Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gvvz8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-28T03:02:18.051Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 April 2017

Emilie M. Hafner-Burton ,
Stephan Haggard ,
David A. Lake  and
David G. Victor
Get access

Abstract

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Introduction
Information
International Organization , Volume 71 , Supplement S1 , April 2017 , pp. S1 - S31
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2017 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Akerlof, George A., and Yellen, Janet L.. 1990. The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 105 (2):255–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alevy, Jonathan E., Haigh, Michael S., and List, John A.. 2007. Information Cascades: Evidence from a Field Experiment with Financial Market Professionals. Journal of Finance 62 (1):151–80.Google Scholar
Allais, Maurice. 1953. Le Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de l'Ecole Americaine. Econometrica 21 (4):503–46.Google Scholar
Allison, Graham T. 1971. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Little, Brown.Google Scholar
Alpert, Marc, and Raiffa, Howard. 1982. A Progress Report on the Training of Probability Assessors. In Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, edited by Kahneman, Daniel, Tversky, Amos, and Slovic, Paul, 294–305. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Andreoni, James. 1995. Cooperation in Public Goods Games: Kindness or Confusion? American Economic Review 85 (4):891–904.Google Scholar
Ardanaz, Martin, Murillo, M. Victoria, and Pinto, Pablo M.. 2013. Sensitivity to Issue Framing on Trade Policy Preferences: Evidence from a Survey Experiment. International Organization 67 (2):411–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aumann, Robert. 1976. Agreeing to Disagree. Annals of Statistics 4 (6):1236–39.Google Scholar
Aumann, Robert, and Brandenburger, Adam. 1995. Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium. Econometrica 63 (5):1161–80.Google Scholar
Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
Banks, Jeffrey S. 1990. Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games. American Journal of Political Science 34 (3):599–614.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barberis, Nicholas, Shleifer, Andrei, and Vishny, Robert. 1998. A Model of Investor Sentiment. Journal of Financial Economics 49 (3):307–43.Google Scholar
Bayram, A. Burcu. 2011. Collective Identity and International Law: The Individual Psychology of Compliance. Unpublished manuscript, University of Texas, Arlington, Texas.Google Scholar
Bayram, A. Burcu. 2016a. Good Europeans? How European Identity and Costs Interact to Explain Compliance with European Union Law. Journal of European Public Policy. Available at: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501763.2015.1114659>.Google Scholar
Bayram, A. Burcu. 2016b. Aiding Strangers: Generalized Trust and the Moral Basis of Public Support for Foreign Development. Foreign Policy Analysis. First published online 7 May at <http://fpa.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2016/06/07/fpa.orw008>.Google Scholar
Bayram, A. Burcu. 2017. Due Deference: Cosmopolitan Social Identity and the Psychology of Legal obligation in International Politics. In The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations, supplement, International Organization 71 (S1):S137–63.Google Scholar
Bechara, Antoine, Damasio, Hanna, and Damasio, Antonio R.. 2000. Emotion, Decision Making and the Orbitofrontal Cortex. Cerebral Cortex 10 (3):295–307.Google Scholar
Bendor, Jonathan, and Hammond, Thomas H.. 1992. Rethinking Allison's Models. American Political Science Review 86 (2):301–22.Google Scholar
Berejikian, Jeffrey D. 2002. A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence. Journal of Peace Research 39 (2):165–83.Google Scholar
Biersteker, Thomas J., and Weber, Cynthia, eds. 1996. State Sovereignty as Social Construct. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Blainey, Geoffrey. 1973. The Causes of War. London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Bleiker, Roland, and Hutchison, Emma. 2008. Fear No More: Emotions and World Politics. Review of International Studies 34 (S1):115–35.Google Scholar
Broude, Tomer. 2015. Behavioral International Law. University of Pennsylvania Law Review 163 (4):1099–157.Google Scholar
Burgoon, Brian A., and Hiscox, Michael J.. 2004. The Mysterious Case of Female Protectionism: Gender Bias in Attitudes Toward International Trade. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August, Philadelphia, PA.Google Scholar
Byman, Daniel L., and Pollack, Kenneth M.. 2001. Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In. International Security 25 (4):107–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Camerer, Colin F. 2003. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Camerer, Colin F., Ho, Teck-Hua, and Chong, Juin-Kuan. 2002. Sophisticated Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games. Journal of Economic Theory 104 (1):137–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Camerer, Colin F., Ho, Teck-Hua, and Chong, Juin-Kuan. 2003. Models of Thinking, Learning, and Teaching in Games. American Economic Review 93 (2):192–95.Google Scholar
Camerer, Colin F., Ho, Teck-Hua, and Chong, Juin-Kuan. 2004. A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (3):861–98.Google Scholar
Camerer, Colin F., Loewenstein, George, and Prelec, Drazen. 2005. Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics. Journal of Economic Literature 43 (1):9–64.Google Scholar
Camerer, Colin F., Dreber, Anna, Forsell, Eskil, Ho, Teck-Hua, Huber, Jürgen, Johannesson, Magnus, Kirchler, Michael, et al. 2016. Evaluating Replicability of Laboratory Experiments in Economics. Science 351 (6280):1433–36.Google Scholar
Checkel, Jeffrey T. 1998. The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory. World Politics 50 (2):324–48.Google Scholar
Chi, Michelene T.H., Glaser, Robert, and Rees, Ernest. 1982. Expertise in Problem Solving. In Advances in the Psychology of Human Intelligence, Vol. 1, edited by Sternberg, Robert J., 7–75. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.Google Scholar
Colgan, Jeff D. 2013. Domestic Revolutionary Leaders and International Conflict. World Politics 65 (4):656–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coller, Maribeth, and Williams, Melonie B.. 1999. Eliciting Individual Discount Rates. Experimental Economics 2 (2):107–27.Google Scholar
Conlisk, John. 1996. Why Bounded Rationality? Journal of Economic Literature 34 (2):669–700.Google Scholar
Costa-Gomes, Miguel A., and Crawford, Vincent P.. 2006. Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study. American Economic Review 96 (5):1737–68.Google Scholar
Crawford, Neta C. 2009. Human Nature and World Politics: Rethinking “Man.” International Relations 23 (2):271–88.Google Scholar
Croco, Sarah E. 2011. The Decider's Dilemma: Leader Culpability, War Outcomes, and Domestic Punishment. American Political Science Review 105 (3):457–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davis, James W. Jr. 2000. Threats and Promises: The Pursuit of International Influence. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
Debs, Alexandre, and Goemans, H.E.. 2010. Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War. American Political Science Review 104 (3):430–45.Google Scholar
Debs, Alexandre, and Monteiro, Nuno P.. 2014. Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War. International Organization 68 (1):1–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
DellaVigna, Stefano. 2009. Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field. Journal of Economic Literature 47 (2):315–72.Google Scholar
Edelstein, David M. 2002. Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs About Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers. Security Studies 12 (1):1–40.Google Scholar
El-Gamal, Mahmoud A., and Grether, David M.. 1995. Are People Bayesian? Uncovering Behavioral Strategies. Journal of the American Statistical Association 90 (432):1137–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Engelmann, Dirk, and Strobel, Martin. 2004. Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments. American Economic Review 94 (4):857–69.Google Scholar
Farnham, Barbara. 1994. Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Fearon, James D. 1994. Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. American Political Science Review 88 (3):577–92.Google Scholar
Fearon, James D. 1998. Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation. International Organization 52 (2):269–305.Google Scholar
Fearon, James D., and Wendt, Alexander. 2002. Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View. In Handbook of International Relations, edited by Carlsnaes, Walter, Risse, Thomas, and Simmons, Beth, 52–72. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Google Scholar
Fehr, Ernst, and Camerer, Colin F.. 2007. Social Neuroeconomics: The Neural Circuitry of Social Preferences. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (10):419–427.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Fehr, Ernst, and Schmidt, Klaus M.. 1999. A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (3):817–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fehr, Ernst, and Gächter, Simon, 2000. Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments. The American Economic Review 90 (4):980–94.Google Scholar
Fey, Mark, and Ramsay, Kristopher W.. 2011. Uncertainty and Incentives in Crisis Bargaining: Game-Free Analysis of International Conflict. American Journal of Political Science 55 (1):149–69.Google Scholar
Finnemore, Martha. 1996. National Interests in International Society. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Finnemore, Martha, and Sikkink, Kathryn. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organization 52 (4):887–917.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fischbacher, Urs, Gächter, Simon, and Ernst Fehr, . 2001. Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence From a Public Goods Experiment. Economics Letters 71 (3):397–404.Google Scholar
Fisman, Raymond, Jakiela, Pamela, Kariv, Shachar, and Markovits, Daniel. 2015. The Distributional Preferences of an Elite. Science 349 (6254), doi:10.1126/science.aab0096.Google Scholar
Fowler, James H., and Kam, Cindy D.. 2006. Patience as a Political Virtue: Delayed Gratification and Turnout. Political Behavior 28 (2):113–28.Google Scholar
Fowler, James H., and Kam, Cindy D.. 2007. Beyond the Self: Social Identity, Altruism, and Political Participation. Journal of Politics 69 (3):813–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frederick, Shane, Loewenstein, George, and O'Donoghue, Ted. 2002. Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review. Journal of Economic Literature 40 (2):351–401.Google Scholar
Frieden, Jeffry A. 1999. Actors and Preferences in International Relations. In Strategic Choice and International Relations, edited by Lake, David A. and Powell, Robert, 39–76. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Frieden, Jeffry A., and Rogowski, Ronald. 1996. The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview. In Internationalization and Domestic Politics, edited by Keohane, Robert O. and Milner, Helen V., 25–47. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Galbraith, Jean. 2013. Treaty Options: Towards a Behavioral Understanding of Treaty Design. Virginia Journal of International Law 53 (2):309–63.Google Scholar
Geanakoplos, John. 1992. Common Knowledge. Journal of Economic Perspectives 6 (4):53–82.Google Scholar
Goldstein, Judith, Margalit, Yotam, and Rivers, Douglas. 2008. Producer, Consumer, Family Member: The Relationship Between Trade Attitudes and Family Status. Paper prepared for the Conference on Domestic Preferences and Foreign Economic Policy, Princeton University, April, Princeton, NJ.Google Scholar
Gourevitch, Peter A. 1999. The Governance Problem in International Relations. In Strategic Choice and International Relations, edited by Lake, David A. and Powell, Robert, 137–64. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Gries, Peter Hays. 2004. China's New Nationalism. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Guisinger, Alexandra. 2014. Racial Diversity and Redistribution: Explaining (White) Americans’ Continued Support for Trade Protection. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August, Washington DC.Google Scholar
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Hughes, D. Alex, and Victor, David G.. 2013. The Cognitive Revolution and the Political Psychology of Elite Decision Making. Perspectives on Politics 11 (2):368–86.Google Scholar
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., LeVeck, Brad L., Victor, David G.. 2016a. How Activists Perceive the Utility of International Law. Journal of Politics 78 (1):167–80.Google Scholar
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., LeVeck, Brad L., Victor, David G.. 2016b. No False Promises: How the Prospect of Non-Compliance Affects Elite Preferences for International Cooperation. International Studies Quarterly doi:10.1093/isq/sqw047 Google Scholar
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., LeVeck, Brad L., Victor, David G., and Fowler, James H.. 2014. Decision Maker Preferences for International Legal Cooperation. International Organization 68 (4):845–76.Google Scholar
Haidt, Jonathan. 2012. The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. New York: Vintage Books.Google Scholar
Haigh, Michael S., and List, John A.. 2005. Do Professional Traders Exhibit Myopic Loss Aversion? An Experimental Analysis. Journal of Finance 60 (1):523–34.Google Scholar
Halevy, Yoram. 2007. Ellsberg Revisited: An Experimental Study. Econometrica 75 (2):503–36.Google Scholar
Hall, Rodney B. 1999. National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International Systems. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
Hall, Todd H., and Ross, Andrew A.G.. 2015. Affective Politics after 9/11. International Organization 69 (4):847–79.Google Scholar
Hall, Todd, and Yarhi-Milo, Keren. 2012. The Personal Touch: Leaders’ Impressions, Costly Signaling, and Assessments of Sincerity in International Affairs. International Studies Quarterly 56 (3):560–73.Google Scholar
Harsanyi, John C. 1967. Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I-III. Part I. The Basic Model. Management Science 14 (3):159–82.Google Scholar
Harvey, Frank P. 2012. Explaining the Iraq War: Counterfactual Theory, Logic, and Evidence. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Hemmer, Christopher M. 2000. Which Lessons Matter? American Foreign Policy Decision-Making in the Middle East, 1979–1987. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Herrmann, Richard K. 2009. Perceptions and Behavior in Soviet Foreign Policy. Pittsburgh, PN: University of Pittsburgh Press.Google Scholar
Herrmann, Richard K. 2017. How Attachments to the Nation Shape Beliefs About the World: A Theory of Motivated Reasoning. In The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations, supplement, International Organization 71 (S1):S61–S84.Google Scholar
Herrmann, Richard K., and Fischerkeller, Michael P.. 1995. Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model: Cognitive–Strategic Research after the Cold War. International Organization 49 (3):415–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hiscox, Michael J. 2002. International Trade and Political Conflict: Commerce, Coalitions, and Mobility. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Hiscox, Michael J. 2006. Through a Glass and Darkly: Attitudes Toward International Trade and the Curious Effects of Issue Framing. International Organization 60 (3):755–80.Google Scholar
Ho, Daniel E., and Imai, Kosuke. 2008. Estimating Causal Effects of Ballot Order from a Randomized Natural Experiment: The California Alphabet Lottery, 1978–2002. Public Opinion Quarterly 72 (2):216–40.Google Scholar
Horowitz, Michael, McDermott, Rose, and Stam, Allan C.. 2005. Leader Age, Regime Type, and Violent International Relations. Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (5):661–85.Google Scholar
Horowitz, Michael, Stam, Allan, and Ellis, Cali M.. 2015. Why Leaders Fight. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Houghton, David Patrick. 1998. Historical Analogies and the Cognitive Dimension of Domestic Policymaking. Political Psychology 19 (2):279–303.Google Scholar
Huberman, Gur. 2001. Familiarity Breeds Investment. Review of Financial Studies 14 (3):659–80.Google Scholar
Hymans, Jacques E.C. 2006. The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Janis, Irving L. 1972. Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.Google Scholar
Jervis, Robert. 1970. The Logic of Images in International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Jervis, Robert. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Jervis, Robert. 1992. Political Implications of Loss Aversion. Political Psychology 13 (2):187–204.Google Scholar
Johnson, Dominic D.P., and Fowler, James H.. 2011. The Evolution of Overconfidence. Nature 477 (7364):317–20.Google Scholar
Jolls, Christine, Sunstein, Cass R., and Thaler, Richard. 1998. A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics. Stanford Law Review 50 (5):1471–550.Google Scholar
Jupille, Joseph, Mattli, Walter, and Snidal, Duncan. 2013. Institutional Choice and Global Commerce. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Kahneman, Daniel. 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.Google Scholar
Kahneman, Daniel, and Tversky, Amos. 1979. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. Econometrica 47 (2):263–91.Google Scholar
Kahneman, Daniel, Slovic, Paul, and Tversky, Amos, eds. 1982. Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Kahneman, Daniel, Knetsch, Jack L., and Thaler, Richard H.. 1990. Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem. Journal of Political Economy 98 (6):1325–48.Google Scholar
Katzenstein, Peter J., ed. 1996. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
Kertzer, Joshua D. 2017. Resolve, Time, and Risk. In The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations, supplement, International Organization 71 (S1):S109–S136.Google Scholar
Kertzer, Joshua D., and McGraw, Kathleen M.. 2012. Folk Realism: Testing the Microfoundations of Realism in Ordinary Citizens. International Studies Quarterly 56 (2):245–58.Google Scholar
Khong, Yuen Foong. 1992. Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Klotz, Audie. 1996. Norms and Sanctions: Lessons from the Socialization of South Africa. Review of International Studies 22 (2):173–90.Google Scholar
Krasner, Stephen D. 1976. State Power and the Structure of International Trade. World Politics 28 (3):317–47.Google Scholar
Krasner, Stephen D., ed. 1983. International Regimes. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Kratochwil, Friedrich V. 1989. Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Krebs, Ronald R., and Rapport, Aaron. 2012. International Relations and the Psychology of Time Horizons. International Studies Quarterly 56 (3):530–43.Google Scholar
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Kydd, Andrew H. 2010. Learning Together, Growing Apart: Global Warming, Energy Policy and International Trust. Energy Policy 38 (6):2675–80.Google Scholar
Laibson, David. 1997. Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (2):443–78.Google Scholar
Lake, David A. 2009. Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review. Review of International Organization 4 (3):219–44.Google Scholar
Lake, David A. 2010–11. Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War. International Security 35 (3):7–52.Google Scholar
Lake, David A., and Powell, Robert. 1999. Strategic Choice and International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Larson, Deborah Welch. 1989. Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Ledyard, John. 1995. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research. In The Handbook of Experimental Economics, edited by Kagel, John and Roth, Alvin E., 111–94. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
LeVeck, Brad, Hughes, D. Alex, Fowler, James H., Hafner-Burton, Emilie, and Victor, David G.. 2014. The Role of Self-interest in Elite Bargaining. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 111 (52):18536–41.Google Scholar
Levy, Jack S. 1992a. An Introduction to Prospect Theory. Political Psychology 13 (2):171–86.Google Scholar
Levy, Jack S. 1992b. Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems. Political Psychology 13 (2):283–310.Google Scholar
Levy, Jack S. 1997. Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations. International Studies Quarterly 41 (1):87–112.Google Scholar
Lieberman, Matthew D., Schreiber, Darren, and Ochsner, Kevin N.. 2003. Is Political Cognition Like Riding a Bicycle? How Cognitive Neuroscience Can Inform Research on Political Thinking. Political Psychology 24 (4):681–704.Google Scholar
Loewenstein, George, and Elster, Jon, eds. 1992. Choice Over Time. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.Google Scholar
Loomes, Graham, Starmer, Chris, and Sugden, Robert. 1991. Observing Violations of Transitivity by Experimental Methods. Econometrica 59 (2):425–39.Google Scholar
Lopez, Anthony C., McDermott, Rose, and Petersen, Michael Bang. 2011. States in Mind: Evolution, Coalitional Psychology, and International Politics. International Security 36 (2):48–83.Google Scholar
Lu, Xiaobo, Scheve, Kenneth, and Slaughter, Matthew J.. 2012. Inequity Aversion and the International Distribution of Trade Protection. American Journal of Political Science 56 (3):638–54.Google Scholar
Mansfield, Edward D., and Mutz, Diana C.. 2009. Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety. International Organization 63 (3):425–57.Google Scholar
Massey, Cade, and Thaler, Richard H.. 2010. The Loser's Curse: Decision Making and Market Efficiency in the National Football League Draft. Working paper.Google Scholar
McDermott, Rose. 1998. Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
McDermott, Rose. 2007. Presidential Leadership, Illness, and Decision Making. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
McNamara, Kathleen. 1999. The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Mercer, Jonathan. 2005. Rationality and Psychology in International Politics. International Organization 59 (1):77–106.Google Scholar
Mercer, Jonathan. 2010. Emotional Beliefs. International Organization 64 (1):1–31.Google Scholar
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. International Organization 51 (4):513–53.Google Scholar
Nagel, Rosemarie. 1995. Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study. American Economic Review 85 (5):1313–26.Google Scholar
Naoi, Megumi, and Kume, Ikuo. 2011. Explaining Mass Support for Agricultural Protectionism: Evidence from a Survey Experiment During the Global Recession. International Organization 65 (4):771–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Neuman, Russell, Marcus, George E., Mackuen, Michael, and Crigler, Ann N., eds. 2007. The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Neustadt, Richard E., and May, Ernest R.. 1988. Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
O'Donoghue, Ted, and Rabin, Matthew. 1999. Doing It Now or Later. American Economic Review 89 (1):103–24.Google Scholar
Collaboration, Open Science. 2015. Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological Science. Science 349 (6251):943–53.Google Scholar
Pauwelyn, Joost. 2015. The Rule of Law Without the Rule of Lawyers? Why Investment Arbitrators Are from Mars, Trade Adjudicators from Venus. American Journal of International Law 109 (4):761–805.Google Scholar
Plott, Charles R., and Zeiler, Kathryn. 2005. The Willingness to Pay–Willingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations. American Economic Review 95 (3):530–45.Google Scholar
Poulsen, Lauge. 2013. When the Claim Hits: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bounded Rational Learning. World Politics 65 (2):273–313.Google Scholar
Powell, Robert. 2017. Research Bets and Behavioral IR. In The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations, supplement, International Organization 71 (S1):S265–S277.Google Scholar
Prather, Lauren. 2014. Values at the Water's Edge: Social Welfare Values and Foreign Aid. Unpublished manuscript, Stanford University, Stanford, CAGoogle Scholar
Rabin, Matthew. 1993. Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics. American Economic Review 83 (5):1281–302.Google Scholar
Rathbun, Brian C. 2009. It Takes All Types: Social Psychology, Trust, and the International Relations Paradigm in Our Minds. International Theory 1 (3):345–80.Google Scholar
Rathbun, Brian C. 2011. Before Hegemony: Generalized Trust and the Creation and Design of International Security Organizations. International Organization 65 (2):243–73.Google Scholar
Rathbun, Brian C., Kertzer, Joshua D., and Paradis, Mark. 2017. Homo Diplomaticus: Mixed-Method Evidence of Variation in Strategic Rationality. In The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations, supplement, International Organization 71 (S1):S33–S59.Google Scholar
Reiter, Dan. 1996. Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Renshon, Jonathan. 2015. Losing Face and Sinking Costs: Experimental Evidence on the Judgment of Political and Military Leaders. International Organization 69 (3):659–95.Google Scholar
Renshon, Jonathan, J. Lee, Julia, and Tingley, Dustin. 2015. Physiological Arousal and Political Beliefs. Political Psychology 36 (5):569–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Renshon, Jonathan, J. Lee, Julia, and Tingley, Dustin. 2017. Emotions and the Micro-Foundations of Commitment Problems. In The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations, supplement, International Organization 71 (S1):S189–S217.Google Scholar
Rho, Sungmin, and Tomz, Michael. 2017. Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest? In The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations, supplement, International Organization 71 (S1):S85–S108.Google Scholar
Rogowski, Ronald. 1999. Institutions as Constraints on Strategic Choice. In Strategic Choice and International Relations, edited by Lake, David A. and Powell, Robert, 115–36. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Rubinstein, Ariel. 1989. The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior Under “Almost Common Knowledge.” American Economic Review 79 (3):385–91.Google Scholar
Rubinstein, Ariel. 1998. Modeling Bounded Rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Sabet, Shahrzad. 2014. Feelings First: Non-Material Factors as Moderators of Economic Self-Interest Effects on Trade Preferences. Unpublished manuscript, Princeton University, Princeton, NJGoogle Scholar
Saunders, Elizabeth N. 2009. Transformative Choices: Leaders and the Origins of Intervention Strategy. International Security 34 (2):119–61.Google Scholar
Saunders, Elizabeth N. 2017. No Substitute for Experience: Presidents, Advisers, and Information in Group Decision Making. In The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations, supplement, International Organization 71 (S1):S219–S247.Google Scholar
Schwarz, Norbert. 2000. Emotion, Cognition, and Decision Making. Cognition and Emotion 14 (4):433–40.Google Scholar
Shafer, D. Michael. 1988. Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of US Counterinsurgency Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Simon, Herbert A. 1955. A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics 69 (1):99–118.Google Scholar
Sitaraman, Ganesh, and Zionts, David. 2015. Behavioral War Powers. New York University Law Review 90:516–88.Google Scholar
Stahl, Dale O., and Wilson, Paul W.. 1994. Experimental Evidence on Players’ Models of Other Players. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 25 (3):309–27.Google Scholar
Stahl, Dale O., and Wilson, Paul W.. 1995. On Players’ Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence. Games and Economic Behavior 10 (1):218–54.Google Scholar
Stein, Janice Gross. 1985. Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence, II: The View from Jerusalem. In Psychology and Deterrence, edited by Jervis, Robert, Ned Lebow, Richard, and Gross Stein, Janice, 60–88. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
Stein, Janice Gross, and Pauly, Louis W.. 1992. Choosing to Co-Operate: How States Avoid Loss. International Journal 47 (2):199–201.Google Scholar
Steinbruner, John D. 1977. The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Strotz, R.H. 1955. Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization. Review of Economic Studies 23 (3):165–80.Google Scholar
Suskind, Ron. 2007. The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of its Enemies Since 9/11. New York: Simon and Schuster.Google Scholar
Svenson, Ola. 1981. Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful than Our Fellow Drivers? Acta Psychologica 47 (2):143–48.Google Scholar
Tetlock, Philip E. 2005. Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Tetlock, Philipe E., and Gardner, Daniel. 2015. Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction. New York: Crown.Google Scholar
Thaler, Richard H. 1980. Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 1 (1):39–60.Google Scholar
Thaler, Richard H. 1999. Mental Accounting Matters. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 12 (3):183–206.Google Scholar
Tingley, Dustin. 2017. Rising Power on the Mind. In The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations, supplement, International Organization 71 (S1):S165–S217.Google Scholar
Tomz, Michael. 2007. Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach. International Organization 61 (4):821–40.Google Scholar
Tomz, Michael. 2008. Reputation and the Effect of International Law on Preferences and Beliefs. Working paper, Stanford University, Stanford, CAGoogle Scholar
Tversky, Amos, and Kahneman, Daniel. 1974. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Science 185 (4157):1124–32.Google Scholar
Tversky, Amos, and Kahneman, Daniel. 1992. Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5 (4):297–323.Google Scholar
Van Aaken, Anne. 2014. Behavioral International Law and Economics. Harvard International Law Journal 55 (2):421–81.Google Scholar
Wagner, R. Harrison. 2000. Bargaining and War. American Journal of Political Science 44 (3):469–84.Google Scholar
Weeks, Jessica L. 2008. Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve. International Organization 62 (1):35–64.Google Scholar
Weeks, Jessica L. 2012. Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict. American Political Science Review 106 (2):326–47.Google Scholar
Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Relations. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Wilson, Rick K. 2011. The Contribution of Behavioral Economics to Political Science. Annual Review of Political Science 14 (1):201–23.Google Scholar
Yoshida, Wako, Seymour, Ben, Friston, Karl J., and Dolan, Raymond J.. 2010. Neural Mechanisms of Belief Inference During Cooperative Games. Journal of Neuroscience 30 (32):10744–51.Google Scholar
Zimbardo, Philip G., and Boyd, John N.. 1999. Putting Time in Perspective: A Valid, Reliable Individual-Differences Metric. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 77 (6):1271–88.Google Scholar