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Burden-sharing in the Persian Gulf War

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Andrew Bennett ,
Joseph Lepgold  and
Danny Unger
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Why do states contribute to alliances? Is relative size the principal factor influencing the size of contributions, as many studies suggest, or are perceptions of threat, dependencies on other alliance members, and domestic institutions and policies equally important? These questions hold unusual interest in the wake of the cold war. The end of bipolarity promises more ad hoc coalitions, which will widen opportunities for research on alliance burden-sharing beyond the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). At the same time, because the political fault lines of the cold war have disappeared, there are few accepted political criteria for sharing those security burdens that are perceived collectively.

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Articles
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International Organization , Volume 48 , Issue 1 , Winter 1994 , pp. 39 - 75
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Copyright © The IO Foundation and Cambridge University Press 1994

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References

We thank Isabelle Grunberg, John Odell, and the referees for International Organization for perceptive, valuable comments on earlier drafts of this article. We also thank Maria Toyoda for preparing the tables and figures.

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141. “A Strange and Motley army,” The Economist.Google Scholar

142. Poll reported in Hamburg DPA broadcast 10 01 1991Google Scholar, in FBIS-WEU 11 01 1991, p. 11.Google Scholar

143. Polls reported in Hamburg DPA broadcast 15 01 1991Google Scholar, in FBIS-WEU 16 01 1991, p. 13Google Scholar, and in Berlin ADN broadcast 20 01 1991Google Scholar, in FBIS-WEU 22 01 1991, p. 22.Google Scholar

144. See “Disagreement Within Bonn Coalition About Deploying Bundeswehr in Gulf,” Frankfurter Algemeine, 16 08 1990, p. 2Google Scholar, in FBIS-WEU 17 08 1990, pp. 10–11;Google Scholar and “Bundeswehr Under U.N. Command?,” Die Welt (Hamburg), 18–19 08 1990, p. 1Google Scholar, in FBIS-WEU 20 08 1990, p. 16.Google Scholar

145. “Standing Up,” The Economist, 18 08 1990, p. 42.Google Scholar

146. Ibid. See also Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991, p. 119.

147. Hamburg DPA broadcast 15 09 1990Google Scholar, in FBIS-WEU 17 09 1990, pp. 8–9.Google Scholar

148. Putnam makes an analogous distinction between voluntary and involuntary defection from international bargains, based on whether central-state actors or domestic actors reject them. See Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics.”

149. By late August when Bush said, “This [conquest of Kuwait] will not stand,” the United States had a rhetorical commitment to a rollback, even though the material capability to implement it took months to put in place.