Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 June 2001
Yitzhak Rabin left a complex and paradoxical legacy. The man who for decades embodied a national security policy based on forceful deterrence adopted, in the 1990s, a rhetoric of coexistence and cooperation. Rabin began to articulate positions identified with the Israeli left: that the Palestinians were at the heart of the Israeli–Arab conflict, and that the conflict was at least partly a product of “psychological walls” on both sides. Despite his traditionally hawkish views and staunch opposition to recognizing Yasir Arafat and the PLO, Rabin oversaw a reversal of policy toward Israel's former arch-enemy. Indeed, it was Rabin's stature as “Mr. Security” that made the Israeli–PLO Declaration of Principles possible. Unlike Shimon Peres, his rival for Labor Party leadership, Rabin's unrivaled role as an architect of national security policy and practice afforded him relative immunity to charges of excessive dovishness. Efraim Inbar, professor of politics at Bar-Ilan University, offers a lucid account of Rabin's contribution to Israeli security. Concluding that Rabin's approach to security was pragmatic, ad hoc, and without an overarching strategic vision (p. 169), Inbar nevertheless begins from the premise that for Rabin and other leaders of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), the anarchic environment of Middle Eastern politics conditions Israel's security needs. In this environment, governments consider international law and treaties unreliable, so “self-help” and deterrence are the sole path to security. For Rabin, “What has assured Israel's existence…is primarily Israel's comprehensive power, with military might as the decisive element” (p. 11).