Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-jn8rn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T09:39:56.280Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 October 2007

David H. Bearce
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh, E-mail: dhb12@pitt.edu
Stacy Bondanella
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh, E-mail: smb39@pitt.edu
Get access

Abstract

This article explores the constructivists' institutional socialization hypothesis, positing that intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) make member-state interests more similar over time, thus promoting interest convergence. We first show how this hypothesis can be tested systematically using relatively new data on dyadic interest similarity and joint structured IGO membership, and then we conduct a series of empirical tests. Our results show strong statistical support for the institutional socialization hypothesis, using both global and more restricted regional samples. We also demonstrate how our results are consistent with a longer-term socialization process and cannot be explained by the short-term effect of institutional information. Finally, we show some limits to the institutional socialization hypothesis. Unstructured IGOs reveal no effect in promoting member-state interest convergence. Following recent theory arguing that great powers in the international system often use IGOs for coercive means, we find that institutional socialization gets weaker as the power imbalance within the dyad grows.Thanks to Chuck Boehmer, Heather Elko McKibben, Kate Floros, Erik Gartzke, Chuck Gochman, Michael Goodhart, Yoram Haftel, Volker Krause, Dan London, Andrew Long, Ed Mansfield, Lisa Martin, Tim Nordstrom, Zeki Sarigil, Meg Shannon, Dan Thomas, Lora Viola, Basak Yavcan, and two anonymous reviewers for data, comments, and/or helpful suggestions.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2007 The IO Foundation and Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Acharya, Amitav. 2001. Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order. New York: Routledge.
Achen, Christopher H. 2000. Why Lagged Dependent Variables Can Suppress the Explanatory Power of Other Independent Variables. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Political Methodology, July, Los Angeles.
Achen, Christopher H. 2005. Let's Put Garbage-Can Regressions and Garbage-Can Probits Where They Belong. Conflict Management and Peace Science 22 (4):32739.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Altfeld, Michael F., and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. 1979. Choosing Sides in Wars. International Studies Quarterly 23 (1):87112.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Axelrod, Robert, and Robert O. Keohane. 1986. Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions. In Cooperation under Anarchy, edited by Kenneth Oye, 22645. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Barnett, Michael, and F. Gregory Gause, III 1998. Caravans in Opposite Directions: Society, State and the Development of a Community in the Gulf Cooperation Council. In Security Communities, edited by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 16197. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bearce, David H. 2003. Grasping the Commercial Institutional Peace. International Studies Quarterly 47 (3):34770.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bearce, David H., Kristen M. Flanagan, and Katharine M. Floros. 2006. Alliances, Internal Information, and Military Conflict Among Member-States. International Organization 60 (3):595625.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bearce, David H., and Sawa Omori. 2005. How Do Commercial Institutions Promote Peace? Journal of Peace Research 42 (6):65978.Google Scholar
Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan N. Katz. 2001. Throwing out the Baby with the Bath Water: A Comment on Green, Kim, and Yoon. International Organization 55 (2):48795.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bennett, D. Scott, and Allan Stam. 2000. EUGene: A Conceptual Manual. International Interactions 26 (2):179204.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beyers, Jan. 2005. Multiple Embeddedness and Socialization in Europe: The Case of Council Officials. International Organization 59 (4):899936.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beyers, Jan, and Guido Dierickx. 1998. The Working Groups of the Council of the European Union: Supranational or Intergovernmental Negotiations? Journal of Common Market Studies 36 (3):289317.Google Scholar
Boehmer, Charles, Erik Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom. 2004. Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace? World Politics 57 (1):138.Google Scholar
Checkel, Jeffrey T. 1998. The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory. World Politics 50 (2):32448.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Checkel, Jeffrey T. 1999. Social Construction and Integration. Journal of European Public Policy 6 (4):54560.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Checkel, Jeffrey T. 2005. International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework. International Organization 59 (4):80126.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davidson, Russell, and James G. MacKinnon. 1993. Estimation and Inference in Econometrics. New York: Oxford University Press.
Fama, Eugene F. 1991. Efficient Capital Markets II. Journal of Finance 46 (5):1575617.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fearon, James D. 1995. Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization 49 (3):379414.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Finnemore, Martha. 1996. National Interests in International Society. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Gartzke, Erik. 1998. Kant We All Just Get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic Peace. American Journal of Political Science 42 (1):127.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gartzke, Erik. 2000. Preferences and the Democratic Peace. International Studies Quarterly 44 (2):191212.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gartzke, Erik, and Dong-Joon Jo. 2002. United Nations General Assembly Voting, 1946–1996. Version 3.0. Available at 〈http://www.columbia.edu/∼eg589/datasets.htm〉. Accessed 17 June 2007.
Gartzke, Erik, Timothy Nordstrom, Charles Boehmer, and J. Joseph Hewitt. 2006. Peace by the Numbers: Disaggregating IGOs in Time and Space. Working paper. New York: Columbia University.
Gibler, Douglas M., and Meredith Reid Sarkees. 2004. Measuring Alliances: the Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Data Set: 1816–2000. Journal of Peace Research 41 (2):21122.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. 2002. Expanded Trade and GDP Data. Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (5):71224.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldstein, Judith, and Robert O. Keohane, eds. 1993. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Gruber, Lloyd. 2000. Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Hooghe, Liesbet. 2005. Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission. International Organization 59 (4):86198.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jaggers, Keith, and Ted Robert Gurr. 1995. Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data. Journal of Peace Research 32 (4):46982.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jepperson, Ronald L., Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein. 1996. Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security. In The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, 3378. New York: Columbia University Press.
Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2001. Treating International Institutions as Social Environments. International Studies Quarterly 45 (4):487515.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2005. Conclusions and Extensions: Towards Mid-Range Theorizing and Beyond Europe. International Organization 59 (4):101344.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Katzenstein, Peter J., Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner. 1998. International Organization and the Study of World Politics. International Organization 52 (4):64585.Google Scholar
Keele, Luke, and Nathan J. Kelly. 2006. Dynamic Models for Dynamic Theories: The Ins and Outs of Lagged Dependent Variables. Political Analysis 14 (2):186205.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kelley, Judith. 2004. International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions. International Organization 58 (3):42557.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Keohane, Robert O. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Kim, Soo Yeon, and Bruce Russett. 1996. The New Politics of Voting Alignments in the United Nations General Assembly. International Organization 50 (4):62952.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kowert, Paul, and Jeffrey W. Legro. 1996. Norms, Identity, and their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise. In The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, 45197. New York: Columbia University Press.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1983a. Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables. In International Regimes, edited by Stephen D. Krasner, 35568. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1983b. Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables. In International Regimes, edited by Stephen D. Krasner, 121. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Lakatos, Imre. 1970. Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs. In Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, 91196. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. 1972. Expectations and the Neutrality of Money. Journal of Economic Theory 4 (2):10324.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maddison, Angus. 1995. Monitoring the World Economy, 1820–1992. Paris: Centre for Development Studies, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Martin, Lisa L., and Beth A. Simmons. 1998. Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions. International Organization 52 (4):72957.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Oneal, John R., and Bruce Russett. 1999. Is the Liberal Peace Just an Artifact of Cold War Interests? Assessing Recent Critiques. International Interactions 25 (3):21341.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Oneal, John R., and Bruce Russett. 2000. Trade Data Version 1.0. Available from EUGene, Expected Utility Data Management Program. [computer file]. D. Scott Bennet and Allan C. Stam III. 〈http://eugenesoftware.org〉.
Ray, James Lee. 2003. Explaining Interstate Conflict and War: What Should We Control For? Conflict Management and Peace Science 20 (1):131.Google Scholar
Schweller, Randall L., and David Priess. 1997. A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate. Mershon International Studies Review 41 (1):132.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Signorino, Curtis S., and Jeffrey M. Ritter. 1999. Tau-b or Not Tau-b: Measuring the Similarity of Foreign Policy Positions. International Studies Quarterly 43 (1):11544.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. 1972. Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965. In Peace, War, and Numbers, edited by Bruce Russett, 1948. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications.
Summers, Robert, and Alan Heston. 1991. The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950–1987. NBER Working Paper R1562. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Thompson, Alexander. 2006. Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission. International Organization 60 (1):134.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Voeten, Erik. 2000. Clashes in the Assembly. International Organization 54 (2):185215.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Wendt, Alexander. 1994. Collective Identity Formation and the International State. American Political Science Review 88 (2):38496.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zürn, Michael, and Jeffrey T. Checkel. 2005. Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: Constructivism and Rationalism, Europe and the Nation-State. International Organization 59 (4):104579.CrossRefGoogle Scholar