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Introduction: approaches to explaining American foreign economic policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

G. John Ikenberry ,
David A. Lake  and
Michael Mastanduno
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Extract

Despite its relative economic decline, the United States remains the dominant power in the world economy. The foreign economic actions taken by American officials, whether they involve trade, technology transfer, or the value of the dollar, continue to have profound consequences for other states in the international system, as well as for American domestic politics and economics. Thus, it is not surprising that the study of American foreign economic policy attracts considerable scholarly attention, and presently constitutes a major portion of the subfield of international political economy.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 42 , Issue 1 , Winter 1988 , pp. 1 - 14
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1988

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References

1. Examples and discussions of system-centered approaches include Kindleberger, Charles, The World in Depression (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973)Google Scholar; Keohane, Robert, “The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes,” in Ole, Holsti, Siverson, R., and George, A., eds., Change in the International System (Boulder: West-view Press, 1980)Google Scholar; Krasner, Stephen, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics 28 (04 1976), pp. 317–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lake, David A., “International Economic Structures and American Foreign Economic Policy, 1887–1934,” World Politics 35 (07 1983), pp. 517–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Snidal, Duncan, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” International Organization 39 (Autumn 1985), pp. 579–614.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2. Society-centered approaches include Schattschneider, E. E., Politics, Pressures and the Tariff (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1935)Google Scholar; Pincus, Jonathan J., Pressure Groups and Politics in Antebellum Tariffs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977)Google Scholar; McKeown, Timothy, “Firms and Tariff Regime Change: Explaining the Demand for Protection,” World Politics 36 (01 1984), pp. 215–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Gourevitch, Peter, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).Google Scholar

3. On state-centered approaches, see Katzenstein, Peter J., “Conclusion: Domestic Structures and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy,” in Katzenstein, , ed., Between Power and Plenty (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978)Google Scholar, and Small States in World Markets (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986)Google Scholar; Krasner, Stephen, Defending the National Interest (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978)Google Scholar; and Ikenberry, G. John, “The Irony of State Strength: Comparative Responses to the Oil Shocks,” International Organization 40 (Winter 1986), pp. 105–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4. Jeff Frieden's contribution to this volume is an exception, since it does not support this general finding.

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10. The classic statements of the pluralist perspective can be found in Truman, David, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York: Knopf, 1951)Google Scholar, and Dalfi, Robert, Who Governs? (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1963)Google Scholar. Subsequent revisions of the pluralist approach dispute some of its elements, but retain the essense of the society-centered focus. See Lowi, Theodore, The End of Liberalism (New York: Norton, 1969)Google Scholar, and Lindblom, Charles, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic Books, 1977).Google Scholar

11. See Schattschneider, , Politics, Pressures and the TariffGoogle Scholar; Pincus, , Antebellum TariffsGoogle Scholar; Gourevitch, Peter, “International Trade, Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873–1896,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 8 (Autumn 1977)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ferguson, Thomas, “From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the Great Depression,” International Organization 38 (Winter 1984).CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Also relevant is the growing literature on “rent-seeking” behavior. See Baldwin, Robert, The Political Economy of U.S. Import Policy (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1986)Google Scholar; Lavergne, Réal P., The Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs (New York: Academic Press, 1983).Google Scholar

12. In his latest work, Politics in Hard Times, Gourevitch attempts to address this problem by developing a more structured conception of interest groups and coalitions.

13. This point is raised by McKeown, , “Firms and Tariff Regime Change.”Google Scholar

14. Skocpol, , “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in Evans, Peter B., Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, and Skocpol, Theda, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).Google Scholar

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16. Skocpol, , “Bringing the State Back In.”Google Scholar

17. See Krasner, Stephen, “Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics,” Comparative Politics 16 (01 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and March, James and Olsen, Johan, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” American Political Science Review 78 (09 1984), pp. 734–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

18. For example, Krasner suggests that the high-level government officials (i.e., “central decision-makers”) are uniquely charged with protecting and promoting broad national security interests and thus are led to develop a distinctive and autonomous set of preferences. See Krasner, , Defending the National InterestGoogle Scholar. Alternatively, it has been argued that the preservation of bureaucratic missions and the maintenance of control over annual budgetary resources may lead state officials to adopt preferences at variance with the interests of societal groups. See Allison, Graham, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971)Google Scholar, and Halperin, Morton H., Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974).Google Scholar

19. See Krasner, , “United States Commercial and Monetary Policy”Google Scholar; Katzenstein, , “Conclusion”Google Scholar; Nettl, J. P., “The State as a Conceptual Variable,” World Politics 20 (07 1968), pp. 559–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Katznelson, Ira, “Rethinking the Silences of Social and Economic Policy,” Political Science Quarterly 101 (Summer 1986), pp. 307–25, especially 321–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

20. Recent work by Helen Milner suggests that the weak state/strong state distinction may be problematic in the comparative context as well. See Milner, , “Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the Making of Trade Policy in France and the United States during the 1970s,” International Organization 41 (Autumn 1987).CrossRefGoogle Scholar