Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 February 2017
156 F.3rd 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
** Robert J. Kestrell was named as a defendant in appellant's complaint in the district court, but he did not appear at any stage in the district court action or before us.
1 Kestell filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in Maryland shortly after the 1995 divorce decree. Appellant was the largest unsecured creditor in that bankruptcy case. Kestell's bankruptcy petition was ultimately dismissed under 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(b) and 105(a) because “the sole purpose of the filing was to avoid the payment of the sums owing to his ex-wife on account of the state court judgment.” In re Kestell, 99 F.3d 146,150 (4th Cir. 1996).
2 As a result of the instant litigation, Kestell has agreed to have the Bank pay appellant an additional $1,710 per month from his salary.
3 Our assumption here is just that—an assumption. We take up the scope of immunity under the IOIA in Part III.
4 The agreement states that “[t]he purpose of the Bank shall be to contribute to the acceleration of the process of economic develop- ment of the member countries, individually and collectively.” Article I, § 1, 10 U.S.T. at 3072. The Bank's functions include promot- ing the investment of public and private capital for development purposes; utilizing its own capital and other funds raised by it; encouraging private investment; assisting member countries in efficient use of their resources; and providing technical assistance for the implementation of development plans and projects. Id. § 2.
5 We explicitly left this issue open in Broadbent v. Organization of Am. States, 628 F.2d 27, 32-33 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
6 We accordingly disapprove of the contrary holding in Rendall- Speranza v. Nassim, 932 F. Supp. 19, 23-25 (D.D.C. 1996).