Why This War…

Donna Robinson Divine

doi:10.1017/S0020743800024685

Why This War…

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 January 2009

Donna Robinson Divine

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Donna Robinson Divine: Affiliation:
Smith College

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The course of events in the Middle East since 6 October 1973 has been as surprising and as unexpected as the very events of that day. In retrospect, of course, the surprises of that day have been depreciated and obscured by journalists, scholars, and politicians who have begun to treat the outbreak of the war as part of a chain of natural developments initiated in June 1967, or in May 1948, or in 1897 depending upon their historical bent. But hindsight notwithstanding, no one expected war to break out in the Middle East in 1973. For this reason, the decision to launch a war against Israel must be examined for what it was: a complex calculation encompassing not one or two but a broad range of considerations. The decision to go to war is never a commonplace decision, nor is it one taken lightly or made naturally – not even in the Middle East. Rather, it is a complex phenomenon whose threads must be unraveled in order to be understood.

Type: Articles
Information: International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 7 , Issue 4 , October 1976 , pp. 523 - 543

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743800024685 [Opens in a new window]
Copyright: Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1976

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^{page 523 note 1} This orientation has been obvious in accounts of the October War offered by Israeli scholars and journalists which have appeared in Ha-Aretz and Ma‘ariv. See especially an interview with Professor Yehoshafat Harkabi, Ma‘ariv, 24 December 1973, or the column ‘Bayn Sheshet ha-Yamim le-Yom ha-Kippurim’ [Between the Six Days and Yom Kippur] Mal'ariv, 6 July 1974.Google Scholar

^{page 523 note 2} For this reason the warnings of the possibility of war coming from an Israeli intelligence officer, David Siman Toy, could be dismissed.Google Scholar

^{page 524 note 1} The most comprehensive accounts to appear thus far are: Lucius D. Battle, ‘The Arabs: Why Now?’ New York Times Magazine, 21 October 1973;Google ScholarDraper, Theodore, ‘The Road to Geneva’, Commentary, 57, 2 (02 1974), 23–37;Google ScholarLaqueur, Walter, Confrontation: The Middle East and World Politics (New York: Quadrangle, 1974);Google ScholarRa'anan, Un, ‘Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1969–1973’, Midstream, 19, 10 (12 1973), 23–45;Google ScholarSafran, Nadav, ‘The War and the Future of the Arab–Israeli Conflict’, Foreign Affairs, 52, 2 (01 1974), 215–36;CrossRef Google ScholarSheehan, Edward R. F., ‘Sadat's War’, New York Times Magazine, 18 November 1973;Google ScholarWaterbury, John, The Crossing, American Universities Field Staff, 18, 6.Google Scholar

^{page 524 note 2} Battle, op. cit. p. 32.Google Scholar

^{page 524 note 3} Daher, Adel, Current Trends in Arab Intellectual Thought (The Rand Corporation, 12 1969), p. 21.Google Scholar

^{page 524 note 4} Sheehan, op. cit. p. 112.Google Scholar

^{page 524 note 5} This kind of thinking allegedly predominated among officials in the United States Department of State who posited that a limited Israeli defeat would increase chances for peace in the region.Google Scholar

^{page 524 note 6} Moore, Clement Henry, ‘On Theory and Practice among Arabs’, World Politics, 24, 1 (10 1971), 106–26;CrossRef Google ScholarSmith, Wilfred Cantwell, Islam in Modern History (New York: Mentor, 1957), pp. 11–46.Google Scholar

^{page 525 note 1} Abdel-Malek, Anouar, Egypt: Military Society (New York: Vintage, 1969),Google Scholar chapter 4 Dekmedjian, Richard Hrair, Egypt under Nasir (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1971), chapters 5 and 6.Google Scholar

^{page 525 note 2} Berque, Jacques, Egypt, Imperialism and Revolution, trans. Steward, Jean (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), pp. 524–7.Google Scholar

^{page 525 note 3} Little, Tom, Modern Egypt (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 174–6.Google Scholar

^{page 525 note 4} Draper, op. cit.; Ra'anan, op. cit.Google Scholar

^{page 526 note 1} Draper, op. cit.Google Scholar

^{page 526 note 2} Ra'anan, op. cit. p. 23.Google Scholar

^{page 526 note 3} Draper, op. cit.Google Scholar

^{page 526 note 4} Safran, op. cit. p. 216.Google Scholar

^{page 527 note 1} Ibid. A similar view is expressed by Sheehan, op. cit. pp. 112–13. It is possible that this view was influenced by the editorials of Mohammed Hasseinin Heikal, who took a similar approach to the subject.

^{page 527 note 2} The Israeli approach had been that everything could be ‘talked about’ in the course of negotiations while announcing policies for specific regions such as Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and Northern Sinai, which seemed to rule out these areas from the negotiating process. See also Laqueur, op. cit. pp. 42–3.Google Scholar

^{page 527 note 3} The first election platform of the ruling Labor Party in Israel, drafted before the outbreak of war, advocated no changes in foreign policy.Google Scholar

^{page 527 note 4} The Israeli Labor Party was prepared to campaign on the slogan of having kept the peace.Google Scholar

^{page 527 note 5} The Foreign Minister was interviewed on American television on 7 October 1973.Google Scholar

^{page 528 note 1} Allison, Graham T., Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971).Google Scholar

^{page 528 note 2} Ibid. p. 5.

^{page 528 note 3} Ibid. p. 67.

^{page 528 note 4} Ibid. pp. 144–7.

^{page 529 note 1} Moore, op. cit.Google Scholar

^{page 529 note 2} Vatikiotis, P. J., ‘Egypt's Politics of Conspiracy’, Survey, 18, 2 (Spring, 1972), 83–99 at p. 83.Google Scholar

^{page 530 note 1} Ibid. p. 85.

^{page 530 note 2} Ibid. p. 83.

^{page 530 note 3} Hanson, Bent, Economic Development in Egypt (Rand, 10 1969), p. 6.Google Scholar

^{page 530 note 4} Waterbury, John, A Note on Egypt: 1973, American Universities Field Staff, 18, 4, p. 4.Google Scholar

^{page 530 note 5} This was borne out by the author's experience in Cairo, summer, 1973. During those months there was a great deal of talk about shortages.Google Scholar

^{page 530 note 6} One joke circulating Cairo during 1973 was about the National Transportation Company; a play on words in Arabic called it the National Killing Company in reference to the company's safety record.Google Scholar

^{page 531 note 1} New York Times, 26 March 1973.Google Scholar

^{page 531 note 2} Waterbury, The Crossing, p. 4.Google Scholar

^{page 531 note 3} Moore, C. H., ‘Professional Syndicates in Contemporary Egypt: The “Containment” of the New Middle Class’, paper delivered at the Middle East Studies Association, 8–10, November 1973, p. 18, n. 83.Google Scholar

^{page 531 note 4} Al-Ahram, 18 July 1973, and 19 July 1973.Google Scholar

^{page 531 note 5} Vatikiotis, P. J., ‘Two Years after Nasser: The Chance of a New Beginning’, The New Middle East, 48 (09 1972), 7–9 at pp. 7–8.Google Scholar

^{page 531 note 6} ‘Al-Irada al Amma’, [National Decree], Al-Ahram, 29 September 1973.Google Scholar

^{page 532 note 1} Al-Ahram, 24 July 1973.Google Scholar

^{page 532 note 2} Ibid.

^{page 532 note 3} At the conclusion of that speech, Sadat called for the establishment of a national organization to plan for the next twenty years (Al-Ahram, 24 July 1973).Google Scholar

^{page 532 note 4} Waterbury, The Crossing, p. 9.Google Scholar

^{page 533 note 1} Al-Ahram, 29 September 1973.Google Scholar

^{page 533 note 2} The student riots of 1972 and pressure from such organizations as the National Egyptian Front which attacked the Soviet presence in Egypt were signs of the weakness of Sadat's position.Google Scholar

^{page 533 note 3} Waterbury, The Crossing, p. 12.Google Scholar

^{page 534 note 1} Quoted in ibid. p. 4.

^{page 534 note 2} A1-Ahram, 29 September 1973.Google Scholar

^{page 534 note 3} Ibid.

^{page 534 note 4} Waterbury quotes one commonly heard joke about Sadat in The Crossing, p.9.Google Scholar

^{page 535 note 1} Compare articles in Al-Ahram and in Al-Akhbar during 1973.Google Scholar

^{page 535 note 2} The coverage of Qadhaffi's visit to Egypt in the summer of 1973 demonstrated the lack of enthusiasm.Google Scholar

^{page 535 note 3} Vatikiotis, P. J., ‘Egypt Adrift: A Study in Disillusion’, The New Middle East, 54 (03 1973), 5–10 at p. 5.Google Scholar

^{page 535 note 4} Al-Akhbar, July 1973.Google Scholar

^{page 535 note 5} Hussein, Mahmoud, Class Conflict in Egypt 1945–1970, trans. Chirman, Michel, Chirman, Susanne, Ehrenfeld, Alfred, and Brown, Kathy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), pp. 104–12.Google Scholar

^{page 536 note 1} A1-Ahram, July 1973, a series of discussions which appeared in the newspaper during that month.Google Scholar

^{page 536 note 2} Ibid.

^{page 536 note 3} Vatikiotis, ‘Two Years After…’, p. 8.Google Scholar

^{page 536 note 4} Waterbury, The Crossing, p. 13.Google Scholar

^{page 536 note 5} Moore, ‘Professional…’, pp. 20–1.Google Scholar

^{page 537 note 1} Al-Ahram, 6 July 1973, and 23 July 1973.Google Scholar

^{page 537 note 2} Vatikiotis, ‘Egypt Adrift …’, p. 10.Google Scholar

^{page 537 note 3} Be'eri, Eliezer, ‘Social Origin and Family Background of the Egyptian Army Officer Class’, Asian and African Studies (1966), pp. 1–40.Google Scholar

^{page 537 note 4} Ibid.

^{page 537 note 5} One gets the impression that the battle was not considered imminent from Sadat's speech of 23 July 1973, when he compared the battle against the Israelis with that against the Crusades.Google Scholar

^{page 538 note 1} Discussions with medical students in the summer of 1973 in Cairo. Many expressed concern over the possibility of being drafted and never really practicing medicine.Google Scholar

^{page 538 note 2} Waterbury, The Crossing, p. 10.Google Scholar

^{page 538 note 3} Al-Ahram, 24 July 1973.Google Scholar

^{page 538 note 4} Waterbury, The Crossing, p. 9.Google Scholar

^{page 538 note 5} A1-Ahram, 24 July 1973.Google Scholar

^{page 539 note 1} Ibid.

^{page 539 note 2} Waterbury, The Crossing, p. 10.Google Scholar

^{page 539 note 3} Ibid. pp. 3–4.

^{page 540 note 1} Vatikiotis, ‘Egypt's Politics. …’, p. 83.Google Scholar

^{page 540 note 2} Ibid.

^{page 540 note 3} Waterbury, The Crossing, p. 10.Google Scholar

^{page 540 note 4} Laqueur, op. cit. p. 43.Google Scholar

^{page 541 note 1} Mentioned by Safran, op. cit., but not detailed.Google Scholar

^{page 541 note 2} Waterbury, The Crossing, p. 3.Google Scholar

^{page 541 note 3} Ibid. p. 16.

^{page 541 note 4} The Israelis discovered to their own shock that the ordinary preparations for mobilization during a surprise attack had never been formulated because Israeli Military Intelligence had assured the army that it could always give them enough warning.Google Scholar

^{page 542 note 1} Laqueur, op. cit. pp. 88–135.Google Scholar

^{page 542 note 2} Waterbury, The Crossing, p. 19.Google Scholar

^{page 542 note 3} Heikal, Mohammed Hassanein, ‘Ka'asher hofta'u ha-Mitzrim’, [When The Egyptians Were Surprised’, Ma'ariv, 9, 16 and 23 November 1973. These are sections of Cairo Documents published in the Israeli press.Google Scholar

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