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The UN and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: What has been Learned in 25 Years?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

David P. Forsythe
David P. Forsythe
Affiliation:
David P. Forsythe is a professor in the political science department of Georgia State University in Atlanta.
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Type
Review Essays
Information
International Organization , Volume 26 , Issue 4 , Autumn 1972 , pp. 705 - 717
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1972

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References

1 See Khouri, Fred J., The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press 1968).Google Scholar

2 This dichotomy of conceptualization is well discussed in the introduction to the 4th ed. of Inis Claude, L., Swords Into Plowshares (New York: Random House, 1971).Google Scholar The present review uses “the UN“ to represent the dual essence of the institution.

3 Falk's, Richard comment on the assembly is applied here in broader purview: “One of the main contributions in the area of war and peace of the General Assembly is to help establish a climate of opinion that is favorable to the growth of world order. This contribution cannot be assessed by any measurable impact or any evidence of specific intent.” The Status of Law in International Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970) p. 179.Google Scholar

4 For a recent example of writing that attributes all trouble in the area to the Soviets, see Hirschmann, Ira, Red Star Over Bethlehem: Russia Drives for the Middle East (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971).Google Scholar

5 This remark was made in a private interview in February 1972. The Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE) is the new official name replacing the United Arab Republic (UAR).

6 In addition to Laquer's writings see, as he suggests, specific issues of Mizan. See also Klieman, Aaron S., Soviet Russia and the Middle East (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970).Google Scholar

7 “U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's,” A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, 9 02 1972, Washington: United States Government Printing Office, p. 133 and passim.Google Scholar

8 Campbell, John C., “The Soviet Union and the Middle East, Parts I and II,“ The Russian Review, Vol. 29, Nos. 2 and 3 (Spring and Summer, 1970).Google Scholar

9 This point has been confirmed in private interviews and was made once publicly. William Rogers said in a new conference, “.… We are quite satisfied that Israel has the superiority in armaments at the present time, which will continue.” Department of State Bulletin (13 04 1970), p. 447.Google Scholar That the word balance is used in this way is not particularly surprising. See Claude, Inis L., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962);Google Scholar and Haas, Ernst, “The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?” World Politics, Vol. 5, No. 4 (07 1953), pp. 442–477.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

10 S/RES/242 was general enough to hide the United States-Soviet Union disagreement over the scope of desired Israeli territorial withdrawal. See Arthur, , Lall, , The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).Google Scholar

11 I have argued elsewhere that the Soviet Union is reluctant to undergo friction with Egypt because of a lack of suitable alternative partners in the area. “The Soviets and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” World Affairs, Vol. 134, No. 2 (Fall 1971), pp. 132–142.Google Scholar

12 The relationship between governmental stalemate and UNRWA's operation is treated in my “UNRWA, the Palestine Refugees, and World Politics, 1949–1969,” International Organization, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Winter, 1971), 38–42.Google Scholar

13 For background see Harkabi, Yehoshafat, “Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy,“ Adelphi Papers (1968), no. 53;Google ScholarHudson, M., “The Palestinian Arab Resistance Movement,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Summer 1969), pp. 291–320;Google ScholarSharabi, H., “Palestine Guerrillas,” Supplementary Papers, Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, (1970).Google Scholar The most recent and comprehensive study of the Palestinian movement known to this author is an unpublished thesis at Georgia State University: Engelberg, Sara, “The Case of the Arab Palestinian Revolution,” (1972), 249 pp.Google Scholar

14 This analysis is based on classified information from the Department of State; no specific attribution is permitted. The author would like to express his thanks to those who facilitated access to this information.

15 At the time of writing, the Lebanese government was trying to get the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to exercise supervision over all Palestinian guerrilla groups operating out of the refugee areas. The Lebanese government hoped to keep its forces just outside the refugee areas but to hold the PLO responsible for events, thus maintaining some indirect control.

16 See my book, United Nations Peacemaking (Balitimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1972).Google Scholar

17 Relevant here is King Hussein's policy statement supporting Palestinian autonomy in the west bank area under Jordanian aegis. See also Reisman, Michael, The Art of the Possible (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970);Google Scholar and Forsythe, David P. and Taulbee, J. L., “The Palestinians and the Arab States,” in Bell, and Freeman, (eds.), Ethnicity and Nation Building (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1972).Google Scholar Cf. Peretz, Don, “Arab Palestine: Phoenix or Phantom,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Winter 1970), pp. 31–46.Google Scholar

18 While there is growing literature on political socialization, little of it relates to the UN. See Coplin, William, The Functions of International Law (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966),Google Scholar chap. 5;1 Alger, Chadwick F., “Personal Contact in Intergovernmental Organization,” in Kelman, Herbert (ed.), International Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 523–547;Google ScholarFalk, Richard A. and Hanrieder, Wolfram F. (eds.), International Law and Organization (New York: Lippincott, 1968), p. 2;Google ScholarHoffman, Stanley, “Introduction,” in Scheinmann, and Wilkinson, (eds.), International Law and Political Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968).Google Scholar

19 On the general problem of analyzing Arab public statements, see Moore, Clement Henry, “On Theory and Practice Among Arabs,” World Politics, Vol. 24, No. 1 (10 1971), pp. 106–126.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The dual level of Arab diplomacy at the UN is noted in Trygvie Lie, In the Cause of Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1954);Google ScholarAzcarate, Pablo de, Mission in Palestine (Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1966);Google Scholar and Forsythe, , United Nations Peacemaking, 1972.Google Scholar

20 Space does not permit extended discussion of UN peacekeeping in general or the withdrawal of UNEF in particular. Many relevant documents are to be found in Higgins, Rosalyn (ed.), United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946–1947 Vols. 1 and 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969 and 1970).Google Scholar

21 See in particular Falk, , The Status of Law, 1970Google Scholar, and Higgins, Rosalyn, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the UN (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).Google Scholar See also Asamoah, O., The Legal Significance the Declarations of the General Assembly of the United Nations (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1967);Google ScholarLande, G., “The Effects of Resolutions of the UN General Assembly,” World Politics, Vol. 19, No. 4 (10 1966), pp. 83–105;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Onuf, N., “Professor Falk on the Quasilegislative Competence of the General Assembly,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 64, No. 2 (04 1970), pp. 349–355.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

22 See Lall, Arthur, Modern International Negotiation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966),Google Scholar and Forsythe, , United Nations Peacemaking, 1972.Google Scholar

23 See further McDougal, Myres S., “Law and Power,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 46, No. 1 (01 1952), pp. 102–114.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

24 UN Document A/4121, 1959.

25 Johnson's resignation statement, implying the need to reinterpret old resolutions, is found in UN Press Release PAL/925, 1 February 1963. The content of his report is most candidly presented in Johnson's, article, “Arab v. Israeli: A Persistent Problem,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter 1964), pp. 2–13.Google Scholar

26 . See further White, Irvin L., “A Framework for Analyzing International Law-in-Action: A Preliminary Proposal,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 1 (03 1969), pp. 46–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

27 . This leaves unresolved the question of whether the specific change should be toward some form of refugee choice within the present regional state system, or toward the creation of a Palestinian state on the west bank, or a federated state of Palestine part Jewish and part Arab.

28 For a concise review see UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. 9, No. 1 (01 1972), pp. 91–115.Google Scholar

29 . Thus the ARE statement breaking diplomatic relations with Jordan in the Spring of 1972 because of Hussein's articulated policy of Palestinian autonomy in the west bank area reinforced Israeli fears that the ARE's no-compromise stand harbored an Egyptian ultimate intention to use refugee repatriation as an anti-Israeli weapon. For an exhaustive study of Arab diplomatic verbiage and of Israeli skepticism toward vague or apparently moderate statements, see Har-kabi, Yehoshafat, Arab Attitudes toward Israel (New York: Hart, 1972).Google Scholar

30 Safran, Nadav, From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948–1967, New York: Pegasus, 1969, p. 420.Google Scholar

31 See Keohane, Robert O., “The Big Influence of Small Allies,“ Foreign Policy (Spring 1971), pp. 177–178 especially.Google Scholar Relevant also is the mood of the Senate on Middle Eastern questions, which, despite the impact of the Viet Nam war, continues to urge extensive and intensive United States involvement in the Middle East in support of Israel. See New York Times, 31 07 1970, p. 3, for example.Google Scholar

32 “United States Foreign Policy 1971,” A report of the Secretary of State Department of State Publication 8634, (Washington: United State Government Printing Office, 03 1972), p. 94.Google Scholar

33 See further my “Transfer of Arms to Combatants and the Control of Force: The Arab-Israeli Case,” Georgia Journal of Comparative and International Law, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Summer 1971).Google Scholar

34 A similar argument is presented in Hunter, Robert E., “In the Middle in the Middle East,” Foreign Policy (Winter 1971-1972), pp. 137–150.Google Scholar For a theoretical discussion of system change centering on step-level functions see Kaplan, Morton A., System and Process in International Politics (New York: Wiley, 1957).Google Scholar

35 This is clearly presented in Kimche, Jon, The Second Arab Awakening (London: Thames and Hudson, 1970), pp. 234–237 especially.Google Scholar

36 The ARE position relates to the large subject of intra-Arab politics. See in particular Kerr, Malcolm, The Arab Cold War, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970),Google Scholar who notes that Egypt under Nasser after 1967 finally moved to oppose the Palestinians after Egypt lost control of the movement.