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Public Opinion and Regional Integration

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Ronald Inglehart
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Extract

For the time being, at least, survey data is relevant to the study of regional integration chiefly insofar as it gives an indication of the influence of the public (and various elite groups) on the decisions of the respective national governments—and vice versa. As integration progresses in given regions our focus may change, and we may become primarily interested in the degree to which given groups direct support or demands toward supranational institutions. But for the present the basic question seems to be:

To what extent do public preferences constitute an effective influence on a given set of national decisionmakers, encouraging them to make decisions which increase (or diminish) regional integration?

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 24 , Issue 4 , Autumn 1970 , pp. 764 - 795
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1970

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Footnotes

1

Assistant professor of political science at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

References

1 See Easton, David, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), for a discussion of some basic concepts underlying our analysis.Google Scholar

2 See Rosenau, James N., Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: An Operational Formulation (New York: Random-House, 1961)Google Scholar.

3 See Deutsch, Karl, “Social Mobilization and Political Development,” American Political Science Review, 06 1961 (Vol. 55, No. 2), pp. 497–502CrossRefGoogle Scholar; cf. Deutsch, , Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry Into the Foundations of Nationality (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1966)Google Scholar.

4 See Lerner, Daniel, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1958)Google Scholar.

5 See Joseph Nye in this volume.

6 See Campbell, Angus, and others, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons [for the Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan], 1960), chapter 7Google Scholar.

7 See Butler, David and Stokes, Donald, Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice (London: Macmillan Co., 1969), chapter 5Google Scholar.

8 See Piaget, Jean with Weil, Anne-Marie, “The Development in Children of the Idea of the Homeland and Relations with Other Countries,” International Social Science Bulletin, Autumn 1951 (Vol. 3, No. 3), pp. 561–578Google Scholar. Cf. Johoda, Gustav, “The Development of Children's Ideas about Country and Nationality,” The British Journal of Educational Psychology, 1963 (Vol. 33, Nos. 1 and 2), pp. 47–60; 143–153CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 See Inglehart, Ronald, “An End to European Integration?” American Political Science Review, 03 1967 (Vol. 61, No. 1), pp. 91–105CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 An individual may be located on the periphery for a variety of reasons: In a short-term sense he may be there in regard to a given decision simply because he is not interested or informed on the topic. In a long-term sense he may be there because he has not attained cognitive mobilization, is below the age of political relevance, or belongs to a category which is coercively excluded from participating in the decisionmaking process.

11 For our purposes defined as individuals who normally transmit the preferences of the unorganized public to the actual decisionmakers and as such occupy positions of above-average influence—especially elected representatives and governmental officials but also leaders of labor, business, agricultural, scientific, military, and other groups.

12 See Inglehart, , American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 1Google Scholar; cf. Abramson, Paul and Inglehart, Ronald, “The Development of Systemic Support in Four Western Democracies,” Comparative Political Studies, 01 1970 (Vol. 2, No. 4)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Merelman, Richard, “Learning and Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review, 09 1966 (Vol. 60, No. 3), pp. 548–561CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 Another interesting (and related) line of investigation lies in the analysis of monochrome correlations between public opinion and the perceptions, preferences, and behavior of elite representatives. This approach clarifies only part of the process—the elite-mass linkage—but has the advantage of immediate feasibility. For an example see Miller, Warren and Stokes, Donald, “Constituency Influences in Congress,” in Campbell, Angus, and others, Elections and the Political Order (New York: John Wiley & Sons [for the Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan], 1966)Google Scholar.

14 See Lindberg, Leon and Scheingold, Stuart, Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns in the European Community (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1970)Google Scholar.

15 The term is from Lindberg and Scheingold.

16 This data is from United States Information Agency (USIA) surveys of 1952 through 1962, reported in Merritt, Richard L. and Puchala, Donald J.Western European Perspectives on International Affairs: Public Opinion Studies and Evaluation (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 283–285Google Scholar. This book contains a rich collection of additional background data on the subject. The above remarks are also based on supplementary data from a 1962 survey (using the same item) sponsored by the European Communities Information Service and similar data from the 1964 USIA, surveys, tabulated by myself. For additional evidence concerning die development of public support for European political integration over the past ten years see Rabier, Jacques-René, L'opinion publique et l'Europe (Brussels: Institute of Sociology, University of Brussels, 1966)Google Scholar; Deutschland und die Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Allensbach: Institüt für Demoskopie, 1967)Google Scholar; and Bissery, Jacqueline, L'opinion des français sur le Marché commun et l'unification européenne (Paris: L'Institute français d'opinion publique, 1968)Google Scholar.

17 A tree analysis of predictors of pro-European attitudes based on survey data from Britain, France, Germany, and Italy gathered in 1963 and in 1968 bears this out while suggesting the growing importance of a cleavage between the publics of the United Kingdom and the European community. See Inglehart, Ronald, “Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity,” Comparative Politics, 10 1970 (Vol. 3, No. 1), pp. 47–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 The 1955–1967 figures are from Deutschland und die Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Table 10; 1967 figures are from Die Einstellung der deutschen Jugend zur Vereinigung Europas (Allensbach: Institüt für Demoskopie, 1967)Google Scholar; 1968 figures are from a cross-national pilot survey undertaken by Leon Lindberg, Stuart Scheingold, and myself; 1970 figures are from a cross-national survey sponsored by the European Communities Information Service.

19 Data for 1957 is calculated from tables in Merritt and Puchala; 1962–1966 data appears in Rabier, p. 24; 1968 and 1970 figures are from the respective sources cited in the preceding footnote.

20 See Deutsch, Karl, and others, France, Germany and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), p. 280Google Scholar; cf. Deutsch, Karl, Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance: Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967)Google Scholar. Deutsch's samples consisted of leaders in the fields of business, politics, administration, journalism, and academic life—men who, while not the actual decisionmakers themselves, were reputedly influential in the national political system.

21 Ibid., p. 27. Deutsch reports that only 7 percent of the French and 3 percent of the German elites indicated that they did not wish to strengthen either European or NATO institutions (ibid., p. 122).

22 Lerner, Daniel and Gorden, Morton, Euratlantica: Changing Perspectives of the European Elites (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1969)Google Scholar, chapter 5. These elite samples are drawn from approximately the same groups as those interviewed by Deutsch, and others.

23 We should not, however, ignore indications of a gradual expansion of the scope of European decisionmaking activities: See Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold.

24 Greenstein, Fred I., “The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush,” American Political Science Review, 09 1967 (Vol. 61, No. 3), pp. 629–641CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

25 The phrase is from Tucker, Robert C., The Soviet Political Mind: Studies in Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change (Praeger Publications in Russian History and World Communism) (New York: Fredcrick A. Praeger, 1963)Google Scholar, cited in ibid, p. 634.

26 This corresponds approximately to Karl Deutsch's definition of “will”: the closure of a communications network against new messages. See Deutsch, , The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control (New York: Free Press, 1963)Google Scholar.

27 Deutsch, , Arms Control, p. 58Google Scholar.

28 Inglehart, Ronald, “Trends and Non-Trends in the Western Alliance: A Review,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 03 1968 (Vol. 12, No. 1), p. 128Google Scholar.

29 See Lancelot, Alain, “Comment ont voté les français le 27 avril et les ler et 15 juin 1969,” Projet, 09–10 1969 (No. 39), pp. 926–947Google Scholar.

30 Our use of the terms “parochial” and “cosmopolitan” is based on Daniel Lerner's classic work cited above.

31 See Inglehart, , Comparative Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 47–72Google Scholar.

32 See Inglehart, , American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 3Google Scholar. This article was based on secondary analysis of cross-national public opinion surveys carried out in 1962 (sponsored by the European Communities Information Service) and in 1963 (sponsored by die Reader's Digest Association). For descriptions of this data and a presentation of some findings see, respectively, Journal of Common Market Studies, 11 1963 (Vol. 2, No. 4)Google Scholar, and Products and Peoples (London: Reader's Digest Association, 1963)Google Scholar.

33 The items asked were: 1) “Are you in favour of, or against, Britain joining the Common Market?” 2) “Assuming (in these next four questions) that Britain did join, would you be for or against the evolution of the Common Market towards the political formation of a United States of Europe?” 3) “Would you be in favour of, or against, the election of a European parliament by direct universal suffrage; that is, a parliament elected by all the voters in the member countries?” 4) “Would you be willing to accept, over and above the British Government, a European Government responsible for a common policy in foreign affairs, defence and the economy?” 5) “If a President of a United States of Europe were being elected by popular vote, would you be willing to vote for a candidate not of your own country, if his personality and programme corresponded more closely to your ideas than those of the candidates from your own country?”

34 Evidence exists that those who take a minority position in regard to prevailing norms are relatively likely to give “no response” to relevant survey items. Thus, for example, support for the French Communist party is consistently and substantially underrepresented in surveys as compared with its actual vote in elections. For a theoretical treatment see McCroskey, James, and others, “The Significance of the Neutral Point on Semantic Differential Scales,” Public Opinion Quarterly, Winter 1967–1968 (Vol. 31, No. 4), pp. 642–645CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In previous research we found that the older cohorts who give a relatively high nonresponse rate on European integration proposals seem relatively likely to shift from support to neutrality or from neutrality into opposition in the face of events which weaken overall support (and hence, the strength of the majoritarian norm). This finding seems consistent with our interpretation, according to which these older cohorts have underlying orientations less supportive of European integration: In a relative sense they tend to be “fair-weather friends.” See Inglehart, , American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 1, pp. 91–105CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

35 Similarly, the importance of this internal conflict may have reduced the pressure on the oldest age-group (the presumed “fair-weather friends” of internationalism) to conform to post-World War II internationalist norms—which might account for the surprisingly large gap between them and the next younger age-group. Our data, which has just become available, permits certain more detailed analyses which might shed light on this question (as well as the nonresponse problem); we have not yet undertaken these analyses. Nevertheless, we felt it would be interesting to present at least the broad outlines of the most recent cross-national survey on the subject.

36 Nor are youth necessarily more internationalistic: In the mid-1950's the youngest adult cohort gave only moderately favorable responses, at least in France; only in the 1960's—when the post-World War II cohorts began to reach maturity—did the youngest age-group begin to show the highest level of Europeanness. See Bissery, pp. 43–45.

37 See Cutler, Neal E., The Alternative Effects of Generations and Aging Upon Political Behavior: A Cohort Analysis of American Attitudes toward Foreign Policy, 1946–1966 (Oak Ridge, Tenn: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1968)Google Scholar.

38 Cross-sectional analysis of these three national samples also revealed age-group differences in the predicted direction. See Inglehart, Ronald, “Regional Integration, Political Development and Public Opinion,” paper presented at Conference on Regional Integration, Madison, Wisconsin, 04 24–26, 1969Google Scholar.

39 Text of questions: 1) “If a United States of Europe were being established, would you be for or against having Britain become a part of it?” 2) “Would you be for or against having the British army become part of one unified European army?” 3) “Do you think that the government of a United States of Europe should have the right to overrule the government of Great Britain on some important matters?”

40 See Merritt and Puchala for additional evidence.

41 See marginals from Survey Research Center surveys, 1952–1968.

42 See Angus Campbell, and others, The American Voter, chapter 7; cf. Philip Converse and Georges Dupeux, “Politicization of the Electorate in the US and France,” in Angus Campbell, and others, Elections.

43 If this is the case, further analysis should show two relatively distinct dimensions appearing in British responses, corresponding to these two sets of orientations.

44 See Gallup Political Index (London), 12 1969 (No. 116)Google Scholar.

45 Ibid. Only 13 percent said it would be bad.

46 The latter item was asked only a minute or two after the one concerning entry into the Common Market.

47 See Inglehart, Ronald, “The New Europeans: Inward or Outward Looking?” International Organization, Winter 1970 (Vol. 24, No. 1), pp. 129–139CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

48 The economic arguments are less than persuasive: In October 1969, 81 percent of a sample of 92 British financiers and bankers—a group presumably well informed on the probable long-term economic effects—were favorable to British entry. See Grand Bretagne et Marché commun (Paris: Agence économique et financière, 03 1970)Google Scholar.