Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-jkksz Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T23:05:52.578Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Too Late to Apologize? Collateral Damage, Post-Harm Compensation, and Insurgent Violence in Iraq

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 June 2020

Get access

Abstract

A key piece of conventional wisdom among scholars of modern armed conflict is that collateral damage is often strategically costly in war. Yet most combatants already know this and take actions after mistakes—most prominently, the distribution of “condolence payments” to civilian victims—in order to mitigate these costs. Do these payments work? This question is important not only for policymakers but also for deeper theoretical debates about how civilians respond to combatant signals in war. To examine these issues, I use micro-level conflict event data on 4,046 condolence payments made by Coalition forces to civilian victims during the Iraq War from 2004 to 2008, matching it with corresponding data on collateral damage and insurgent violence. The results of this analysis reveal that post-harm compensation does significantly diminish local rates of insurgent violence, and that this is true across different types of payments (cash handouts or in-kind assistance). Ultimately, these patterns can be best explained by a rationalist mechanism in which civilians update their beliefs about violent events based on new information about combatants’ wartime intentions. The results thus provide a compelling strategic rationale for combatants to compensate their victims in war, and suggest that civilians are not blinded to new information about conflict dynamics by their preexisting biases.

Type
Research Note
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2020

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Aiko, Rose. 2015. Effect of Police Integrity, Government Performance in Fighting Crime, and Accessibility of Police Stations on Reporting of Crime in Tanzania. Afro Barometer. Available at <http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/ab_r6_policypaperno20.pdf>..>Google Scholar
Benmelech, Efaim, Berrebi, Claude, and Klor, Esteban F.. 2015. Counter-Suicide-Terrorism. The Journal of Politics 77 (1):2743.Google Scholar
Berman, Eli, Felter, Joseph H., Shapiro, Jacob N., and Troland, Erin. 2013. Modest, Secure, and Informed. The American Economic Review 103 (3):512–17.Google Scholar
Berman, Eli, Shapiro, Jacob, and Felter, Joseph H.. 2011. Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? Journal of Political Economy 119 (4):766819.Google Scholar
Biddle, Stephen, Friedman, Jeffrey A., and Shapiro, Jacob N.. 2012. Testing the Surge. International Security 37 (1):740.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Borch, Frederic L. 2001. Judge Advocates in Combat. Office of the Judge Advocate General / Center of Military History, United States Army.Google Scholar
Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC). 2009. Losing the People. Available from <http://civiliansinconflict.org/resources/pub/losing-the-people>..>Google Scholar
Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC). 2013. Monetary Payments for Civilian Harm in International and National Practice. Available at <http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/Valuation_Final_Oct_2013pdf.pdf>..>Google Scholar
Condra, Luke N., and Shapiro, Jacob N.. 2012. Who Takes the Blame? American Journal of Political Science 56 (1):167–87.Google Scholar
Crawford, Neta. 2013. Accountability for Killing: Moral Responsibility for Collateral Damage in America's Post-9/11 Wars. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Johnston, Patrick B., and Sarbahi, Anoop K.. 2016. The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan. International Studies Quarterly 60 (2):203–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kalyvas, Stathis N., and Kocher, Matthew Adam. 2007. How “Free” is Free Riding in Civil Wars? World Politics 59 (2):177216.Google Scholar
Lyall, Jason. 2010. Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents? American Political Science Review 104 (1):120.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lyall, Jason. 2019. Civilian Casualties, Humanitarian Aid, and Insurgent Violence in Civil Wars. International Organization 73 (4):901–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lyall, Jason, Blair, Graeme, and Imai, Kosuke. 2013. Explaining Support for Combatants During Wartime. American Political Science Review 107 (4):679705.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schutte, Sebastian. 2016. Violence and Civilian Loyalties. Journal of Conflict Resolution 61 (8):1595–625.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Silverman, Daniel. 2018. Seeing Is Disbelieving: The Depths and Limits of Factual Misperception in War. Paper presented at MPSA Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL.Google Scholar
Sloboda, John, Dardagan, Hamit, Spagat, Michael, and Hicks, Madelyn Hsiao-Rei. 2013. Iraq Body Count. In Counting Civilian Casualties: An Introduction to Recording and Estimating Nonmilitary Deaths in Conflict, edited by Seybolt, Taylor B., Aronson, Jay D., and Fischhoff, Baruch, 5376. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tracy, Jonathan. 2007. Responsibility to Pay. Human Rights Brief 15:1657.Google Scholar
Witt, John Fabian. 2007. Form and Substance in the Law of Counterinsurgency Damages. Loyola of L.A. Law Review 41 (4):1455–82.Google Scholar
Supplementary material: Link

Silverman Dataset

Link
Supplementary material: PDF

Silverman supplementary material

Silverman supplementary material

Download Silverman supplementary material(PDF)
PDF 199.4 KB