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South-South relations: the economic and political content of interactions among developing countries
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 May 2009
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Traditionally, examinations of the international relations of the less developed countries (LDCs) have focused on influences that can be attributed generally as originating in the developed countries (DCs). In fact, relatively few scholarly analyses of inter-LDC relations have been undertaken. Since South-South relations have grown appreciably in recent years, however, it is important that a framework for studying these relations be developed, and this framework must include an awareness of the significance of the international economic system
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References
1 Among the exceptions are the following studies: Brecher, Michael, “The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia,” World Politics 15 (01 1963): 213–35Google Scholar; Binder, Leonard, “The Middle East as a Subordinate International System,” World Politics 10 (04 1958): 316–33Google Scholar; Agor, Weston H. and Suarez, Andres, “The Emerging Latin American Political Subsystem,” in Chalmers, Douglas A., ed., “Changing Latin America: New Interpretations of its Politics and Society,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 30 (08 1972): 153–66Google Scholar; Rosenbaum, H. Jon, “Argentine-Brazil Relations: A Critical Juncture,” The World Today 29 (12 1973): 537–42Google Scholar; and Ronfeldt, David F. and Einaudi, Luigi R., “Conflict and Cooperation among Latin American States,” in Einaudi, Luigi R., ed., Beyond Cuba: Latin America Takes Charge of Its Future (New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1974), pp. 185–200Google Scholar.
2 While it is recognized that the old colonial epoch has not been closed completely, the vast majority of LDCs have obtained at least formal political sovereignty and are distracted by other matters.
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6 While 17,000 Brazilian visitors entered Argentina in 1960, in the first three months of 1972 alone 20,000 Brazilians traveled to Argentina. See “Brasileiros invadem a Argentina,” Visäo, 1 08 1972, pp. 18–20Google Scholar. In great part, such tourism is a result of Brazilian policy to maintain an overvalued exchange rate.
7 “Sugar: Unlikely Partners,” Latin America, 20 July 1973, p. 1.
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9 A few countries, such as Kenya and Ghana, have issued protests.
10 See table 2 in this article.
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14 Figure 1 is an adaptation of similar diagrams found in Nye, Joseph S. and Keohane, Robert O., “Transnational Relations and World Politics,” International Organization 25 (Summer 1971): 333–34Google Scholar; and in Kaiser, , “Transnational Politics: Toward a Theory of Multinational Politics,” pp. 803–4Google Scholar.
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21 For a discussion of Indian exchange rate policy, see Banerji, Ranadev, Exports of Manufactures from India: A Prospective Appraisal of the Emerging Pattern (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, forthcoming in 1975)Google Scholar.
22 This is not to say that the developing countries that define their domestic currencies in terms of developed country currencies cannot redefine them. For example, Brazil, with its monetary unit tied to the US dollar, actually revalued by a nominal 3 percent in February 1973 after the dollar's devaluation.
23 See also the discussion in this volume by Carlos Diaz-Alejandro.
24 See Dell, Sidney, “An Appraisal of UNCTAD III,” World Development 1 (05 1973): 1–13CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
25 Ibid., p. 4.
26 Ibid., p. 6.
27 This growing support was readily apparent at the UNCTAD III meetings and at the IMF annual meeting in September 1973.
28 See Krasner, Stephen, “Oil is the Exception,” Foreign Policy, no. 14 (Spring 1974): 68–83CrossRefGoogle Scholar, for a complete listing of the key variables.
29 For a description of the OPEC experience, see Alnaswari, Abbas, “The Collective Bargaining Power of Oil Producing Countries,” Journal of World Trade Law 7 (03–04 1973): 188–207Google Scholar. Given the rapidly growing world demand for petroleum products and the relatively low income elasticities for many other primary products, it can be argued that the petroleum industry presents far more favorable conditions for operating a producers alliance than most other products. It might also be argued that cultural and political similarities between the Arab oil-producing nations have facilitated reaching agreements.
30 For discussion of the International Coffee Agreement, see Galloway, Thomas L., “The International Coffee Agreement,” Journal of World Trade Law 7 (05–06 1973): 354–74Google Scholar; and Kravis, Irving B., “International Commodity Agreements to Promote Aid and Efficiency: The Case of Coffee,” The Canadian Journal of Economics 1 (05 1968): 295–317Google Scholar. For an account of the attempts of developing countries to collaborate in the marketing of cocoa, see Wasserman, Ursula, “The International Cocoa Agreement,” Journal of World Trade Law 7 (01–02 1973): 129–34Google Scholar.
31 Hague, Irfan Ul, “The Producers' Alliances Among Developing Countries,” Journal of World Trade Law 7 (09–10 1973): 511–26Google Scholar.
32 See Bergsten, C. Fred, “The Threat from the Third World,” Foreign Policy, no. 11 (Summer 1973): 102–24Google Scholar, and “The Threat is Real,” Foreign Policy, no. 14 (Spring 1974): 84–90Google Scholar, for a view that such arrangements are likely to be formed for numerous commodities.
33 See, for example, Johnson, Harry G., Economic Policies Toward Less Developed Countries (New York: Praeger, 1967)Google Scholar.
34 See Dell, Sidney, “An Appriasal of UNCTAD III,” World Development 1 (05 1973): 7CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
35 See Murray, Tracy, “How Helpful is the Generalized System of Preferences to Developing Countries,” Economic Journal 83 (06 1973): 449–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
36 See Helleiner, Gerald K., “Manufactured Exports from Less Developed Countries and Multinational Firms,” Economic Journal 83 (03 1973): 21–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
37 Fajnzylber, Fernando, Sistema Industrial e Exportacāo de Manufaturados: Anàlise da Experiência Brasileria, IPEA/INPES Relatorio de Pesquisa No. 7 (Rio de Janeiro: Ministério do Planejamento e Coordenaçäo Geral, 1971), pp. 209, 238Google Scholar. In all fairness, it can be argued that the Brazilian example may not be representative in that many foreign firms are reported to have initiated or expanded their Brazilian operations with the hope of supplying the LAFTA market at least partially from Brazil.
38 For a discussion of UNCTAD III and the multinational firm, see Krause, Walter, “The Implications of UNCTAD III for Multinational Enterprise,” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 15 (02 1973): 46–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
39 See “A Common Andean Group System for the Treatment of Foreign Capital,” Comercio Exterior de México 17 (03 1971): 4–6Google Scholar.
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41 Recently, however, Egypt has terminated its limited foreign aid program and has become a major recipient of aid from other LDCs, i.e., other Arab countries. This aid has been used to subsidize Egypt's war efforts and to defray losses inflicted by the war.
42 de Onis, Juan, “$ 1-Billion for Poor Lands is Pledged by Shah of Iran,” New York Times, 22 02 1974, p. 1Google Scholar.
43 A good expression of such an attitude is found in a recent statement by Mr. Mostafa Mansouri, director general of petroleum at the Iranian Ministry of Finance. When asked whether Iran would take measures to offset the higher cost of oil for the LDCs, he replied: “Industrial countries have to take care of those who are developing … The fact that they [the LDCs] have no resources—that is not our fault.” New York Times, 19 December 1973, p. 15. Kuwait has announced that most of its financial aid will be distributed to the Arab countries and other Moslem nations, particularly those in Africa. Mr. Abdel-Rahman Salem al-Atiki, Kuwait's minister of oil and finance, has stated: “Nobody looked at the Arabs before. Why does everybody expect us now to be the godfather?” See de Onis, Juan, “Kuwait to Invest Riches in Arab Channels,” New York Times, 7 03 1974, p. 1Google Scholar.
44 Uphoff, Norman T. and Ilchman, Warren F., eds., The Political Economy of Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 1Google Scholar.
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