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Regime design matters: intentional oil pollution and treaty compliance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Ronald B. Mitchell
Ronald B. Mitchell
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Oregon, Eugene.
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Abstract

Whether a treaty elicits compliance from governments or nonstate actors depends upon identifiable characteristics of the regime's compliance systems. Within the international regime controlling intentional oil pollution, a provision requiring tanker owners to install specified equipment produced dramatically higher levels of compliance than a provision requiring tanker operators to limit their discharges. Since both provisions entailed strong economic incentives for violation and regulated the same countries over the same time period, the variance in compliance clearly can be attributed to different features of the two subregimes. The equipment requirements' success stemmed from establishing an integrated compliance system that increased transparency, provided for potent and credible sanctions, reduced implementation costs to governments by building on existing infrastructures, and prevented violations rather than merely deterring them.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 48 , Issue 3 , Summer 1994 , pp. 425 - 458
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1994

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References

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99. I am indebted to Robert O. Keohane for the notion of a strategic triangle of compliance.

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