 1, box 950, DL/1960–1965, MAE. And he confided in him, for instance complaining about Lebanese personalities. See letter, de Boisseson to MAE, Beirut, 29 June 1963, p. 4, box 950, DL/1960–1965, MAE.

157 Lebret, Louis-Joseph, Manifeste pour une civilisation solidaire (Caluire, France: Économie et humanisme, 1960)Google Scholar; idem, L’économie au service des hommes (Paris: CERF, 1968)Google Scholar.

158 Becker, Charleset al., eds., Le Père Lebret, un Dominicain économiste au Sénégal, 1957–1963 (Dakar: Fraternité Saint Dominique de Dakar, 2007)Google Scholar.

159 Malsagne, Le Père Louis-Joseph Lebret, 18–19.