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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 May 2009
In comparing Soviet and American policies we find a paradox: The Soviets, though ideologically antagonistic to international organizations, are pressed politically to at least minimal participation by a concern for influence-building among neutralist countries; whereas the United States, which is ideologically attached to the principle of strengthening international organizations, deems t i necessary for political reasons to limit its commitments to the fulfillment of the UN's economic and social goals. Hence, from their competitive global struggle, their evaluations of trends in underdeveloped areas, and their domestic influences, derive a number of important similarities in Soviet and American behavior.
First, both are opposed to any significant expansion of large-scale operational responsibilities by international organizations. This is clear from their reluctance to channel more than a minimal fraction of their total foreign aid expenditure through international organizations.
Moscow's support of UN economic programs is a necessary act of political accommodation. Its contributions are minimal and inappropriate to its great-power status, its level of industry and resources. It has never accompanied its vocal support for an increase in the activity of a commission or agency, or even its advocacy of SUNFED, by a concrete or generous offer of financial assistance. The Soviet Union favors keeping programs for underdeveloped countries financially marginal because it is ideologically opposed to the expansion of UN activities. Moreover, foreign aid is an integral adjunct of Soviet diplomacy, and Moscow has no desire to see international organizations pre-empt or challenge the attraction of Soviet bilateral aid.
1 A comprehensive account of Soviet policies is presented in the author's forthcoming study, The Soviets in International Organizations, which will be published by the Princeton University Press in the spring of 1964.
2 General Assembly Official Records … Second Committee (6th session), pp. 115–116.Google Scholar
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4 Economic and Social Council Official Records (18th session), pp. 155–156.Google Scholar
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6 Economic and Social Council Official Records (20th session), p. 167.Google Scholar
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9 Economic and Social Council Official Records (24th session), p. 191.Google Scholar
10 The New York Times, 07 31, 1957.Google Scholar
11 The issue, however, is far from dormant. At its 15th session (1960)Google Scholar, the General Assembly decided “in principle that a United Nations Capital Development Fund shall be established” and set up a committee of 25 to consider preparatory measures, including draft legislation. One Yugoslav has stated that “the crux of the matter was whether or not the United Nations was to become the organ to rally Member States for financing the development of underdeveloped countries.” (Economic and Social Council Official Records ], p. 58.)Google Scholar
12 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on International Organization Affairs, United Nations Special Fund, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 02 18, 1963, p. 17.Google Scholar
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14 This approximation is based on 1961 Soviet contributions to the UN, EPTA, the Special Fund, the UN Children's Fund, the International Labor Organization, the International Telecommunication Union, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Universal Postal Union, the World Health Organization, and the World Meteorological Organization.
15 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on International Organization Affairs, Review of United States Participation in the United Nations, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 03 13, 1963, p. 10.Google Scholar
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45 See UN Documents E/3522 and E/3750; also ECOSOC Resolution 793(XXX), 08 3, 1960.Google Scholar
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54 Gardner, Richard N., “The United States and the United Nations: Reflections on the 17th General Assembly,” Department of State Bulletin, 09 17, 1962 (Vol. 47, No. 1212), p. 435.Google Scholar
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58 Thomas, Hovet Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 108–111.Google Scholar