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Delegation, Comitology, and the Separation of Powers in the European Union

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 July 2003

Alexander Ballmann ,
David Epstein  and
Sharyn O'Halloran
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Abstract

Although relatively unknown outside of Europe, comitology committees are an object of considerable controversy in the European Union (EU). Controversy stems from their pivotal role in overseeing policy implementation authority delegated from the Council of Ministers (Council) to the European Commission (Commission). In this article, we employ a game-theoretic model to analyze the influence of these, committees on policy outcomes. Our analysis provides three important insights. First, we show that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, comitology committees move outcomes toward the Commission's preferred policies rather than the Council's. Second, we demonstrate that the possibility of a Council veto may also move outcomes away from Council members' policy preferences and toward the Commission's. Third, the 1999 changes to the comitology procedures, designed to enhance the Commission's autonomy in policymaking, may have had the exact opposite effect. Paradoxically, we conclude that comitology serves to enhance the Commission's role in policy implementation and thereby strengthens the separation of powers within the EU.

Type
Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 56 , Issue 3 , Summer 2002 , pp. 551 - 574
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2002

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